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Abstract
This is a qualitative inquiry into the possible relationships between language and
thought for teachers and learners. This research has as its central focus some
questions about the dynamic nature of language. These were 'what is the role of
language in the formation of conceptual structures', 'what light might an inquiry
into this subject throw on the processes of teaching and learning' and 'what kind
of method could best be used to illuminate such questions?'
The thesis uses Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) as a method for inquiring
into people's deeply subjective experience, especially for modelling those
experiences.
The methodology was both action research and phenomenology, inquiring into
people's subjective experiences. There were two phases to this project; the first
consisted of my own interviews of six ex-patriates who had attended a course 1
had taught in a Middle Eastern country in 2000. Both phases paid attention to
what in NLP terms, are called internal representations. I explored their responses
to a number of language structures in interviews, which aimed to elicit some deep
introspections from the learners. The second phase was the analysis of transcripts
of six more interviews carried out by two collaborators, where I track changes in
people's constructs of learning, and themselves as learners.
The interview data is used to develop working hypotheses about the relationships
between language and thought. These involve proposing that language transmits
messages about how information is to be decoded, as well as content. A key
finding appears to be a number of basic epistemological processes that are
mediated through language, and which playa role in the construction of
knowledge. The study offers models that describe the interactions of language
and mental constructs, and lists some basic epistemological processes.
Practical implications of the study concern teachers' awareness of the power of
language, and the potential need for the training of teachers to address the
interplay between language, thought and learning.
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1Chapter 1. Setting out on the Journey of Discovery.
Daughter. What are the really big differences between people and
animals?
Father. Well- intellect, language, tools, things like that.
D. And it Is easy for people to be intellectually objective in language
and about tools?
F. That's right.
D. But that must mean that in people there is a whole set of ideas or
whatnot which are all tied together. A sort of second creature within
the whole person, and that second creature must have a quite
different way of thinking about everything. An objective way.
F. Yes, the royal road to consciousness and objectivity is through
language and tools.
D. But what happens when this creature looks at all those parts of the
person about which it is difficult for people to be objective? Does it
just look? Or does it meddle?
F. It meddles.
D. And what happens?
F. That's a very terrible question.
(Conversation between Gregory Bateson and his daughter Catherine-
Mary Bateson, in Bateson 1972:48-49.1;
1.1Introduction.
The core Intention of this research project is to explore the role of
language in human information processing, mainly within the context
of teaching and learning. This is a broad inquiry, with relevance to
teaching and learning in both formal and informal settings. Although It
concerns itself with some philosophical and especially epistemological
aspects of learning and making sense, the aim Is to contribute to
educational thinking. The main partlcipants that were used for the
lQuoted from 'Metalogue:What Is an Instinct', originally publishedin
Sebock,T.A., ed (1969) Approaches to Animal Communication.
2gathering of information were adult learners, though there is also
some use of observations made in a secondary school. It is thus
rooted in an educational context.
There has long been a fascination about the internal dynamics of
human information processing. These processes include such activities
as thinking, learning, dreaming, remembering, reflecting, and not
least, knowing. A central purpose here is to explore the approach of
Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) to understanding people's
subjective processes.
The emergence of NLPwas strongly influenced by Gregory Bateson's
philosophical reflections (Bateson 1960, 1972, Bateson and Bateson
1988, Donaldson 1991). One of Bateson's main concerns was the
exploration of the possibilities a cybernetic approach opened up for
research into human behaviour and thought. This inquiry approaches
the phenomena of teaching and learning from a cybernetic and
systemic perspective, as well as using NLP.As Bateson's cybernetics
included concerns and explorations of epistemology, this also forms a
thread running through this work. Thus, whilst it has inter-disciplinary
aspects, it is neither linguistics nor psychology, but seeks to delineate
a different approach to what happens when people engage In
learning. What I aim to explore specifically are the effects of language
and communication on the inner world of the conceiver's constructs.
According to Mercer et al (1999) there has been little significant
research into the relationship between language and thinking in the
learning process. This thesis seeks to enhance understanding of the
inter-relationships between language and thinking in the learning
process, through the perspective of NLP, and Bateson's ideas. This
inquiry could be saId to follow in the tradition that holds
communication to be central to the (sometimes Inseparable) activities
of teaching and learning. I approach the subject from a particular
theoretical and epistemological standpoint.
3The central questions that I address are:
• How does language influence the formation of people's
conceptual structures?
• What perspective does NLPoffer on inquiring into the processes
of teaching and learning?
The thesis offers a model of the interactions between language and
thought with special reference to learning processes. The model was
derived from an empirical approach, within a phenomenological
context, as part of an action research programme. Its status is that of
a working hypothesis for the generation of future explorations.
1.2. An overview of forthcoming chapters
This first chapter gives a brief introduction to the theoretical
background relevant to the whole work. Chapter 2 reviews some
philosophical and methodological approaches that might serve as
useful tools to further this inquiry, and describes the first phase of
information gathering. The thesis explores In detail the approach of
Neuro-linguistlc Programming (Bandler and Grinder 1975, 1975A,
1979, 1982, Bandler 1985, Bandler and McDonald 1988, Grinder and
Bandler 1976, Grinder Delozier and Sandler 1977) towards the main
issues. I review this topic In relation to other approaches to language
and cognition in Chapters 3,4 and 5.
Iwas fortunate in having been invited to the capital of a Middle
Eastern country in 2000 to give a course in NLPto ten people working
in one of its large military hospitals. Most of my data comes from this
period.
Two distinct data gathering phases emerged from this time. The first
one happened during my two months' stay I where I carried out a
series of preliminary interviews of people who had participated in an
NLPcourse I had given. I believed these interviews to be a pilot study
4at the time. However, these yielded such a wealth of information
when transcribed, that they became one of the two major sources for
my analysis and subsequent theory generation of this lnqulrv. The
analyses of these, and my reflections on them, form the main part of
chapters 6,7,8 and 9.
The second phase was the result of the activities of two collaborators,
who carried out some post-course, retrospective interviews of some
students on the course, whose tape recordings I transcribed after my
return to the UK; I used the information from these to explore new
ways of understanding what may be happening when people learn. I
describe and explain these in Chapter 10.
In Chapter 11, I draw on Information gathered from both these
phases, as well as a transcript of a previous observation of a
mathematics class' to propose a new model of learning in which
language structures may have distinctive epistemological functions. I
propose that these may catalyse various processes leading to the
construction of learners' models.
In Chapter 12, I review some current approaches to the training of
teachers in communication skills. I put forward some brief
suggestions for the inclusion of a new approach to the training of
teachers in communication so as to enhance their teaching. Chapter
13 is a review of the work as a whole, and takes a backward glance
over what this inquiry mayor may not have achieved.
1.3. Serendipity, and the personal emergence of the question
for the researcher.
Heuristic inquiry Is a process that begins with a question of a problem
which the researcher seeks to illuminate or answer. The question Is one
that has been a personal challenge and puzzlement In the search to
2 This wasa part of the coursework (Assignment2) for the MPhll/PhD/EdD
ResearchMethodsProgrammeat the University of Surrey, 1999.
5understand one's self and the world in which one lives. The heuristic
process is autobiographical, yet with virtually every question that
matters there is also a social - and perhaps universal - sIgnificance.
(Moustakas 1994: 11)
Reason and Marshall (1987) urged that research be perceived as
necessarily including a personal process. James (1999) has explored the
influence of researchers' autobiographies on the process and outcomes
of their research. Here I recount some of the professional and personal
events that led to my own involvement in this inquiry. It Initially arose
as the result of my own reflections (and puzzlement) about many
challenging experiences I have had in nearly forty years of teaching and
learning. I first began by teaching Botany in the early 1960s, at what
was then Chelsea College of Technology, (University of London). Then
the approach to teaching was didactic, and effectiveness was judged on
the amount of 'useful' information that a lecturer transmitted to
students. 'Useful' in this context meant 'necessary to regurgitate to pass
unseen exams'. Then, in the seventies I lectured in Zoology at a College
of Technology, which was in the throes of becoming a Polytechnic.
Originally, here too, the teaching was essentially the transmission of
Information, made all the more challenging by the fact that the
examination questions! were set 'Internally' by the University of London,
and completely unknown to us teachers on the 'External London', The
only way to teach, at the time, seemed to be to cram as much
information into the poor students just In case a question came up on
some abstruse topic that might only be hinted at in the University's
published syllabuses. Often it seemed like a game of chance."
It was fortunate that this particular college was deSignated a
Polytechnic in 1972, and began, (not without a struggle) the transition
to the development of designing, teaching and awarding Its own
degrees under the aegis of the CNAA (Council for National Academic
3 The degree was the now long defunct BSc (External london).
4 If the lecturer was III, and missed a topic, which then came up on the exam
paper, this was merely considered to be bad luck.
6Awards). The CNAA insisted (In Clause 5 of their Educational
Principles) that scientific subjects should be taught in the context of
their social, political and economic backgrounds, which presented
many challenges to us teachers who were not even aware of the
limitations of logical positivism, let alone the necessity of persuading
science undergraduates of this. I was one of a team chosen to design
a completely new approach to the teaching of scientific subjects. It
became obvious however, that this section of the syllabus needed a
different approach from that of classical science teaching, and I found
myself becoming fascinated by the History and Philosophy of Science,
and how to teach it.
We were forced to become Innovators, and present, for validation, a
course that was to be taken by all the science undergraduates. This
included the History and Philosophy of Science in the first year,
Science in the Present Social Context in the second year, and a third
year group project, where students worked as a team on a jointly
designed project about a scientific issue of current relevance."
At about the same time, the Polytechnic encouraged our (not always
willingly given) participation in its newly formed and innovative School
for Independent Study, (SIS) where students without the 'usual'
qualifications could sign up to do a degree in a subject of their choice,
however outlandish, provided they could persuade the Board of
Studies to accept their Study Plan and Learning Contract, and find a
member of the teaching staff to supervise them," (O'Reilly 1989,
1991, Stephenson 1988, Stephenson and Laycock 1993). This
resulted in the somewhat strange situation where a Biologist such as
myself was suddenly asked to supervise the studies of students whose
interests were not always covered by my formal academic
5 Some examples of these were; the ecology of motorway verges (with the
advent of the neighbouring MU), the misuse of antibiotics, the ramifications
of Darwin's theory, the development of nuclear weapons, the ethics of the
pharmaceutical industry, the use and mid-use of antibiotics, and many
others.
6 Many colleagues refused to have anything to do with such an unorthodox
approach.
7qualifications. They were often also difficult to place within accepted
academic disciplines. The existence and success of the School for
Independent Study (SIS) certainly exposed the tensions between
academic orthodoxy and a more post - modernist, heterogeneous and
liberating approach to learning. It was closed in the early 1990s as
the result of changes in educational policy.
The most critical difference that I, as a tutor working with students
from SIS, experienced, was that teaching people whose field of
interests were somewhat outside my own immediate areas of
expertise demanded that I pay more attention to the processes they
used to learn and investigate their field, rather than its academic
content. I had to develop a very different approach to tutoring. Many
of my students got First Class Honours, fully validated by the CNAA's
various External Examiners. What struck me as curious was that there
seemed to be little Interest in the educational literature in the idea
that teaching involved attention to both process and content.
Recognising this distinction was a fundamental part of training in
Neuro-linguistic Programming. Traditionally, NLPis taught through a
kind of apprenticeship, learning and finding out through experience
and assisting other trainers. This gave me many opportunities to
observe very 'good' communicators at work. I became intrigued by
the distinctions between process and content, and by the ways In
which learning processes could be activated by what, and how
discussions were 'Ianguaged'.
At this point, in the late eighties, serendipity played a vital role in my
own personal and professional development. A friend of mine, a Swiss
psychiatrist who works for the International Committee for the Red
Cross, was engaged In visiting prisoners In countries where torture
was an acceptable part of the judicial process. This faced her with the
task of understanding the suffering of political prisoners who had been
tortured and were consequently suffering from the effects of their
Incarceration and PTSD(Post Traumatic Stress Disorder). She told me
that she found NLPto be very useful for 'modelling out' PTSD. She
8claimed that thus she gained a different understanding of the inner
dynamics of the victim's thought processes. This, she believed, gave
her new understandings of the inner aspects of this distressing
condition. She claimed she was able to plan rapid and effective
interventions in the short time the ICRC is allowed for visiting
individual prisoners. She also asked me to translate some of her
writings from German into English, (whilst on a summer holiday in the
mountains of Switzerland!) and at that point I became curious to
know more. It was my first introduction to the idea that we use our
senses internally to recreate events in our lives. She has continued to
work in this field, and has trained other medical staff, and published
extensively. (Perren-Klingler G. 1988, 1990, 1996, 1998, 1998A).
I did my first 'Practitioner' course In NLPin 1988, and was
unimpressed by Its claims, Its culture, and apparent lack of rigour.
However, serendipity was not going to leave me alone, and on my
return to the Polytechnic at the start of the 1988 Academic Year, the
School for Independent Studies circulated all the staff, asking whether
any of us knew anything about NLP, as they thought it might be a
subject that might recruit more students to SIS. I responded, and to
my horror found myself a named supervisor to students wanting to
work on NLP. It became necessary for me to acquire many more skills
and qualifications in it, which I did. Then, in the late eighties I took
voluntary redundancy? from full time teaching, and started a new
career as a trainer in Neuro-Lingulstic Programming, whilst teaching
part time in two separate departments at what had now become one
of the 'new' universities. These were the Departments of Health
Studies, and Educational Studies. I have written about some of my
experiences of applying NLPto teaching and learning elsewhere,
(Mathison 1994, 1999).
So the early nineties saw me as Course Tutor to a part time degree
called the BA in Nurse Education. The NLPtraining had Introduced me
7 This was In responseto a 'trawl' of staff agedover 50 years.
9to the emergent paradigm of Cybernetics, the epistemology of
Gregory Bateson and the philosophy of Bertrand Russell and Alfred
Korzybsky, as well a wealth of information about the influence of
language, much of it based on the work of the psychiatrist Milton
Erickson, as well as Richard Bandler and John Grinder's approach to
language and communication. (I review these, and other approaches
to language in Chapters 4 and 5).
My then Head of Department asked me to 'do the Education bit for the
nurses' so I took the opportunity of making two questions the central
themes of my teaching. These were 'what are the processes that are
involved in learning?' and 'how do we elicit these by how we behave
and communicate with our students?' At the same time I examined
my own processes, both conscious and unconscious, to learning new
things. My teaching by this time was greatly influenced by NLP,as
well as the ideas of Gregory Bateson. The success of this course led to
me being Invited to a capital of a country in the Middle East, initially
to teach the distance learning students working at an Armed Forces
Hospital, and studying for the BA (Nurse Education). I was then
invited to make several trips as a visiting lecturer to teach NLP
Practitioner Courses. One of these yielded the data on which this
inquiry is based.
The BA (Nurse Education) recruited few students. By chance, they
were an extraordinary group of people prepared to explore and push
at the boundaries of their perceptions about the teaching and learning
processes, and the crucial role played by communication in their own
teaching. Two of them went on to register to do PhOsin this area. So
I asked myself the question, 'why not me too?' thinking that I would
be gently turned away by any Department of Education that I
approached, either because the topic I was interested In was too
eccentric, or because people in their seventh decade may be thought
of as too old to do PhDs. These fears, however, were unfounded. If I
have stretched the envelope of possible hypothetical explanations of
10
learning too far, the responsibility is nevertheless mine. I offer the
results of this research purely in the spirit of inquiry.
Thus, serendipitously, did this inquiry come about.
1.4. Language In teaching and learning: some Introductory
reflections on theory.
Nothing is more pradical in teaching than knowing how people learn.
Learning is not a theoretical issue. Weneed to understand the
learning process not only because, as teachers all, we need to know
ourselves, but also because we need to express our curiosity in how
other people learn. (Cullingford 1990:231).
This section is an introduction to some of the literature on the central
topic, serving to set the scene for the rest of the work. It is not the
definitive literature review, but rather an introduction to my own
theoretical approach.
The nature of learning is one of the main foci for this Inquiry.
MacBeath (2002) claims that about 85 percent of what we know about
learning has been discovered in the last 10 - 15 years. Rojas-
Drummond and Mercer (2003)8 have pointed out that there are a
variety of different approaches to inquiring into language and
education, largely Inspired by the work of Vygotsky, (1978).
Vygotsky's approach, which recognises the critical significance of
language in the processes of learning and development, is summed
up in his statement that "learning awakens a variety of internal
developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child
is Interacting with people In his environment and In cooperation with
his peers, (Vygotsky 1978, cited in Pollard 2002:14).
8 To be publishedin a forthcoming issueof The International Journal of
EducaHonalResearch
11
There has, however, been little systematic exploration of the effects
of language on the subjectively experienced processes involved in
learning. This inquiry seeks to complement existing understandings of
the role of learning by exploring the relationship between specIfic
language structures on a learner's construction of knowledge, drawing
on Neuro-linguistic Programming
The literature on the role of language in learning comes from a variety
of different backgrounds. Vygotsky's idea (1939) that it was important
to study how the language of teachers influenced the learning process
was being explored by some, Including Barnes In the 1970s. Over
thirty years ago Barnes (1972), stressed that It was Important to
generate useful discussions between learners as a part of their
teaching and learning process. He suggested that "language Is a
major means of learning, and ( ...) pupils' uses of language for learning
are strongly influenced by the teacher's language,n (Barnes, D. 1972,
cited in Open University 1972). He suggested that one fruitful line of
inquiry could be the study of teachers' linguistic styles, and use of
linguistic forms to influence the ways In which people learn. One of
the main differences that they identify is whether teachers create a
passive receiving of knowledge by learners, or Its active exploration.
Cazden (1988) has used an approach based on Discourse Analysis to
describe the language patterns that are typical of classroom
interactIons, and of which teachers and learners may not immediately
be aware." She urges the introduction of a more catalytic learning
environment, where learning Is not simply dependent on producing
the right answers, and being corrected for wrong ones. She also cites
research that implies that the immediate correction of children's
answers by teachers depressed both their abilities to self-correct, and
to score highly on accuracy tests. One of her main interests was the
9 Cazdenreviewssomeof the most commonpatternsof discoursein the
classroomas teacher 'Inquiring', learner 'responding',teacher'evaluating'
and feedingbackwhether the responseis acceptableor not. This pattern of
classroomdiscourseis shortened to the acronymIRE(Initiate, respond,
evaluate).
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possible role of exploratory talk among children as a way of learning.
Influenced by Barnes (1976), she describes exploratory talk as "the
process of learning without the answers fully Intact," (Cazden 1988).
There has been increasing interest in the effects of teaching children
'exploratory talk'. Mercer, Wegerich and Dawes (1999) for instance,
found that encouraging learners to use exploratory talk about specific
topics significantly increased their understanding. Mercer (1995)
suggests that sharing, and co-operatively guiding the shared
development of knowledge should be at the heart of the learning
process. He is critical of the approach to teaching that discourages
children from seeking Information for themselves, and sharing their
reflective observations. He believes that there are some essential
requirements for what he calls 'the guided construction of knowledge',
the most important of which is that the 'essence of human knowledge
and understanding is that it is shared,' (Mercer 1995:66). He
conceives of language as a purposeful persuasive process, proposing
that Vygotsky "draws our attention to the construction of knowledge
as a joint achievement," (Mercer 1995:73). In Mercer's view, the
teacher's role is that of a 'discourse guide'. Such collaborative
learning involving guided discussions among learners is fast becoming
an accepted and recommended classroom activity. Tao (2003), for
instance, reports that using stories and peer collaboration were
effective means of generating learning on the nature of science for
many of the students involved In his study.
Mercer's views Imply that a closer study of the influence of language
on thought becomes critical to the development of our understanding
of teaching and learning. Mercer also states his belief that the process
of communication with language contributes to children's thinking,
(Mercer 2000). He observes that few in his field share his interest in
exploring the nature of talk. This, he believes, is not confined to
educationalists, but also that "people with a practical interest In the
effectiveness of communication in business, counselling, law, and
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other important areas of every day activity have shown surprisingly
little interest in the careful analysis of talk" (Mercer 2000: 175).
The present study takes the line that we need to know more about
the influence of language, which is a complex task. Anderberg (2002)
suggests that "little is known about the character of the relationship
between word meaning and understanding, how it develops or what
role it plays." (Anderberg 2000:89). However, here he is addressing
the topic of students' language, rather than that of teachers.
Despite the relative paucity of research into the role of language in
learning, there are further publications of Interest. Crespo (2002) for
instance, has found from her classroom observations that traditional
modes of discourse between teacher and pupils are very persistent,
and likely to remain unchanged unless examined more purposefully.
She suggests that praising tends to cut off discussion, and explored
alternative strategies for teachers, such as probing students' thinking,
rather than automatically correcting It. She raises an important
question: what sort of course experiences for those training In
teaching could better support, extend and balance teachers
understanding of teachers' talk? More recently, Harrop and Swinsch
(2003) have analysed teachers' uses of different types of questions,
claiming that there has been no essential change In their format in
half a century, and that approval and disapproval are still very much a
part of teachers' feedback strategies.
Entwistle and Smith (2002), taking a constructivist view, have
proposed a model to describe classroom learning, observing that
constructivist theories present learning In terms of the development of
individual understanding, but that this is "too diffuse a set of Ideas to
provide an Integrative framework" (Entwistle and Smith 2002:324).
They found that explanation, enthusiasm and empathy were the
qualities of communication which are most likely to evoke what they
term a 'deep' approach to learning in pupils. Carden (2001) has
Investigated the effects of introducing group discussion into a learning
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situation. He found that many students were inhibited from using
exploratory talk, as this was not what they were used to. He also
observed that teachers needed certain skills if small group work in
their classrooms was to operate successfully.
Corden's (2001, 2001A) approach typifies much of the research Into
the area of teacher-learner interactions. For instance, he presents a
classification of the different types of utterances heard in classrooms,
drawn from forty videotaped discussions. He then analysed how often
these occurred under different teacher led contexts, such as the
differences between when students perceived teachers to be in a non-
examiner role, or when teachers were seen as expert examiner. He
also identifies certain Introductory phrases (such as I was wondering,
and what if?) as linguistic markers that he claims encourage
collaborative learning.
Many of these works focus mainly on the language of learners, and on
how to facilitate the development of pedagogically useful talk among
them. Phillips (1985) makes the point that, with the realisation of the
Importance of classroom discussions, which has Its historical roots in
the 1970s, teachers need to understand more about how to generate
such activities.
None of this research, however, attempts to address how the learning
is subjectively experienced. The works that Ihave cited have not
attempted to answer questions such as 'how specifically does
language Influence the construction of knowledge?', and 'what are the
subjectIvely experienced effects of communication?'. So, the gap this
thesis attempts to address is the need for a more precise inquIry into
the actual, subjectively experienced, effects of language on cognition,
and thus on learning. We can describe and classify communication
patterns to our hearts' content, but without an understanding of what
language actually does to the construction of knowledge of an
individual person, we fail to address what may turn out to be one of
the most vital dlrnenslons of teaching and learning.
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To approach such a problem, I have drawn on a number of sources.
This includes many of the models used in linguistics, cognitive
psychology, systems' and cybernetic theory," and other areas where
understanding human interaction is paramount.
1.5. Introducing Neuro-linguistic Programming, (NLP).
NLPoffers a model of the relationships between language and
thought, and was one of my starting points. Although I cover many of
the origins and Ideas of NLPin more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, a
brief historical introduction may be appropriate to set the scene.
Neuro-Iinguistic Programming (NLP), was developed in the USA in the
1970's and has achieved widespread popularity as a method for
communication and personal development, and is a recognised mode
of psychotherapy In the UK. To date, however, the academic
community has shown little interest in it. The exceptions are Craft
(2001) who is critical of some aspects, and Tosey and Mathison
(forthcoming publication) who respond to Craft, and suggest that
when understood more fully, it could be a useful approach to
qualitative Inquiry into learning.
NLPis claimed to be an innovative form of modelling (Dilts 1994,
1998) that alleges it offers a potential for systematic and detailed
inquiry Into people's subjective experience. NLPmay turn out to be
complementary to other approaches such as phenomenology and
cognitive and conceptual mapping, because it seems that it enables
the researcher to seek more precise information about people's
subjective experiences. This Inquiry is as much about using NLPas it
is about evaluating its potential as a more refined research tool for
such an Inquiry.
10 I explore these further In Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
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NLPwas developed at the University of California at Santa Cruz'! in the
1970's (Jacobson 1994; Mclendon 1989). Its founders and principal
authors were Richard Sandler, a mathematician and information
SCientist, and John Grinder, a linguist. Their partners, Leslie Cameron-
Sandler and Judith Delozier, also contributed significantly, as did other
early developers such as Robert Dilts and David Gordon (McLendon
1989).
The title, "Neuro-linguistic Programming" was coined by Bandler and
Grinder (McLendon 1989), who were partly inspired by Korzybski's
(1958) extensive theoretical explorations of the relationships between
language and ways In which he believed that the nervous system
patterned information. This he referred to as Neuro-linguistics. Bandler
and Grinder added programming so that their model refers to a
purported systematic link between a person's internal experience
(neuro), their language (linguistic) and their patterns of behaviour
(programming). It is difficult to place it within anyone academic
discipline; it straddles linguistics, transformational grammar,
psychotherapy, cybernetics and cognitive psychology, and Its
epistemological approach is inspired by the Ideas of the polymath
Gregory Bateson and the logic of the mathematician and philosopher
Bertrand Russell. Despite the name NlP, and Its connotations, It has no
direct connection to neuro-science, or to computer programming
(though these were fields of interest to its developers)12.
The first NLP publication was Bandler and Grinder's (1975) •Structure
of Magic: a Book about Language and Therapy', which was an attempt
to identify pattems of communication that distinguished what they
identified as extremely effective communicators. These patterns are
explained in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5. They were also interested
in how they differed from the strategies of some less successful
11 http://sidjacobson.com/institute/history.htmlaccessed29.11.2002
12It Is entirely separate from Natural Language Processing (for example,
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/ ...pjh/semlaS/ptl/ptlhistory.html). which also
uses the acronym NLP
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communicators. They based their studies, among others, on Virginia
Satir, a leading family therapist, Fritz Perls, the founder of Gestalt
therapy, and Milton Erickson, a hypnotherapist. Each of these had skills
which Sandler and Grinder were able to identify, and model.
Central to the NLPapproach is that it proposes a typology of language
patterns which are believed to reflect basic cognitive processes. To put
it differently, it proposes a model of language in which certain linguistic
structures activate and reflect some fundamental epistemological
processes essential to the construction of meaning. Idescribe these
aspects In more detail in chapters 4 and 5.
The research project used this NLP model as a tool for data gathering.
NLP refers to this type of approach as modelling, which is, eliciting the
subjective processes that people use when approaching and carrying
out specific tasks. There is a sense In which Iam using modelling to
understand some of the processes specific to learning, which are
mediated through language.
NLP remains controversial in academic circles. One of the greatest
obstacles to introducing NLP into an academic context appears to result
from the culture and ethos of NLP, which has resulted in Its own
particular, somewhat anarchic genre. Most of the books written by the
originators come with gaudy, psychedelically illustrated covers, and
have curious titles, such as The Structure of Magic (1975), Frogs into
Princes (Sandler and Grinder 1979), and USing your Brain for a Change
(Sandler 1985). These are hardly likely to attract the attention of
mainstream cognitive psychologists or cognitive linguists.
The almost total ignoral of NLP by the academic community may be an
example of how particular genres of discourse act both for the
maintenance of cohesion In a group or culture, and at the same time
exclude others. As Mercer (2000) points out, "Different groups of
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researchers have their own discourses and research agendas, with not
much dialogue taking place between them." (Mercer 2000:167).13
One of the aims of this inquiry is to attempt to bring together
information from some of these disparate disciplines, using NLP as a
central thread. Mercer suggests that "we need a fresh perspective on
language and thought, one that is not commonly employed in
psychology, linguistics or other apparently relevant field of research."
(Mercer 2000:167). He urges that we need what he calls an
'intermental' (my italics) perspective, which perceives language and
communication as a an activity for the development of knowledge as a
shared process. Most NLP practitioners would recognise this view. What
this inquiry aims to contribute is an unravelling of the complex
interactions between language and thinking at a more precise level.
This will itself also need evaluation for both its usefulness and its
Iimitations.
When using any model, it is important to be aware that a model is only
a conceptual framework, which may bring some aspects of a
phenomenon to the attention of the observer, whilst hiding others. My
approach to NLP is purely Instrumentalist; its usefulness can only be
gauged by the amount of information its use yields. All models have
their limitations, and I review some of the limitations of NLP in Chapter
13.
There remains a fundamental difficulty for a researcher using such an
approach; much of NLP is not learned from published work, but by what
can only be called a system of apprenticeship, which includes not only
attending courses, but also 'doing time' as an assistant to more
experienced trainers, as well as running one's own courses. On the face
of it, this makes NLPa different genre to most academic activities, and
13 Time and again, In my reading for this venture, I have been struck at how
many different groups there appear to be studying the powers of language to
influence and shape the thought of others, yet who do not appear to know of
each other, if their bibliographies is any indication of this.
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adds a further challenge to the putative researcher in this field. It
includes the challenge of translating between one genre and another, so
as to create bridges between different outlooks.
1.6. Conclusion.
This chapter has Introduced this inquiry from the personal history of the
researcher. It has stated the main research question illuminating the
inquiry. It has also introduced the reader to Neuro-linguistic
Programming as a novel approach that has yet to find its place in
mainstream academic research. This was to set the scene for the ways
in which the data gathering phases of this inquiry developed, and how
the resulting information was then analysed.
In the next chapter I describe some of the methodological issues that
arose from starting and following through such an inquiry, and describe
the emergence of the two data gathering phases. The central role that
NLP played is explained in greater detail.
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Chapter 2. The Nature of this Inquiry: some methodological
issues addressed.
The closing years of the 2fih Century could find us on the threshold of
important new understandings, but whether to cross it will depend on
our success in integrating the literary scholar's appreciation of what
language does, the ethnologist's respect for what actually happens,
the philosopher's perspective on the larger picture, the psychologist's
concern for experimental manipulations, the computer scientist and
neuroscientist's fascination with how things work, and the artist's
capacity to produce dreams. (Chafe 1994:302 - 303.)
Tomost scientists, subjectivity is the Great Satan. It is the mind-virus
which has turned the humanities into an intellectual free for a/l, where
the idea of "progress is dismissed as "bourqeois", and belief in "tects"
naive. (Matthews 1998:17).
2.1 Reflections on research methods.
Although the main framework for this Inquiry was action research,
(which I consider later In this chapter) when I reflected on the ways in
which the questions could be approached, phenomenology seemed to
offer the most appropriate approach for such an inquiry. Thinking,
learning and responding to communication are phenomena, which
belong to the realm of people's subjective experiences. The data for
this research came from interviews and questionnaires designed to
elicit information about respondents' intensively experienced
conceptualising and what they reported. This required both delicacy
and precision from the inquirer. It meant using language and thought
to investigate the language and thought of the other, through what
can only be described as a kind of focused introspection. A question
that then arises is: what existing approaches have been used to
21
inquire into such phenomena? What kind of theory wlndow' would
enable the inquirer to see a more detailed picture? Creswell (1998)
sums up the phenomenological approach as one that "serves as the
rationale behind efforts to understand individuals by entering into
their field of perception (authors' emphasis) in order to see life as
these individuals see it". Stanage (1987) claims that "phenomenology
is the clearest, most foundational and fullest form of investigation",
(Stanage 1987:281). However, there remains the question of how to
investigate such a complex phenomenon. Lincoln and Guba (1985)
propose that an important but frequently overlooked aspect of design
is to select the theory (and the methodology it generates) that
provides the most power in relation to the problem. I interpret what
they mean by power as the amount of useful information that Is
generated through such an inquiry.
The choice of an appropriate methodology is also one of the most
critical factors influencing how the research questions are to be
addressed. Silverman, taking a somewhat instrumentalist approach,
warns that, like theories, "methodologies cannot be true or false, only
more or less useful", (Silverman 1993:2). A quantitative approach is
precluded because it is not possible to apply measurement to a
phenomenon that has yet to be described. In this case the topic under
the metaphorical research lens is the relationship between language
and people's subjective Internal thought processes. Therefore this is
also an inquiry into some of the dynamic aspects of consciousness.
Essentially, one is seeking to discover, describe and define a new
phenomenon, or aspect of one, however transient, through an intense
collaboration with others. This indicates that phenomenology may be
a useful approach. My own approach is based on this, but I used my
own practice as a source of information, and action research also
played a critical role.
1 I use this term in the sensethat Oenzinand lincoln (1998) use it: " not
only are facts determinedby the theory windowthrough which one looks for
them, but different theory windowsmight be equallywell supportedby the
sameset of facts..." (Denzlnand Lincoln1998:199)
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Stevens (2000) proposed that phenomenology should be a central
discipline in the field of consciousness studies. When consciousness is
the focus of investigation, then the traditional separation between the
observer and the observed is difficult to maintain. Phenomenology
Itself is not a unified approach, but is split into different approaches,
(Stevens 2000). Stevens regrets the failure to develop an effective
phenomenological methodology. Approaching the study of conscious
experiences is fraught with epistemological traps; not least is the
question of the status of the information obtained through asking
people to be deeply introspective, and then transforming such data
into language, in order that It can be communicated. This was one of
the main ways in which I gathered information for this inquiry. "For
we are creating our consciousness in the very act of creating it",
(Stevens 2000:113).
Phenomenologists are thus dependent on verbal accounts of
phenomena which are not themselves necessarily verbal. Words
themselves may also have different meanings for different people.
This is a fundamental difficulty in using Information acquired through
other people's introspections. Stevens points out, "such accounts can
only be reconstructions, subject to the interpretative style of the
subject and/or researcher and always open to change and
negotiation," (Stevens 2000: 115). Stanage (1987), making a case for
a phenomenological approach to language, describes linguistic
phenomenology as a "way of articulating, as precisely as possible, the
distinctions between what adults say In direct investigation, and
description of phenomena which we feel, experience and conscious
(know with)," [sic]. (Stanage 1987:53). However, there Is no
escaping the deeply subjective nature of the Information so gleaned,
which raises the issue of the status of subjectivity itself, let alone the
question of the doubtful conceptual distinctions between the
subjective and objective.
It has become widely acceptable to believe that knowledge Is never
'neutral' but always emerges from the matrix of a pre-existing
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conceptual framework or set of beliefs. (Chalmers 1978). The post-
modernist approach to research stresses that the distinctions between
objectivity and subjectivity are false ones. Thomas Kuhn, has
described how the paradigm that was operative at a particular
historical period influenced not only what was selected to be
observed, but also the interpretations and explanations that were
then generated, (Kuhn 1970). The notion of objective knowledge
belongs within the logical positivist tradition. Mangan (1993) accuses
the psychologists, whose main conceptual operational framework is
logical positivism, of squeamishness. He suggests that it is time that
the rejection of the 'subjective' is seen for what it is: an unscientific
prejudice [ ...] which diminishes the scope of research" (Mangan
1993:93). Lincoln and Oenzin (1998) resolve the divide between the
Scylla of objectivism and the Charybdis of subjectivism by suggesting
that the qualitative researcher's commitment should be to "study the
world always from the perspective of the interacting individual"
(Lincoln and Oenzln 1998:407).
This has become one of the main philosophical assumptions which
guides the qualitative research carried out within a post modernist
framework, (Creswell 1998). Reason and Marshall (1987) describe the
post positive approach as one in which the researcher is living In a
participatory universe where truth can be practical, Intuitive,
experiential and presentational. Moustakas (1994) also proposes that
such approaches generate Information which incorporate creative self-
processes and self-discoveries. As In quantum physics, the observer
brings the universe of her observations Into being, (Nagel and
Newman 1956). Participation means more than naively wondering
how the apple fell. In my view, it also means actively participating in
the dialectic between theory and observation, hunches and data,
paradigms and practice, self and others.
Moustakas (1994) defends the phenomenological approach, because,
he claims, it should lay stress on open (my Italics) processes In
conducting research, rather than on fixed methods and procedures.
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He also points out that the phenomenological approach is an Inductive
process, where, contrary to the nomothetic approach, the pre-existing
conceptual frameworks of the researcher should be put aside, and the
researcher be open to the possibility of fresh discoveries. Giorgi has
summed up this position: "The return to beginnings makes the
phenomenologist a perpetual beginner" (Giorgi 1985:86). Moustakas
(1994) proposes that the task of the phenomenological and
hermeneutic approach is to explore the direct conscious description of
experience, and the underlying dynamics of structures that account
for the experience. He, like Stevens (2000) recognises the somewhat
paradoxical nature of language in the inquiry Into consciously
experienced phenomena. "Our possession by language is the
ontological condition for our understanding of the texts that address
us", (Moustakas 1994:10). Paradoxically, I am forced to use language
to investigate the effects of language on consciousness!
The phenomenological approach also seemed to be appropriate for
working with people's subjective experience, because Its aim Is to
uncover and describe new phenomena; (Moustakas 1994). As such It
seems suitable as an approach for inquiring into the relationships
between consciousness and communication. Maykut and Morehouse
(1994) have suggested that "the discovery of propositions by
observation and the careful inspection of the patterns which emerge
from the data are the hallmark of the phenomenological approach."
(Maykut and Morehouse 1994: 13). Such an approach could be
criticised for being too deeply subjective, however it is the very nature
of subjective experience that is under the microscope. Moran (2000)
wrote that "phenomenology attempts to recognise and describe the
role of consciousness in the achievement of knowledge, and Is not
wallowing In the subjective domain purely for its own sake." (Moran
2000:15).
One Important aspect of this inquiry was to examine how useful the
NLPapproach to language and precision questioning were as effective
tools for a phenomenological Inquiry. My own personal view, which
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developed from my analyses of the transcripts, is that this approach
has uncovered aspects of conscious and unconscious thinking that are
new to the educational literature. In fact, it yielded a veritable
embarras de richesses of insights into language and learning through
the use of introspection guided by my use of NLPapproaches. This
placed me in a conflict; should I weed out what might not be so
interesting, and risk being accused of too much bias? Or should I be
as transparent as possible, and write about as many of my findings to
do justice to the approach, and risk overloading the reader? My sense
throughout this inquiry was that of a biologist having been given a
new kind of high-powered microscope, which uncovered many novel
and sometimes elusive creatures moving through the depths of
people's consciousness. I therefore opted for the latter choice, to give
as complete an account as possible of some teasingly curious,
evanescent, and sometimes paradoxical effects of language and
teaching on people's thinking. The risk in this was the danger of
overloading the reader with detail.
2.2. The case for introspection
Most of the data for this inquiry was obtained through interviews
which asked partiCipants to describe the responses which they
experienced through the guided introspection that I used when
interviewing. Thus the inquiry relies heavily for both the information,
and the models derIved from the information, on data obtained from
people's shared descriptions of their inner worlds. Lincoln and Oenzin
(1998) suggest that qualitative research might move away from
"grand narratives and single, overarching ontological, epistemological
and methodological peradlqms" (Lincoln and Oenzin 1998:407) to a
position where inquiry is committed to focusing on personal
interactions.
This raises the question of the status of such information, which has
been obtained through Introspection. Moustakas describes the
heuristic approach as one which involves a process of internal
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searching, which enables the discovery of both the nature and
meaning of experience. This implies that introspection has some
recognition as an information gathering technique. My own approach
to this inquiry was to investigate people's subjective experiences of
language structures and learning. I wanted to know how people
experienced learning itself, as well as how they responded to
particular types of language structures. In the first data gathering
phase, very careful and precise questions were used in order to elicit
people's subjective experiences, which could only be accessed by
them through the act of introspection. Thus most of my data was
obtained as the results of engaging in guided introspection with my
collaborators. This was done partly through careful questions in my
interviews, and the analysis of transcribed interviews carried out by
two collaborators.
The phenomenological approach proposes that people's inner worlds
of subjective experience, however complex and difficult to pin down,
are nevertheless a valid area of inquiry. Stanage (1987) has put
forward the bold claim that phenomenology is "founding, foundational
and a foundation for all philosophies and for all science"', (Stanage
1987:45). This raises the issue of the management of both the
complexity of the processes of introspection, and the reliability of the
information so gained. Mangan, (1993) citing William James, reminds
us that the introspection of a transitive act of consciousness is
difficult. "The attempt at introspective analysis [ ...] is in fact like
seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas
to see how the darkness looks," (William James, cited in Mangan
1993:95). Chafe 1994) paints out that "private, introspective data
provide a more direct access to the mind, but suffer from the absence
of public verifiability" (Chafe 1994:25), yet urges its use in the
exploration of consciousness, because, "though difficult, [it] is an
absolutely essential part of this picture", (Chafe 1994: 15). He
proposed that it was important to immerse oneself in "linguistic and
introspective observations, combined with the cultivation of a creative
imagination adequate to understanding these observations in
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maximally insightful ways", (Chafe 1994:25). Carruthers (1996)
proposed that although there was scope for error in introspection, it
was nevertheless a useful vehicle for inquiring into people's thought
processes.
Stevens (2000) states that since the early introspectionists, there
have been few attempts at accessing and representing people's
immediate subjective phenomenological experience. Henry (2000)
adds that the majority of orthodox approaches to transforming
consciousness in the clinical area are heavily dependent on
introspection. Harre (2000) defends the use of introspectively
obtained data: "the legitimacy of trying to convey to another person
the nature of one's own private experience by describing it needs to
be defended," (Harre 2000). Giorgi (1985) offers the critique that
"psychology has consistently failed to explicate the phenomenon of
thinking" (Giorgi 1985:86). It is difficult to see any way of inquiring
into this field (other than by neurological means), which does not
make use of information harvested from introspection. Johnson Laird,
whose main interest was the exploration of people's mental models,
wrote in defence of introspection: "why can't we be aware of the rules
of language and thought by introspection?" (Johnson-Laird 1983:ix).
Patton (1990), writing about approaches to research methods, wrote
that: "The inner perspective assumes that understanding can only be
achieved by actively participating In the life of the observed and
gaining insight by means of Introspection", (Patton 1990:47).
I am nevertheless aware of Miller's warning, that "introspection is a
fickle mistress", (Miller 1960:71), so offer my findings in the
knowledge that my field of inquiry is, by its nature, complex and
difficult to clarify. Croft (1998) asked "What can introspective
linguistic evidence, taken alone, tell us about mental representation of
forms and meaning?" (Croft 1998:151) He urged that it could only
lead to possibilities, which would then. need hard 'neurological' data to
validate It. Sandra, (1988) in his response to Croft, suggests that
although the study of how the mind represents linguistic facts to Itself
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is a valid one. He proposes that "as far as language processing is
concerned, linguists have nothing to say, and I know no linguist who
has tried to do so". (Sandra 1998:364). He concludes that "it Is highly
advisable to systematically avoid any reference to mental
representation in linguistic discussion." (Sandra 1998:376).
My approach is the exact opposite; this inquiry Is based on the Idea
that it is possible to explore the subjective responses of other people
exposed to certain language forms and structures. The data is very
subjective, so It requires hesitancy In coming to conclusions that are
too firm. I offer models and hypotheses for further Inquiry from the
introspections of my collaborators, not facts in the sense that a logical
positivist would understand.
2.3. What about Discourse Analysis?
One of the main current approaches to the study of language and
conversation in the classroom has been the use of DiscourseAnalysis.
Thus the question arises for an inquiry such as this: 'why not use
Discourse Analysis?' There are critical distinctions to be made
between NLPand Discourse Analysis. I believe that the most
important difference is that NLP is essentially about modelling, which
is as much about understanding people's inner responses to
communication, as It is about the structure of messages. Discourse
Analysis, on the other hand, is a more descriptive way of analysing
and classifying human communication (Chafe 1994, Silverstein and
Urban 1996, Popkewltz and Brennan 1998, Yaguello 1998). It
concerns itself with the minutiae of the structures of language, or the
power relations inherent in it, (Popkewitz and Brennan 1998) but not
with the complexities of the recipient's conscious and unconscious
responses, let alone the possible effects on these of different types of
communication. Potter (1991) believes that Discourse Analysis
comprises 'a whole range of things,' (Potter 1991:144). It is difficult
to disagree with David Silverman's (1993) suggestion that "because
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Discourse Analysis is so heterogeneous, it is difficult to arrive at a
clear definition of it," (Silverman 1993:121).
There is another important distinction to be made between Discourse
Analysis and modelling using NLP. Each arose from two different
historical and theoretical perspectives, and thus have different foci.
Sandler's (Sandler and Grinder 1975) approach to modelling is rooted
in Cybernetics,2 Information Theory, the philosophical Insights of
Russell's logical levels and types (Russell 1921) as well the insights of
modern linguistics and transformational grammar (Sandler and
Grinder 1975A). The inquirer using this approach has to assume that
any interaction between humans is complex and multi-dimensional,
and based on an exchange of Information within complex systems.
These operate at many levels of complexity. Sandler and Grinder's
theoretical approach to modelling was partly developed from the
theoretical frameworks of the sciences of complexity, Including the
emergent Systems Theory, as an approach to understanding
complexity.
Checkland (1981) proposes that when complex systems are
investigated, then "our basic model has to include both an external
reality and an observer/describer who will, for his own purposes, use
systems thinking as a means of arriving at his (sic) description"
(Checkland 1981:101). So modelling uses both a systems or
cybernetic approach, based on the assumption that communication is
an integral factor whenever human beings connect with each other or
engage in their own reflections and feelings. This in turn is perceived
as part of a complex system of both conscious and unconscious
processes. Discourse Analysis, on the other hand, arose from
European post-modernism, and belongs more to the field of cultural
studies, and does not, as I understand It, address the sciences of
complexity as such.
2 GregoryBatesonwasa memberof the MacyConferencesfrom which the
scienceof Cyberneticsemerged.
30
Recently however Chafe (1994), whose approach Is rooted in
Discourse Analysis, has proposed that topics within a conversation
display a hierarchy of sub-topics, but interestingly does not refer to
Bertrand Russell's theory of logical levels and types in relation to this.
I am inclined to believe that it is not as powerful an approach as
modelling as a method of inquiry into complex, interactive systems
that are operating at many levels of complexity, and may Involve both
conscious and unconscious processes.
Much of Discourse Analysis claims to be about understanding human
communication, and identifying genres of discourse, yet largely
ignores the perspectives of Cybernetics, Information Theory and
Systems Theory. It also seems unaware of the seminal ideas of
Bateson (1972) and Watzlawick and Weakland (1977) who, Inspired
by Bateson, proposed that human communication and Interaction
were multi-level and dynamic processes. They proposed a new way of
understanding healthy and pathological patterns of communication,
and how they could influence others both consciously and
unconsciously.
What NLPand Discourse Analysis have in common is that they both
focus on patterns of language between people. They differ In that NLP
provides tools for inquiring into the subjective effects of language,
that Is, how meaning might be created, rather than aiming to provide
a typology of conversational genres. Potter (1991) states that "DA
(Discourse Analysis) does not use talk and texts as a pathway to
underlying cognitions; indeed DA resolutely steers clear of cognitive
reduction" (Potter 1991: 158). To understand more about learning, I
believe that NLPwas the more useful tool. It made room for
considering the cognitive dimension to language and learning. It was
also a challenge to use an approach, which has not yet been used at
such a level of detail in an educational inquiry.
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2.4. An outline of the data gathering phase of the research
process.
"Know/edge does not end with moments of connectedness,
understanding or meaning. Such journeys open vistas to new journeys
for uncovering meaning, truth and essence - journeys within journeys
within journeys" (Moustakas 1994:65.)
McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead (1996) urge the putative researcher to
'be prepared for the unexpected' (Mcniff et a/1996:40). This was
certainly the case when I was invited to give a course in NLPat a
hospital in the capital of a Middle Eastern country in 2000. My stay in
this country lasted two months. It was not the first time I had visited
it; I had taught the educational component of a degree in Nurse
Education as a visiting lecturer in 1993 In 1994. I was then asked back
on four different occasions to teach NLPto staff at the hospital under
the aegis of their Post-Graduate Department of Education.
This particular stay was serendipitous in that it gave me an
unexpected opportunity to explore my teaching of NLP, and to use the
time and the people as collaborators In this research venture. Some of
my students had already acted as a focus group for another PhD
venture into NLP.Jan Robertson (2000) describes qualitative research
as a complex activity. It involves both doing and reporting, and Is not
a tidy process, rather the opposite. This was certainly my experience
of my 'field work' and after.
There were two separate phases to my information gathering. These
were to develop Into two different but complementary parts within the
whole inquiry. The first was close to my original intentions which had
been to use the time abroad to pilot my own interview schedule, and
'try it out' on people. I then Intended to develop a more sophisticated
version when I got back home to the UK. What actually happened was
that I interviewed six of the students on the course, inquiring Into their
responses to certain language structures, originally to see what
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happened. (I describe this interview schedule below). When I arrived
back in the UK, I transcribed these interviews, and then realised that I
had so much information that the 'pilot' became one of the main
sources of information. My reflections on these are the main themes of
chapters 6,7,8 and 9.
The second stage of the inquiry was to work with three people who
had attended previous courses of mine, and had already reached
practitioner status in NLP.These acted, in a sense, as what McNiff et a/
(1996) would call my validating group. They were also to engage on an
information gathering exercise by interviewing some of the students
who had attended the NLPcourse. This was to be carried out after I
had left the country. It would include obtaining feedback from the
parttclpants on the course about a number of different aspects of their
experiences of learning. I describe this phase of the inquiry, and my
thoughts about it, in some detail in Chapter 10. Essentially, my
collaborators and I were interested in feedback from the partiCipants
on the NLPcourse, especially in any changes that had occurred in their
conceptual maps about themselves as learners.
The overall outcome for this inquiry was that I developed a new
understanding of some of the processes Involved in learning, which I
offer as a hypothesis. As a result I hoped to perhaps be able to initiate
changes in either the theory or praxis of my teaching, (and perhaps
that of others). These are some of the characteristics that are said to
define action research, (McNiff et a/1996, Gill and Johnson 1997,
Robertson 2000. My research methods also arose largely out of the
context In which I found myself.
When I set out to teach these NLPpractitioner and Master Practitioner
Programmes in 2000, I made it clear to all the participants at the
outset that we were all involved in research, though to begin with I
found it difficult to specify what exactly we were looking for. This was
to ensure transparency. NLPis taught through exploration, group
work and feedback sessions. Power Issues, and questions such as
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'who owns the information that is uncovered?' are important to post-
modern qualitative research. I made it clear from the outset that we
were all engaged in exploration and discovery, some of which would
be useful to me for this study. Anderson (1990) stresses the need for
honesty, avoiding deception, and obtaining informed consent as some
of the pre-requisites of an acceptable ethical approach. When I was
teaching, my focus was on enabling the students to meet the
standards of Practitioner status in NLP.3 The overall framework for
both myself In the context of being the trainer, and the participants
on the course, was that of an exploration of themselves and others
using the tools of NLP.This was, after all, what I was being paid for at
the time.
2.5. Action Research
Much of this phase of the inquiry was illuminated by the approach
generated by action research. It has been described as an approach
where "researchers are intent on describing, interpreting and
explaining events (enquiry) while they seek to change them (action)
for the better (purpose)". (McNiff et a/1996: 13). Action research also
involves reflection on practice, and I found that when I was engaged
in teaching, I was mainly focused on guiding a group of ten people to
the level of Practitioner. NLP Is learned and taught through guided
exercises and interactions with others in the group, and then shared
reflection on what was discovered. The approach to teaching it is, In a
sense, to 'hand over' the responsiblllty for learning to the participants,
and to become more and more invisible, as It were, as their
enjoyment and curiosity took over the process. It is deliberately
taught as inductively as possible. The participants became fully
engaged in their learning, and as I observed them becoming more
confident with the exploration of their own subjective processes, and
those of their peers, I soon realised that what was also emerging was
a sample of people with a deeper awareness of their own Internal
3 Thesestandardsare set by the Societyfor NLP,which Isone of the many
world wide accreditingbodies.
34
modelling processes, and how these were influenced by language.
Most of them were nurses, and often reported that they had used NLP
to make discoveries about their patients' experiences on the wards.
They also reported that they found it useful in information gathering,
negotiating and reassuring.
One of the Master Practitioners, (who was also one of my assistants,
and later one of the interviewers for the second phase of information
qatherinq.)" used his new insights to develop a more effective
discharge planning procedure for his ward. If one of the hallmarks of
collaborative inquiry is that professionals and non-professionals
become co-researchers (Patton 1990) where the purpose of "such
shared inquiry is typically to elucidate and improve the nature and
practice in some arena of action" (Patton 1990: 129), then it seems to
me that what emerged was a kind of research team of more or less
enthusiastic inquirers, sharing and applying their own insights in the
contexts of their personal lives and work. Truly, serendipity is an
essential component of research and inquiry.
McNiff et al (1996) warn that authentic research is "where you do not
already have the answers [ ...] it means that you are willing and able
to change your own understanding." (McNiff et a/1996:13). About
half way through the course, I started thinking more like a researcher
than a trainer. I initially found it difficult to reflect on my practice as a
researcher, until I realised that when I was actually engaged in
teaching, I was more focused on the students' learning processes
than on myself and what I did. One of the aims of an NLP training is
to develop people's understanding of their own situation, and explore
their abilities to make changes. This is not unlike what Lather
describes as one of the hallmarks of research in practice, which is that
"research (can be) consciously used to help partlclpants understand
and change their situation" (Lather, cited in Robertson 2000:311).
Arhar and Buch (2000) describe teaching as a form of scientific
4 See Chapter 10
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inquiry and a moral commitment to democratic relationships between
teachers and learners. "Action researchers design their watching into
their work, not only as an afterthought... but as a documented
reflective process throughout". (Arhar and Buch 2000:328). I believe
that reflection on action may be as much an unconscious as a
conscious process, an issue which most writers on research design
and methods ignore.
My own approach to teaching is greatly influenced by the training I
underwent to achieve the status of NLP trainer. Among the most
important skills to be developed are the ability to enthuse one's
learners and to enable them to acquire insights into language. This
includes Bandler and Grinder's (1975, 1975A) model of language. This
proposes ways in which language may guide people's thinking. Other
important aspects which are developed are the ability to facilitate
people to learn for themselves, and to create relationships which act
as a context for safe, rapid, and sometimes surprising insights to
occur. Entwistle and Smith (2002), inquired into the factors that
promoted what they term 'deep' learning'. They found that students
reported that the qualities of a lecturer, which were most likely to
bring this about, were explanation, enthusiasm and empathy. These
generalisations echo some of the prescriptions for 'good' NLP training.
Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that the design of a piece of
research "designates nothing more than a broad plan relating to
certain contingencies that will probably arise, but the precise nature
of those contingencies is unpredictable" (Lincoln and Guba 1985:259).
This echoes what happened to this study at the beginning. What I
originally thought of as a pilot study emerged from a hunch, which
came to me about half way through the course. What if I 'tested'
these people's responses to a number of different statements by
asking them for their responses to certain language structures where
they would talk to me about the results of their introspections? I now
had a sample of over a dozen highly trained people with considerable
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considerable insights into some of their own thinking processes. I
might never have such an opportunity again.
This fitted into the category of purposive sampling, which Silverman
describes as a sample which "allows us to choose a case because It
illustrates some feature or process in which we are interested,"
(Silverman 2000:104). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that one of
the characteristics of purposive sampling is what they term emergent
sampling design where there can be no a priori specification of the
sample, and that naturalistic sampling is based on informational
rather than statistical criteria. These reflections of my sampling are
made a posteriori; at the time Iwas only interested in developing and
testing a pilot interview schedule, without realising that the data so
obtained would more than Illumine my inquiry. What Iwas
consciously looking for were people who had developed the ability to
report on their own introspections, and who were unafraid to share
them with me.
One of the first activities in the NLPPractitioner's course was to
encourage people to explore how we use our senses internally to
structure subjective experience. Sandler and Grinder (1975) suggest
that we use all our senses to re-present experience internally as
internal representations. Thus when we think, we see, hear, feel,
taste, smell, and perhaps use other senses as well.
I introduced this aspect through telling a story, (see Appendix 1)
which was deliberately written to stimulate the listeners' five sensory
modalities, so as to generate rich internal representations, and draw
attention to them. This was an approach much loved by Milton
Erickson, (Erickson 1980, Rosen 1982). The structure of stories seems
to be able to influence people's thinking at the unconscious level (Glck
and Holyoak 1977) and engage people in abductive learning (Bateson
1972). Erickson believed that the power of metaphors lay In their
ability to make the topic 'come alive In' people's minds.
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After I told the story, the group was asked: "as you were listening to
the story, what sort of images did you make? What did you see?"
This was to encourage participants to look more deeply at their own
internal responses to the story, through a process of shared
introspection in small groups. People usually respond by talking about
what images they made internally. I then sometimes ask questions
like "was it in colour or black and white? Was it a movie or a series of
stills, were you in it experiencing it or outside, looking in on it?" This
was so as to elicit information about the different characteristics that
their internal images seem to have. Whenever I have used this
approach, people have always reported on the quality of the imagery
produced by such stories. I then asked "as you were listening to the
story, did you hear any sounds tntemelty?" Again, many report that
they heard sounds (for instance the grunts of the camel). I then
asked about bodily sensations, tastes and smells. Some felt the heat
of the desert as they listened to the story. Others experienced states
such as curiosity, pleasure, relaxation or interest. Often they reported
to have been aware of the taste of the water or the smell of the old
goatskin. NLP training presupposes that this is one way that people
can develop a greater awareness of their own worlds of internal
representettons." Interestingly, many participants reported an
increase in the amount of vivid dreams they had at this stage of the
course.
5 The effects of such developing insights was described by one of the
participants, a twenty eight year old Nurse Tutor H. who was Interviewed by
one of the Master Practitioners. These were also acting as my assistants on
the course. The Interviewer asked her for her Impressions at the beginning of
the NLPcourse. Her reply Indicates something of the surprise she felt at
discovering so much more about her own Internal world, particularly at the
level of Internal representations.
H. The way she spoke the way she engaged discussion from the group,
the way how she'd... think ... 'imagine yourself there, see yourself there,
see what you see, hear what you hear, feel what you feel'. We've never
had that taught, like in that second go back into thinking of that certain
scenario it's like certain scenarios like wow, I've got it in stills, I've got
it In certain pictures, I've got It in movie, I've never been taught that
before.
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The story itself also had another function; to create a metaphorical
framework for the philosophy of the course. The theory is that the
structure of stories has the ability to by-pass the conscious mind, and
influence how subsequent information is then structured, (Gick and
Holyoak 1977, Erickson and Rossi 1989). I review some of these
aspects further in Chapter 4. One of the things that the NLPtraining
was designed to do was to produce a small population of people who
were practised in introspection, and the sensitive elicitation of their
own and other people's internal processes. The sample, and the
questions for what I thought of as an initial set of explorations,
emerged from my reflections on the responses of the participants on
the course.
2.5.1. The Pilot Interviews, which then became a surprisingly
important source of Information
In the last two weeks of my stay I designed what I then believed was
the pilot interview schedule. This consisted of a number of different
statements, in response to which I wanted my collaborators to reflect
on the internal processes that they produced. (These are described in
some detail in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9.) What kinds of statements could
I use as probes? These questions became the catalyst for the
emergence of my interview schedule. Patton states that the purpose
of interviewing is to find out what is on someone else's mind, (Patton
1990), and that "the persons being interviewed respond in their own
words to express their own personal perspectives" (Patton 1990:
278). Silverman warns that it is Important to ensure that one's
analytic position Is appropriate to one's practical concerns, (Silverman
2000).
I wanted to find out whether It was possible for people to be capable
of an Introspection which was deep enough for them to report on their
own responses which might 'normally' lie outside 'normal' awareness,
yet keep them emotionally safe. The question that then arose was:
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would I then be able to model how thinking was influenced by
language? Bateson was fascinated by the possibility that we know
what we know, yet are not aware of how we know it.6 I wanted to
know what would happen if I aimed at questioning people in such a
way that they might reveal aspects of how they know. This was one of
my main outcomes for this inquiry.
This led to the need to recognise that there were important theoretical
distinctions to be made between what people knew, and the processes
by which that information was represented to them. Oenzin and
Lincoln point out "not only are facts determined by the theory window
through which one looks for them, but different theory windows might
be equally well supported by the same set of facts... "(Denzin and
Lincoln 1998: 199). Thus my theoretical standpoint was mined from
the bedrock of Bandler and Grinder's model of language and their
proposed epistemology, 7 which in turn determined how I formulated
the pilot interview schedule. It was also based on the notion that
people could access some of their internal processes where they had
used their senses to reconstruct experience, (Sandler and MacDonald
1988). (I explore and describe some of these aspects in greater depth
in Chapter 3.) At this point my main question was 'what happens
inside people's minds when I use particular language structures?'
Might there be differences in people's responses to these?
The Interview schedule that emerged, as the result of my reflections
and questioning, fell into what Patton (1990) characterises as "a
standardised open ended interview, where the exact wording and
sequence of questions are determined in advance. All interviewees are
asked the same questions in the same order. Questions are worded in
completely open ended format." (Patton 1990:289). I then followed
up people's answers with probing questions in order to elicit more
6 "It seemsto be a universal feature of human perceptionof the
underpinningsof humanepistemologythat the perceivershall perceiveonly
the productsof his perceivingact. He shall not perceivethe meansby which
that productwascreated" (Bateson, In Donaldson1991:216),
7 This Is exploredfurther In Chapters4 and 5.
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information about the effects of my words that people reported they
had experienced. Patton describes probes as questions that are used
to deepen a response and increase the richness of the data being
sought, (Patton 1990).
This part of the data gathering used an approach that Gill and
Johnson (1997) refer to as a quasi experiment. Here the prime aim is
to analyse causal relationships between independent and dependent
variables, where subjects cannot be randomly assigned to control
groups. Anderson (1990) describes It as an approach "where there is
an artificially manipulated treatment, but where randomisation is not
possible", (p. 129). This seemed to be appropriate to a
phenomenological inquiry, as it had the potential to uncover
subjectively experienced processes, with the caveat that it is
epistemologically dangerous to draw too many generalised
conclusions from data so obtained. Thus any model that emerges
from such an inquiry essentially has the status of a hypothesis or
preliminary working model, which can then act as a heuristic device
for further elucidation of the phenomena under scrutiny.
Each question thus required interviewees to engage in deep
introspection, then describe and reflect aloud on their own responses
and whatever processes they then became aware of. In a sense they
were to take what has been described as the transcendental
phenomenological attitude, as part of their responses, (Sokolowski
2000).
2.5.2. Designing the pilot interview schedule
...In describing a given system, the scientist makes many choices, He
chooses his words, and he decides which parts of the system he will
describe first; he even decides into what parts he will divide the
system in order to describe it. Thesedecisions will affect the
description as a whole In the sense that they will affect the map upon
which the typological relations between the elementary messages of
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the description are represented. (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:62).
When one is engaged in modelling, the main task is the elicitation of
information from others at both verbal and non-verbal levels, in order
to find out more about how they respond and construct information
for themselves. So, when NLP is being used as a modelling tool, it is
assumed that what is being interrogated is not the world of external
reality, but a deeply subjective, internally constructed complex of
thought processes, of which emotions, Images, goals, values,
memories, sounds, speech, bodily sensations, tastes and smells form
integral parts. This involves the researcher in very precise and
sensitive questioning of participants who are willing to share in the
exploration of these levels of experience. This Is what I mean by
guided introspection. Questions designed to bring to awareness the
structures that people may be using to 'map' experience requires
interview skills and the ability to enter into the world of the other, yet
stand respectfully aside. It also involves a precise and skilful use of
language and observation. This I based on Sandler and Grinder's
meta-model of language, (Sandler and Grinder 1975). I have often
experienced feelings which I can only describe as reverence and awe
when a participant shares her surprise and delight at discovering
more about her own, previously un-accessed internal processes and
resources.
What follows is the interview schedule, which I originally thought of as
a pilot project, to be refined at a later time. I explain below what my
rationale was behind each of the questions; what I wanted was for my
interviewees to tell me about the subjective effects of the various
statements at the level of their internal representations and sub-
modalities. Although I explore Sandler and Grinder's (1975) idea that
thinking involves the use of all the senses in the construction of
internal representations further in Chapter 3, a quick summary of
these ideas maybe useful at this polnt,
Sandler and Grinder (1975) and later Sandler and MacDonald (1988)
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proposed that we re-create experience internally, as it were, using all
our senses. So as we think, we also see, hear, feel, perhaps taste and
smell, whatever experiences we are reflecting on. Thus our senses
internally represent experience, often below the levels of immediate
awareness. Sub-modality distinctions (Sandler and MacDonald 1988)
are the characteristics of each sense; for instance, internal images
may be in colour or black and white, sounds may be loud or soft and
feelings (usually termed kinaesthetic responses in NLP) may be warm
or cold, hard or soft, and may even be experienced as having a
location within the conceiver's body.
It was this level of awareness that I wanted my interlocutors to report
on in response to the language structures In the interview schedule. I
sought information about their processes, not their responses to the
content of my words. This part of the inquiry is as much about
exploring these levels of consciousness and how they may be involved
in the construction of knowledge, as it is about the effects of
language. There is no 'logical' sequence to the schedule described
below; I simply wanted to explore a number of different aspects in no
particular order. Many of the technical terms, and my thoughts about
them, are described in greater detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
The transcripts of the responses to questions 3, 4, 9, 10 and 16 are
analysed and reflected on in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 are my reflections
on the transcripts of the responses to questions 5, 7, 8, and 12.
Chapter 8 reviews what I found in the transcripts of questions 8, 6, 11
and 13. Finally, Chapter 9 reports on my analyses of the transcribed
responses to questions 1, 2, 14 and 15. These were natural
groupings, which emerged after I had read the transcripts several
times.
2.5.3. The interview schedule
Below I list the questions that I finally used In the pilot study, and the
thinking that led to them. I include at the end, for the sake of
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completeness, some questions which I realised after the first few
interviews were repetitive or inappropriate, and therefore left out in
my analysis of the transcripts.
Question 1.
This question was designed to explore the difference between the
injunctions to 'think' and 'remember'. I was also curious to know
whether the word 'think' was more likely to produce a dissociated
response, and the word 'remember' an associated response. So
people were asked for their responses to the following two
suggestions.
a) Think of a time when you were happy.
b) Remember a time when you were happy.
Question 2.
It has been claimed that there are two fundamental ways of attending
to information. (Bateson 1972). One is to attend to difference, and
the other to attend to similarity. With this question I wanted to
explore how the internal representations of some familiar objects
differed when the subject was asked to attend to their differences,
and then to their similarities.
a) How are apples and oranges different?
b) How are apples and oranges the same?
Question 3.
With this question, I wanted to explore moving from a phrase which
asked about the process how you relate, to a phrase where the verb
had been nomlnallsed. (Bandler and Grinder 1975) This turns what
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was, for the conceiver, originally a process into an abstract noun.
According to Bandler and Grinder (1975) the original activity of the
verb is thus deleted. I also changed the wording of the initial
command from 'be aware' to 'think' in the second question, to find out
what would happen.
a) Can you be aware of how you relate to someone you value?
b) Can you think of a relationship with a person you value?
Question 4.
This was a rather ambitious question, where I wanted to explore the
differences between 'scientific text book language' about the human
heart, and a more emotive personalised description. The first part has
more nominalizations, and is expressed in the third person. The
second part takes the perceptual position of the second person and
uses more verbs rather than nominalizations.
a) In the heart, the ventricles contract to pump blood around the
body. The atria receive blood from the body. Closure of the valves at
the bases of the main arteries prevent the backflow of blood on
ventricular relaxation.
b) Your heart is a pump and receives blood from your body and
pumps blood around your body. Imagine your ventricles contracting
and squeezing blood into the main arteries so they need valves at
their base that close so that blood isn't sucked back when the
ventricle relaxes.
Question 5.
In this set of questions I wanted to explore the effects of a group of
words known as modal operators (Sandler and Grinder 1975) on the
internal representations that would be elicited. Modal operators are a
complex group of words which have been described (Hall 1996) as
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'words that express the contingent relationships we believe to exist
between ourselves, others and outcomes'. I describe them in greater
detail in Chapters 5 and 7. This group of words can be said to
describe the mode in which a future activity is to be carried out. It has
been claimed (Hall 1996) that some modal operators (such as you
will, you must) Imply that the listener is at effect, or at a reactive
stance. Others, such as 'you might' or 'you could', imply that there is
a choice. This is thought to place the listener into a more pro-active
position. Part of the interest in modal operators is that there is always
an implied causality to them, which can be uncovered by questions
such as 'who says', 'what would happen if you didn't' or simply by
using the word 'because?' as a question to elicit further information
about the activity defined by the modal operator.
Think of something quite ordinary, (like cleaning your teeth) that you
are going to do in the near future. What happens when I say:
a) you will do it
b) you might do it
c) you can't do it
d) you should do it
e) you can do it
f) you could do it.
Question 6.
Here I wanted to explore what happened when my collaborator was
asked to change temporal frames. First each was asked to think of an
event in the near future, then to perceive it as If it were now In the
past. The injunctions place the information into two different temporal
frameworks, one future, and one past.
a) Think of something you have to do but are not sure you particularly
want to do.
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b) Now imagine you were in the future having done it.
Question 7.
With this question I wanted to find out about some of the effects of
the question 'how do you feel about it' on the subject's memory of a
mildly unpleasant experience. The word 'feel' is a sensory predicate
(Bandler and Grinder 1975) and it is claimed that the use of this word
can amplify existing kinaesthetic responses in the internal
representation of a memory.
a) Remember a mifdly unpleasant experience.
b) How do you feel about it?
Question 8.
Here my aim was to explore the effects of the word 'but' when used to
link two separate statements in the context of feedback on a person's
performance. In sections a) and b) I also wanted to find out what
happened when the first and second halves of the complex sentence,
changed places. In the third part c), I wanted to explore what
happened when words implying a causal linkage (...so that you can...)
between the two halves of the sentence and deliberately linking them
to a future outcome, were included.
a) You are good at NLP but you need to work on your rapport
skills
b) You need to work on your rapport skills but you are good
atNLP
c) Think about your rapport skills so that you can be even
better at NLP
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Question 9.
With this question I wanted to see whether there were any differences
in response to the adverb (wrongly) and the adjective (wrong) used in
the same context. Hall (1996) claims that adjectives digitalise
information, whereas adverbs are analogical, giving a sense of an
activity, which the conceiver experiences as part of an on-going
temporal continuum.
Think of something you might have done better.
a) you did that wrong
b) you did that wrongly
Question 10.
With this question I was exploring wording a command three different
ways so that three different perceptual positions were implied in the
phrasing, yet all referred to the same topic. The first a) uses the
nominalisation 'childhood' which is an abstract noun. The second b)
uses the word 'being' which could produce association into the event,
and in the third c) I was curious about whether there would be
different responses to the instruction 'remember yourself as...'.
a) Remember your childhood.
b) Remember being a child.
c) Remember yourself as a child.
Question 11.
The intentions behind this question were to explore the effects of
directing the other to look at information (about something they did
really well) in different ways, first by asking them to think about how
they could make something even better, (which presupposes that it
was good in the first place) and then requesting them to consider it in
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a totally different way, directing them to search for information that
they were not (yet) paying attention to. This question was dropped
after the first two interviews because the subjects seemed to be
confused by b, and confusion was not what I wanted to explore at this
stage.
Think of something you do really well.
a) how could you make it even better?
b) what are you not paying attention to?
Question 12.
With this question I was interested In the effects of the word 'yet'
placed at the end of a negative injunction. The word 'yet' is both a
linkage word and a phonological ambiguity, (Sandler and Grinder
1975A). It also presupposes an on-going process by introducing a
further time frame through presupposition.
Imagine something you might do. How do you respond when I say:
a) you can't do that, or
b) you can't do that yet
Question 13.
Here I was interested to find out the effects of using questions
beginning with what and how, then why, to explore whether these
produced different internal responses when applied to the same
content, l.e. a goal in life. Question d) aims to move the conceiver's
perceptual position from present looking forward, to future looking
back.
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The last question f) aims to find out whether having considered the
previous questions had in any way altered the internal representation
of the subject's goal.
Think of a goa/ you have in your life:
a) what do you need to achieve it?
b) how will you achieve it?
c) why will you achieve it?
d) what will It be like to have achieved that goal?
f) Now think of the goal again? What happens?
Question 14.
It is claimed that human consciousness cannot compute a negative,
(Erickson 1980) but must always first make an internal representation
of what is to be negated, in order to then negate it. The aim of this
question was to explore the effects of negative injunctions on internal
representations. People were asked for their responses to each of
these statements.
a) Don't think about failure
b) Youmust not imagine a blue camel
c) Don't make that mistake again.
Question 15.
What interested me with this question was whether the command to
'think about' as in sentence a) produced a different response to the
question using an awareness predicate (feel) in question b.
a) think about how much you have learned
b) are you aware of how much you have learned?
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Question 16.
This is another attempt to elicit different responses to nominalised
and de-nominalised information. Thus the word 'communication' is an
abstract noun obtained by the transformation of the verb
'communicating'. In this process the action of the verb is again
deleted, (Sandler and Grinder 1975).
a) It's important to understand communication.
b) It's important to understand communicating.
2.5.4. Questions that ended in the recycle bin
In retrospect, I believe that some questions were thought up too
hastily, as I really believed that the data that I would gather would
lead me to design a more effective schedule. I give them for the sake
of transparency about my own research process. When I realised that
they seemed inappropriate, I consigned them to the recycle bin.
The question below was used with some of the interviewees. I
stopped using it, because the answers seemed somewhat complex. In
fact the few people I asked did, on reading the transcripts, yield some
interesting insights.
A. How are apples and oranges different?
B. How are apples and oranges the same?
In the next question, I left out C.
A. Think of something you do really well.
B. How could you make it even better?
C. What are you not paying attention to?
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2.6. Ethics and research protocols.
The Interviews were carried out after the end of the course and the
assessment. This was to distinguish this part of my activities from the
teaching, so that students' assessment and my own research were
clearly distinguishable. I was careful to interview people several days
after the end of the course and the presentation of certificates. I
chose people as much on the basis of their availability in a busy
hospital setting, as on my judgement of their willingness to share
their (sometimes strange) introspections. Each person was
interviewed in private, either in a teaching room in the hospital
complex, or in their own homes. The interviews were tape recorded,
and transcribed on my return to the UK. I include a sample of one
whole transcript in Appendix 3.
McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead (1996) have published a checklist for
ensuring that the research protocol follows ethical guidelines. Among
the first is to negotiate access with the authorities. I obtained written
consent from the Head of the Hospital Programme to carry out this
research. This is included in appendix 2. I also asked each participant
to sign a consent form in which they gave me permission to use the
material for this research study, and which also informed them that
any material that they did not want to be included would be
withdrawn. The form also assured them of their complete anonymity,
and confidentiality. Patton (1990) emphasises the necessity for this.
These consent forms are also included in Appendix 2. The names of all
the participants have also been changed to ensure anonymity.
Before the interviews, each person was told that they could stop the
interview at any time that they wished, and withdraw from the
sample. This was to ensure participants' right to withdraw from the
research, which is one of the aspects listed by McNiff et a/ (1996). It
is also important to protect participants from any harm or distress, so
I made it clear during the interviews that we were not there to
uncover unhappy memories, but to explore their responses to
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language. So on the one occasion when one of my collaborators did
access an uncomfortable childhood memory, Imade sure that she
was able to 'leave it behind' and stay safely in the present, by
reassuring her, and gradually moving her into a more confident state.
She also knew that she could stop the interview, and even withdraw
from the research at any time.
McNiff et at (1996) also recommend that others involved in the
research should be kept informed. Unfortunately it was not possible to
do this with all the participants, as a few weeks after my return Iwas
hospitalised for some time, and then endured several months of
convalescence. Many of the participants had by then left the country,
and changed their email addresses. Communication with people in the
Middle East became problematic because of the changing world
political climate. However, Iwas able to check some of the transcripts
by email with one of the partlclpants, (,Edward'), who was also an
assistant on my course. He later engaged in some further interviewing
for the second phase of my data gathering. The account of this, and
the analysis of the resulting transcripts form the main subject of
Chapter 10.
2.7. Concluding reflections.
These interviews were designed to elicit information about some
deeply subjective processes in my participants. Gregory Bateson's
cybernetic thinking, which forms one of the theoretical backbones of
NLPand this inquiry, proposed that units of behaviour are defined by
the structure of the experiment. (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:74).
What follows from this is the ontological impossibility of any
separation between observer and observation. The observer and that
which is observed becomes one interactive phenomenon only possible
through the act of knowing. The researcher, as it were, brings a
phenomenon into being through the act of inquiry. According to
Bateson, any Inquiry is "an action [ ...] cut out from the flow of
behaviour, through the act of perception" (Bateson, in Donaldson
53
1991). An inquirer becomes " ... partly blown by the winds of reality
and partly an artist creating a composite out of the inner and outer
events". (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991 :223). Introspection and
reflection become an essential part of this approach, for " ... every
discovery concerning human behaviour in the external universe is also
a discovery about the self, and often an unwelcome discovery in that
inner field", (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:247).
What this approach makes possible is the ability to make distinctions
between what Bateson thought of as logical types. For instance, it
becomes easier to distinguish between process and content,
description and explanation, abstraction and sensory experience,
different levels of abstraction, or observation and projectlon, because
they are considered to be different logical types. Bateson also
introduced the fascinating possibility that learning occurs at different
levels, so there can be learning, and learning about learning, and
learning about learning about learning, just as there can be reflection,
and reflection on reflection, and so on. Because these are different
logical types or categories, it can be predicted that one can draw
distinctions between them. A research project may then become as
much about researching into research, as about research Itself. Such
self-reflexivity is one of the hallmarks of cybernetic systems.
Cresswell (1998) notes that every model implicitly generates
presuppositions about its ontology, epistemology and methodology.
Bateson's ontological view was that information was the fundamental
organising principle of the universe. Bateson told his students" I want
you now to start thinking in terms of biological systems or universes
which are organised by Information, i.e. by significant differences
rather than by forces or impacts." (Donaldson 1991:178) Thus there
is a clear distinction to be made between the ontological
presuppositions of the mechanistic scientific tradition, which believes
that everything is reducible to particles and forces, and Bateson's
views on the primacy of information. In this model, information is
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itself organised into different logical levels. It is thus itself the subject
of being organised by information, in an almost fractal way.
And this was only the beginning.
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Chapter 3. Of Maps and Models, Phantasmagoria and
Simulacra.
Philosophy of the mind, traditional experimental psychology,
communication theory, systems theory, computer science, linguistics
and neuroscience have all played important roles in the shaping of
this research area - changing its focus, providing new theoretical
concepts and supplying integration metaphors as explanatory tool.
[Out of this has arisen] cognitive modelling. Explanations of human
cognition are expressed as abstract models based on the conception
of a human brain as a physical symbol system consisting of a
representational system and the processes which manipulate it.
(Aitkenhead and Slack 1985:IX).
We must bear in mind Wittgenstein ~ reminder that the diverse
phenomena that are found within the domain of the words 'conscious'
and 'consciousness' may not be unified by a common essence. "
(Harre 2000:234).
3.1. Introduction
My research up to now has increasingly led me to inquire into the
processes that people use to explain, understand, dream, make
sense, achieve goals, learn, reflect, and respond to external stimuli,
including language. This is at the heart of my investigation, and I
intend to offer another model of some learning processes, which may
be involved in the construction of knowledge. I explore the ways in
which these may be linked to language in Chapters 10 and 11. These
emerged from my reflections on the data I had collected, and its
analysis.
This chapter is a review of some of the ideas from the more recent
literature about our cognitive processes. Making sense of how we
make sense internally has remained a challenge to educational and
cognitive psychology for the best part of the last century. It is
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dominated by questions such as: what are the internal processes that
are necessary for us to operate successfully in the world? What do we
do 'inside our heads' that enables us to construct our conceptual
maps and act on them? How do these processes influence learning?
There are four main sections to this Chapter:
1. I address some theories about mental models and related
domains, including a consideration of the cybernetic approach.
2. I review the possible contribution of NLP to our understanding
of mental models, and a comparison with other approaches,
3. I consider the processes of abstraction and categorisation, and
their roles in the formation of our cognition.
4. I include a short review of some of the principal ideas about
unconscious information processing.
3.2.1. Mental models, internal representations, cognitive maps
or constructs; a rose by any other name ...
The notion that we possess cognitive maps is usually attributed in the
psychological literature to Tolman (1948) who proposed that the
nervous systems of organisms were able to produce some sort of
internal spatial re-creation of the world around them in order for them
to find their way around their territory. However, this idea goes back
further, to the work of Korzybski (1958) who first published his views
in 1941 that human beings have internal maps, which may be linked
to language. Gregory Bateson was particularly intrigued by the
epistemological implications of such internal ways of sense making,
(Bateson 1972). Bandura, one of Bateson's coevals, was urging
people to recognise the relevance of the study of conceptual models
to learning: "It is surprising that traditional accounts of learning
contain little or no mention of modelling processes" (Bandura
1971 :2).
One of the main problems facing any reviewer of this field is the
question of nomenclature. Wittgenstein mused that "nothing is more
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difficult than facing concepts without prejudice, and that is the
principal difficulty of philosophy" (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994: 177).
The area known as cognitive psychology, from which much of this
chapter is drawn, attributes a distinctive meaning to the word
cognitive, and embeds it in a distinctive paradigm, or way of thinking.
The framework of most cognitive psychology is Cartesian, positivistic,
and based on reliance on the results of experiments that are mostly
carried out within the empirical, objectivistic and nomothetic tradition.
The meaning of the word cognition that emerges from this is one
where knowing is an almost platonically idealistic mental process,
undistorted by gross feelings, values or the ever present danger of
subjectivity. It is also one where it is easy to conclude that the
nervous system alone is the chief mediator of knowledge, ignoring the
possibility that individuals may use many other parts of their bodies
to know, and to process information. The latter belongs more to the
field of cybernetics, which has, in the main, been ignored by
mainstream psychological inquiries. Its essence is to understand
phenomena as complex wholes, not reducible to parts, depending on
information for their functioning, and responsive to feedback. Patton
(1990) has pointed out that neither objectivity or subjectivity are
useful as concepts.
When I turned to the Concise Oxford Dictionary for a definition of the
term 'cognition', I found, to my surprise, that lt allowed for a rather
broader view. Cognition: (noun) the mental action or process of
acquiring knowledge through thought, experience, and the senses. >
a perception, sensation or intuition resulting from this. It then informs
me that its origin is from the Latin cognoscere, 'get to know'.
Furthermore, the word cognitive is an adjective relating to cognition.
Although the dictionary defines cognition as a 'mental' process (this is
only to be expected; Cartesian/platonic dualism is embedded in our
language!), it does not exclude the role of sensation (which I take to
refer to a neuro-physiological function mediated solely by the body).
It also includes the role of experience, which again, is not just a
mental phenomenon. It goes on to include intuition within the bounds
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of the definition of cognition. The definition of intuition seems to have
been a challenge to many researchers, (Clarke and Mackaness 2001,
Perrig and Wippich 1995), and may long remain so.
The terminologies that have been used to explore such internal
'mental' phenomena present us with a veritable Tower of Babel of
nomenclature. There are a number of different terms used in the
literature to describe the inner worlds of human information
processing. As far as I can make out, they all seem to be addressing
the same .issue, perhaps from slightly different vantage points or from
within differing conceptual models. Miller et al (1960) introduced the
term 'plans' into the literature. Johnson-Laird (1983) and his co-
workers favoured the term mental models. Piaget (1953) used the
term 'mental image'. Sutherland (1992) preferred the term 'mental
constructs'. Zhang and Norman (1994) used the term
'representational system', and 'internal representation', though in a
different sense to the ways in which Bandler and Grinder understood
and used the term. Fauconnier and his school describe internal
processes as interacting 'mental spaces' (Fauconnier 1994, Koenig
1998). Jackendorff (1996) and Gibbs (2001) use the term 'mental
representations'. In the literature (for instance Fauconnier 1997,
Martin 2000, Kerzel et al 2001) the term 'cognitive map' is frequently
found. Cause mapping is another approach used by many. This seeks
to understand thought and action in terms of the cognitive patterns of
cause and effect, (Weick 2001). I use a number of terms
interchangeably; the only caveat is that when I use the term 'mental',
I use it metaphorically rather than dualistically.
Whatever confusion this variety of nomenclature produces, the
exploration of how people code and process information remains a
vast and complex area for inquiry. This project centres on the
question of how we can find out more about people's internal mapping
processes, and the possible role of language in our mysterious sense
making procedures. The question of what to call these processes (or
structures) remains important. Despite Wittgenstein's provocative
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statement that "we are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we
use, not because we don't know their real definition, but because
there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there must be
would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they
playa game according to strict rules," (Wittgenstein, in Kenny
1994:119).
My own preference is to use the term cognitive maps, or mental
constructs to give the reader some idea of the development of my
own thinking, despite the Cartesian baggage these terms may carry.
My own meaning of the term cognition is that which refers to a
process of knowing in which the whole of the system of an organism
may be involved, and which may be explored in a multitude of
different ways.
Our concepts, or cognitive maps could be defined as the abstractions
that we use to make sense of our life's experiences. The term 'map'
is sometimes very useful; Tolman (1948) suggested that the central
nervous system produced internal spatial representations that acted
as maps enabling animals to find their way around their terrain. Since
then the meaning of the term has expanded to include both internal
'geographical' maps as well as the more abstract patterns of
information that enable people to make sense of their worlds. The
term has since expanded its meaning. It is still used in the
geographical sense, such as in the work of Golledge et al (2000) who
propose that "cognitive maps are the internal representations of
experienced external environments, including the spatial relations
among features and objects" (Golledge et al 2000:93). Others include
Yeap and Jefferies (2000) who propose a model for the development
of spatial maps in people. The notion of mapping has come to be
included in models about how we think, (Gattis, 2001, Liben 2001).
The term 'map' was also much loved by Bateson (1972) who often
used it to describe the processes that we employ to build up our
knowledge of the terrain of our existence.
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3.2.2.Constructivism and cognition
Entwistle and Smith (2002) have proposed that the 'present fashion'
(sic) in education is constructivism. Constructivist theories present
learning in terms of the development of an individual's unique
understanding through how they have 'structured' knowledge. There
is increasing interest in how learners actually construct their cognitive
maps when engaging in learning. Constructivism is based on the
central tenet that humans actively "build" their internal models or
representations of the world of their experience. My own approach
could be seen to be within this movement, as I inquire both into the
nature of people's internal conceptual worlds, and the roles that
language plays in their formation. The emergence of the constructivist
movement and its main players has been reviewed by Sutherland
(1992) who stresses the importance of developing our understanding
of the role of language in the development of mental constructs. He
also relates constructivism to the emergence of new approaches to
the teaching of Science, such as the Cognitive Acceleration Science
Education, (CASE).
Perhaps the main originator of our present understanding of the
importance of our needs to create constructs as part of learning was
Piaget, (1971) who, in acknowledging his debt to Kant, wrote that:
' ...intelligence is not limited to receiving impressions like a tabula
rasa, but structures reality by means of a priori forms of
sensibility and understanding'. (Piaget 1971:57.)
He further held that 'the mental image [ ... ] owed its formation to an
internalised imitation', (Piaget 1971: 132). Learning theory has been
greatly influenced by Piaget and his followers for the last half century,
and has dominated much research into the development of children's
logical abilities as they grow through different stages to maturity,
(Beilin 1992). Doolittle (2003) has reviewed some more recent
developments and applications of constructivism to teaching and
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learning theory. He has also suggested (Doolittle 2003, 2003A), that
constructivism, having become the main explanatory metaphor system
in contemporary learning theory, needs integrating with cognitivism,
and could be further illumined by complexity theory.
Jonassen (1999) urged that mental constructs still needed further
investigation, particularly in relation to how learners built up
advanced knowledge. Martin et al (2000) have, for instance, used
concept mapping and interviews to compare the internal strategies of
successful and not so successful learners. Lancaster (2000) suggests
that the impetus to generate models is probably the most
fundamental point of connection between spiritual mysticism and
psychology. Clarke and Mackaness (2001) have used cognitive maps
to isolate the intuitive elements of managers' intuitions, and how it
might be that intuition 'cuts through' to the essence of a situation.
Weick and Bougon (2001) suggest that maps are epistemological
structures which are intimately tied to thought and action. Liben
(2001) suggests that cognitive maps are essential to thinking. She
distinguishes between a cognitive and a cartographic map; in a
cognitive map the medium is both internal and metaphorical.
Cognitive maps are thus the more complex of the two. Van Dijl<..·
(1997) brings in the dimension of language, suggesting that mental
models are "the point of departure of all text and talk" (Van Dijk
1997:189).
3.2.3 Modelling learning, and learning modelling.
Interest in modelling learning emerged as part of the development of
constructivism. In the 1970s, Norman (1977) argued that all cognitive
systems had to have an internal model of the environment, of their
self and of others in order for there to be any intelligent interaction
between humans and the external world. He stressed that the nature
of these cognitive systems needed to be the focus of many different
lines of further inquiry.
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Rumelhart and Norman (1985) focused mainly on how learners learn.
They proposed that information within human memory consists of
active structural networks with their own complex and dynamic
characteristics. They stress that in such representation systems "the
processes that evaluate and interpret the representations are as
important as the representations themselves." (Rumelhart and
Norman 1985:20) These, they proposed, behaved somewhat like
templates for organising information. Their origins involved the
aggregation of a complex of information into nodes, (possibly
mediated by the nervous system) then the naming of these with
words, as well as organising and structuring data on the basis of
similarity and clusters around prototypes, distinguishing differences,
parsing, ordaining cause effect relations, creating connections,
ordaining intentionality, quantifying, and defining subject-object
relations. They also believed that language played a part in these
complex processes. They suggest that it manifests as semantic
networks in the central nervous system and was integral to human
information processing. They also refer to a representation as a map,
which is something that stands for something else, and which can be
used without reference to the phenomenal world.
Such mental models are considered to be important to learning
theory. Nelson (1996) has explored the possible roles of language in
the construction of what she calls Mental Event Representations
(MER). She believes that 'by building representations of
environments on the basis of individual experience, a general "world
model" is constructed that guides individual actions, (Nelson
1996: 17). She recognises that language has an important role to
play, claiming that MERschange during an individual's development
as the result of acquiring language. She also suggests that the way in
which people are spoken to during their early development affects
what and how they remember.
However, nearly a decade earlier, Oatley (1977) had proposed that
thinking about anything involved the internal manipulation of
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something that was re-constructed by human thought, rather than
purely interacting with the environment.
"Cues in the environment and used to address and guide an
internal model or representation, within which symbolic
inferences are made about the outside world and actions that we
might take towards it" (Oatley 1977: 547)
Rumelhart and Norman, (1985) having explored similar ideas further,
suggested that:
The most important point about a representation is that it allows
us to reach conclusions about the thing being represented by
looking only at the representing world. (Rumelhart and Norman
(1985: 17).
Johnson-Laird, working in the field of cognitive psychology, (1983,
1983A) also suggested that mental models were indispensable to the
process of learning and understanding. He believed that there were at
least two levels to this process. One was the actual construction of a
working model in the mind, which was, in his view, always limited. At
the second level, there was the possibility of constructing a working
model about a working model. He further distinguished between
propositional representations and mental models. Using the example
of finding one's way around Hampton Court Maze, he suggests that
when a person in the maze used their internal map to 'see' what was
around the next corner, they were using a mental model of the
environment. Propositional representations, on the other hand,
involved using language in order to access the rules about how to exit
the maze, such as 'keep taking the next right turn.'
Johnson-Laird's view is similar to that of Miller (1977), who
distinguished between practical and lexical knowledge. Johnson-Laird
further distinguishes between mental models, propositional
representations and images, which the mind uses, as it were, to
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represent classes of phenomena. He suggests that one can have an
image of an individual triangle, but not of the class triangle.
Sometimes however a specific image of a triangle might actually
stand for the class it represents. He proposes that mental models are
built up by discourse, recognising that language plays a vital role in
their formation.
Johnson-Laird was also interested in the logical processes that people
use to solve problems and make sense of information. He recognised
that mental models were complex. They had the power to enable
people to draw inferences, verify statements, use syllogisms, make
true-false decisions, manipulate data, perceive images from different
view points, transform images, rotate them, and (almost as an
afterthought) 'see' the possible results of actions. He suggests that
mental models are analogues of the world of experience, which can be
modified and updated. Thus, in this view, all our knowledge of the
world depends on our ability to construct models of it. However, we
may have no ways of knowing what the structure of the world is that
is independent of the way in which we conceive of it. Gregory Bateson
(1972) described this as the difference between map and territory.
Are our constructs pure phantasmagoria? This was an ontological and
epistemological conundrum, which fascinated Gregory Bateson,
(Bateson 1972, Bateson and Bateson 1988).
Most significantly to my own work, Johnson-Laird goes to some
lengths to explore the relationships between language and mental
models, proposing that language is used to create models by proxy,
and that it does not matter as far as psychological processes are
concerned, whether those processes are real or imaginary. Language
itself is understood through mental models. Much of what Bandler
and Grinder (1975, 1975A, 1976, 1979), Bandler (1985), Bandler and
MacDonald (1988) explored and proposed, that what they found from
working in the field of personal change and psychotherapy, often bore
resemblances to developments in cognitive psychology such as those
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of Norman, (Rumelhart and Norman 1985) Johnson-Laird, (1983) and
De Beaugrande (1985), who wrote that:
It would seem reasonable to envision the mental representations
as multi-directional networks constructed and annotated to serve
all the levels of processing, including words and phrases. (De
Beaugrande 1985:168).
One of the main differences between NLPand other more mainstream
schools of psychology is the role assigned to the senses in the
formation of cognitive maps. (I explain this in the next section.) There
is little in cognitive psychology on the role of the sense in the
formation of mental models. There are some exceptions. Kosslyn
(1985) for instance, proposed that much long term memory is based
on imagery, and that people can perform a variety of actions on their
internal images, such as rotating them, scanning, zooming in or out
or transforming them. He further suggested that people can
"voluntarily form images of objects at different sizes and locations"
(Kosslyn 1985:71). He does not specify the extent to which such
'images' are constructed by means of the senses, or whether this had
ever been empirically investigated.
Others have lately paid lip service to the idea that the senses may be
part of internal modelling. Golledge et al (2000) recognised that:
"Most people, when building a knowledge structure or
representation of places and environment, do not use
instruments or mapped representations, but rely on the basic
sense of vision, acoustics, touch and sensory, motor or
proprioceptive experience to identify, encode and store
environmental knowledge." (Golledge et al 2000:94).
Prevously, Gibbs and Colston (1995), working within the tradition of
cognitive linguistics had recognised that what they term mental image
schemas are at once visual, auditory kinaesthetic and tactile, and
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include the sense of balance. However they do not offer any ways of
attempting to discover more about these. It is one of the most
fundamental tenets of NLP, both in theory and practice, that we re-
create experience internally through our senses, through creating
internal representations. Thus when we make internal representations
we use our vision, hearing, kinaesthetic information, taste, smell and
movement internally. These may all be integral to our mysterious
mapping processes, to how we make sense. I explain this in greater
detail below.
3.2.4 Behaviourism and information processing; two different
approaches.
Classical Behaviourists such as B.F. Skinner (1974) believed that we
were essentially stimulus-response machines, so that learning and
behaviour were nothing but responses to particular stimuli. Learning
became equated with re-inforcement. On the other hand, the
emergence of the information processing approach, reviewed by Klahr
(1987) was closely linked to the growth in interest in artificial
intelligence and robotics. Before that, Wiener had meticulously
explored the differences between classical behaviourism and the
implications to man and machine of the new paradigm of cybernetics
and information processing, (Wiener 1961). Answers to the question
'how do humans process information and then act on it?' became
central to developing computer software that carried out the same
processes. It came to be recognised that humans (and perhaps
animals as well) may well have to construct some kind of internal
representation or conceptual map. Then the focus of inquiry changed
to exploring the characteristics and roles of the internal processes
that were necessary to receive, store, recover and process
information. They needed to make models of how people made
models of their experiences. This changed the focus of psychological
lnqulrv. Perrig (1999) has made a similar polnt.
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Through the dominance of the behaviourist tradition in the first
part of this century, the focus was mainly on the action part, on
performance. Cognitive psychology changed this focus and
psychological studies started to contain lengthy elaborations on
mental architecture and processes. (Perrig 1999: 103).
With the growth of interest in artificial intelligence, it came to be
realised that without more insights into such 'mental' processes, the
investigation of any human behaviour was missing a whole dimension.
Turing (in Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960) wrote that "a machine
cannot be expected to simulate something that has never been
described - it can be held responsible only for those aspects of
behaviour that an observer has recorded". (Miller, Galanter and
Pribram 1960:46). The field is still at the stage of exploration; many
authors have observed that we continue to lack an overall theoretical
paradigm to account for human information processing and mapping.
Van Dijk (1997) observed that "despite the rather extensive work on
mental models, an explicit theoretical account of their internal
structures has so far not been provided". (Van Dijk 1997: 191). I hope
that this work contributes something to this area.
3.2.5. Cybernetics
I introduce and explain some cybernetic theories, as I believe they
may be a useful approach to our understanding of our cognitive
processes. They also form one of the conceptual frameworks within
which I carried out this study. The cybernetic theories of Gregory
Bateson (1972) are relevant because they influenced the development
of NLP.
Both cognitive psychology, and the developers of cybernetic thinking
sought greater insights into what they called mental processes.
Bandler and Grinder, the founders of NLP, admit their debt to many of
the first cyberneticians, such as Miller. In 1960, Miller, Galanter and
Pribram (1960) wrote:
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'A human being - and probably other animals as we" - builds up
internal representations, a model of the universe, a schema, a
simulacrum, a cognitive map, an Image' (Mtller et aI1960:7).
Miller and his co-workers argued that such internal representations
(or plans) were necessary in order for any activity to be carried out
successfully. They claimed that without an organism's ability to re-
construct an internal representation or map, either of experience or of
a future outcome, there could be no meaningful behaviour. Learning
thus became dependent on building up effective mental maps;
simulacra of the 'real' world. They proposed that there could be no
survival if an organism did not have the ability to somehow create
such internal models. In order to operate successfully on the
environment, the organism, in addition, needed some kind of imaginal
thinking ability. This is part of what they termed the 'plan' which they
believed was essential to connect knowledge, evaluation and action.
An organism was thus continuously interacting with its environment,
and updating its 'maps'.
'Imaginal thinking is neither more nor less than constructing an
image or model of the environment, running the model faster
than the environment, and predicting that the event will behave
as the model does.' (Miller et a11960: 173)
This raises questions about the possible functions of such plans. Some
cyberneticians suggest that in order for any activity to be able to be
carried out successfully in the present, information about its desired
outcome in the future must also be available to it from somewhere
within the system. This introduction of the dimension of time into our
understanding of information processing is one of the key differences
between cybernetics and most other approaches and distinguishes
the cybernetic approach from most other constructivist traditions.
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3.2.6. The Cybernetics of control and goal achievement; the
TOTE.
Norman (1977) urged his contemporaries in cognitive psychology to
include cybernetic explanations, proposing that there must be a
regulatory apparatus, which 'runs' the system. Perrig (1999) has
stressed the importance of developing our insights into what controls
cognitive processes. Such controls may well be beyond conscious
awareness, and even be one of the bases of intuitive knowledge.
Gregory Bateson was already exploring the concept of control in
cybernetic theory and our understanding of complex systems in the
1950s and 1960s, (Bateson 1960). The idea that all complex systems
needed a regulatory mechanism in order to function effectively and
survive remains one of the most important tenets of cybernetics.
(Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960, Wiener 1961, Ashby 1965,
Bateson 1972). Miller and his co-workers, exploring the implications
of creating artificial intelligence, (Miller et al 1960) suggested that
behaviour is organised at many levels of complexity, and is controlled
and guided by plans existing as information already within the
system. Such plans may be conscious or unconscious. These plans
were essentially information about a future goal or outcome. They
proposed that the fundamental unit of information processing which
operated at the heart of all systems was the TOTE, an acronym for
test-operate-test-exit. They distinguish this from the classical concept
of the reflex arc, believing that the TOTE was the main process
controlling all animate activities.
The TOTE became important to the development of my thinking about
how we might construct our mental models. For this reason, I give a
short account of this process. In cybernetics, there must be some
information, or plans about future activities within the system. Plans
are internal representations of what the system wants or needs to
achieve. As long as people are alive and behaving, their plans are
being executed. In order for the system to 'know' whether a plan is
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being achieved or not, it needs to compare its present state (i.e.
information about what is happening in the 'now') with the desired
planned outcome, (information about what should happen in the
future). If there is a difference between the two, then the system is
primed to respond to information in the form of negative feedback.
This is what Bateson referred to as 'news of difference', (Bateson
1972). Negative feedback informs the system that something needs
to change in order for the system to achieve the goal, i.e. that there
is a difference between the present state and the desired outcome. If
further operations are then carried out, and the state of the system
becomes the same as the planned outcome, then the system 'tests'
the differences between present state and desired state. If the activity
is 'on track'; then the feedback is positive, which is information that
no changes in the activity are needed in order to achieve the goal. If
the two (present state and desired state) become the same, then the
system exits the goal directed activity, and ceases to strive to achieve
the goal. The acronym TOTE is derived from this model. Hence test-
operate-test-exit.
The first 'test' evaluates the difference between what is to be
achieved, and what has been. Thus the TOTE process relies almost
entirely on our abilities to compare, and to perceive similarities and
differences. Bateson (1972) believed these to be fundamental
epistemological processes. The 'operate' part of the TOTE Is the
system engaging in an action that furthers its path to achieving the
goal. The third 'test' then evaluates what has now been achieved, and
if the result matches the desired plan or outcome, then the action is
exited ('exit'), or abandoned, having been completed.
This TOTE process is considered to be central to information
processing, whether conscious or unconscious. This model is held to
be as valid to explain how the nervous system controls the
contraction of a muscle fibre, as it is to illuminate more complex
activities such as learning, or finding food. Miller and his co-workers
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(1960) suggest that the TOTE is an organising and co-ordinating unit,
which processes information occurring at many levels of cornplexttv'.
They also explored the questions about the relationships between
energy and information. They suggested a hierarchical model in which
energy represented the lowest level of abstraction, information the
second level, and control the third. Cybernetics assumes that
intentionality is an aspect of all systems.
More recently, Freeman (1999) echoes Miller's ideas about
intentionality. He claims that neurophysiologists suggest that there
are integrated neural frameworks which are needed for intentional
action, because even the simplest action, such as finding food, needs
a mechanism to co-ordinate the individual creature's position in the
world in relation to that of its prey. It then has to be able to evaluate
its progress during its planning of an attack, or escaping from danger.
Freeman also suggests that the brain is able to co-ordinate visual,
auditory, somothetic and olfactory information into 'gestalts', which
then influence selective attention, expectancy and prediction of future
events. This hints at a neurological basis for the TOTE process.
Bateson was intrigued by the implications of the TOTE to human
information processing. He supported Mittelstaedt's distinctions
between the processes of calibration and feedback, (in Bateson and
Bateson 1988:42). Calibration is the process of referring to an
aggregate of information, which is constellated into a plan. The
marksman who sets his sights on a moving target is computing a
large amount of information, including how it will be when the shot
hits the target. This is calibration, which is a different activity from
feedback. Feedback is the information about the extent to which the
calibrated outcome is being met, or not. In the TOTE process, If the
first 'test' elicits the information that the goal has not been achieved,
1 Thus, for instance, every muscle fibre responds to information generated by a TOTE
carried out in the cerebellum, or the whole of a human organism can decide what he
or she is going to have for lunch. These reflect two different levels of complexity, yet
are operated by the same process.
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then it is responding to negative feedback. If the 'test' finds that the
plan has been achieved, then this is defined as positive feedback.
For Bateson, such activities were of necessity hierarchical. He uses
the example of a thermostat controlling the central heating of a
house. This is essentially a feedback mechanism, the thermostat
being receptive to information about the temperature. It acts in the
same way as the governor of a steam engine. If the ambient
temperature is lower than that at which the thermostat is set, then
this is negative feedback, indicating that more heat (i.e. a change) is
needed. In other words, there are still differences between the
present state and the desired state. When the temperature reaches
the set degree, then the thermostat sends information to the boiler to
switch itself off. However, there is a 'higher' level of complexity to this
hierarchy. The person setting the thermostat, her needs, values and
beliefs, have a controlling role in the heating of the house. She will
TOTE as she sets the thermostat to her own outcomes. So this
operation is at another level of control. These levels in turn may be
controlled by yet 'higher' factors, such as the ecological implications
of burning fossil fuels, and so on.
Thus one of the main implications of cybernetic theory is that a
system's goals must playa central role in its continuing functioning.
This intentionality is an idea not dissimilar to Aristotle's final cause.
Using this approach, we could not gain a full understanding of a
phenomenon without considering how its intentionality operates." The
cybernetic model proposes that the feedback, calibration and the
TOTE may be the most fundamental of all information processing
mechanisms, operating at all levels of complexity in organisms, from
the sub-cellular to the societal.
2 Crombie (1961) has ootnted out that Aristotle distinguished between
animate and inanimate things. Living things, in Aristotle's view, were able to
initiate movement and changewithout at external mover. Both Aristotle and
Galenmade valuable discoveries about the organs of animals by seeking to
understand their purpose or function. The main difference between the
Aristotelian view, and cybernetics, is that for the Greeks purposewas
perceivedas something metaphysical.
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In cybernetics, intentionality is part of the physical information
processing apparatus of any self-maintaining system.
There is a growing awareness in the literature of the importance of
goals to the healthy functioning of individuals. Bandura (1997) has
explored the importance of a person's goals, and how they relate to
people's experience of their own self-efficacy. Tory-Higgins et at
(1997) suggest that there are two kinds of goals. One has what they
term a 'promotion focus' which relates to a desirable outcome, and
the other is called a 'prevention focus', which is where the individual's
goal is to avoid something unpleasant. They claim that there is a
relationship between individuals' goal attainment, and them feeling
good or bad. Foerster et at (1999) propose that motivation increases
as one moves towards a goal. Motivation is also stronger when it is
powered by a 'promotion focus' than by its opposite. Lebiere and Lee
(2001) apparently (and if their bibliography is anything to go by,
without being aware of Miller's views) re-discover the idea of the
TOTE, but use a different terminology. They propose that
uncompleted or only partially completed intentions are available as a
context to the current goal. Once tasks are completed, they are
removed from the current goal. This then produces an inhibitory effect
on further activities. This is another way of describing the TOTE.
If there is any substance to Lebiere and Lee's views, then the goal
must be of a different logical type to the actions leading to it. In
cybernetic terms we would use the concept of positive and negative
feedback as necessary information guiding intentional actions. As the
internal representation of a goal is a complex aggregate of
information, it must then be of a higher (more complex) logical level
than the simpler actions used to achieve it. Such higher logical levels,
operating on the system as goals, may then also act in a similar way
to conceptual categories. Intriguingly, they then go on to suggest that
there is an Intention Superiority Effect (ISE). They claim to show by
means of empirical data and computational modelling, that intentions
are the greatest determinants when people are successful in carrying
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out tasks such as memorising. Schaub (2001) believes that all
behaviour is driven by intentions! describing them as a data structure
comprising! besides the respective needs! one or more goals! which
appear to be suitable to satisfy the current goal. He uses this as a
basis for distinguishing different personality types, based on their
individual approach to a goal.
It is as if we had come full circle back to the cybernetic viewpoint! and
Bateson's thinking, which was so important to the development of
Bandler and Grinder's work. Bateson stated that with the growth in
cybernetic theory,
"the whole problem of purpose and adaptation - the teleological
problem in the widest sense - had to be reconsidered ... what
happened at the Macy meetings was an exploration of the
enormous scope of these ideas in the explanation of biological
and social phenomena". (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:53 - 54).
3. 3. 1. NLP, models and modelling.
NLP is both about the exploration of the nature of our subjective
experience! and the role that language plays in thinking! (Bandler and
Grinder 1975). Exploring the ways in which we make sense involves
modelling! attempting to create an understanding or model of another
person's internal world. The word modelling seems to have emerged
directly as the result of the need to generate computer models that
simulated human thought processes. With the emergence of cognitive
psychology there came the recognition that inquiring into what went
on in people's subjective experience was perhaps more important
than experimenting with rats in mazes.
Eysenk (1993) suggests that with the growth of interest in
information processing there occurred a' significant shift of attention
to 'mental' processes in a number of fields. Clement (2000) has posed
some questions that this shift generated for contemporary research
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into teaching and learning. Some of these were: what are the roles of
mental models in learning? What is the nature of these models as
knowledge structures? What learning processes are involved in
constructing them? What teaching strategies can promote these
learning processes? (Clement 2000).
Lakoff (1987), believed that we use mental models in order to
attempt to understand the world. In particular we depend on them for
our theorising about the world, and they allow us to make sense of
mental phenomena. This is of interest to educationalists, particularly
those favouring a constructivist approach, because learning is thought
to involve the formation of cognitive maps. I draw from a number of
psychological approaches, especially from those that intersect with my
own approach. I believe that the topic is of importance to anyone
interested in the processes involved in learning, and how these may
be mediated by teaching.
In 1976 Bandler and Grinder, the founders of NLP, explained their
own approach to the idea that in order for us to know, and to be able
to act on the world, we humans had to be able to re-create an
internal representation of 'reality', through using all the senses
internally. They used the term 'internal representation' specifically to
refer to this aspect of knowing and making sense. I review their ideas
in more depth later on in this chapter. They cite Vaihinger's work
published in 19243 (Bandler and Grinder 1976) as one of the sources
which inspired them to further explorations. Gregory Bateson (1972)
was perhaps one of their most influential mentors, as their neighbour,
friend and prolific speculator and writer. He spent a great part of his
life exploring how we humans, made sense of the myriads of bits of
information that impinge on our sense organs throughout our lives,
believing that only a new approach to our own mental processes
would result in a greater understanding of understanding. In this he
was influenced by Alfred Korzybski(1958), who was one of the first to
3 Vaihinger, H. (1924) The Philosophy of "As If". Routledge Kegan Paul, UK.
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explore the idea that mental processes might influence how we
thought, understood and used language.
For both Korzybski and Bateson, the existence of such maps had a
profound epistemological significance. They proposed that it was only
through developing an understanding of the mapping processes
themselves that we could arrive at any insights into how we knew. As
early as 1941 Korzybski had distinguished between the mental
processes we need to make sense of experience, and experience
itself, urging that it was an epistemological necessity to understand
that such internal maps were in no way to be confused with the
'external territory'. In this he echoed Bertrand Russell, who according
to Ernst Nagel (1960), had re-interpreted physics by proposing that
what is experienced is distinct from the logical constructions
subsequently put upon it by the observer.
In the 1970s some schools of psychotherapy, such as the Mental
Research Institute in Palo Alto, California, and the approaches taken
by practitioners of Brief Therapy, were quick to use developments in
our understanding of internal processes. These included therapists
deliberately inquiring into how people constructed their problematic
experiences. What did patients see, hear, feel, taste, smell as they
recollected? These traditions placed considerable emphasis on trying
to understand the structure of the pathologies in people's cognitive
maps, (Watzlawick 1967, Bateson 1972). Bandler and Grinder (1975,
1976, 1979), Bandler (1982), were influenced by these approaches.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) and Bandler and MacDonald (1988) then
developed an approach to therapy and change which depended wholly
on understanding and working with people's subjectively experienced
internal representations, beliefs and values, stressing the
quintessential need for language to generate changes within these
internal processes. They also recognised the extent to which
individuals could be damaged through the pathological communication
patterns from significant others.
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3.3.2. Bandler, Grinder and MacDonald's ideas on internal
representations and sub-modalities; how the senses may
be involved in information processing.
In this section I consider the approach to internal representations that
has become part of current NLP theory and practice. It also
represents a departure from many other ideas about mental models,
which currently predominate in the literature. It has become part of
received wisdom that we possess a complex interactive processing
mechanism, simulating, yet adapting and responding to incoming
information, forming a kind of dynamic map, a simulacrum of
experience which is then responsible for generating our responses.
Sandler and Grinder (Grinder and Sandler 1976, Sandler and
MacDonald 1988) claim to have discovered a significantly different
aspect of people's internal cognitive models, which seems to have
escaped the notice of mainstream cognitive psychologists.
This difference is that people create what are specifically termed
internal representations, which could be described as a part of
people's mental models. However, in internal representations, all the
senses are involved in creating or re-creating experience for the
conceiver. So people can see, hear, feel, taste, smell, be aware of
movement, experience changes in temperature, and the other
physiological concomitants of associated emotions as they think about
an experience. It does not matter whether the experience that is 're-
presented' is a memory, a reflection, a future goal, or a daydream.
Thinking always involves using the senses internally, as it were, to
code experience.
My information gathering focused on exploring these areas.
Information about this aspect is almost completely missing from other
approaches to modelling how we know, and how we process
information. It is also absent from most mainstream educational
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theories. It was of particular interest to me, as it is one of the areas
which I explored in my data collecting, and which I describe further in
Chapters 6 - 10.
There are some references to internal representations in the
therapeutic literature. Knox (2000), for instance, investigated people's
internal representations of their therapists. She found that not only
did they use visual, auditory and kinaesthetic modalities when they
were introspecting about the therapists, some also used these images
to gain comfort and reassurance when away from the therapist.
When one is working at the level of internal representations and sub-
modalities, questions about 'how do we know' inevitably occur.
Traditional psychology, cast in the Cartesian dualistic mode (Damasio
1994, 2000), usually ignores the role of the body and the emotions in
cognition. This is nowhere more typified than in some of the recent
publications in cognitive linguistics. Grady (2000) reviews his ideas on
what some of the basic cognitive processes might be, but ignores the
role of physiological processes or feelings. Gibbs (2001) explores
blending theory in relation to cognition. Blending theory suggests that
meaning is produced through the "blending" of different mental
"spaces" (Fauconnier 1994,1997, Fauconnier and Turner 2000, 2002).
Gibbs proposes that blending theory offers some provocative ideas
about how people represent information and map different domains of
knowledge to create what he terms 'blended spaces'. (Gibbs
2000:352). He also cites seven characteristics of cognitive models,
originally published by Markham in 1999 as a guide to further
research. In none of these is there any mention of body, feelings,
emotions, goal setting, or rnotlvatlon", let alone any role for the
senses.
4 Markham's Proposals, cited by Gibbs (2001) as defining cognitive models.
1. Cognitive models must be based on representations that actually
represent.
2. Cognitive models must adopt multiple approaches to representation
3. Cognitive models must use representations at multiple grain size.
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In Bandler and MacDonald's (1988) view, if all the senses are used to
create an internal representation, then feelings or bodily sensations
must also be involved. Internal representations are thus not only
neuro-physiological phenomena, they may also be linked to
physiological processes. Damasio (2000) expresses such a view from
his standpoint as a neuro-physiologist, " .... Even when we merely
think about an object, we tend to reconstruct memories not just of a
shape or color but also of the perceptual engagement the object
required and of the accompanying emotional reaction, regardless of
how slight", (Damasio 2000: 148). Kerzel el al (2001), writing from a
similar position, suggest that the most recent neurological research in
this area polnts to cognitive maps both influencing perception and
simultaneously activating patterns of motor responses. Perception and
action, in their view, are fed by a common, cognitively penetrable,
representation.
The importance given to the domain of the senses as essential parts
of the structures of internal representations appears to be unique to
NLP. In Bandler's view, a phobia is a memory or image of something
that is linked to an overwhelming bodily feeling, which produces a
strong fight-fright-flight response whenever it is accessed. In
cybernetic theory, body and mind are not separate entities, (the split
is purely a linguistic one); they are parts of the same cybernetic
system. They are not distinguishable, except conceptually. Bateson
described the Cartesian split as "the battleground of science,
especially of biology (...) and the problem is how to get away from it",
(Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:176). In his cybernetic epistemology
there is another split of a fundamentally epistemological nature; the
split between the map that we have conceptualised, and the terrain of
4. Cognitive models must be clear about the specification of process.
5. Cognitive models must attend to the details of processing as well as
its gross form.
6. Cognitive models must attend to social context.
7. Cognitive models must attend to the relationship between the
individual and the world.
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experience. This, in his view, may forever remain an ontological
conundrum to us. Bateson recounted at a lecture given at Lindisfarne
in 1975: "I keep coming back to the assertion that what we deal with
are descriptions, second order representations of how it is. How it
primarily is we don't know, we can't get there", (Bateson, in
Donaldson 1991: 182). This is reminiscent of Zeno's paradox, for it
has a similar structure. Is the only thing that we know, perhaps, that
we cannot know?
3.3.3 Sub-modalities
One of the main areas 1 inquired into in my own data gathering was
the changes that occurred in people's internal representations as 1
asked them to respond to certain of my words or phrases. I was often
asking people to report on their experiences of what Bandler and
Grinder termed sub-modalities. Bandler and Grinder (1976) stressed
that our senses are critical to the coding of information and the
construction of our internal models. They propose that there is great
significance in the small distinctions within each sensory modality.
These distinctions are called sub-modalities.
Sub-modality distinctions are revealed by asking people about their
internal representations of events. For instance, are the internal
images in colour or black and white? Moving or still? What sort of
sounds are associated with an internal representation? Are they
accompanied by an internal dialogue? Are the sounds loud or soft,
near or far? What bodily or kinaesthetic responses contribute to a
particular internal representation? (Bandler and MacDonald 1988).
When using NLP to work with people, we explore what and how
people have re-represented internally, before making any kind of
intervention. In order to do this we need to know how to make people
conscious of their own processes at this level, as well as how to
question people about their experience of these processes.
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Bandler and Grinder were some of the first people to focus
deliberately on this aspect of people's internally coded information in
their therapeutic work. They also paid attention to what was
happening at this level when they were modelling people's conceptual
processes. This meant they had to develop an approach to
questioning which would elicit the information stored at those levels.
An example taken from one of Richard Bandler's seminars illustrates
this approach, (Andreas 1999). In the following extract Sandler is
asking people to compare their own internal representations of two
different memories, then to explore how changing some of the
variables could result in a subjective change of meaning for them. He
does this so that people easily become aware of their own domains of
internal representation, and learn about sub-modality distinctions at
the same tlme."
"There is another fascinating phrase that has always stuck in my
mind. When you're going through something unpleasant, people
will often say, "Later, when you look back on this, you'll be able
to laugh". How many people in here have a memory of an event
that was unpleasant to them at the time, but now you can look
back on it and laugh? There must be something you do in your
mind in the meantime that makes an unpleasant experience
funny later. I want you to compare those two memories to find
out how they're different in terms of visual sub-modalities - the
smaller process elements that make up a visual mental
experience. Do you see yourself in one and not the other? Is one
a slide and one a movie? Is there a difference in color, size,
brightness or location? Find out what's different and then try
changing the process variables of that unpleasant picture to
make it like the one that you can already laugh at. If the one you
can laugh at is far away, make that one far away too. If you see
yourself in the one you laugh at, see yourself in the experience
S This forms an important aspect of training in NLP.
82
that is still unpleasant. Go ahead." (Bandler, quoted in Andreas
1999:23-24).
This passage illustrates how Bandler teaches people about their own
internal representations. I am continually surprised when I train in
NLP, how easily people can access their own internal representations
of events, whether past, present, or future, and then go on to
explore the sub-modality distinctions between them without apparent
difficulty. In my own personal experience the very rare exceptions
have been when individuals have apparently suffered some profound
trauma. Then it may become difficult for them to access certain
internal representations. These may, quite appropriately, be
suppressed as part of a coping mechanism. (Perren-Klinger 1998,
Mathison 1999). There is also some interest in using NLPto enhance
teaching, (Hager 1989, 1990, 1992, Lee, 1993 Sandhu, 1994,
Stanton, 1994,).
There has also been interest in the use of NLP in coaching and
personal development work, (Thompson et al 2002). Many types of
interventions can be made at the levels of people's internal
representations and sub-modalities. This approach has also been used
to coach top athletes. Steve Collins (1995) for instance, used an NLP
trained personal coach," before his fight with Chris Eubank. A short
extract from Collins' autobiography illustrates how coaches can work
with people at the level of internal representations and sub-
modalities. The coach asks Collins to shrink the internal image he has
generated of his opponent before the fight. This is essentially asking
him to change a sub-modality, an aspect of the internal visual image.
In the following extract the coach has enabled Collins to access his
internal representations about the coming fight, then change the sub-
modalities so that his feelings about the approaching fight changed.
Collins wrote that:
6 This person had been one of my students in NLP.
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"Sports psychologists have discovered that when a boxer, a
tennis player or an athlete who competes as an individual is
frightened or intimidated by an opponent, he'll actually see that
person as being physically bigger than he really is. Again, he (the
coach) asked me to picture Eubank, standing opposite me in a
ring. 'Reduce him in size,' he said. 'He's getting smaller ... smaller
... smaller. And I did, until I towered over him by at least a foot".
(Collins 1995:173).
Our senses may have two vital functions; one is to receive
information from the environment, the other is to re-create
experience internally. The existence of such internal structures is
taken for granted by anyone who has participated in workshops or
seminars on NLP.When working to effect changes in people, internal
representations and their sub-modalities are often one of the main
'sites' at which to target interventions. Bandler claims to be able to
cure phobias by working with people almost entirely at the sub-
modality level of their conception of the phobic event, (Andreas
1999).
Some of the areas in which an understanding of internal
representations and sub-modalities has been shown to be of use
includes the investigation and treatment of post-traumatic stress
disorders, (Perren-Klinger 1992, 1998, Walsh 1992). It has also been
applied to personal coaching (Faulkner 1999) enhancing sportsmen
and women's performance (Wanless 1987, Collins and Howard 1995)
and to improving students' abilities to memorise and understand,
(Mathison 1999).
Despite its track record in business, management, and sports
coaching, NLP remains outside mainstream psychological and
phenomenological inquiry. Most of the published accounts of working
with NLP in a variety of contexts are anecdotal. Sometimes people
become suspicious of the approach, perceiving it as 'manipulative'.
There have been some publications on NLP. They range from the
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enthusiastic (Thompson, et al 2002, Lyall 2002, Reynolds, 2002) to
the critical (Platt 2001, Craft 2001).
NLPmakes many claims about how to go about modelling people's
subjective experiences. What is lacking, however, from the founders
of NLP, and many of their students, is any rigorous experimental
inquiry into the nature of theses internal representations. Internal
representations and their sub-modality distinctions are simply and
uncritically accepted as one of many aspects of everyone's ability to
code and process information. Indeed Bandler and Grinder (1975)
claim that the classical scientific approach would be entirely
inappropriate to this field, as one of their most fundamental beliefs is
that every individual is unique in the way in which he or she re-
constructs and responds to information. However, I believe one can
demonstrate the existence of internal representations and sub-
modalities, however subjective and fleeting these phenomena may
appear, through introspection.
If there is any substance to the notion of the existence of the domain
of internal representations, then this opens up new directions for
investigation. There are new questions that can be posed. These
include: what do our senses do in the construction of internal
representations? What effects does language have on these internal
processes in particular?
There also remain some thorny methodological questions, such as
'what ways are the most appropriate to such an inquiry?' The proposal
is that human beings re-represent information internally in the form
of complex simulacra of sensory data, which can be influenced by
language. What remains central to this inquiry is the belief that
people's internal representations are accessible, and can be
approached as a domain of consciousness, which can be interrogated.
They may appear as phantasmagoria to the more empirically minded,
and are as evanescent as any phantasm, yet working with them
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phenomenologically is almost like entering another domain of
consciousness. 7
3.4.1 Abstraction, categorisation, classification, logical levels;
thinking about thinking about sense-making.
The processes of abstraction and categorisation are relevant to this
inquiry because they involve both cognition and language. In this
section I review some ideas about how abstraction and categorisation
may influence our thinking. I include in the next chapter information
about some of the ways in which language too can categorise. I have
gone into this area in some detail, as my own findings were that these
levels played an important role in people's approach to learning, and
to being 'taught'.
Korzybski's work Science and Sanity (Korzybski 1958), originally
published in 1933, was one of the first to explore the implications of
the processes of abstraction to both mathematics and linguistics, as
well as to how we know that we know. It was also one of the works
that influenced the development of many of Bandler and Grinder's
ideas. Korzybsky proposed that abstraction was fundamental to
human thinking processes, and not without its dangers. The process
of abstraction essentially involves the aggregation of information into
classes or categories. Korzybsky was influenced by Bertrand Russell's
(1921) insistence that our views of logic had to be entirely revised as
the result of his (Russell's) theory of logical types. In a nutshell, it
proposes that there was a significant epistemological distinction to be
made between an individual event, and the group or category to
which it was assigned. The individual could never be the group
because they were two different logical types.
7 I describe this aspect of my explorations in Chapters 6 -9.
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In 1910 Russell (Russell 1960) had urged the necessity of
distinguishing between what was experienced through the senses,
and the constructions and definitions placed upon this through
theorising. Here we have the germ of the important distinction
between logical levels; sense data are of a different logical type, and
at a different level, than the abstractions to which they are linked to
in the conceiver. We could say that internal representations are a
different logical type to the class or category to which the represented
experience is assigned. Both are essential to making sense. It could
also be said that language could be thought of as yet another logical
type.
The epistemological pitfalls for human reasoning encountered through
the processes of abstraction remained a lasting fascination for
Gregory Bateson. He frequently wrote about the importance of being
able to distinguish between different logical levels, in order to
understand human (and even animal) behaviour. Among his most
enduring contributions was his analysis of the aetiology of
schizophrenic thinking (Bateson 1972) which could only be
understood on the basis of a sufferer's inability to assign messages to
their 'correct' logical category.
His best-known example is illustrated by the two statements 'fruit-
flies like a banana' and 'time flies like an arrow'. These can only be
understood if they are assigned to their 'correct' class of
communication. The first statement belongs to the category 'literal
statement' the second one is metaphorical. Bateson's view was that in
'schizophrenogenic' families, victims were unable to assign the second
statement to the 'correct' category of metaphor. They may even have
been prevented from doing so through confusing communications
from significant others. There are no such insects as time flies, nor do
they feed on arrows. To be able to assign incoming information to its
correct category is, in this view, critical to any act of making sense.
To be prevented from doing so, can lead to psychopathologies of
thinking.
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The processes of abstraction have also been of considerable interest
to linguists, philosophers, logicians, educationalists and psychologists.
George Lakoff (1987) in his seminal work Women, Fire and Dangerous
Things explores the processes of categorisation and their phuosophtcal
implications, arguing for an essentially subjectivist view of knowledge.
He suggested that how information was categorised, influenced how it
was then perceived. In his view, to change the very concept of a
category was to change not only our concept of the mind, but also
people's understanding of the world. Categorisation was, in his view,
so fundamental an epistemological process that people tended to
attribute a real existence to the categories themselves. For Lakoff,
categorisation was an equally fundamental aspect of the architecture
of all conceptual models. "There is nothing more basic than
categorisation to our thought, perception, action and speech", (Lakoff
1987:5). Lakoff also rejects the legacy of Cartesian dualism, stressing
that in his view, concepts were embodied. Lakoff and Johnson (1999)
wrote: " ... our categories arise from the fact that we are neural
beings, from the nature of our bodily capacities, from our experience
interacting with the world, and from our evolved capacity of basic
level organisation" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:30). Knott, Sanders and
Oberlander (2001) agree with Lakoff and Johnson that "human beings
categorise the world around them, usually unconsciously", (Knott et at
2001:198).
It has now become part of received wisdom to suppose that our
central nervous systems have a way of ordering information into
classes and categories. Rosch, (1977), whose work influenced Lakoff,
sums this up in a passage reminiscent of Bateson's own approach:
One of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up
of the environment into classification by which non-identical
stimuli can be treated as equivalent [ ....] the objects of the world
are determinately structured because levels of abstraction in
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class-inclusion hierarchies are themselves not structured but
highly random. (Rosch 1977: 212 - 213).
Nelson (1977) believed that categorisation was a primary cognitive
function. In her view, categorisation involved the grouping of events
into aggregates based on perceived similarity. This presupposes that
the ability to perceive similarities is a necessary perceptual process.
The ability to categorise and classify is thought to be of great
importance to how individuals act on the environment. The
evolutionary biologist MacPhail (1998) argues that this is one of the
most basic of survival mechanisms. The social psychologists Sia, Lord,
Blessum, Ratcliffe and Lepper (1997) believe that there is a
relationship between how something is categorised, and a person's
consequent attitude and behaviour towards it. Wittenbrink, Gist and
Hilton (1997), and Hahn and Chater (1997) propose that judgements
and actions are based not on individual instances, but on the category
to which the conceiver has assigned an event. Then categories are
thought to act as a kind of blueprint, which contains within it
templates informing subsequent behaviour and cause effect relations.
Minsky (1977) suggests that we use such frames as a kind of data
structure for representing new situations.
Weick (2001), approaching the subject of categorisation from the
point of view of management psychology, emphasises the importance
of categorisation to sense making, and the effects of changing the
perception of a task through re-categorisation.
"If a person justifies a decision to accept an unpleasant
assignment with the explanation that it will be a challenge and
an opportunity, that person often can create just such attractions
and solidify the justification by the way he or she performs the
assignment", (Weick 2001 :23).
Cazden (1988) cites an example of the influence of a perceived
context (which acts in the same way as a category or class to which
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the perception of an action is assigned) on the responses of
schoolchildren to a command.
"In two soviet experiments, preschool children were able to
stand still longer when asked to "be a guard" (contextualised
instruction) than when asked simply to stand still", (Cazden
1988:116).
Price-Davies and Knowles (1999) have described the effects on people
when their existing conceptual frames are disrupted, and replaced
with others. Goldstone, (1998) who heads the Percepts and Concepts
Laboratory at Indiana State University, has researched the perceptual
and cognitive processes involved in, and influenced by, categorisation
and abstraction. He proposes that assigning events or 'things' to
particular groupings or categories influences what is then attended to,
and what is not. There are, in his view and those of his co-workers, at
least nine different perceptual effects that categorisation can
potentially exert on the perceiver. I have listed them fully, as they
indicate the potential powers of categories to influence perception.
The words that are used can also assign events to categories in subtle
ways. (This inter-relationship between language and categorisation
will be re-visited in other chapters.)
Categorical Perception: Differences among items that fall into
different categories are exaggerated, and differences among
items that fall into the same category are minimised. (Goldstone
2001A)
Attention: One of the simplest ways in which thoughts distort
perception is by highlighting or emphasising certain aspects that
are momentarily important. (Goldstone 2001B)
Dimensionalization: We create perceptual dimensions (size,
brightness, saturation, eccentricity) by witnessing variation along
these dimensions. We tend to order objects by their value on
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dimensions that we create or already possess. Objects are
originally perceived holistically, without being decomposed into
separate dimensions, come to be perceived analytically, in terms
of their underlying dimensions, (Goldstone 2001C).
Unitization: If a group of shapes form a coherent, contiguous
pattern and are often repeated together, a single chunk or unit
will be formed by concatenating them together. Unitization
creates a single unit from multiple parts that occur together.
(Goldstone 20010).
Segmentation: We naturally see objects as being composed out
of parts. Instead of perceiving indivisible objects, we perceive
objects in terms of their labelled or categorised parts. We break
objects into parts that we have learned are relevant or
important. (Goldstone 2001E).
Assimilation and contrast: We distort the dimension values of an
object so that they become more like the values typically seen
for the object's category, or less like the values seen for
contrasting categories. (Goldstone 2001F).
Differentiation: With expertise or practice, differences are
noticed between objects that were once thought to be identical.
(Goldstone 2001G).
Idealisation: Objects are often simplified so as to capture the
basic essence of the underlying concept. (Goldstone 2001H).
Elaboration: the filling in of perceptual details according to what
we know of the object. It is the opposite of idealisation in that it
involves creating richer, rather than more impoverished
representations. (Goldstone 20011).
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What may be significant about this list is that aU these different
factors may also be communicated through language. They give a hint
that when we use language to categorise something, then it is likely
that this could have an influence on perception and thought, and thus
on behaviour. Gipps and MacGilchrist (2002) have, for instance,
reviewed this in terms of teachers' perceptions of their students'
abilities, and how this influenced their attitudes to them.
There has been some interest in what happens when people's existing
categories are changed. In some clinical studies of human
interactions, applying the notion that thinking and making sense
always involved categorisation of some kind has developed clinical
research into pathological communication patterns. In the 1960s,
Watzlawick and his co-workers (Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson
1967) had proposed that communication was multi-level; that all
messages had to include meta-messages about the category to which
the original message was to be assigned. Such meta-messages were
communicated non-verbally. They explored how the multi-level nature
of all communication could result in many misunderstandings and
pathologies. Watzlawick was one of the original people at the Palo Alto
Mental Research Institute, whose work was partly inspired by Gregory
Bateson's approach to human thinking and epistemology, (Weakland
1994). Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974) explained how their
clinical approach to psychotherapy had as one of its essential bases
Evariste Galois' Theory of Groups, and Russell and Whitehead's
Theory of Logical Types. In 1977 Watzlawick and Weakland produced
a seminal book, which showed the ways in which behavioural
pathologies could be analysed in terms of destructive communication
patterns. These always involved producing confusion between more
than one level of meaning, or categorisation. What this means, if one
applies this model, is that just as human information processing
involves categorisation as an essential part of the construction of
mental maps or constructs, so all acts of communication between
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humans must contain information about the category to which the
message is to be assigned. 8
Sandler and Grinder (1982) argue that changing the conceptual
framework that people have constructed around a problematic event
can alter the meaning that they have made of it. They also believe
that this is the basis of all therapeutic change. Q'Hanlon and Wilk
(1987) wrote extensively about the psychotherapeutic effects of
changing patients' perceived contexts and frames, and the effects this
had on their subsequent well being. This is another way of saying that
re-categorisation affects how events are experienced and responded
to.
The investigation of the processes of abstraction and categorisation
have become of interest to researchers in both cognitive and
educational psychology. It is as if these processes are now taken for
granted. Underwood and James (1996) wrote that: "Historically the
ground has shifted in the debate over the nature of the representation
of knowledge from an argument over whether an abstraction occurs
or not ... to a position where abstraction is a phenomenon accepted by
many." (Underwood and James 1996:25.)
Thus abstracting and categorising may be as necessary to the
construction of mental mapping processes or mental models as are
internal representations. According to this approach, we cannot form
mental maps, or process information without having performed some
sort of grouping or classification. Murphy and Lassaline (1997)
suggest that a particularly important way of organising concepts is
8 One of my findings from the Master Practitioners' interviews of students
having attended an NLP course was that how they categorised themselves as
learners had undergone significant changes. I describe these in Chapter 10.
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through a hierarchical arranqernent.? This introduces the idea that
organising information into different logical levels may also be an
aspect of our cognitive ordering of information. These processes raise
interesting epistemological conundrums, such as Epimenides'
paradox, and the Double Bind theory (Bateson 1972). Questions such
as: 'what are their functions in learning and how does language
influence them?' remain intriguing. De Beaugrande (1985) proposes
that "it would seem reasonable to envision the mental representations
as multi-directional frameworks, constructed and annotated to serve
all the levels of processing, including words and phrases." (De
Beaugrande 1985:168) There also remains the possibility that how
learners categorise their experiences of learning may influence their
internal representations about learning. These are some aspects
which were explored later in the data gathering and analysis stage of
this inquiry.
3.4.2 Metaphors
Any consideration of the processes of abstraction and categorisation
would be incomplete without some mention of the recognition that
has been accorded to the idea that metaphors also play a
fundamental role in how we know. Metaphors also bridge cognition
and linguistics. The recognition of their importance was catalysed by
the publication of Lakoff and Johnson's work Metaphors we Live By in
1980. Since then there has been increasing interest in the cognitive
influence of metaphors and their epistemological significance.
Indurkhya (1992) echoes the views of Lakoff and Johnson, believing
that metaphor but pervades all aspects of cognition is not just a
phenomenon of language, and is indispensable to understanding. The
cognitive aspects of metaphor cannot be separated from language.
Christa Baldauf (1997) believes that metaphors fulfil a central
function to human understanding, as they make abstract concepts
9 Thus, the sentence "My dog Daisy is a black and white Border Collie"
contains within it at least six levels of abstraction. 1,009, 2)Collie, 3)Border
Collie, 4)Black and White Border Collies, Slather ones called Daisy, 6) Daisy.
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accessible. She refers to them as "ein Uebersetzungsmedien", which,
loosely translated means a medium for translation. Thomas and
Mareschal (2001) write that the metaphorical process is in some ways
similar to that of classification. Both are equally basic epistemological
processes. "Metaphorical meaning emerges as a result of deliberate
misclassification" (Thomas and Mareschal 2001: 12) so they function
as a different kind of classification. (Mis-classification is still
classification!) They go on to explain that "categorisation causes a
transformation of the input vector to make it more consistent with the
category. Metaphor occurs when the novel input is not a member of
the category to which it is applied." (Thomas and Mareschal 2001).
Bateson (1972) refers to the process whereby two mental events are
linked to form a new meaning as abduction, suggesting that this too
was a basic epistemological process.
Metaphors themselves only "work" if they are able to make links
between what could be two different logical types, even if they initially
appear to be mis-matched. The process of 'metaphorisation' may thus
be essential to any act of making sense. We seem only to have begun
to gain insights into how we know that we know, how we map
experience, and the power of categories to shape information.
3.5.1 Unconscious processes.
The term unconscious is difficult to define with accuracy. I include a
consideration of unconscious processes here because in my data
gathering, I seemed to be working with material from people that
seemed often, metaphorically, to come from the border between their
conscious and unconscious processes. In the analysis of the text of
some interviews, I conclude that it is likely that unconscious
processes played a role in people's approaches to learning.
There has recently been increasing recognition that many of our
information processing activities may act below the level of our
conscious awareness. Some of the processes, such as forming
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internal representations, ordering information into categories and
logical levels, apprehending meaning through metaphor, may all be
beyond conscious awareness. They may also involve the conceivers'
emotions and other physiological factors such as their levels of
physiological arousal. Thus there may be unconscious processes,
which play an important role in learning and behaviour.
This has led to increasing interest in the activities of the psychological
unconscious, how "mental structures, processes and states can
influence experience, thought and action outside of phenomenal
awareness and voluntary control." (Dorfman, Shawer and Kihlstrom
(1996:260). Knowlton (1997) refers to the apparently separate
conscious and unconscious conceptual activities as declarative and
non-declarative knowledge. Categorisation is certainly a process over
which we seem to have little conscious control, yet it is critical to how
we order information, and therefore to our epistemology.
The idea of the existence of unconscious mental processes has been
mooted from classical times to the emergence of the psycho-analytic
movement, Plato to Freud as it were, (Rey 2000). Perrig, Wippich and
Perrig-Chiello (1993) suggest that the concept of unconscious
processes has been slow to be taken up by mainstream cognitive
psychologists because of the difficulty of investigating these
empirically. Their position is that Psychology is a long way from
having a clearly defined and workable model of consciousness itself,
let alone of the unconscious. Historically, the unconscious has been
mostly explored through introspection. They suggest that
consciousness itself can never be fully modelled, as individual
consciousness can only be experienced by an individual. The
constructs, models, theories and generalisations that are derived from
experimental data cannot be applied to an individual's most private
insights into their own unique inner worlds. "When we take our
mental situations as personally relevant, private data, then we must
abandon the notion that such data can be the basis of any generalised
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theory", (p17, author's translation);'? They further suggest that a
phenomenological approach to exploring human experience is as valid
as a 'scientific' one.
This is not the place for a review of the history of the idea of the
unconscious, or its many applications. This has been done extensively
elsewhere, for instance in Underwood (1996) and Windmann (1997).
This concept has formed a metaphorical backbone for most if not all
of Psychoanalytic theory developed over the last Century. It has also
been extensively explored in the literature on hypnosis, particularly
within the Ericksonian tradition, (Bandler and Grinder 1975A, Grinder,
Delozier and Sandler 1977, Erickson 1980, Hall 1989). Underwood
(1996) has reviewed the emergence of interest in unconscious
processes, and Tolk and Reingold (1996) have explored the
unconscious relationships between motivation, categorisation and
retrieval. Perrig and Wippich (1995) have researched the idea of
intuitive judgements as the product of an unconscious organisation or
structuring of perception.
There is also the question of the role of the unconscious in memory,
(Meier and Perrig 2000). Perrig (1999) claims to have demonstrated
that people can discriminate between an array of shapes, picking out
the one that does not fit, (in other words, belongs to a different
category) without being aware of how they do it. Windmann (1997)
has reviewed some work on unconscious recognition of sensory
stimuli. There has also been intriguing work on the unconscious
effects of metaphor (Bettelheim 1976, Gick and Holyoak 1977,
Watzlawick 1978), which indicates that the structures embedded
behind the language of story or metaphor are processed
unconsciously, and then influence subsequent information processing.
10 Wenn wir mentale Zustaende als persoenlich relevante, private "Daten'
begreifen, muessen wir davon ausgehen dass so/che "Daten" nicht die
Grund/age einer allgemein akzeptab/en Theorie sein koennen.
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Gregory Bateson was intrigued by the unconscious effects of
communication. He was one of the earliest people to suggest that one
of the unconscious' most vital functions was that of assigning
incoming information to categories. The notion of semantic priming is
of more recent origin. Dorfman (Dorfman et a/1996) cites Yaniv and
Meyer's (1987) proposal that "subjects are sensitive to, or influenced
by, knowledge structures that are activated below the level required
for conscious awareness" (Dorfman et a/1996 p 275). These
knowledge structures may be embedded in linguistic forms. This is
one of the core assumptions of the Ericksonian tradition of hypno-
therapy.
An increased emphasis on the importance of unconscious processes in
learning is emerging. Johnson-Laird (1983) in his exploration of
mental modelling, suggested that we have no way of knowing how
our mental constructs are produced. We cannot be aware of every
step in deduction, or of the extent to which our mental models
actually correspond to the physical world. Neither do we know how we
retrieve, only what we retrieve. He ends by proposing that "all
learning depends on unconscious processes" (Johnson-Laird
1983:467).
There is now a tendency to use the term implicit rather than
unconscious in the literature. It is proposed that there are implicit
and explicit memory and perception, (Dorfman et a/1996). It is also
argued that intuition and incubation are unconscious processes, being
aspects of implicit thought and cognition.
Explicit memory refers to conscious recall or recognition of
events, while implicit memory refers to any effect an experience,
thought or action that is attributable to past events in the
absence of conscious recollection of those events" (Dorfman et at
1996:260).
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3.5.2. Emotions and performance
One emerging area of interest is the study of the role of the emotions
in many kinds of human activities. I include them here because they
may be consciously or unconsciously experienced. It is likely that
subtle changes in a person's physiology can affect cognition. Among
the proponents of these are Damasio (1994, 2000) and Goleman,
(1996, 2003). Perrig (1995) also challenges the historical emphasis
on exploring 'pure' cognitive processes, proposing that "not only do
organisms use phenomenological information in a decision making
process before showing consciously controlled behaviour", but that
"feelings and emotions, even physiological variants played a
significant role. The phenomenological discriminations, feelings or
emotions thus mediate information that is not yet knowledge". (Perrig
1995:25). Can we ever be aware of all the physiological and
emotional factors that are at work as we think on things?
Another development in this area is the increasing interest in the
effects of emotional states on people's cognitive performances. For
instance, Frascara (1999) has suggested that the complexities of
human cognitive performance are dependent on context and its multi-
dimensionality. He wrote that:
"It is clear that previous experiences, fear, beliefs, arousal level,
moods, expectations, purposes, models of behaviour, familiarity,
adaptability, intelligence and temperament all play roles in
cognitive performance" (Frascara 1999:78).
Interest in the influence of individuals' physiological states on their
abilities to process information has produced much research in this
area, especially from within the field of the cognitive sciences. It has
offered some tantalising conclusions. Harber and Pennebaker (1992)
have made the startling suggestion that people who have undergone
traumatic events, and are better able to write well organised
narratives on their ordeals, have better immune functioning. Bower
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(1992) suggests "our emotional reactions are triggered by
'computational demons' (sic) in the brain that monitor how our plans
are faring during execution," (Bower 1992:5). He also proposed that
the arousal of a particular emotion activates a repertoire of responses
or action plans, so that it is as if each emotion produces a particular
script, or perceptual category, or themes and ways of interpreting the
world, as well as acting as perceptual filters. Strong emotional
concomitants to learning produce strong learning, whereas depression
and anxiety can decrease learning. Cannon (1999) believes that
concepts such as 'failure' carry a powerful and influential emotional
stlnq."
Mandler (1992) takes a constructivist approach, proposing that
people's schemas (another term for cognitive maps) have emotional
concomitants which express some aspect of an individual's value
system. These originate as visceral responses, which may involve a
degree of autonomic arousal. Revelle and Loftus (1992) write that it is
their "suspicion that both arousal and affect have substantive and
some qualitatively different effects on information processing." (Revell
and Loftus 1992:141). Heuer and Reisberg (1992) found that vivid
experiences produce vivid memories, and that arousal can narrow
focus and lead to memory and perceptual impairment. Memory for
detail was influenced by physiological arousal. There has also been
conslderable interest in the underlying neuro-physiological and
anatomical systems associated with the links between emotion and
cognition, such as McGaugh, (1992) and Ledoux (1992). Christiansen
(1992) suggests that emotions may affect memory at two different
stages; those of perceptual processing and a later conceptual
processing stage.
More recently, Shevrin (2000) has reviewed the factors that operate
unconsciously, and believes that the time is ripe for cognitive
psychology to consider the role of the emotions in how people make
11 This was apparent in the Master Practitioners' interviews of the participants
on the course.
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sense. "Affect, conflict, unconscious expectancies and anxieties are
not given any consideration in cognitive research and thus the
tendency is for the theories of the unconscious to be overly narrow
and purely cognitive in nature" (Shevrin 2000:62). He suggests that
even the way in which people categorise events is influenced by their
emotional state. Damasio (2000) has made a strong case for
considering emotions to be an integral part of cognition. "You simply
cannot escape the affectation of your organism, motor and emotional
most of all, that is part and parcel of having a mind". (Damasio
2000:148).
I return to this theme in the chapters on the analysis of my interview
transcripts, and especially in Chapter 10, which is an analysis of
interviews about people's experiences of learning, and the emotional
concomitants of people's memories of previous learning experiences.
3. 6. Conclusion.
This chapter has reviewed the idea that it is becoming a modern
paradigm about consciousness that we cannot operate without using
some kind of internal representations or mental models. These are
claimed to be indispensable to remembering, learning, dreaming,
thinking, solving problems, and most importantly, planning the future,
motivating and achieving outcomes. They may be conscious or
unconscious, or just beyond immediate awareness. Although much
work in the cognitive sciences seems to be based on a predominantly
Cartesian paradigm, more recently there have been inquiries into the
roles of affective and unconscious factors in the construction of
cognitive maps. The cybernetic approach may shed further light on
the operations of cognitive models. There are indications that these
involve many and complex dimensions, such as the senses,
abstraction, bodily sensations, feelings, responses, values, beliefs and
goals. They may also be organised at many levels of complexity.
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The cybernetic model proposes that the feedback, calibration and the
TOTE may be the most fundamental information processing
mechanisms, operating at all levels of complexity in organisms, from
the sub-cellular to the societal. The roles of language and
communication perhaps play one of the most significant roles in
creating, transmitting, organising and responding to information.
The question 'what role does language and communication play in the
complex interplay of the many dimensions of internal models?' and
'what can such an inquiry illumine about the learning process?'
remains a critical aspect of this research project. I review and
explore the results of my own explorations in chapters 6 to 10. I
propose that many of the processes that we use to construct our
'cognitive architecture', especially at the levels of internal
representations and their sub-modalities, are influenced by language.
I also believe that the time is ripe for inquiring into these aspects of
cognition and learning.
102
Chapter 4. Reflections on Language, and the Cybernetics of
Cognitive Systems.
Every reflection, including one on the foundation of human
knowledge, invariably takes place in language, which is our distinctive
way of being human and being humanly active. For this reason
language is also our starting point, our cognitive instrument and our
sticking point. (Maturana and Varela 1987:26).
The whole of language must be thoroughly ploughed up.
(Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994:277).
The fact that communication is a conditio sine qua non of human
existence has been known for a very long time. (Watzlawick 19.93:4)
4.1. Introduction
In chapter 3 I reviewed some of the literature on cognitive maps and
some related areas. I explored the notion that Bandler and Grinder's
ideas, and especially their work on internal representations and sub-
modalities, had contributed to a wider understanding of the
phenomenon of cognitive mapping and of how we make sense of
experience. This is one of the main foci of my research. In a sense,
what they explored was a little known aspect of human information
processing. Although the lack of research into the role of language by
mainstream cognitive psychologists has been judged as regrettable
(Nelson 1996) there is an increasing amount being published on the
possible roles of language in how we develop our understanding and
create meaning.
The previous chapter considered aspects of cognitive mapping, and
introduced a cybernetic viewpoint. The next two chapters are about
language, especially in relation to how we know, and how language
may influence our perceptions, our responses, and our cognitive
mapping processes. They lay the ground for my approach to the
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development of my interview schedule, my ways of questioning
people, and the approach I took to analysing the texts from the
second stage of the data gathering phase. NLP is as much about
modelling the subjective processes that people use in processing
information, as it is about the complex roles that language may play
in thinking.
An overview about what has been written about language presents a
problem, because it has been subjected to many different approaches.
I review some of these in order to place NLP into a theoretical
context, and to identify some of the ways in which it is distinct from
other approaches. Chafe (1994), has pointed out that in the present
time, "the sciences that deal with language and the mind are
currently in something of an epistemological crisis" (Chafe 1994: 8)
He further suggests that "theories of language are swimming in an
alphabet soup whose ultimate contribution to the understanding of
language is murky" (Chafe 1994:21). This suggests that we need to
study language beyond its grammatical constructions or genres, which
have been among the main pre-occupations of many engaged in using
Discourse Analysis.
I suggest that the main reason why an understanding of language is
so essential to any communicator, and especially to teachers, is
because there is increasing interest in the ways in which certain
linguistic forms may influence both perception, and the making of
meaning for the listener. Learning must surely, in my view (and
personal experience) involve the development of personal meaning.
This inquiry is also about some previously unexplored ways in which
people use words to make sense, and conversely make sense of
words.'
1 I review what emerges from my information gathering in Chapters 6 - 10,
and then suggest a new model of learning processes, in which language
patterns, as described by Sandler and Grinder (1975) may operate as
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In this chapter I review some of the background theories about
language and cognition that are current in the literature. This is also
in order to place my research into an overall theoretical framework.
My inquiry bridges both cognitive mapping and linguistics. There is a
sense in which language emerges almost as the mirror image of
cognition. Their separation seems to be convenient yet does not
reflect the complexity of their interaction.
Because I use NLP in my data gathering and as one of the main foci of
this inquiry, I explain the model of language that Bandler and Grinder
(1975) developed in the 1970s, in some detail, particularly with a
view to exploring the possible links between language, cybernetics,
the creation of internal representations, mental models and
epistemology. This is in essence what this inquiry was about
Central to Bandler and Grinder's views was that language cannot be
separated from epistemology; language is as much about
communicating what to know as how to know. This approach
underpins my own thinking and research into language and thought.
Much modern research in this area now considers language as a
process that is intimately linked to acts of cognition, (as explored in
Chapter 3). With the increasing interest in cognitive linguistics, it is
coming to be believed that "language (is) an integral part of human
cognition, not an autonomous faculty independent of other cognitive
functions". (Paradis 2001 :48). I suggest this is highly relevant to
Education; it is mainly through teachers' communication that
knowledge is constructed by learners in the classroom. For this reason
I give the topic of language more than a cursory glance.
'drivers' of certain epistemological processesnecessaryto the construction of
cognitive maps. This idea is explored In Chapter 11.
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4.2. Language and cognition
There have been many attempts to understand the role that language
plays in cognition. Nelson's (1996) research focused on the role of
language in the development of children's conceptualisations. She
describes an experiment, which involved observing a group of
mothers and children visiting a museum. The mothers themselves
were of two types; those who talked to their children about was going
on, and those who merely answered questions. The second group of
mothers also differed in that they would answer their child's questions
by mentioning practical matters, such as where a child left a toy. The
mothers that talked to their children also used a narrative form.
Nelson observed that "the narrative format organises the memory as
a coherent whole, representing the perspective of consciousness as
well as the perspectives of action [ ...] children are learning how to
remember, not what to remember", (Nelson 1996: 168).
Bruner (Sutherland 1992) believed that language was one of the main
tools for accelerating learning, and urged that it be used to help
develop children's understanding. He (Bruner 2002) added that there
were two main constraints to our understanding. One was that "our
evolution as a species has specialised us into certain characteristic
ways of knowing, thinking, feeling and perceiving" (Bruner 2002:11).
The second constraint was the complex nature of language itself.
The constructivist movement proposes that children build up their
concepts from their experience of the world, and that teachers
facilitate this process. How if not through language? (This is one of
Vygotsky's central questions; I review his contributions later in this
chapter). Nelson (1996) also urged that language should be
understood as a catalyst for cognitive change during early to middle
childhood, and that it was "surprising how little attention is paid to
language in current psychological theories of cognitive development",
(Nelson 1996:3). Fauconnier (1997) echoes this, urging that it is time
that grammar should be recognised as "cognitively motivated, and ...
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that understanding grammar in its context ... will yield insight into
cognitive organisation" (Fauconnier 1997:67). Later he (Fauconnier
and Turner 2002) suggested that words actually activated neuronal
patterns.
This chapter is an attempt to explore some theoretical aspects
relating to such ideas, and to dissect (as it were) some of the
epistemological and ontological connections between language and
thought. I rely on Bandler and Grinder's metamodel of language
structures as the main conceptual frame within which to start this
inquiry, (Bandler and Grinder 1975).
Language and thought may be inescapably intertwined, but we do not
yet know enough about the specifics of their relationship. Sandra
(1998) wrote that "cognitive linguists, as their name implies, set out
from the working hypothesis that language cannot be isolated from
general cognition and must be studied with the explicit purpose of
finding its cognitive underpinnings" (Sandra 1998:362). This project
attempts to do just that. Teaching can be said to be essentially about
the facilitation of sense making, and learning about constructing a
mental model of the knowledge to be learned. Rasmussen, (2001) for
instance, considers that language acts metaphorically as a scaffold, so
that when teachers communicate with their pupils, they are in a sense
building a framework within which the pupils construct their own
unique understanding. Thus, " the student's understanding of what a
teacher says is a product of the student's own construction"
(Rasmussen 2001:577).
My approach to language is to view it as more than transmitting
information; it also transmits messages about how the information is
to be coded and de-coded. This epistemological dimension, which was
recognised by Korzybsky (1958) and Bateson (1972) demanded
further investigation, both from the point of view of the literature in
the field, and my own data gathering and interpretations.
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Epistemology was to emerge as a vital aspect of how language
appears to enable us to make sense.
4.3. On some of our current approaches to language and
thought
The emergence of an understanding of language as an essential agent
in the mediation of internal cognitive processes has come down to us
through the confluence of several different approaches. One of these
comes from the ideas of early cognitive psychology, characterised by
the works of people such as Vygotsky (1936), Miller (1977), Johnson-
Laird (1983, 1983A) and more recently Fauconnier (1997), and
Fauconnier and Turner (2002). Another approach stems from the
works of linguists such as Sapir (1921), Whorf (in Carroll 1956),
Wittgenstein (Kenny 1994) Edwards (1997) and Koenig (1998). A
particularly rich source comes from the work on metaphor by Lakoff
and Johnson (1980, 1987 and 1999), and Johnson (1987). Another
approach is that of Discourse Analysis, which, although it initially
concerned itself with the structures and genres of text and spoken
language, is now becoming increasingly concerned about the
importance of inquiring into the relationships between language and
thought. (Chafe 1994, 1996).
Yet another approach that has contributed to the emergence of new
models of the role of language in the dynamics of consciousness came
from the therapeutic tradition of the Palo Alto Mental Research
Centre, which originated with Gregory Bateson, (1960, 1972), and
Milton Erickson. (Watzlawick et a/1967, 1974, 1977, Weakland and
Wendel 1994, Bandler and Grinder 1975, 1975A, 1979, 1982, Grinder
and Bandler 1977). Neuro-linguistic programming is an offshoot from
this approach.
It is becoming increasingly acceptable to believe that we respond to
information at both a conscious and unconscious level. This idea was
central to the way in which Milton Erickson worked with his patients.
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(Bandler and Grinder 1957A, Erickson and Rossi 1989). Erickson was
one of the people from whom Bandler and Grinder drew inspiration
and many of their insights. If language is considered as a critical
component of information processing, then many questions arise
about the possible relationships between language, how we learn, and
how we construct our internal worlds. Other questions also arise, such
as, how is language processed? What are the roles of what are
traditionally termed conscious and unconscious ways of processing
information? More importantly, what is it in us that responds to
language, and enables us to make sense of it? What is the
phenomenon that mediates this alchemy of creating meaning?
Another recently emerged school is that of cognitive linguistics, which
seeks to understand how language and cognition are related. Its
development appears to have been catalysed by the work on
metaphor and categorisation by Johnson (1987), Lakoff and Johnson
(1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), and the ideas
about mental spaces inspired largely by the work of Fauconnier
(1884,1997) and Fauconnier and Turner (2000, 2002). Cognitive
linguists recognised the difficulties of studying the complexities of
language and thought (Gibbs and Colston 1995). These approaches
are different from those of Neuro-linguistic Programming, yet based
on the same premises, that a study of language may lead to insights
into cognitive processes.
4.4. Distinguishing between map and territory
Any exploration of the connections between language and thinking
raises many philosophical questions. Not least of these is the central
ontological conundrum of the relationships between what we actually
'map', as it were, through our internal cognitive re-creations of
experience, and the world that is being mapped. Words, by virtue of
the fact that they are essentially symbolic representations of
something, and not the something they represent, must play some
intriguing roles in human information processing. Edwards (1997),
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with no reference to Korzybski, comes to much the same conclusion
about the relationships between maps and territory. "The classic
underground map distorts scale, direction and distance for the sake of
functional readability, omitting an infinite number of possible details",
(Edwards 1997:226). This echoes one of the main presuppositions
about language and thought on which NLP is built; that words
themselves may themselves be something like metaphorical maps, in
the Korzybskian sense (Korzybski 1958), and not territory they refer
to. They may further also be instrumental in mapping. Weick (2001)
suggested that sense making is analogous to mapping; " (it)
resembles more closely the activity of cartography ..." (Weick 2001:9).
Rom Harre has suggested that there were two major paradigm shifts
in the cognitive sciences of the zo= Century. (Harre 1994). The first
was the emergence of Behaviourism, the second resulted in a focus
on understanding more about the internal cognitive processes that
people used to construct their own maps, which then also yield
meaning. I have reviewed some ideas about these in the previous
chapter. With the coming of this second revolution, the links between
language and consciousness emerged as a central concern to anyone
trying to explore more about cognition. Harre proposed that this
second revolution was influenced by both post-positivist science, and
the influence of Wittgenstein's views on the nature of language. In his
view, it was invalid to separate language from the other cognitive
processes that people used to make sense. His particular approach to
such questions suggested that:
Concepts, the bases of thinking, are expressed by words, and
words are relocated in language, which are used to accomplish a
huge variety of tasks ... in this view, our delineation of the subject
matter of Psychology has to take account of discourses,
significations, subjectivities and positionings, for it is in these
that psychological phenomena actually exist. (Harre and Gillett
1994:21-22).
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His position is close to that of Vygotsky, who, working mostly in the
1920s and '30s from within a Marxist context, believed that speech
and words played a central part not only in the development of
children's thought but in human consciousness as a whole. (Vygotsky
1939). Put more simply, what do the words we inherit from our
milieu actually do to our cognitive processes? And no less important,
how do we go about finding out? What sorts of methods are most
suitable to uncovering the interplays between them? And if it is true
that language creates internal meanings and recreates 'reality', then
language has an epistemological function as well. Wittgenstein asked
whether it was possible to think a thought without language, or even
whether it was possible to separate the two, (Kenny 1994).
Fauconnier has pointed out (Fauconnier 1997) that much of traditional
linguistics has concentrated rather exclusively on syntax and
phonology. This focus on patterns and form neglected questions about
other possible functions of language. In fact, he urges that language
studies could suffer from ignoring the complex dynamics of meaning
construction. There is a sense in which there has been a third
revolution in our approach to cognitive processes, which was when
the role of language as a constructive and epistemological device
came to researchers' awareness. The focus changed; "it was urgent
to concentrate on the difficult problem of meaning construction".
(Fauconnier 1997:7).
Although Fauconnier claims that his own approach is predominantly
positivistic, he proposes that we not only have access to 'scientifically
obtained' knowledge about language production, we can also validly
use "speaker intuitions about possible understandings of expressions
in various settings". (Fauconnier 1997:7). This appears to encourage
the reliance on data obtained through different kinds of introspection.
For mainstream psychology within the positivistic tradition, there is a
perception that such data may be polluted by the lack of clarity about
anything dredged from the murky depths of subjectivity, let alone the
dangers of the attendant methodological traps.
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It follows that such a revolution in our understanding of cognitive
processes makes the dynamics of language of central concern. What I
mean by dynamics is the actual conceptual and epistemological
processes that are behind both the production, and the processing of
language. Sometimes much linguistic analysis was concerned with the
descriptions of patterns and forms. Now the focus is on its
epistemology and how it may be an active agent in the construction of
meaning itself. Recently Fauconnier, writing from his standpoint as a
cognitive psychologist stated that: "It is a constant assumption
throughout [my] work that grammar is cognitively motivated and,
correspondingly, that understanding grammar in its context of use,
(rather than in purely autonomous structural terms) will yield insight
into cognitive organisation" (Fauconnier 1997:67). This indicates the
importance of considering language, and language production, as
containing some (perhaps) basic epistemological directives, from
which it may be difficult for our ways of knowing to escape.
4.5. VY90tsky, Sapir, Whorf and others.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) were influenced by many of the linguistic
philosophers of the 20th century. The idea that language seems to be
intimately bound up with our cognitive processes has a not
unimpressive pedigree. Edward Sapir, working mainly between the
two World Wars, actively proposed that language and thought were
inseparable. In his introduction to his book Language, an Introduction
to the Study of Speech, (Sapir 1921) he explains his ideas about this
relationship.
We must ... imagine that thought processes set In, as a kind of
psychic overflow, almost at the beginning of linguistic
expression; further, that the concept, once defined, necessarily
reacted on the life of its linguistic symbol, encouraging further
linguistic growth. We see this complex process of the
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interaction of language and thought actually taking place under
our eyes. (Sapir 1921:17).
Sapir believed that we build up our ideas about what we hold to be
'the real world' unconsciously through the language and the culture
we inherit. This creates culturally determined Weltanschauungen. This
in turn influences what we pay attention to and how we interpret the
wealth of our life's experience. Benjamin Lee Wharf, one of Sapir's
students (Wharf, in Carroll 1956) believed that all 'higher levels of
thinking' were dependent on language, and that the structure of a
people's language influenced how they understood their environment.
Carroll summed up Whorf's insIghts in the phrase "the picture of the
Universe shifts from tongue to tongue." (Carroll 1956:vi). This
approach is generally known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Bandler
and Grinder, and NLP in general, presuppose much the same thing.
The central tenet of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis proposes that
different languages generate different kinds world views about
experience, not only about 'life the universe and everything', but also
about how it is to be known. Words may be the messengers of
meaning as well as the agents of its construction.
The stand taken by Sapir and Whorf has its critics. Pinker (1994)
vigorously dismisses it with 'it is wrong, all wrong'. (Pinker 1994:57).
In his view, linguistic determinism was a radical position which cannot
be supported by semantic analysis. Pinker further criticises Wharf for
basing some of his claims on the Apache language, yet claimed that
Whorf had not studied this group of Amerindians. He also claims that
many of Whorf's ideas were supported by some over simplistic rnls-
translations of Hopi sentences. In addition, he explodes the myth
about the much quoted example of the number of words that Eskimos
have for snow as a 'factoid' which has misled generations of students
of linguistics, describing it as the Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax
(Pinker 1994:64).
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Edwards (1997) also offers criticisms of Wharf; among them the
problem of comparison between two different languages, and the
elicitation of the exact concepts behind certain words. Whorf claimed
that the Hopi Indians, whom he studied, had no concept roughly
equating to the linearity of time. Silverstein (Silverstein 1996) has
criticised Sapir's work, suggesting that he was not always entirely
accurate in his analysis of the texts that he obtained from talking to
native Americans. De Beaugrande (1997) has also criticised Sapir's
approach for being too 'mentalist', and not making the distinction
between what de Beaugrande calls langue, and para/e. He suggests
that language is "a leading modality for moving between the
conscious and unconscious" (De Beaugrande 1997: 10).
Edwards, (1997) when reviewing Wharf's work, also disagrees with
his views on the lack of a Hopi conception of time. Edwards believes
that the Hopis did have an idea of time, though it differs from that
described by the vocabulary of standard American English. He also
makes an interesting distinction between a 'strong' Sapir-Wharf
Hypothesis, which proposes that language creates and determines the
categories of thought and perception, whereas the 'weaker' version
would be that language rather influences thought. One of the reasons
for ridiculing the strong version was that it was impossible to
demonstrate, 'let alone test' such a hypothesis (Edwards 1997: 209).
The weaker version may be a more acceptable theoretical starting
point; it certainly describes some of the things I set out to do in this
inquiry.
Sapir and Wharf were not alone in their fascination with the complex
relations between languages and consciousness. On the other side of
the world, in what was then the USSR, Vygotsky was pursuing his
understanding of the relations between language and the
development of thought. Vygotsky, working within the Marxist
tradition of the early part of the 20th Century, concerned himself with
the importance of langua'ge to the intellectual development of the
child. For him, language was a part of the child's environment, and
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therefore part of his or her historical and cultural context. For him it
was essential for a child's learning that he or she be spoken to by the
teacher. In this he differs radically from Piaget's views of children's
conceptual development. Among other things, Vygotsky was
interested to observe children actually talking to themselves as they
were learning. From this he concluded that speech was one of the
most important catalysers of children's conceptual development.
(Vygotsky, in Kozulin 1986). For Vygotsky, the teacher's
communication was integral to a child's conceptual development.
Furthermore, he proposed that language and thought were interactive
and interdependent. "The relation of thought to word is first of all not
a thing but a process; it is a proceeding from thought to word and
conversely, from word to thought." (Vygotsky 1939:33).
Vygotsky has been criticised for his insistence on the importance of
the distinction between psychic and social processes by Rasmussen
(2001) who proposes that this is a false dichotomy. He suggests that
if systems thinking is applied to these concepts, then they become in
effect two aspects of the same system, (Rasmussen 2001). However,
from thinkers such as Vygotsky, there arose the fundamental question
of how mere strings of words could be interpreted and processed to
make meaning in human thought. Vygotsky was also one of the first
psychologists to assign significance to the activities of inner speech,
which he considered as essential to people's thinking processes. He
urged that psychologists should inquire into the functions of this
aspect of speech. "Without a correct understanding of the
psychological nature of inner speech, there is no way of explaining the
relation of thought to words in all its complexity" (Vygotsky 1939: 37).
He also held that inner speech had a specific function governed by its
own laws, and that it was distinct from 'outer speech'. It was also
Vygotsky's view that words playa central role in both the
development, and continuing functioning of human thinking. His
theories were drawn largely from his own observations and
experiments. Sapir and Whorf, on the other hand, pursued their goals
through the study of different languages and their structures.
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Vygotsky also played a role in opening up this area to further
exploration. More recently, Frawley (1997) has written extensively on
Vygotsky's approach. He suggests that "higher thought is
instrumental and involves the deferral and recasting of the external
world, never its direct apprehension on its own terms", (Frawley
1997:96). He believed that "speakers of different languages have
divergent, and even perhaps incommensurable learning tasks in
constructing meta-conscious thought", (Frawley 1997:97). He also
proposes that an approach to understanding language in both its
inner and outer forms, requires the researcher to distinguish between
a language of thought and a language for thought.
This is similar to Bandler and Grinder's approach, (1975) who, in
proposing what they called the meta-model of language (to classify
the different processes in which the cognitive and linguistic aspects
are inseparable) sought to do just that. Grinder's roots in linguistics
(Grinder and Elgin 1973) aided this development. One could say that
their aim was to produce a language for thought. In Frawley's view,
the Vygotskian approach leads to the conclusion that thought and
speech are not identical, but come together just where mental content
comes into focus in what he calls meta-consciousness, (Frawley
1997). He furthermore asks "how does language make it easier to
think thoughts if, indeed, you were going to have them anyway?"
(Frawley 1997:175). Working with people's responses at the sub-
modality level of consciousness during this research project also led
me to wonder about the same thing. 2
Vygotsky's approach was distinct from that of Piaget, because he
believed that language played an important role in the formation of
concepts. Nelson (1996) judges that Piaget's work is based upon
2 I address this in chapters 6 - 9 where it became obvious that my
collaborators were using a lot of internal dialogue.
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abstract logical operations independent of language, with a minor role
assigned to symbolic representation, (Nelson 1996). Baldauf (1997)
goes further, and, as it were, throws down the gauntlet by suggesting
a more extreme view, namely that it is possible that the language
faculty is really the whole cognitive system. I hesitate to agree with
this point of view; it seems to me that language and cognition are
intimately linked, but separable, as distinct logical types. Language is
not thought, it is phenomenologically only an aspect of thought, yet
there is a sense in which the two seem to be so interdependent that
they could be considered as two aspects of the same complex process
of knowing. Using the terminology of systems thinking, they could be
viewed as two aspects which subsume a more complex whole.
4.6. Some Reflections on NLP in the context of 20th and 21st
Century thinking.
One of the discoveries that was revealed from my own background
reading was the existence of many different schools of thought about
language and cognition. Many of these seemed isolated from one
another. Not only did they stem from different groups (factions may
be too strong an expression) but they seemed to not know of, or
ignore, many of the ideas and writings of others outside their own
narrow fields. For instance, in the writings of many of the
mainstream cognitive psychologists I have read, the work of
psychotherapists such as Watzlawick and his co-workers are rarely
cited, neither is much included from the literature of the therapeutic
tradition, let alone Milton Erickson's work on language and change.
Conversely, the therapeutic tradition shows an almost lordly disdain
for the findings of mainstream cognitive psychology and its laboratory
based ideas. I have often found similar ideas expressed independently
among these different groups, and when I referred to specific
bibliographies, it was not unusual for me to be surprised that other
people with similar concerns had not been cited. In particular, one of
the traditions that stands alone, seemingly ignored by mainstream
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the traditions that stands alone, seemingly ignored by mainstream
cognitive psychology, (let alone learning theory) emerged from the
spread of the practices of one particular school of Psychotherapy, one
of whose inspirers was Gregory Bateson and his colleagues. This is
the Palo Alto school (Watzlawick et a/1967), which uses, among
others, a systemic and cybernetic approach.
The researcher may sometimes happen upon some surprising
simultaneous discoveries in the literature. For instance, Fauconnier,
(1994) a contemporary of Watzlawick, proposed the idea that
language creates 'mental spaces' which may be organised at different
levels. He produced ideas in many ways close to those of Watzlawick's
and his co-workers. I perceive little to distinguish Fauconnier's notion
that these mental spaces are organised in a hierarchy of some sort,
from Bateson's thoughts about logical levels. However, Fauconnier
does not seem to have referred to either Bateson or Russell's ideas
about logical thinking. Bateson's and Russell's ideas are, however,
central to Watzlawick's approach to therapy and change.
Furthermore, it is rare to see Gregory Bateson cited. His views on the
origins of schizophrenia as a pathology of communication within
families, appearing as early as 1960, presupposed that the patterns of
communication between people actually influences the 'victim's'
cognitive skills by distorting them. (Bateson 1960). This implies that
language may actually create adaptive or maladaptive thinking styles
and patterns of response in others, and must therefore play some role
in the formation of people's ways of thinking.
Fauconnier, and Turner (2002) have published extensively on their
ideas about mental spaces and conceptual blending. Their models of
how we make sense are complex, and have lately included more
about the role of language. However, their views do not seem to be
based on empirical research, as there is no apparent mention of what
data they base their conclusions on. Neither do they seem to explain
any methods that they employed. Their explanatory models rely
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greatly on what is essentially a metaphor system of spaces and the
coming together and separation of spaces in the mind. Yet they have
some interesting insights into language. "Language is the surface
manifestation of a capacity. It is a singularity of function, and so
nothing prevents it from having arisen from a basically continuous
and adaptive process of evolution." (Fauconnier and Turner
2002: 177). For them, words activate neuronal patterns, and are also
active in blending, compressing and enabling other processes that
they believe enable people to make sense of information.
In many ways, Fauconnier's notion of conceptual blending is not
unlike Bandler and Grinder's suggestion that many internal processes
such as making linkages, and categorisation are essential to the
making of meaning; the critical difference is that Bandler and Grinder
actually suggest a typology of language that both reflects, and is
believed to activate, such processes. Their general outlook finds
echoes in the works of Maturana and Varela (1998). They proposed
that we 'exist' in language, so that "the domain of discourse that we
generate become part of our domain of existence, and constitute part
of the environment" (Maturana and Varela 1998:234). " ...it is by
languaging that the act of knowing [ ...J brings forth a world ... we are
constituted in language, in a continuous becoming that we bring forth
in others." (Maturana and Varela 1998: 234-235). However, Bandler
and Grinder attempted to explain some of the more specific aspects of
the question 'how does language shape our knowing?'
As I have used NLP as one of my approaches to this project, it may be
appropriate to consider Sandler and Grinder's typology of the
processes inherent in language in more detail. In their view, language
shapes how we know. This model is not usually accepted as having an
'academic' pedigree, and is often largely ignored as 'weird' or 'new
age'. It also has its critics, (Robbie 2000, McWhirter 2002, 2003, Craft
2001). Nevertheless, here I offer some of the history of its
emergence, and the baste presuppositions on which it operates, as it
was one of my main approaches. I also consider some of the
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implications of Bandler and Grinder's model, and show how it links to
other emergent ideas about language and thinking. Not least, I have
explored some philosophical issues in the form of my own
speculations and introspections.
Richard Bandler was originally one of John Grinder's students at the
University of California, Santa Cruz. Grinder was himself influenced by
Chomsky's work on linguistics, and his model of transformational
grammar, (McLendon 1989). Chomsky proposed that we have innate
abilities to structure a string of words in order to make meaning.
Grammar is thus an innate ability. Information is transformed from
what Chomsky calls 'deep structure' (Chomsky 1965) to the surface
structure of language through a transforming process which results in
the deletion of information. It is never very clear what Chomsky
means by deep structure, and interestingly the term is not used in his
later writings, being relegated to an end note (Chomsky 2000). For
Chomsky (1965), the process of understanding sentences was also
predicated on an individual's ability to assign words to categories and
sub-categories. Sentences thus have two different categorical
components, lexical and categorical. A grammar contains a syntactic
component, a semantic component and a phonological component, all
of which may be processed differently. Language, in Chomsky's view,
was thus also indisputably a tool for thought, (Smith 1999).
Chomsky's thinking has been criticised for its Cartesian slant, and that
he ignored the Mind-Body problem. De Beaugrande (1997) accuses
him of denying the sclenttflc status of many of his predecessors such
as Saussure, Sapir and Hjelmslev, as we" as indulging in
confrontational rhetoric. Most importantly, he criticises Chomsky for
not being empirical enough; for choosing to ignore making
observations, and relying on his own 'model of competence' ,(De
Beugrande 1997: 32) for his extensive theorising. He also accuses
him of using 'technical fictions hedged round with rhetorical moves'
(De Beaugrande 1997:45). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) are also
trenchant in their views on Chomsky's limitations; they believe that
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from Chomsky's perspective, science studies 'essences'. Linguistics
likewise is concerned with the essence of 'language', namely pure
'syntax'. Phenomena outside the essence of 'language' are not worthy
of being called linguistics, and thus not 'interesting', (Lakoff and
Johnson 1999:479). They are dismissive of Chomsky's views, arguing
that much of the research in linguistics over the last few decades has
indicated that his models have little validity. Farkas and Li (2001) also
criticised Chomsky for his structuralistic approach, urging that a more
connectionist approach was more a valid tool for understanding
language.
Whether such accusations of mentalism and the accusations of an
absence of any empirical basis to these theories render them valid or
not, Cartesian dualism remains part of the western scientific paradigm
that perceives and perpetuates the dichotomy between mind and
body, mental and physical, subjective and objective, internal and
external. Smith (1999) has dismissed such apparent (and
linguistically mediated) splits as putatively incoherent, and not
necessarily invalidating the Chomskyan points of view. Bandler and
Grinder went further; they rejected the Mind-Body problem as an
insignificant and outdated construct. In linguistic and historical terms,
mind and body are both abstractions with little useful meaning,
except as curiosities belonging to the categorisation of redundant
philosophical traditions. Systems theory, according to Rasmussen,
does not share these dichotomies, and does not regard thought as
distinct from language and communication, (Rasmussen 2001).
Viewed from the standpoint of cvbernetlcs, human information
processing is thought of as involving all of the systems of the living
body. There cannot be separation between mind and body. The
distinction is purely linguistic.
De Beaugrande (1997) reflects that the old dualisms have not been of
service to linguistics. Chomsky himself (2000) holds a similar position,
stating that:
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"Distinctions between mental and other aspects of the world, in
these respects, seem unwarranted, except in one respect: our
theoretical understanding of language, mind and people
generally is so shallow, apart from limited domains, that we can
only use our intuitive resources in thinking and talking about
these matters". (Chomsky 2000:138).
Whatever the controversies about Chomsky's notions of deep
structure and his tendency towards theorising within a mentalist
perspective rather than engaging with the domain of data gathering,
his ideas have nevertheless been a fertile ground for Sandler and
Grinder. They were instrumental in the development of some insights
into the one of the most interesting aspects of language, namely, that
it is both communicative and epistemological in its functions. In a
sense, they used Chomsky's original ideas as one of their starting
points. This sets them apart from cognitive linguists such as Sandra
(1998) who proposed that "linguistic analysis alone cannot definitely
answer questions of a (mental) representational nature ..." (Sandra
1998:367).
For Bandler and Grinder, the essence of NLP was to use language to
investigate language and thought. An inquiry into how we make sense
is as much a linguistic investigation as it is an exploration of some of
the ways into sense making. Their own views of deep structure,
however, seemed to change over the years; in Patterns of the
Hypnotic techniques of Milton H. Erickson M.D. (Sandler and Grinder
1975A) they use the concept of deep structure as a 'given'. Later,
(Grinder, Delozier, Bandler 1977), deep structure is treated more as a
word meaning the profoundly embedded, complex constructs or views
of which the individual person may not be consciously aware. The
concept remains vague, and difficult to define.
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4.7. Setting the stage for the linguistic part of NLP
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it
can in the end only describe it. (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994:269).
NLP developed from a number of sources, and the serendipitous
coming together of a number of somewhat anarchic thinkers very
much in tune with the Zeitgeist of California in the 1970s. It can be
said to be derived from Milton Erickson's insights into the unconscious
effects of language, Fritz Perls' approach to therapy, Gregory
Bateson's epistemology and cybernetic theory, and Grinder and
Bandler's original model of language structures, some of it derived
from Chomsky. The young Richard Bandler was Gregory Bateson's
neighbour (personal communication) at the time when Bandler was a
student of psychology and cybernetics at the University of California
at Santa Cruz in the 1970s. Through Bateson he also got to know
Milton Erickson, a psychiatrist who spectaltsed in Hypnotherapy, and
was well known for his powerful uses of therapeutic language.
Grinder was a Professor of Linguistics at the University of California at
Santa Cruz, where Richard Bandler studied. At the same time Grinder
was also a covert operator for the American Army, (McLendon 1989).
During his studies, Bandler became increasingly disillusioned with the
traditional academic psychology that was taught at the time, railing
against it for not being applicable to the 'real world', (Bandler,
personal communication, McLendon 1989). At the time, Bandler was
intrigued by Gestalt Psychology. He was introduced to Fritz Perls
himself by Grinder, and ended up editing some of Perls' later works,
in particular his book The Gestalt Approach and Eye Witness to
Therapy, (Perls 1973).
Bandler and Grinder created an informal group of like-minded people
to explore and experiment with a number of different ideas and
linguistic techniques that appeared to produce changes in people.
Their aim was simply to find out 'what worked and what did not'. This
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included exploring and investigating Erickson's hypnotic language
patterns, Perls' exercises in therapeutic dialogue, Grinder's insights
into language, and Bateson's cybernetics. Sometimes there was a
dabbling in the esoteric, in particular from the works of writers such
as Carlos Castaneda. One of their interests was in how to produce
changes in people that would benefit them. Their explorations were
not only informal, they seem to have been somewhat anarchic and
chaotic, as well as extremely experimental, (McLendon 1989).
Milton Erickson's therapeutic work had as one of its basic tenets, the
belief that words influence an individual's psychological life both in the
present and the future. He also believed that people responded
consciously and unconsciously to words. Bandler and Grinder were
one of the few non-medically qualified people to be allowed access to
Erickson personally, and to observe how he practised and thought.
They became adept at identifying Erickson's patterns of
communication. Erickson himself wrote, (perhaps with his tongue
slightly in his cheek) in his preface to Bandler and Grinder's first book
(197SA) about his hypnotic language forms:
Although this book by Richard Bandler and John Grinder ... is far
from being a complete description of my methodologies, as they
so clearly state it is a much better explanation of how I work that
I myself, can give. I know what I do, but to explain how I do it is
much too difficult for me. (Milton Erickson, in Bandler and
Grinder 1975A:viii).
When Erickson was working with his clients he assumed that language
and thought interacted, and that most of people's responses to
language took place below conscious awareness, (Erickson and Rossi
1989, Hall 1989). His approach has since been further developed in
the fields of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy at the Mental Research
Institute, Palo Alto. (Watzlawick et a/1967, Watzlawick and Weakland
1977, Watzlawick 1978, 1983, 1990, Weakland and Wendel 1994). It
also laid the foundation for many of the interventions made in Brief
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Therapy, (De Shazer 1998). The researcher wishing to follow in this
tradition faces some awesome methodological challenges. This model
of language proposes that much of our responses to communication
take place at an unconscious level.
4.8.1. The NLP approach to language and thought
Sandler and Grinder proposed that the deletions, distortions and
generalisations within language can act as epistemological directives
that influence how meaning is to be made from words that are
spoken. There remains the spectre of deep structure. Robbie (2000)
has argued that linguistics had moved on, and the concept of deep
structure is now becoming redundant. It may be more useful,
however, to think of linguistic directives as imparting information
about how a message is to be understood. This is believed to be the
epistemic part of language, which elicits unconscious responses, often
for both the sender and the receiver.
Chafe (1994) came to a similar conclusion twenty years after the
publication of Sandler and Grinder's first book. (Sandler and Grinder
1975). In Chafe's view, grammar is a set of "mental processing
instructions [ ... ] designed to trigger specific mental operations in the
mind of the receiver", (Chafe 1994: 180). He also proposed that
"language suggests that we store and activate ideas of particular
referents and that we also store categories and schemas that allow us
to "make sense of" those ideas by treating them as instances of
things already familiar", (Chafe 1994:35).
Sandler and Grinder went further in their ideas about this emergent
area. Not content with simply stating that there was an epistemology
within language structures, they produced a model about language,
which they called the meta-model. This is a model about a model, or
a map of a map. It is also about ways of categorising both the content
of the information that is transmitted, and how it is to be decoded at
the process level. Most importantly, it is the first real attempt to
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produce a typology of various language structures according to what
they do to information processing, as well as what instructions they
give to guide the construction of knowledge.
An understanding of the processes behind languaging may thus
provide a way of listening to, and analysing what people say, and thus
attending to the thinking structures and processes behind the surface
structure of the words. In my view, it adds another dimension to the
analysis of discourse and text. It also produces a way of interrogating
conscious experience (both one's own and that of others), which is
innovatory. My own approach relies heavily on this; it became one of
the most important tools with which to design and carry out my
interviews. I then used it to analyse the transcripts of both my own
interviews, and those of my assistants. I was thus using language to
test people's responses to differently syntaxed expressions. I also
used Bandler and Grinder's model to elucidate some of the processes
that I believed were revealed by a using NLP as a method for textual
analysis which was significantly different from that used in
mainstream Discourse Analysis.
4.8.2. Deletions, Distortions and Generalisations.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) originally proposed that there were three
main epistemological processes that occurred between the contents
lodged in the 'deep structure' (in a 'Chomskyan' sense) and the
Surface Structure of Language. These were deletion, distortion and
generalisation. If we abandon the notion of deep structure, then the
question 'how does language originate in the human information
processing system?' arises. It seems that at one level we code
information primarily through our senses in the form of internal
representations, which I explained in the previous chapter. These
could be considered to be antecedent to language production. There is
a discontinuity between the analogue coding of the inner world of the
senses, and the production of words which are digital. (Bateson
1972).
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Deletions, distortions and generalisations are thought to occur
whenever the conceiver's experience becomes 'Ianguaged'. One of the
unavoidable consequences of the translation of information from the
domain of internal representations to that of speech is the deletion of
the many details in the internal representations. Therefore, what was
being spoken about could never convey the whole content that
originally generated the speech act. In the act of verbalising the
content of consciousness, a different logical type has to be used.
Language and consciousness are different aspects; languaging
experience involves the transformation of the information from one
logical type into another. It also involves categorisation. Thus,
changing an experience into words inevitably must delete information,
just as making a map of an area can never include every detail of the
'real' terrain.
According to this model, in any written text or spoken words, there
must always be missing Information, deleted, as it were, from its
original source from the domain of internal representations and other
cognitive structures. Language may thus be mainly communicating
information about the map rather than the terrain. An illusion of
reality is created through the individual's response, who processes the
information received by filling in the missing bits for him or herself.
(This was certainly the case in my own data gathering, where
individuals could report on what they 'did' at the level of internal
representations and sub-modalities in response to the words I
presented to them in the form of my interview questions. My
collaborators always made sense of my words in their own way.)
Perhaps, every time speech Is used, it also generates a mini-Zeigarnlk
effect on the listener. The Zeigarnik effect describes the influence of
incomplete Information on human thinking. It is based on the premise
that the human processing system tolerates incomplete information
with difficulty, (Zelgarnlk 1965, Mazur 1996). I suggest that we add,
or construct internal representations to fill the gaps. The Zeigarnik
effect can be thought of as a kind of drive towards the perpetual
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resolution of unfinished business, or the filling in of missing gaps.
Mowrer (cited in Miron 1967) wrote that "One person, by the use of
appropriate words or other signs, can arouse or "call up" particular
meanings in the minds of another person", (Miron 1967:11). More
poetically, and echoing some of Wittgenstein's ideas, he further stated
that "language, in short, is a sort of web that we spin between
ourselves and the true essence of things, and we must constantly
struggle to keep from becoming hopelessly enshrouded therein."
(Mowrer, in Miron 1967:38). This ontological fragility between
language and what it is supposed to represent, is one of the most
exasperating and intriguing aspects of this whole inquiry.
One of the questions I asked as I was gathering my data was: what
do people do internally that enables them to fill in the gaps? What are
the elements that are used to weave such webs? I believe that the
data pointed to the existence of the phenomenon (or process) of
people's active participation in the making of sense. Sandler and
Grinder suggested that the effects of hypnotic language patterns
depended on this process. These are syntaxed in such a way that they
may contain confusing and paradoxical messages. Listeners are
'forced' to make sense of them for themselves, thus producing a new
thought or meaning. (Sandler and Grinder 1975A). Watzlawick states
it more directly; that one can't not communicate, neither can one not
respond." (Watzlawick et a/1967).
Sandler and Grinder revealed that Erickson structured his sentences
so that listeners had to make sense of the information in their own
ways. (Grinder et a/1977). A typically Ericksonian injunction such as
'You may be wondering about the things you are learning yet as you
are sitting, relaxing and reflecting on all your experiences in many
different ways now haven't you' makes little grammatical sense.
However it is thought that it sends the listener on a deep internal
search to make some sort of meaning. The followers of Erickson
3 Author's italics.
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would claim that the actual content evoked by the words spoken by
the therapist is uniquely re-constructed by the individual who hears
them. This active search for meaning is termed a trans-derivational
search, in which a person actively scans stored information, accesses
it, then uses it as their own semantic building blocks to construct a
meaning unique to themselves, (Grinder, Delozier and Bandler 1977).
This is the essence of hypnotic language patterns; they create a
response in which listeners are driven to make their own internal
sense of the words, by structuring the information for themselves. In
this way, it is believed, they achieve both meaning and closure.
4.9.1 Some hidden aspects of deletions
Deletion is an inevitable consequence of the languaging of experience.
Bandler and Grinder distinguish between a number of different kinds
of deletions, which I have listed in Appendix 5. There are two kinds of
deletions which are interesting for the light they may shed on some of
the basic processes we use to make sense. I have chosen to explore
these as they are also examples of language structures which are
both epistemologically and semantically significant. I have also used
these as some of the bases for my questions in the interview phase of
this inquiry. The ones I have chosen to Illustrate this are comparative
deletions, and nominalizations. I explore these in some depth,
because they give a sense of how Bandler and Grinder's model may
be considered to be more than just a superficial typology, but also a
way to uncover some of the basic processes that we use to make
sense. These explorations are my own thoughts after using
introspection to uncover more about some of these processes in
myself.
Comparative deletions are a distinct category of words in the meta-
model. Examples include words such as better, worse, colder, hotter,
lovelier etc. They occur when words or expressions are used which
presuppose that a comparison has had to be made in order to produce
that word. However, the actual scale or criteria on which the
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comparison is based are deleted. This means the criteria on which
the judgements are based are never explicitly stated. For instance,
the sentence 'the weather is better today' contains the word better
which is technically a comparative deletion. In order to initiate such a
statement, a number of internal processes have had to precede it for
the conceiver. The person uttering it has had to make a comparison
with the weather yesterday, the day before, perhaps even the week
before. The word better presupposes the existence of a graduated
scale (from good weather through bad weather to perhaps English
weather) and that a comparison has been made according to the
scale, which is missing when translated into words, and then
'understood'. Often uncovering the scale behind people's patterns of
comparative deletions through well aimed questioning may reveal a
great deal about their internal maps, and the criteria used to make
judgements. (Bandler and Grinder 1975). The question that arises
from this is to what extent is the process of comparing a fundamental
epistemological prototype, a kind of archetype of sense making?
Bateson, in his search for understanding some of the basic
epistemological processes that systems used, had suggested in 1972
that:
" ...we can assert that any ongoing ensemble of events and
objects which has the appropriate complexity of causal circuits
and the appropriate energy relations will surely show mental
characteristics. It will compare, that is, be responsive to
difference. (Bateson 1972:315).
The importance of such conceptual scales which are actively (if
unconsciously) brought into play in people's cognitive maps was
proposed by Johnson (1987), who observed that "scalarity does seem
to permeate the whole of human experience ... this experientially
basic, value laden structure of our grasp of both concrete and abstract
entities is one of the most pervasive image-schematic structures in
our understanding." (Johnson 1987:123). Lakoff (1987) also believed
that our metaphorical up-down schemata were like basic templates
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structuring cognition. However, I suggest that in order for such basic
scalar schema to be of any use, they must be accompanied by the
process of comparison. Scales are useless without the ability to make
comparisons.
4.9.2. Hidden comparisons.
In Baldauf's view (Baldauf 1997) comparison (Vergleichung) is a
prototypical function. I like to think of such operations as basic
epistemological processes. So words like better, worse, prettier,
Jesser, and sentence constructions involving expressions such as more
than, less than, greater than, and so on, are transmitting information
which is the product of a kind of hidden internal 'holdlnq a datum
against an internal scale, comparing it to the divisions on the scale,
and then judging'.
The receivers of messages containing comparative deletions are then
truly caught in the web of words, because they need to draw on their
own hidden scales of comparison, (which may be different from that
of others) and then generate a response from within their own
subjective constructs. This can produce the illusion of agreement.
Bateson wrote that "the living man is ... bound within a net of
epistemological and ontological premises which - regardless of
ultimate truth or falsity - become partially self-validating for him."
(Bateson 1972:314). For better or worse, such processes seem to be
mediated through linguistic forms. Furthermore, it is almost
impossible to utter a meaningful 'better' or 'worse' without having to
use what is considered an almost archetypal epistemological process
in cybernetics, namely the ubiquitous TOTE process.
If we look more deeply at the process of producing a comparative
deletion, we uncover another complex layer of processing. What I
propose happens, (for the sake of argument) is that the information
to be evaluated is tested internally against a scale, found wanting or
not, adjusted, tested again, and then transformed into words. To
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simplify the process, it goes something like this. Was the weather
better? First test it against my internal scale. Then get a yes or a no,
(in cybernetic terms, obtain positive or negative feedback, and act on
it), then make a judgement, and exit the TOTE. Only then can the
word be uttered, or yield an illusory understanding in the hearer or
reader. Even to 'TOTE' successfully involves comparing the present
state with the desired outcome; self-correction to achieve the goal is
only possible after a comparison has been made. Perhaps the
transition from thought to language may also involve such a
cybernetic loop. Perhaps scalarity, the use of conceptual scales in the
formation of our internal mappings and sense making, is another
epistemological prototype. Baldauf, (1997) also stressed the
importance of scalarity, of vertical ordering, as a way of making sense
of information, and which would be useless without the system's
ability to make comparisons.
The role of comparison as essential to how cybernetic systems
processed information in order to maintain themselves was mooted by
Norbert Wiener in the late 1940s when Cybernetics was still in its
infancy. (Wiener 1965). He went on to explore the ways in which
perception could be understood cybernetically. This led him to
suggest that perceptual systems relied on an ability to compare
incoming data in order to organise it. The TOTE process was an
integral part of carrying out and completing such acts. "We centre our
images around the focus of attention and reduce them more or less to
outlines. We have now to compare them to one another, or at any
rate, with a standard impression stored in memory. II (Wiener
1965:136).
Similarly, we could ask the question 'how is it poSsible to assign
information to meaningful categories without being able to perceive
similarities and differences? How can it be possible to assign a hue
such as violet to the category 'red' or the category 'blue' without
scanning for similarities and differences, and then making
comparisons before deciding to which category to assign the
132
information? It supports the view that comparing is a prototypical
epistemological process, as are perhaps the abilities to perceive
similarity and difference.
So 'behind' apparently simple language structures such as
comparative deletions, there are complex processes, perhaps
operating unconsciously, which have to be brought into action in order
for the words to make sense. This is an example of some of the
epistemological dimension of language making and language
processing.
4.10.1. Nominalisations.
I want to explain the complexities of the class of words called
nominalisations in some detail because they emerged as one of the
foci for my inquiry. My Interviewees reported some interesting effects
of these types of words, which I describe in Chapter 6. Some of my
interview questions were designed to inquire into the effects of
nominalisations on my collaborator's internal constructions. The
responses that people gave were intriguing. The purpose of this
section is to explore more about this class of words, so that the
responses that were elicited in the first information gathering phase
are placed into context.
If at a very simple level of explanation, the constructivists' stance is
that we actively participate in creating our 'realities', (Von Glaserfeld
1984), then bringing forth a world becomes "the burning issue of
knowledge", (Maturana and Varela 1987: 27). Such an activity may
be associated with "the deepest part of our cognitive being, however
strong our experience may be" (Maturana and Varela 1987:27).
Wittgenstein (in Kenny, 1994) believed "that people who ascribe
reality only to things and not to our representations take the World of
our representations so much as a matter of course and aim no
further" (Kenny 1994: 276). Wittgenstein was intrigued by the ways
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in which our intelligence could be bewitched by means of language.
Nominalisations are among the most bewitching of words.
Exploring Nominalisations may also shed light on what may be other
basic epistemological processes. These kinds of words seem to have
the power to illuminate, persuade and delude. Bandler and Grinder
were not the only ones to describe these; they have been the subject
of investigation by many others. Langacker, (1977) for instance
reminds us that there are two basic lexical categories, nouns and
verbs, which he proposes profile things and processes.
Nominalizations are essentially \thing words', and are at the same
time, abstract nouns.
4.10.2. The tyranny of hypostatisation
Nominalisations are also deletions, because they are the product of
turning a verb into a noun. They are abstract nouns from which the
original process (a verb) has been deleted. (For this reason they are
considered as deletions by Bandler and Grinder). The original verb
form presupposed an activity, a process which has an implied duration
in time. Nominalizations litter a great deal of every day speech. Words
such as education, health, life, communication, relationship are all
abstract nouns which in actuality do not have any objective existence
yet behave as simulacra of something that does, perhaps because
they have been made into nouns. Education can thus be seen as the
reification of educating, health of healing, and relationship of relating!
4.10.3. Are nominalisations metaphorical?
In becoming nominalized, these words also become hypostatised;
they are interpreted as something concrete. In reality, they refer to
the existence of something that has no objective existence, because it
is an abstraction. Yet they are treated as if they were concrete
objects. They are no longer perceived by the conceiver as processes
that take place within a time frame, but rather as entities that exist
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independent of the variable of time. Time has thus also been deleted
from the word at the level of presuppositions. This is a distortion
lodged deep within the structure of our language and perhaps our
cognition as well. The processes that the nominalizations have
originated from have become deleted, and are thus not attended to.
This means that every time a nominalization is produced, it has been
born as the result of a metaphorical shift. Metaphor always involves
understanding one thing in terms of another.
I have already described some aspects of the metaphorical nature of
thought in the previous chapter. It is becoming increasingly
recognised that metaphors are a fundamental conceptual process
which we use to make sense of communication and experience.
Johnson (1987) has proposed that metaphor is "a pervasive principle
of human understanding that underlies our vast network of
interrelated literal meanings" (Johnson 1987:65). Baldauf (1997)
develops the work on metaphor of linguists such as Lakoff and
Johnson (1980, 1999) by suggesting that our main metaphorical
system comes from the world of concrete objects (what she terms the
Geqenstendsberelcb" in German). For her, both thinking and meaning
were thus conceptualised as dearly defined and bounded objects. This
involves a basic metaphorical and epistemological transformation.
Whenever we nomina lise, we therefore also 'rnetaphortse', because a
process is now thought of as a 'thlnq', It has become concretised.
More recently, Thomas and Mareschal (2001) have proposed that
metaphors also act as categorisers of information. To explore the
epistemological paradox posed by the structure of nominalisations
further, that "metaphor occurs when the novel input is not a member
of the category to which it is applied" (Thomas and Mareschal
2001:16). Fitzgerald (1999) has proposed that providing new and
useful analogies may be a powerful way of communicating novel
4 Roughly translated as the realm of solid objects.
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ideas. This raises the possibility that our epistemology has the ability
to transform abstractions into simulacra of concreteness through such
reification; furthermore this process is in itself profoundly
metaphorical in that it imposes on our understanding the tyranny of
thinking about abstractions as concrete entities. So nominalizations
also have ontological implications. The metaphor of concreteness
imposes this notion on our understanding. It may be an unavoidable
mapping process, a cognitive modelling task that is fundamental to
how we process information, and then language it. We think and
speak as if these abstractions had a concrete existence external to us.
It can be revealing to reflect on the notion that every time we use a
nominalization, we may in fact be deeply deceived (and perhaps
deceiving) both ontologically and epistemologically. We talk earnestly
about the necessity to have more education, to have a better life, to
fight poverty, to make democracy more attractive, to encourage good
relationships. In each of these cases, the nominalization seems to
refer to a solid object external to the speaker. This also raises the
question of whether we can ever know the world as it is, or whether,
in the weaving the conceptual web of our own making, we rely on the
simulating power of nominalizations in our attempts to understand
experience. Yet, paradoxically, in English and many other European
languages,S we cannot convince ourselves that we know without
abstracting and concretising. Tutescu (1970) has, for instance,
written extensively on nominal structures in the French language.
Baldauf (1997) writing as a German speaker, refers to nominalizations
as ontological metaphors, which transmute the original process into
clear things or substances, and which then appear to occupy a
location and even give the illusion of quantifiability.
Wiener (1965) suggests that our dependence on noun forms is a
survival of the scholastic emphasis on substance, 'tn a world where
5 It has certainly been my experience as a French and German speaker, that
these also rely heavily on nomlnallzations, German, In particular, seems to
be very rich In them.
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the noun was hypostatised and the verb carried very little weight'
(Wiener 1965: 127). Weick (2001) has proposed that there are a
number of basic properties of sense making. Among these he
suggests that experience is a continual flow, and that it only becomes
understandable in terms of events, which can only happen when
subjective or conceptual boundaries are placed around them. Lakoff
and Johnson (1980) stressed the idea that the metaphorical use of
entities was a fundamental cognitive device, assigning the
metaphorical connections between ideas and objects to what they
classed as the conduit metaphor.
4.10.4. Nominalisations as categorisers.
One of Gregory Bateson's pre-occupations was with the
epistemological conundrums that anthropological termInology had
generated for him during his years in the field. In an essay written In
1974 (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991) he expressed his suspicions about
the pervasive ways in which human epistemology needs to impose
delimitations on experience.
As I see it, the fundamental idea that there are separate "things"
in the universe is a creation of and projection from our own
psychology. From this creation we go on to ascribe this same
separateness to ideas, sequences of events, systems and even
persons. I therefore ask whether this particular psychological
habit can be trusted ... (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991 :77).
Thus nominalizations may not reflect an experience, but refer rather
to a class of experience. Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974),
exploring the paradoxes and contradictions that beset human
thinking, stress that their work is inspired by Bateson, and some of
his predecessors such as Russell and Whitehead's explorations in their
Principia Mathematica. This reveals the logical inconsistency of
confusing a class with one of its members. Bateson had stressed that
"we have a whole host of words which name classes of action without
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identifying the members of the class ... What is 'play'? What is
'aggression'? ... It is not too much to say that a science of psychology
might begin here". (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:74). Watzlawick goes
further and polnts out the deception inherent in confusing the class
with its member. "Any attempt to deal with the one in terms of the
other is doomed to lead to nonsense and confusion," (Watzlawick et aJ
1974:6).
Nominalizations are therefore one of the richest linguistic classes for
exploring how language may influence the construction of our internal
maps. They are one of the many ways in which language weaves a
web of deceit, is profoundly metaphorical, creates illusions of the
existence of non-existent entities, and generates a mistaken notion
that there is clarity when there is only belief. Paradoxically, the
English language without nominalizations is an trnposslbllltv." they are
necessary to processing and storing information. They are also of
primary epistemological interest in that that which is apparently
perceived through their use, need not exist to make sense,
(Butchvarov 1997).
Nominalizations were also among the main linguistic devices used by
Milton Erickson. Bandler and Grinder were able to interpret and
describe how Erickson used language to produce therapeutic changes
in his patients, (Bandler and Grinder 1975A). They were among
Erickson's many linguistic tools. As soon as information is languaged,
it deletes. Yet when it is heard, and made sense of, listeners fill in the
gaps for themselves. Grinder, Delozier and Bandler (1977) claim that
this is how internal changes may be produced in the context of
therapy, rather than the use of "repetitious verblgerations (sic) direct
suggestions and authoritarian commands" (Erickson, in Grinder,
Delozier and Bandler 1977:ix) so beloved of more traditional
hypnotherapists.
6 I challenge the adventurous reader to try talking about any topic that
involves levels of abstractions without using nomlnalizations with their
attendant ontological and epistemological seductiveness.
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Perhaps the only thing that can be said about nominalizations is that
for all their complexity, possible treachery, (my own analysis of old
German newsreels indicated that Adolf Hitler used them to great
effect,) and the epistemological and ontological puzzles with which
they seem to tease the enthusiastic seeker after truth, (itself a
nominalization!) they are essential to how we organise and verbalise
information from deep within our own unique internal mapping
processes.
4.11 Conclusion
In this chapter I have reviewed some of the background theories of
language in order to put Sandler and Grinder's model in context. I
explored the idea that there is an epistemological function to
language, and that exploring how certain classes of words are
produced also reveals underlying epistemological processes. When
experience is languaged, one of the inevitable processes is deletion. I
paid attention to comparative deletions and nominalisations, as they
illustrate some of the complexities of language production. I then
explored some aspects of their formation in detail, indicating that they
are multifaceted in their origins as well as their effects. I described
them in some detail, as they are a backdrop to my own inquiry into
how people process language, and how it may be linked to cognition.
The effects of nominalisations was one of my interests when carrying
out this inquiry. I report on this further in chapters 5, 6 and 7 and 8.
To sum up, it seems that the effects of language are fourfold; it can
enable people to perceive, to conceive, and to receive information. It
also has extraordinary powers to deceive. Lakoff (1987) urged that
our understanding of both language and cognition in general must be
changed considerably.
This chapter was a venture into this new area. It is also the
theoretical foundation for much of my reflections on the data
gathering phase. This forms the substance of chapters 6 - 12.
139
Chapter s. The Imperative of Connections in Cognitive
Mapping, and the Relevance of Presuppositions.
Clearly there are in the mind no objects or events, no pigs, no
coconut palms, and no mothers. The mind contains only transforms,
percepts, images etc, and rules for making these transforms. In what
form these rules exist we do not know ... the rules are certainly not
commonly explicit as conscious "thoughts". (Bateson 1972:271).
There are some safes which can be opened by using a certain word or
a certain number; before you hit on the right word, no amount of
force can open the door, but once you do so, any child can open it.
Philosophical problems are like that. Wittgenstein, in Kenny (1994),
page 269.
5.1. Introduction.
In the previous chapter I reviewed some ideas about language as
epistemology, in particular some views on deletions and re-visited
metaphors. In this chapter I explore other aspects of language
construction which may illuminate other cognitive processes. These
include the phenomenon of linking different domains of thought in
order to create new meanings. I also include the concept of causality
as part of our mapping processes. One of the aspects of language that
I explore is the way in which it can create connections between two or
more 'mental' events which, taken individually, may not immediately
appear to connect to other concepts. This idea is not new; it has been
extenslvelv explored by Fauconnier, (1994,1997), Fauconnier and
Turner (2002) and others. These suggest that meaning occurs
through what they term conceptual blending. Fauconnier, in his
original work on the concept of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985) had
proposed that connections were a part of idealised cognitive models,
essential to making mental representations of reality. As such, they
are also a basis for selecting certain actions. Weick and Bougon
(2001) go further, and suggest that making connections between
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events are basic epistemological processes which are imperative to
cognitive mapping. I consider these ideas in some detail, because
looking for connections between 'conceptual entities' in texts is one of
the approaches Iused in my analysis of the Master Practitioner's
interviews. Chapter 10 is mainly about these. Connections emerged
as significant to the analysis of the texts. They also yielded some
insights into the nature of people's conceptual maps. They may also
be involved when people undergo transformative changes in their
beliefs. For this reason I describe this aspect of Bandler and Grinder's
meta-model in some detail.
I prefer to remain with Bandler's terminology, that meaning Is
dependent on 'how you connect the dots', 1and to use the term
connections to explain linkages between two or more (hitherto
perhaps unrelated) mental events or constructs. Connections are a
also a way of describing linkages between two concepts. I describe
some of the kinds of linkages that Sandler and Grinder have proposed
are embedded in syntactical structures. Originally they proposed a
category of language structures which they termed distortions,
(Bandler and Grinder 1975). Two of the four sub-sets in the category
distortions are cause-effect structures and complex equivalences.
Here the connections are easy to spot. There are two more sub-sets,
lost performatives and mind reads, where the connections are more
complex to tease out. Iwant to explore the notion that all four of
these sub-sets rely on connections for the emergence of meaning.
One of the structures that Iwas interested in when scanning the
transcripts of the Master Practitioners' interviews, were the types of
connections that people had linked to learning, and used to construct
their identity as learners.
1 Personalcommunication.
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5.2. Causality as significant to the mapping process
The search for causes to events and entities, and the use of causality
as an explanatory principle, has something of the nature of an
epistemological imperative. Talmy (1985) believed that what he called
"force dynamics" (under which causality is subsumed) was a semantic
category which had previously been neglected in linguistic study. He
proposed that language uses certain categories to structure and
organise meaning, and that force dynamics was a basic category
which achieved this. Force dynamics refers to the notion that we use
the idea of force, (which is a physical experience which becomes
internalised as a metaphorical device) in order to understand, make
sense, and map experience. Lakoff has described the concept of
causation as one of the most fundamental of human concepts. "Such
concepts are usually coded right into the grammar of language -
either via the grammatical construction or grammatical morphemes
[ ... ] the prototypical concept of causation is built into the grammar of
the language, (Lakoff 1987:55).
Weick (2001) has proposed that causality is an epistemological
primitive, even describing it as a cognitive archetype. The critical
factor defining causal thinking is that two events, separated by time,
are linked causally, and the antecedent event is believed to exert a
(metaphorical) force on the later one, causing it, or something about
it, to change. This is different from the views of Lakoff and Johnson,
(1980), who reject the idea of the existence of what they term
undecomposab/e primitives, proposing that causation is best
understood as an experiential gestalt, an example of an ontological
metaphor "grounded by virtue of systematic correlates within our
experience" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:58). Nevertheless they believe
that "causation is a basic human concept. It is one of the concepts
most often used by people to organise their physical and cultural
realities", (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:69). They suggest that our
understanding comes from domains of experience, rather than
individual concepts. By their term domains of experience I understand
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that these are more than concepts; they are groups, categories (or
whatever term seems most appropriate) whose main characteristic is
that they have an internal structure. Freeman (1999) echoes Lakoff
and Johnsons's views, citing David Hume's proposition that there are
no universal essences in reality, so the mind can frame a concept or
image that constitutes a general term such as causality. The concept
itself, however, does not exist in the world external to the conceiver.
5.3. Modal operators: carriers of information about future
events?
One of the classes of words from the meta-model that I investigated
in my interviews were modal operators. Stamenov (1977) has
described these as "the prime examples of language as activity
directed towards the accomplishment of certain goals" (Stamenov
1977:69). Bandler and Grinder identified two meta-model language
structures which presupposed and communicated causal thinking.
These were modal operators and cause-effect patterns. Chomsky
(1965) had identified what he called modals as an auxiliary to
meaningful sentence construction. Johnson, (1987) stated that his
inquiry into modal verbs is actually "an investigation into a further
cluster of extremely significant patterns of experience and
understanding", (Johnson 1987:49).
Johnson draws heavily from the work of Eve Sweetser, (Fauconnier
and Sweetser 1996) who argued that the different Sources of modal
verbs were related by metaphorical structures in which physical forces
become a metaphor for the non-physical, He suggested that what he
called 'epistemlc modals' originate from the metaphor of the operation
of a force or restraint which can be experienced as either internal or
external. Langacker (1998) has argued that a modal "is analogous to
a future tense marker" and that the conceptualiser using the modal
engages in a "mental extrapolation of ongoing reality" (Langacker
1998:85).
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Sweetser explained that "root modal meanings are extended to the
epistemic domain precisely because we generally use the language of
the external world to apply to the internal mental world, which is
metaphorically structured as parallel to that external world",
(Sweetser, cited in Johnson 1987:50). She distinguishes between
three main categories of root modals, which is similar to Bandler and
Grinder's classification. These were modals about ability (can),
permission (may) and obligation (must). Thus their epistemic sense
denotes the existence of perceived distinctions between probability,
possibility and necessttv, which again reflects Bandler and Grinder's
typology of modal operators. (1975)
What is interesting (and perhaps not insignificant) about modal
operators is that they denote the mode, and therefore define the
category in which a future activity is to be carried out. However
metaphorical they may be, they introduce the dimension of time into
the cognitive and linguistic domains. In cybernetics, the model makes
no sense without the inclusion of time as an integral part of the
operation of the system. Time may thus be both conceptual or actual.
Because modal operators define the mode in which a future event is
to be carried out, they presuppose the existence of a present and a
future as linked together. The sentence I will do the ironing tonight
could not be uttered, (let alone conceived of) without both an
awareness of the time frames of present and future, and the ability to
produce or construct information that links the two. This is one of the
most critical distinctions between a mechanistic world view, and that
of cybernetics. For a system to be able to operate and maintain itself
in time, it must have access to information about future events that
may not yet have happened. As noted in Chapter 3, without such
information, the TOTEprocess cannot be carried out.
Talmy (1985) proposes that force dynamics are "a major conceptual
organising system", (Talmy 1985:293). His view of this class of
metaphorical structures is that they relate to how entities are
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perceived as interacting with respect to force. Modal operators imply
the action of a force; they can presuppose that someone is pushed
from outside (you must) or that the agent experiences him or herself
as the locus of control, or 'at cause', (you might) or that there is an
insurmountable barrier to the agent's future outcome (you can't).
This model sheds some light on the possible metaphoric derivation of
modal operators, yet is firmly embedded in a mechanistic paradigm
with its reliance on force and energy as explanatory principles. If we
take a more cybernetic approach, then modal operators could be
thought of as the verbal analogues of some basic homeostatic
processes. In cybernetics, the present state of a system is always
being calibrated to possible future states. Are not modal operators, in
their way, information about how to calibrate to that future outcome?
They seem to be the carriers, as it were, of implied causality,
introducing a temporal dimension which also categorises a future act.
This again raises the idea that intentionality, that is, an innate drive
to work towards as yet unachieved goals, is one of the characteristics
of all cybernetic systems. With the advent of cybernetics, it became
impossible to explain behaviour without recourse to the explanatory
principle of intentionality. Schaub (2001) suggests that all behaviours
are driven by intentions which are stored as specific data structures.
"An intention is a data structure comprising, besides the respective
needs, one or more goals ..." (Schaub 2001: 199).
In 1946 the Macy organisation sponsored a conference on
"Teleological Mechanisms". This was influential in bringing the notion
of intentionality back into the spotlight as a working concept for the
pioneers of cybernetic theory, (Heims 1977). As Wiener painted out:
"when we go duck shooting, the error which we try to minimise is not
between the position of the gun and the actual position of the target,
but that between the position of the gun and the apticipated (author's
italics) position of the target." (Wiener 1962:113). Systems run on
information, of which feedback is a central dynamic. In Wiener's
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example we have an example of information being exchanged, as it
were, between a situation in the present and a construct of an event
in the future. This is another way of approaching the TOTEprocess.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) stressed the need to listen carefully for
the modal operators that clients use when describing problem states
because they include (by implication) the dimension of causality, and
thus where the client perceives themselves to be on a metaphorical
continuum between experiencing themselves to be 'at cause' or 'at
effect'. It is as if behind every modal operator there is a cause-effect
pattern. A trivial example may serve as an illustration. If I were to say
I must do the ironing tonight and you were to ask what would happen
if you didn't? then your question might uncover the causality behind
the must, that I wish to look nice wearing a freshly ironed shirt. The
cause-effect pattern then becomes clearer: the (perceived and
anticipated) effect is to have this because it will feel nice, or I may
wish to make a certain impression on others. When NLPis used for
information gathering, then questioning the modal operators that
people use so as to reveal the causal assumptions 'behind' them can
uncover further significant information about the goals that are
driving particular activities or thoughts.
5.4. Cause-effect thinking as basic conceptual processes.
Modal operators are not the only syntactic forms that reveal cause-
effect thinking patterns. Bandler and Grinder identified cause-effect
patterns as another category belonging to a class of language
structures they originally referred to as distortions, (Bandler and
Grinder 1975). These have been described in the previous chapter.
Distortions or connections also include the categories of complex
equivalences, mind reads and lost performatives. All of these have
interesting ontological and epistemological implications.
It is considered useful to be able to recognise these patterns when
interviewing or gathering information from others. They can reveal a
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great deal about the patterns of thinking and beliefs that operate
within other people's inner worlds. My own preference is to think
about distortions as containing connections. These inevitably make
use of internal representations of locations or vectors in metaphorical
space. The idea of space as a conceptually essential organising
principle has been widely written about. Fauconnier (1994, 1997),
Fauconnier and Turner (1998), Turner and Fauconnier (1998),
Fauconnier and Turner 2002, and others have put forward similar
views. Much of this work originated with the explorations of the roles
of metaphor in human thinking by Lakoff and Johnson, (1980, 1999)
and Johnson (1987).
Gregory Bateson has described causality as being both literal and
metaphorical (Bateson 1972). Lakoff and Johnson however (1999), in
their thorough exploration of the nature of causal thinking, propose
that cause has two syntactic valence structures that correspond to the
metaphors of causation as a forced movement, or as transfer of an
effect to an affected entity. For Fauconnier, the reason for studying
space configuration was that they "provide general answers to puzzles
of language and meaning that are usually associated with sentence
logic". (Fauconnier 1997:66). My understanding of Bandler and
Grinder's model is that it places a greater emphasis on teasing out the
different types of connections in people's maps. According to this
model, connections occur both in syntactical structures and
conceptual maps.
In this sense Bandler and Grinder's work is more in the tradition of
Vygotsky, (1939) who not only proposed a relationship between
language and thought, but also that "every thought tends to connect
something with something else, to establish a relationship between
two things" (Vygotsky1939:33). He also believed that the sense of
words "merge into each other" (Vygotsky 1939:48), so that preceding
words modify the meaning of those that follow. Using this model, it
can be suggested that the syntactic linkages between words, and the
abstractions that they generate, are indeed basic semantic
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epistemological processes used to create meaning out of otherwise
inchoate information. Bandler and Grinder's views (197SA) were that
causatives were basic modelling principles which did not need to be
rational. "The important issue is not logic, but the modelling principles
by which the client organises his experience", (Bandler and Grinder
1995A:19).
Fauconnier's theories, however useful as explanatory devices, have
the weakness that they are essentially metaphorical, and may not
represent actual spaces to the subject. In my own data gathering,
there were indications that space was in a real sense part of people's
internal representations. (I describe these processes further in my
reflection on the texts of my interviews in Chapter 6,7,8 and 9). I
found that both the spatial location of constructed 'entities', and the
'perceived' connections between different abstractions, were reported
by my collaborators in the interviews. Fauconnier's (1994) uses of the
image of mental spaces seem to differ somewhat from my own
findings, where people actually reported that their conceived images
or internal representations appeared to them to occupy a location in
actual space. Thus sometimes images were reported as experienced
as near or far, or to the left or right of my respondents. These
phenomena seem to show the qualities of primary experience, rather
than those of metaphorical devices. There may be both literally
perceived space as well as metaphorically conceived space in people's
conceptual maps. This is a distinction which is not apparent in
Fauconnier's model.
Cause-effect connections are believed to be deeply embedded in
language. It is difficult not to conclude that they must have an
epistemological function. To take my light hearted example, the cause
effect pattern behind the original statement is: if I iron my shirt, then
I will look nice, or to put it more simply, it can be represented by the
algorithm: if x (at point t1 in time) then y (at point t2 in time). If the
factor of time is taken out of the equation, then we have another kind
of syntactical structure. Wearing a freshly ironed shirt means being
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pleasing. This is what Bandler and Grinder refer to as a complex
equivalence, which is represented by the simpler algorithm A=B. Here
the factor of time has been eliminated from the construction. Such
connections can be very typical of beliefs.
The idea that it is possible to map people's ideas about causality has
been explored by Weick (2001). There is a trend to map causal
sequences in both individuals or organisations from documents or
interviews. Cause maps may be simple linear representations of
cause-effect thinking, or more complex, containing recursive loops.
Weick suggests that cause maps are attractive because they lend
substance to phenomenology, and are a useful way of analysing the
social construction of reality. It has even been established that cause
maps may change over time. I suggest that complex equivalence
patterns may be just as useful to map, either in conjunction with
cause maps, or on their own.
Identifying complex equivalences can thus add significant information
to elucidating cause maps; both cause-effect and the linking of
abstract entities in patterns of complex equivalences may be two
sides of the same epistemological coin. It may be that both causal
linkages and complex equivalence linkages are interdependent
mapping processes. Beliefs that have the structures of complex
equivalences may develop from an experience of cause and effect.
Conversely, particular patterns of complex equivalences may
themselves generate changes in the conceiver's cause effect patterns.
This seemingly innate tendency to create connections as a way of
making meaning is deeply embedded in language. Fauconnier and
Turner (2002) call this conceptual 'blending'; the bringing together of
two hitherto unrelated 'spaces'. I prefer to use the language of
Bateson, Russell and Korzybsky, suggesting that we create
connections between different conceptual entities, which may then
also operate as different categories or logical types. Sometimes these
connections can appear to be relatively simple, such as smoking
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causes cancer. They can also be of considerable complexity, so that
teasing out what and how people have connected in a kind of super-
complex constructs can become a challenge. This was one of the ways
in which I approached the transcripts of the Master Practitioners'
interviews, and forms the substance of Chapters 10 and 11.
The part of this inquiry, (which was carried out by my assistants, the
two Master Practitioners), uncovers some interesting aspects where
people appeared to have made dis-connections and re-connections in
their own conceptual maps. This was evident when their experiences,
and therefore their abstractions about themselves as learners,
changed. One of the aspects we were interested in was the
Practitioners' conceptions of themselves as learners. I will present and
review theses in chapter 10, because it Illustrates how one may be
able to track changes in people's conceptual connections. This may
yield insights into the nature of transformative changes.
5.5. Hidden connections and double binds
The complexities of connections also raises the issue about how we
make judgements. Could connections also be involved there? Bandler
and Grinder suggest the existence of a class of words which can only
be produced after a judgement has been made. These are lost
performatives; words which can only be conceptualised after a
process of judgement has been carried out. So words such as 'good',
'bad"evll', 'excel/ent', belong in this category. How does the
conceptualiser 'know' that something is good or bad? What has to
happen before the word is even brought to mind?
Perhaps we store such judgements as categories of 'good things' and
'bad things'. So there are hidden connections between the word and
the category to which the individual has assigned events that have
been judged. It may be impossible to categorise without making
connections. Again, as with comparative deletions, in order to make
any judgement, there has to have been a process of comparison, in
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order to assign an event to a category. Does it fit into the category or
not? Is it the same as the other members of the category or is it
different? Such functions are impossible without the use of the
epistemological primitive of comparison.
This idea has emerged through my reflections on Bateson's ideas
about language, categorisation and Russell and Whitehead's theory of
logical types, (Bateson 1972)2. My own perception of the way I
analyse what may be the conceptual processes producing them is
rather like dissecting a newly discovered creature. However, this is
more of an epistemological dissection, to introduce a new metaphor.
It is an exploration of some of the processes which may have been
used in the creation of a lost performative, words that are the result
of a judgement having been made.
Here the notion of scalarity, (which I described in Chapter 3) as a
possibly essential conceptual device emerges again. It is as if there
existed an invisible scale behind categories such as 'good' or 'bad'.
This is similar to what I believe happens before the production of a
comparative deletion. However, lost performatives do not seem to be
based on a sliding scale; rather they presuppose a comparison with
what is perceived as a polar opposite. For instance, if something is
conceived of as 'good', then this is a polar opposite to the concept
'bad', yet the two are linked. What are the differences between
'ordinary' categories which group members of a class together such as
mammals, whales, food, and so on, and categories which Include
judgements about ideas and events? This is a question which has only
arisen for me as the result of my data collecting and perusal of
transcripts. These are mere reflections on what could be some of the
processes that occur before the words themselves to come to the
surface.
2 In particular, the chapter entitled A Theory of Play and Fantasy, Bateson
1972 pp 177 - 193.
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I suggest that connections may also be involved in lost performatives.
If deletion, generalisation and making connections are some of the
fundamental processes that occur in the production of language,
(Bandler and Grinder 1995) then I suggest that what have been
deleted from lost performatives are the 'mental' connections to the
category and the scale which are part of the process of judging.
Categorisation could be described as drawing an imaginary line
around the information that is to be attended to, which also conveys
information about what is not to be attended to, (Bateson 1972).
There is an overlap with Fauconnier's (1997) model that what he
metaphorically terms 'blending' occurs between different 'mental
spaces', when people subjectively create their maps of their
experiences. This seems to me to be another way of saying that
people construct all sorts of complex connections. However, he and
his co-workers do not seem to address the process of the making of
judgements. Connecting may also be an integral part of the process of
judging, and then of languaging the result. However, in the case of
lost performatives, the connections appear to be deleted, and the lost
performative generalised into a class. (Deletion is the inevitable
consequence of any abstraction.) Thus, when someone says 'this is
bad' he or she is assigning an event to a class, and possibly confusing
logical types. A member of a class cannot be the class. Bateson's
view is that conceptually and metaphorically, a class operates as if it
has a frame around a group of events within it. In his words:
"the messages enclosed within the imaginary line are defined as
members of a class by virtue of their sharing common premises
or mutual relevance. The frame Itself thus becomes part of the
premise system. Either ... the frame is involved in the evaluation
of the messages which it contains, or the frame merely assists
the mind in understanding the contained messages by reminding
the thinker that these messages are mutually relevant and the
messages outside the frame may be ignored" (Bateson
1972:188).
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In order to assign events to the class 'good' it has again been
necessary to use the process of comparison. With what? Perhaps with
its polar opposite, 'bad'. Bateson, in suggesting that what a frame or
category does conceptually is to draw attention to what is within, not
to what is outside the frame. He suggests that this gives a figure-
ground situation, where the frame which is operative determines the
figure against the ground of what Is excluded from perception, and
beyond the frame. So in the category of lost performatives, there has
not only been the assigning of an event to a category; paradoxically,
the category itself bears a (deleted) relationship to its opposite, which
is not consciously attended to, but which is nevertheless 'there', as
the ground behind the figure at the fore.
Perhaps, the ability to conceive' of opposites may be another essential
epistemological process we use to make sense of value judgements.
So good may be the figure against the ground of evil. Evil could be
the figure delineated against the ground of 'good'. Thus we have the
algorithm A is not B at the heart of the process of producing a lost
performative. Yet paradoxically, A cannot be conceived of without B. A
and B co-exist together at a deeper level (not in the Chomskyan
sense); when lost performatives are languaged, it is as the result of
some fundamental epistemological processes such as comparison,
deletion, exclusion and the apprehension of polar opposites which act
as precursors to the emergence of words.
Thus there may be connections within the conceptual processes
leading to lost performatives, though they are complex and perhaps
obscure. However, they may highlight some perhaps very
fundamental epistemological processes such as the use of scales, the
conception of opposites, categorisation, figure-ground relationships,
deletion, and the formation of connections. These may be obvious, as
with complex equivalents and causal relations, or obscured, as with
lost performatives. I do not think that it is tilting at windmills to
suggest that these are some of the basic processeswhich form
bridges between map and territory. Perhaps I should let Bateson have
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the last word in this context; "language bears to the objects which it
denotes a relationship comparable to that which a map bears to a
territory," (Bateson 1972: 180). At the heart of this inquiry lies the
little explored interface between our internal representations, and
language, which is of a different logical type. In this inquiry, the two
appear to emerge as dynamically inter-related.
5.6. Mind reading, and other epistemological traps
Let us remember: we never deal with realities oer se, but rather with
images of reality - that is, with interpretations. Watzlawick
(1993: 119) .
...The mind, in apprehending, also experiences sensations which
properly speaking are qualities of the mind alone. These sensations
are projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies in
external nature. Thus the bodies are perceived as with the qualities
which in reality do not belong to them, qualities which in fact are
purely offsprings of the mind. A.N. Whitehead, quoted in Velmans
(2000: 112).
I offer the following example of a typical mind reading process. There
is an illuminating group exercise in a management training book
(Mullins 2002) which I have often used as a trainer. I include It here
because it illustrates the idea of mind reading. In this activity the
group is given the following story, then asked to judge a number of
statements about it as true, false or don't know, without being
allowed to refer back to the text.
A businessman had just turned off the lights in the store when a
man appeared and demanded money. The owner opened the
cash register. The contents of the cash register were scooped up,
and the man sped away. A member of the police force was
notified promptly. (Mullins 2002:414).
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One of the statements that participants are asked to evaluate as true
or false is: After the man who demanded the money scooped up the
contents of the cash register, he ran away. (Mullins 2002:415).
Surprisingly, many participants rate this statement as true. What
seems to happen is that the people make the judgement from
'reading' the information that they have coded into their internal
constructs, not from what was stated in the text. When the results of
the exercise are discussed, people soon realise that what they are
doing is to make judgements about an event by 'reading' as it were,
their own internal representations of the story. They are thus
evaluating what they believe are objective facts from the source of
their own subjective responses, rather from the statement whose
origins were external to them. This is the essence of mind reading.
(Bandler and Grinder 1975, 1976). So here we evaluate what we
know by making an internal representation, and filling in the missing
gaps in our own constructs. We then believe this to be real, and a
valid source of knowledge.
It is also possible to project this process on to others. One of the
dangers that Bandler and Grinder (1975) draw attention to is when a
person believes he or she 'knows' what another person Is thinking.
This process produces the typical meta-model pattern of mind
reading. The statement being late for our date means you don't love
me' is typical of a mind read. Connections again come into play. In
this case, the conceiver makes a link between an external event
(someone being late) and a subjective internal response. Such
linkages are purely subjective, and yet another example of the power
of connections to create meaning. A common linguistic marker that
alerts one to a mind read is 1 know that you ..., followed by some
judgement or conclusion. Inevitably, there may also be cause-effect
patterns buried deep within these structures.
Bandler and Grinder observed Milton Erickson use this process with
patients. In the Ericksonian tradition, therapists use their own
complex patterns of language in such a way that patients' internal
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constructs of painful events are altered. Grinder, Delozier and
Bandler(1977) have written extensively on their analyses of
transcripts of Erickson's sessions with people, identifying the meta-
model patterns that Erickson used. This example taken from Grinder,
Delozier and Bandler (1977) of Erickson talking to a patient gives
some indication of Erickson using mind reading.
I know from past experience that your blood pressure Is
changed, your pulse is changed and your eyelid reflex is
changed. (Grinder, Delozier and Bandler 1977:175).
Thus there are essentially two kinds of mind reads; one in which the
'reading' is from the individual's own cognitive constructs, and the
other in which people come to believe that they 'know' what is
happening in the mind of another.
It Is tempting for the putative philosopher to propose that mind
reading may be the most fundamental epistemological process of all.
We know that we know because we refer continuously to our own
internal maps, and mapping processes. Our maps become the vade
mecums of knowledge about our knowledge. They are reflected in
linguistic structures, and also influenced by them. We end up with an
infuriatingly recursive piece of logic; that we know that we know
because we make it up. Yet without this ability to construct our own
maps, we would be lost in meaningless chaos. Bateson proposed that
"the function of consciousness is the coupling between man and the
homeostatic systems around him" (Bateson 1972:445); that we
continually interact cybernetically with our environment. Whatever
models of language are used, it seems that this paradox is an
essential part of human information processing.
5.7. Presuppositions
Sandler and Grinder emphasised the presuppositional nature of
language. A dictionary definition of presupposition indicates that It is
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something that is assumed, or taken for granted. It is also thought to
be a necessary antecedent to making sense. Presuppositions are
considered to be a pre-requisite for sense making. Dilts (2000)3 has
explained the term as something that is overtly expressed in the body
of a statement, which must be supposed or accepted in order for the
sentence or utterance to make sense. Thus for a statement to make
any sense, the hearer or reader must first assume certain things. In
the statement the cat sat on the mat, the existence of the entities cat
and mat have to be assumed in order to process the information
contained in the sentence. Similarly, the existence of a past, and the
phenomenon of sitting also have to be presupposed. In other words,
these assumptions are antecedent to the understanding of the
sentence.
When Bandler and Grinder were identifying how Milton Erickson
achieved the therapeutic effects that he did through his language
patterns, one of the most influential devices he used were
presuppositions. In The Structure of Magic Volume I they identify 29
different types of these.
Thus in order for a statement to be taken as 'true', something
antecendent to it must also have been believed to be 'true'. Making
sense of something In the present is based on sense-making that has
gone on before. In terms of logical levels, presuppositions operate at
a higher level of abstraction. This may then influence how an
utterance or a text is decoded. Thus they also act in a similar way to
categories or frameworks, which are thought to influence people's
perception (Goldstone 2001). Presuppositions can also be powerful
persuasive devices. For Instance, asking a child at bedtime "do you
want to put your pyjamas on now or after supper" presupposes that
pyjamas will be put on. It is claimed that such patterns are more
likely to elicit assent. This is a brief example of another dlrnenslon to
the profoundly subjective nature of sense making through language,
3 This can be downloadedfrom
http://nlpunlversltypress.com/hmtI12/PrPu20.html.
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and of the ways in which language can be thought of as operating at
many levels, both conscious and unconscious.
5.8. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the idea that there are different types of
complex connections within people's conceptual architecture which
are reflected in language structures. These both represent
epistemological processes (which are agents in the creation of
conceptual constructs) and, when languaged, influence the thinking of
others. Such connections can be sought for when analysing texts,
which is what I have done with the transcripts in Chapter 10, showing
the changes that people underwent after attending the NLP course in
Riyadh. Connections of various kinds seem to contribute to the
emergence of meaning. They are also part of the process of
abstraction; the higher abstract concepts will include connections of
various kinds as part of the internal framework of the conceiver's
maps. These in turn generate the presuppositions through which
people make sense of statements and texts. Thus Bandler and
Grinder's model of language is not merely a typology, it also includes
some important underlying epistemological processes, which are as
much about thought as they are about communication. These are
some of the many aspects of information processing that I explore
further, using the transcript of my interviews, in Chapters 6 - 10.
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Chapter 6. Exploring Nominalisations and De-nominalising, and
finding Other Things on the Way.
You talk to yourself too much. You're not unique in that. Everyone of
us does. We maintain our world with our inner dialogue. (Carlos
Castaneda's character Don Juan, quoted by Kornfield 2000:36).
Be prepared for the unexpected. You might find that you unearth
other issues which were existing at a deeper level than the issue you
originally decided to investigate. [. ..J Always be careful, however, not
to let an inquiry get out of hand. Stay disciplined and concentrate on
one area at a time. (McNiff et a/1996:40 - 41).
6.1. Introduction
This is the first of four chapters on my analyses and interpretations of
the transcripts of my own interviews. I explained their background
and design in chapter 2. Although the detail I now go into in reporting
my findings may seem daunting, I have purposely approached this
with care, because this approach, and the findings, may be new, and
may therefore need careful exploration and description. In my own
data collection, I focus on the internal representations and sub-
modality changes that my interviewees reported on. I link changes in
people's internal representations to the language structures that I
used in my interview schedule.
My new 'microscope lens' had revealed hitherto little known things.
One of the difficulties of using this new method is that it has shown
the topic of my inquiry to be far more complex than I had originally
thought. Working from within a system's perspective, it has been
difficult to decide what to leave out. This was because many aspects
emerged that I consider are part of the greater whole of the learning
and sense making of people's cognitive mapping processes. However,
I believe that the role of the senses in conceptual mapping emerges
from the data that I describe in the following four chapters.
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As I explained in chapter 2, I interviewed six participants on my NLP
course.' I have changed their names so that they remain anonymous.
I was most interested in eliciting people's experience of their own
internal representations and sub-modality changes generated in
response to my words. I have described Sandler and MacDonald's
(1988) ideas on internal representations and sub-modalities in
Chapter 3, where I suggest that they may be a vital but hitherto little
explored aspect of people's internal constructs. The next four chapters
are mainly about people's reports on their internal representations,
and the changes in sub-modalities that appear to have been elicited
by changes in the language structures that were used. Chapter 10
takes a different approach, as it describes my interpretation of
interviews carried out by my assistants.
This chapter is mainly about my explorations of the effects of
nominalisations (as distinct from the verb form) on people's
construction of meaning at the levels of internal representations and
sub-rnodalltles. However, other features also came to light in these
interviews, namely the role of words used at the beginning of my
questions also played a role in how subsequent information was
attended to by the conceiver.
Chapter 7 explores the role of modal operators and the effects of
other small but seemingly powerful words on people's internal
processes. Again, the focus is on changes in people's internal
representations.
In Chapter 8, I offer my analysis of the transcripts with a focus on a
number of factors that seemed to emerge from the interviews. These
include the roles of the dimension of time and goal setting. They also
indicate that people have the ability to use different time frames
(past, present and future) as perceptual positions.
1 'Lucy', 'Edward', 'Ina', 'Kathleen', 'Steve' and 'Beatrice'.
160
In Chapter 9, I focus on responses to certain words, which seem to
generate more specific internal responses in people. I also describe
my attempts to explore the different perceptual filters of 'sameness'
and 'difference'. Throughout the four chapters, I also refer to the role
of people's internal dialogue, which appeared to emerge as an
essential aid to the development of the conceivers' internal
processing, and meaning making.
In Chapter 10 I use the transcripts of the Master Practitioners'
interviews to explore some of the more abstract levels of people's
constructs of learning, and propose that the style of teaching and
communication may have profound effects on how people construct
knowledge. This chapter uses Sandler and Grinder's meta-model as
the main tool for my analysis of the transcripts.
The information from chapters 6 to 10, and my reflection on these
findings, became the basis for the development of my hypothetical
model of the specific processes involved in the construction of
knowledge (and also learning). It suggests that there are a number of
identifiable epistemological processes, used in the construction of
people's models, which are mediated through language and
communication.
Where I cite extracts from the transcripts, I use J. for my own words,
and the pseudonyms for those of my interlocutors. Where there were
pauses, I have indicated these thus: , and where I have left out
parts of the transcripts, I have used ( ).
6.2.1. Nominalising and de-nominalising.
In this section I begin to analyse the information from the transcripts
of my interviews. The main focus in this chapter is on my attempts to
explore the effects of nominalisations. I review my collaborators'
answers to 5 different questions from my interview schedule. All of
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these were initially intended to inquire into the effects of
nominalisations. One of my original goals was to explore the internal
processes associated with the nominalised and de-nominalised forms
of words. A characteristic of our language and thinking is that as part
of our conceptual strategies we appear to concretise what were
originally processes. I have explored what I believe to be some of the
theoretical background to these linguistic processes in Chapter 4.
In my own interview schedule, (whose design I described in chapter
2) there were five sets of linguistic constructions which deliberately
contained both nominalisations and de-nominalisations. These were
questions 3, 4, 9, 10 and 16.2 Each contained information that I
wanted to present in both forms using different linguistic
2Question 3
a) Can you be aware of how you relate to someone you value?
b) Can you think of a relationship with a person you value?
Question 4.
a) In the heart, the ventricles contract to pump blood around the body. The
atria receive blood from the body. Closure of the valves at the bases of the
main arteries prevent the backflow of blood on ventricular relaxation.
b) Your heart is a pump and (pause) receives blood from your body and
(pause) pumps blood around your body. Imagine your ventricles contracting
and (pause) squeezing blood into the main arteries so (pause) they need
valves at their base that close so that (pause) blood isn't sucked back when
the ventricle relaxes.
Question 9.
Think of something you might have done better. What are the differences
between saying to you 'you did that wrong, and you did that wrongly?'
Question 1.0
a) Remember your childhood.
b) Remember being a chi/d.
c) Remember yourself as a chi/d.
Question 1.6.
a) It's important to understand communication.
b) It's important to understand communicating.
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constructions. In the case of question 9, I explored using the
adjective 'wrong' and then changed it to the adverb 'wrongly'. For the
sake of simplicity I will look at a set of responses, and then reflect on
my findings at the end of this section.
6.2.2. Responses to Question 4,3 textbook language
explored
With question 4 I had deliberately set out to explore the differences
between the standard 'medical text book' language which is
dissociated, and uses the third person, and the same kind of content
phrased in the second person, with some of the contents
denominalised. I had offered two statements. The first was more
'text-book', and contained a number of nomtnellsatlons." The second
deliberately contained more verbs, (de-nominalisations) and used the
second person. Some of the interviewees reported that their first
response to my initial (more impersonal, third person) statement was
that they were reminded of lessons, or textbooks in cardiology.
Beatrice, for instance replied almost immediately that what came to
her mind were still, fiat, two dimensional colour pictures from a book:
Beatrice: It's a text book, it's the picture from our textbooks from our
training as a nurse. It's actually a colour picture .... It's colour
pictures in the book.
1. So it's flat, two dimensional?
3 In the heart the ventricles contract to pump blood around the body. The atria
receive blood from the body. Closure of the valves at the bases of the main arteries
prevent the back flow of blood on ventricular relaxation.
Your heart is a pump and receives blood from your body and pumps blood around
your body. Imagine your ventricles contracting and squeezing blood Into the main
arteries so they need valves at their base that close, so that the blood isn't sucked
back when the ventricle relaxes.
4 By dissociated, I refer to a particular perceptual stance, in which the conceivers
experience themselves as separate from the content of their conceptions.
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Beatrice: Yeah, flat, still picture. I can actually see the book, I can see
the whole thing, I can see the art that was involved in drawing it.
The second statement changed her internal representation from a still
picture to a moving representation at the sub-modality level. This
appeared to be a significant change. Her whole internal construction
seemed to alter with my words. The language of the second
statement contained more verbs, and I had deliberately tried to
create a flow of information using my voice. On hearing this part, she
commented that she experienced more movement:
Beatrice: It's the same picture from the book, but has movement in it,
and the ventricles are contracting, and it's probably because I know
the flow of the blood that I can see the movement.
Another person, Kathleen, reported a similar response, conceiving a
static 'picture' in response to the first statement, and a moving one
after the second. Her response to the first statement was:
Kathleen: Do I have the right picture? Thick black lines, that's it.
J. One picture?
Kathleen: Yeah.
J. And anything about what's on the picture?
Kathleen: Just little lines pointing to it. Like a diagram
J. It's like a diagram?
Kathleen: Thick black lines for the walls of the heart and little black
lines pointing to the atria and ventricle.
J. Sort of textbook?
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Kathleen: Yeah/ sort of basic textbook.
She responded to the second statement more enthusiastically than to
the first.
Kathleen: Yeah/ it's a moving picture/ colour/ quite close to me
actually, and in the picture there are different colours, the valves, the
reds, the .... I can't see the blood going through the arteries but I can
see the ventricles contracting, pumping.
Lucy, on the other hand, reported that her response to the first
statement was to become aware of... Slides. I'm trying to ... they're
slides. It wasn't moving A bit of colour. I suppose I can put a little bit
more into it being a nurse .... Definitely slides.
For Lucy, the second part evoked moving pictures. She told me that
she had been aware of the 'ands' linking the various pieces of
information together, which she thought had helped to produce the
movement. She also commented on the effects that the word
'squeeze' had had on her. This word is one that Bandler and Grinder
(1975) classify as a sensory predicate, that is, one likely to evoke a
ktnaesthetic" response. In her case it seemed to transform the
internal imagery from a series of stills to images in which there was
movement.
Lucy: So yeah, much more of a picture. The word 'squeeze', it's easier
to envision, it definitely was a moving picture.
J. So it was a movie?
5 The term 'kinaesthetic' is one used in NLPto denote any bodily sensation.
This may range from Interviewees being more aware of shifts in their bodily
responses, to other sensations such as feeling heavy or light, warmer or
colder, or with a sensation located at a particular polnt, or felt throughout.
Kinaesthetic responses are considered to be an essential aspect of internal
representations, which I have written about in chapter 3. My respondents
often used the term kinaesthetic; it had become part of the language that we
used in the NLPcourse to denote bodily sensations.
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Lucy: It was a movie.
Edward was a thirty two year old Respiratory Technician in the
hospital, and was also one of the Master Practitioners assisting me on
the NLP course. He was one of the people with whom I discussed the
design of my interviews. He gave me some useful feedback.
It is, I believe, indicated from Edward's response that for him, the
text-book language evoked text-book images. He volunteered what
for me was one of the most significant pieces of information, which I
have underlined below. Here he describes how he is aware that he is
actively engaged in creating an internal representation, as it were in
conjunction with my words, and his additional verbal reflections on
them. Then, his internal representations seemed to take on a life of
their own, so that it is as if, as he is describing his responses, his own
internal words continue to access more information, so that as it
builds up, it acquires more detail, colour and movement. It was as if
that when he spoke of his own internal representations, they
increased in detail and richness, stimulating more memories in the
form of further internal representations.
Edward: Mh Mh (laugh) takes me back to my days of cardiology. Em,
I have a picture of the heart with ... an aorta coming out of the
ventricle ...
J. Is it a still or a movie?
Edward: It's moving.
J. Mh Mh
Edward: I'm just filling in the bits as I go along. I'm constructing
your dialogue against my map of my cardiology that I know. (My
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emphasis, as this made me curious about what might be involved in
people's inner searches.)
J. OK. Yeah.
Edward: So I'm putting on the vena cava,
J. Yeah.
Edward: And just building it UP, and now that it's built now it starts
getting its colour. (My underlining, as he is talking through how he is
constructing the internal representation.) Interesting, the colour ts as
if you're using colour Doppler. I don't know if you know colour
Doppler; towards the colour Doppler is always red, and away from
the, eh...probe is always blue. From my days of doing cardiac echoes,
so it's actually being coded appropriately to cardiac echoes...
J. In your internal representation?
Edward: Yeah, uh huu,
He responded differently to the second half of the question. Instead of
responding visually, his first response appeared to engage the
kinaesthetic domain.
Edward: That's very different. First of all I internally go to where my
heart is, I can feel the sensation of blood moving through my vessels,
then if I check my ventricle I can feel the blood moving out of my
vessel... out of my ventricle, sorry, into the aorta, and when you
mention the valves I can feel the sensation of re-gurge, the blood
coming back and pushing against the valves .... Now that's all the
kinaesthetic, I can also see the picture (...), which is three 0, no
borders, movement.
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In this case it was as if using more verbs, and the second person verb
form, rather than the third person, may initially have led him to a
kinaesthetic response, as he used the word 'feel' three times, as if he
were attending more to his bodily sensations. He reported that he was
not aware that there were any significant differences in his visual
responses to each statement, though I did not probe further, except
to note that his 'pictures' also had movement in them, as a response
to my second set of statements.
Lucy, a 28 year old nurse responsible for Quality Control and teaching
in the hospital, initially gave responses that were baffling, because
they were different from those of the others, and thus a counter
example. For her, it was the first statement that brought about vivid,
colour coded moving pictures of a diagram of the heart. The second
statement surprisingly produced a more 'textbook' representation.
Lucy: (laughter) I think to make sense I had ... first instructions you
had were nice, the second instructions you gave me were more
textbook. The language was unfamiliar yet it needed textbook picture,
whereas the first language was un textbook like, it was
understandable to a nurse or a layman, it was easy, the second one I
needed a diagram for myself, it reminded me of school.
One of the aspects that I have not focused much attention on is the
role of meta-communication in human discourse. Factors such as
tonality, modulation, rhythm, tempo and volume all have message
value, (Watzlawick et a/1967). One possible explanation for Lucy's
different responses is that my own 'meta-messages' were influencing
her. As non-verbal communication is considered to operate at a
higher logical level than words, that too may influence how the
message is to be decoded. It is considered to act as a categoriser of
the verbal content. (Watzlawick et a/1967, Watzlawick 1978). The
main aim of the research was exploring the power of words to
teaching and learning. Although I did not explicitly inquire into the
influence of meta-communication, its effects were unavoidable.
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One of the most interesting responses to the second part of Question
4 was offered by Steve, a 26 year old male nurse, where he describes
how his internal representation of his heart included information he
had coded visually, auditorily and kinaesthetically. My first statement
elicited a predominantly visual description, accompanied by some
'squelching sound', (sic) whereas the second statement produced this
response.
Steve: No, there is blood coming back in but I can't see it coming
back in. there's a noise again, but the noise is more like the lub dub
of the heart, than the squelching sound, standing on oranges!
(Laughter) I can feel my heart in my chest now, the rate is quicker
than normal, I can actually feel the sensation in my arms of blood
going through them.
I became curious to explore how people might experience the effects
of their own internal words on these cognitive processes, and he
seemed to be someone who was very aware of his own internal world,
so I asked him: "So you talking about it has actually kind of changed
the internal representation, so what you were saying was not just
from what I was reading?" His reply then illustrated how his own
dialogue developed the images in his introspections.
Steve: I think from what I was saying, the kinaesthetic became
stronger, (my underlining) but the kinaesthetic did not change. The
picture came first. As I was describing it the kinaesthetic became
stronger. That's exactly what happened. The auditory sounds ... other
than my internal dialogue was... became ... the volume became
greater.
Here he seemed to distinguish between the sounds of his own speech,
and the other noises in his internal representation. So as he became
aware of sounds, then of his own internal dialogue, as well as what he
was saying to me, his internal model seemed to become amplified,
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more intense. It was as if the internal dialogue was leading him to
access more information. He also stated that he experienced a link
between his act of describing internal events, and an increase in the
intensity of the auditory and kinaesthetic components of his own
responses. Lynch (1983) has reported that there is an increase in
blood pressure in people when they talk, or even read aloud, as if
speaking directly influenced their physiology. In the case of Steve, his
own speech seems to have had a direct effect on the intensity of the
activities of his internal sensory world. He also seemed to be able to
track the effects of his own inner dialogue on the development of his
internal representations. This could almost be described as
introspecting introspection!
6.3. First words emerge as important.
With the first question" that I had designed to investigate people's
responses to the nominalisation 'relationship' and the denominalised
form 'relate', there were to be some surprising responses. Instead of
reporting on the effects of the nominalisations, the transcripts seem
to indicate that some people responded more to the words 'aware'
and 'think' than they did to the nominalisation and de-nominalised
form. This is indicated by Lucy's response.
Lucy: I find that easier to think of, than being aware. Aware seemed
to be more dissociated. Aware? (pause) so I think I would still get all
the same feelings ...
In my first interviews, it appeared that words such as 'think' and
'aware' may create particular mind sets rather as categories or
metaphors do. These then influence how the information is
constellated at the sub-modality levels. This is in keeping with
6 Question 3
a) Can you be aware of how you relate to someone you value?
b) Can you think of a relationship with a person you value?
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Goldstone's views about the influence of categories on perception,
which I reviewed in Chapter 3. (Goldstone, R. 2001A). In this case, I
found that, if we consider 'think' and 'aware' to represent two
different frameworks, perhaps at a higher logical level than the rest of
the sentence, then they seem to have altered the way in which my
interlocutors paid attention to the rest of the sentence. This is in
keeping with Robbie (2000) who has explored the idea that Bandler
and Grinder's metamodel of language structure needs fine tuning. He
suggests that Pinker's idea that phrases contain a word which acts as
a 'head' (Pinker" 1994) which gives a phrase its name and determines
what it is about, needs to be considered. Perhaps how I used 'think'
and 'aware' also caused people to respond to them as if they were
'heads'. It is perhaps too soon to draw many generalisations about
the effects of such words from such a small sample. Lucy's response
to 'think' and 'be aware' were interesting. These words were somehow
considered by the interviewees as more significant than I had
originally thought. They seemed to override the effects of the
nominalisatons, which were the class of words that I wanted to
investigate.
The information about sub-modalities in the responses to this
question was initially somewhat confused; if anything it was a lesson
in the importance of the interviewer's awareness of her own words.
Erickson and Rossi (1989) stressed that the initially spoken words
may create a 'set' (or framework, perhaps even a kind of category),
which then determines the context to which subsequent information is
assigned by the listener. It is as if how one asks someone to process
information (requesting them to be aware or asking them to think
about) appears to direct the internal search in different directions. In
writing about the responses to these language structures, it is also
interesting to note that 'be aware' and 'think' produce different
effects. I illustrate this with extracts from the transcripts below.
It seemed that words such as 'think' and 'aware', when used as
directives, may produce a different kind of internal search, and define
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different ways in which the acquired information is to be configured.
In retrospect I should have made clearer distinctions between
whether I was exploring nominalisations, or the effects of asking
people how to process and search.
Steve's responses were interesting for a number of reasons. He was a
practiced meditator, who claimed this made him more aware of his
own processes. There appeared to be more detail in his responses to
my questions. The next extract shows his internal search; he is
commenting on his process of searching as well as his responses to
my words. Of particular interest are his comments on his own internal·
dialogue, which I have underlined. In the second set of responses he
repeats the word 'relationship', which I take somewhat hesitantly to
indicate that he is configuring the information in noun form, though
he then spontaneously uses the verb to continue his own internal
search, which may have influenced the way the information was then
experienced. Early on in the interviewing process I began to wonder
about the role of internal dialogue in the internal search during the
introspective process.
One of the most marked differences in my interview with Steve was
the distinct sensory modalities which were evoked; the first directive
that I gave him directed his attention to his kinaesthetic response
(which may be his response to the word 'awareness') whereas in the
second part he seemed to oscillate between awareness of the visual
and the kinaesthetic aspects of his internal representations.
Sometimes people's responses seemed initially to be difficult to
describe; I suggest this may be because we lack an appropriate
language to describe many of our introspections.
Here are some of Steve's responses to the same set of requests. They
also seem to indicate that he uses his internal dialogue to further and
deepen his own introspection. I have underlined the parts of the
extracts, which seem to me to illustrate this.
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J. OK Fine. So number three is 'can you be aware of how you relate to
someone you value?'
Steve: Yeah, that's mainly a kinaesthetic, and the feeling is mainly in
my chest and affects my breathing actually, I get a feeling first and
then I get a picture of the person, and I hear their name, myself
naming them. ( ..) It's a still picture, it's brightly coloured, the colours
in the picture are bright anyway, that I have, the person's wearing
bright colours, but it's a still picture, it's clear, it's framed, I can hear
myself talking inside saying why I value the person, what this person
means to me.... (pause) but it's mainly kinaesthetic, is the strongest
response ...
J. OK So what happens if we kind of re-phrase that into 'can you think
of a relationship with a person you value'.
Steve. Em, yes but I don't see. I have a sense of the relationship but
I can't see it relating, I can see a picture ... but I can't see it relating in
it, I can't see the interaction but I know there's a relationship, and it's
good, it's comfortable, the feelings again, it's mainly kinaesthetic, the
feelings are comfortable, ... I feel relaxed .... (pause) but I can't be...
it's difficult to explain, but I'm going to the back of my head here
there's a kinaesthetic feeling like a ball again, a sphere, in this
relationship. It's sitting there. Give me a second to see what's in
there... again, I've got a different picture. It's of me and the same
person in this relationship ... and it's moving, it's bright, it's vivid, it's
actually the same scene... and there's actually different scenes
coming in and out, ... the feeling at the back of my head has gone
actually.
What emerges from this part of the transcripts and the extracts from
the transcripts of question 3 in particular, is that here we have more
glimpses into the complex interactions between people's internal
dialogue, and the directions taken by their introspections, and
therefore, it seems, their internal representations. Internal dialogue,
173
even in the responses to the most deceptively simple statements, was
now emerging as a factor apparently able to direct searches, and
influence how the information was then sorted and attended to. At the
same time it seemed to echo and further develop my interlocutor's
internal dialogue. It also appeared to stimulate the creation of some
rich and varied internal representations.
6.4. Reflections on the responses to question 10;7 memories of
childhood.
The questions where I asked my collaborators to search internally for
certain memories about their younger years yielded some unexpected
responses. I chose to use the term 'childhood' because it is one of
those nominalisations for which it has become impossible to return to
the original verb, which could be something like 'childing', though that
is ambiguous. I asked them to think about the differences in their
responses between 'being a child' and 'your childhood'. These
produced marked alterations in the internal configurations of their
sub-modalities. There were further differences when I asked people
to remember themselves as 'a child'.
Were I to carry out this type of questioning again, I would be more
aware of the influence of first words on people's initial internal
responses. People reported significant shifts in how they processed
and responded to my words in this question. Many differences in sub-
modalities were reported. Some of the wordings elicited pleasant
memories for some, for others, less pleasant. There were also marked
shifts in people's perceptual positions; sometimes my respondents
could see themselves in the internal representations, at other times
they were actually experiencing remembered events as if they were
71. Remember your childhood.
2. Remember being a chi/d.
3. Remember yourself as a child.
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happening to them in the present. The first stance is typical of
dissociation, where people experience themselves as being 'on the
outside' of the events that are happening, or that they are
remembering. Abascal et al (2001) describe this as taking the
'witnessing stand'. When people are associated, on the other hand
they appear to experience events as if they were actually happening
to them in the present.
Beatrice's responses illustrated just such a dramatic shift. To the first
question she replied that she 'sees' lots of little pictures, which were
associated with a good feeling. The second question produced a long
silence and signs of distress. I wanted to avoid making any of my
collaborators uncomfortable, so I quickly gave a few words of
reassurance, and then moved on. Only when I was sure that she was
no longer distressed did I continue with the interview. Here is the
extract which I believe illustrates these shifts. What seemed
interesting is that the first question elicited 'loads of pictures' whereas
the second only produced one picture. This is a sub-modality
distinction.
J. What happens if I say' remember your childhood?'
Beatrice: (Pause.) Loads of pictures, pictures all over the place of my
childhood.
J. OK. Lots of different pictures?
Beatrice: All different pictures.
J. All in front of you. Are you in the pictures, or looking at them, or ...
Beatrice: I'm in some of them, yeah, looking at others, there a ...
they're not very clear, they're like sort of fuzzy sort of pictures,
they're nice, and there's a nice comfortable feeling as well.
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J. And how is that different to 'remember being a child?'
Beatrice: Remember being a child is one picture with a border on it, it
actually automatically goes into not a very nice situation ...
J. Oh dear...
Beatrice: I'm a small person... (Here she showed signs of discomfort,
so I reassured her, and we gently moved on to another topic).
A similar pattern was shown by Edward, who also responded to the
first statement by seeing and feeling many different things, and who
then, when asked to remember being a child, experienced a change in
the number of pictures and a change in the feelings (kinaesthetics)
associated with them.
Part of Edward's response to the first statement illustrates the
richness and complexities of people's internal representations and
sub-modalities. Again he gave me many insights into the dynamics of
his own internal searches.
Edward: ...picture is a multitude of moving pictures ... smells, sounds,
colours, fabulous, em, I have one picture at the front, again no
borders, they're all open... open pictures, so as I look around the
pictures I just re build the map as I go round and interestingly I have
all these pictures, and the one I have at the front is the one I always,
em, sink back to when I think of childhood, it's eh, very powerful, I
can see 3D, movement, fabulous colour, in fact the colour is more
fabulous than it would have been then, sounds, smells, even the
sensation of breeze, so there's the external kinaesthetic as well.
Yeah, that's a fabulous one.
His response to the second statement was different. Whereas the
response to the first statement was attention to visual information,
the second statement seemed to focus him on a kinaesthetic
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response. There were also changes in his conceived spatial location of
visual elements. The 'pictures' of his childhood have become more
distant.
1. So how is it different when I say' remember being a child?'
Edward: (Pause.) That's... primarily a kinaesthetic, with small pictures
in the distance. Pictures are quite hard to focus on, emmm, very
strong kinaesthetic .. em.
1. Located anywhere?
Edward: In my throat. Mmm. The pictures are wanting to be there
but they're just so far away... so far away ... still with the kinaesthetic
in my throat, ... quite a sad one... for some reason ... mmmm .....
(pauses) .
I was surprised when Kathleen also responded to the directive
'remember yourself as a child' with an internal representation
associated with an unpleasant feeling.
Kathleen: (pause) ... (indistinct) I don't hear, ... it's smaller picture,
black and white, and ... I'm in it but the K is not... it's not a very
pleasant K.8
Each of my interlocutors reported different responses to these three
statements. The main differences were in their internal
representations and sub-modalities. What was also of interest was
that the words that were used to ask someone about their childhood
actually produced a noticeable shift in their perceptual position in
relation to the re-constructed memory. It was as if the events were
categorised by the words that I used even before their searches were
begun. Lucy's responses indicated something of the complexities of
8 The term 'K' Is an abbreviation for kinaesthetic, and was used on the course
spontaneously by participants.
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her internal searches, the changes in her sub-modalities as well as
shifts in her perceptual position. At one point she is searching so
intently that she forgets my words.
J. What happens if I say 'Remember your childhood. '?
Lucy: (laughter) My whole life flashed before me! Remember my
childhood! Like I'm looking over here again, there's a lot in it, like I
can't focus on anyone thing.... Although everything is going around
here at the moment, but there seems to be a little child at the top of
the pictures, it's in a circle, little things are happening, and there's a
picture at the top, and it's me, as a child.
J. OK. So let's move on to the next one, and leave that one for the
time being. 'Remember being a child. '
Lucy: Yeah right I'm looking down now, also I'm going inside,
remember being a child, I suppose it's ... I'm trying to get a feeling of,
it's a kinaes ..., Say that question again?
J. Remember being a child.
Lucy: yeah it's a feeling that comes out, it elicits more than seeing a
picture. Remember being a child. Yeah, yeah definitely. A big K.
J. OK. And the picture is not. ..
Lucy: the pic ...? remember? It's more of a K. I was trying to search
for that. !1underline this sentence because she describes this process
as a 'search'.)
J. OK. That's fine.
Lucy: A bit more of a K.
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J. 'Remember yourself as a child'.
Lucy: Remember yourself as a child. Well I'll be looking at mvself. A
picture, it's moved down here, it's from the past obviously, my left
hand side. ..... the picture's sort of started off. ..(tape ends, new side
to tape begins). ... looking at myself as a kid there ...
In Steve's case there were similar processes; he moved from being
associated to being dissociated, and he reported experiencing a shift
in his internal representation from a pleasant to an unpleasant
feeling.
J. OK. So what happens if I say' remember being a child'?
Steve: (laughs) I'm associated into a picture where I'm playing with
my friends ... but I wouldn't know who the people are now ... (laughs)
erm ... mind you the games were being very violent, but they're still
pleasant if you like. I see the picture in front of me, not life sized, it's
child life sized if you like .... it's bright, I can hear noises, but it's
unspecific noises, sort of shouting and roaring, laughing, erm, I've got
a strong kinaesthetic sense on my left side here, it must be the
trouble I found myself. .. I (laughs) I have a feeling of very much
warmth or something here ... (Here he pointed to the left side of his
chest).
J. On the left side of your chest?
Steve: Actually it's here, still on my chest. Erm, ... it's funny. It's
clear, it's vivid, as if I'm a child.
J. And what if I say' remember yourself as a child'.
Steve: I see a different picture, and I'm dissociated from it, and ... it's
... pretty dull ... it's pretty dull, the movement is pretty sluggish. .. it's
black and white.
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J. Are you in it? (This question was intended to establish whether he
was associated or dissociated).
Steve: yeah, I am in it but I'm not. .. I'm dissociated ... [the feeling
is] kind of in my chest, a heaviness again, my breathing is slower,
and the air going in and out are the same temperature, and that's
cold, and it's erm ... it's a strong yuck factor actually.
6.5. Reflections on the transcripts of question 17.
In this section I give an description and some initial reflections on the
transcripts of question 17, which was again an attempt to present
similar information in the nominalised and then denominalised form.
This question came towards the end of the interview sessions. We had
ranged over all sorts of topics, and perhaps my long suffering
collaborators were getting tired of it all. However, some interesting
responses emerged. It now seemed that particular words in a
sentence set frames for people. There were, for instance, no
differences between the responses to the two forms from Beatrice. I
suspected at the time that she was attending so intensely to the
richness of her internal processes that she did not 'hear' the
denominalisation. Therefore I checked on this in my questioning, and
found that this was the case. The word 'important' also seemed to set
a frame for her internal search, as she repeated it. Perhaps the word
'important' overrode the effect of 'communicating'. It may have
categorised the information for her. Much of her reply is in the form of
content, yet there are some aspects of her processes that emerge.
Here is a part of the transcript.
J. 'It's important to understand communication.'
Beatrice: I agree.
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J. What do you have to do before you agree?
Beatrice: Em, let me see, just seeing a breakdown in communication.
I've seen a situation where there is a breakdown in communication.
That happens every single day with me. And that is how, looking at
that, that's how I know that it's important.
1. So there's a picture out in front of you?
Beatrice: There's a picture of me at work, surrounded by people who
don't have fluent English properly, and how our communication is
never fluent, they never understand a word that comes out of my
mouth, I can just see how we just don't communicate very well. How
they can't understand me because I speak too fast, and I can't
understand them because they use all the wrong tenses. I can see us
all at the desk, normally me in the middle of an argument
J. Movie? Still?
Beatrice: Movie.
J. Noise? Sounds?
Beatrice: Yes, loud loud sounds. I can just see my normal average
working day.
1. And how is that different, or how might that be different if I were to
say 'it's important to understand communicating. '?
Beatrice: There's no difference, they're still all there yacking away.
It's the same, I'm still in it, they're still in it. We're all still having our
little communication breakdowns, which is leading me to the
assumption that it is important to establish good communication. At
this point I wonder whether she is still under the 'influence' of the first
statement, so I ask her:
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1. Ah, so you've just said something new, which is that you realise
that it is important to establish gQQS/_ communication. Did that come
off the first statement or the second statement?
Beatrice: The first statement.
Kathleen offered the following information on the effects of my voice
tonality on her internal responses. It was never my intention to elicit
the unfortunate image of a little liked teacher from her past. This is
however what happened.
1. We're nearly at the end. So if I were to say to you 'It's important to
understand communication. '?
Kathleen: (pause) like a schoolteacher.
1. Oh, sorry about that!
Kathleen: Like a schoolteacher, yeah, she's sitting up. (End of side
of tape. Continues to talk about her memories of this teacher sitting
in front of her.)
1. OK. Was it the way I said it that elicited Sister Frances over there?
(I ask this because she has pointed to her internal image's spatial
location.)
Kathleen: Yeah, you must have sounded ....
1. The tonality?
Kathleen: Yeah. (At this point I decide to experiment with changing
my tone of voice.)
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1. So if I were to say something like (softer voice)' it's important to
understand communication. '
Kathleen: That makes me want to know more.
1. OK.... want to know more. And any pictures, any other responses?
Kathleen: I pictured you in the classroom.
1. Now you see me in the classroom?
Kathleen: Not Sister Frances. Poor Sister Frances! (laughter)
1. How is it different to I it's important to understand communicating'?
(Here I deliberately asked her to focus on what was different, so as to
elicit the contrasts between the two, by using 'different' as a
suggestion that guided the internal search.)
Kathleen: (pause) It's more flowing, movement, and there's a picture
there also ...
1. Is it a moving picture?
Kathleen: Yeah.
Apart from the effects of my tone of voice, there were changes in her
sub-modalities when communication was denominalised to
communicating. I realised I could have asked for more detail from
her, but the interview had now been almost an hour long, and we
probably both felt tired. However, there seemed to be more
movement in her denominalised version.
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6.6. Doing it wrong, and doing it wronglYi adjectives and
adverbs.
There were many words which had the effect of changing my
interviewees' static internal representations to more flowing ones.
Question 99 attempted to explore the effects of changing the adjective
'wrong' to the adverb 'wrongly'. I include my reflections on them in
this section, as some of the responses appeared to have similar
effects to those of denominalisations. Bandler and Grinder (1975) and
Christina Hall (Hall 1989)10 propose that adjectives actually produce a
form of nominalisation which they call a lesser nominalisation. For
example, to say that someone was 'a lazy housewife' is said to link
the adjective 'lazy' to the noun 'housewife' forming a structure that is
essentially a nominalisation because it seems to be frozen in time,
and also implies an identity, which is itself a nominalisation.
(McWhirter 1992).
This was perhaps the most deceptively simple pair of linguistic
constructions, as the two key words only differed by the addition of
two letters. Yet the two versions, the first using an adjective, the
second using its adverbial form, did not fail to produce different
responses. It was summed up by Kathleen, who told me that "wrong
is so negative, it couldn't have been any worse, whereas wrongly
means it was ... (pause) slightly wrong." She went on to reflect on
her responses to the two types of wording.
Kathleen: I did it wrong... it's a black and white still picture, and I've
no choice in the matter, and that's it, but I did it wrongly, slightly
over here, (indicating the imagined location of the first picture) it's
still to the right of the first picture, and .... I've a very unpleasant
feeling about the first picture, I've an unpleasant K, but this one is not
9 Think of something you might have done better. What are the differences between
saying to you 'you did that filJ2.ruL and you did that wrongly?'
10 Christina Hall, personal communication.
184
quite as strong, I still feel I have... there's a choice there ... (pointing to
the location of the second picture).
J. OK, yeah.
Kathleen: that I have a choice to improve, if I did it wrong then that's
it. You know. (. ..J you did it wrongly gives me room to make it better.
Wrongly notices some things that I've done wrongly so I can make
that better, but with wrong I'm going to have to start all over again, I
must have done a big boo boo.
Lucy's responses, however, were the opposite to those of the others'.
Wrongly? Wrongly? You did that wrongly? The pictures moved up a
little bit now. The picture's moved ever so slightly, it's given me a bit
of a yuckier" K. wrongly, wrongly? There's not as much movement
with the 'wrongly' for me. With the 'wronq', OK it's past, let's get on
with it. It's (wrongly) bringing it stuck more. I feel more stuck than I
did with the wrong ...
Steve gave detailed descriptions of his responses to the two forms.
What was of interest were the bodily responses that he reported
about the two different wordings.
The kinaesthetics of wrong and wrongly are different as well. They're
not particularly strong but there's a sense of relaxation, I felt more
relaxed, in the second part where I'm doing something wrongly, I
don't feel as tense as when I was told I did it wrong. And you don't
even know what it is! (Laughter)
He went on to describe the different responses to 'wrong' and
'wrongly' in these words.
11 The term 'yucky' became part of the slang on the course to denote an
unpleasant experience.
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Steve: OK. (long pause) well, if I did it wrong, then it seems that
that's it. Stuck, whereas if I did something wrongly it gives me a
sense that there is some kind of possibility that I might be able to do
it better the next time. If you tell me I did something wrong, it was
wrong.
1. You're looking up and your eyes are moving.
Steve: I'm looking at a picture and I can see... it's one frame, even
though it's not framed, and I see a process doing an exercise that I'm
doing where .... I can see two different outcomes .... it doesn't sto.p...
like underneath there's a marker that says 'wrong' and then there's
nothing in the future, there's a sort of blankness, and I can see mvself
doing something better, it's wrong, and I've stopped, and I'm going
over, and I've done it wrongly, and I'm looking at what it is that I'm
doing wrong. and trving to change it. That's what's going on. (my
emphasis).
1. That's interesting.
Steve: Strange actually, because I see myself three times, in the one
room as it were, it's like it's a hall. Strange!
1. There's a lot of strange things in all of this.
Bateson (1972) distinguished between two kinds of Information,
digital and analogue. Essentially, digital information consists of
discontinuous 'bits' whereas analogue information is in the form of a
continuum. Bateson further believed that analogiC processing
preceded the digital mode. (This raises the possibility that analogic
communication may operate at a higher logical level, so that voice
tonality, for instance, is yet another transmitter of messages about
the category to which a speech act is to be assigned. (Watzlawick et
a/1967).
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It appears that Steve's responses to 'wrong' and 'wrongly' follow this
pattern. The word 'wrong' in the context of giving feedback, produces
what could be a 'digital' response, one where there is clear
discontinuity, because the internal representation appears to come to
a sudden stop. It is almost as if future possibilities had been
expunged from his program. On the other hand, the response to
'wrongly' could be compared to an analogue process, as it appears to
elicit the experience of continuing into future possibilities. The first
one does not seem to imply the possibility of change, whereas the
second one does. However, this was not the case for all these
interviewees, so any generalisations of this kind must remain purely
speculative. Nevertheless, the idea that some forms of words can
increase or decrease the amount of choice available within an
internally constructed (and perhaps problematic) situation is
intriguing. Five of the six collaborators spontaneously volunteered the
information that they sensed the critical difference between the two
constructs to be the amount of choice available to them.
6.6.Conclusion.
Many aspects emerged from these reported guided introspections.
Not least were the complexities of people's individual internal worlds.
There was much that was left out from the transcripts, and many
other questions I could have asked. I was not expecting that small
changes in syntax, for instance, would produce distinctive changes in
the listeners' perceptual positions, as if their responses to my
language structures were moving them to different internal points of
view. Although I had set out to explore nominalisations, people
responded strongly to other words that I had used. It was usual for
people to experience changes in their internal representations in
response to changes in my wording.
The question this raises is 'is it possible that language can, as it were,
not only profoundly influence people's cognitive maps, but also, in the
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form of internal dialogue, move people around within a kind of
internal space?' (I explore this further in the next three chapters).
In this section, which began as an exploration into the effects of
nominalisations at the level of internal representations, other insights
emerged into the power of language to shape the listeners' thinking.
One of the most noticeable aspects for me, re-reading the transcripts,
was the discovery that people's own internal use of language
furthered their own internal searches. It was as if these searches took
on a life of their own. I believe that most of the processes that we
explored, and which I have written about in this chapter, may possibly
be beyond the conscious awareness of the individual.
Another factor that emerged was the extent to which many senses
are used internally in the construction and re-construction of events
and experiences that people have had. What is particularly interesting
are the links between internal vision and feeling; changing a visual
perspective seemed to produce changes in their kinaesthetic
responses. This suggests a dynamic link between language, internal
vision and people's physiological responses, which for this kind of
exploration one can only describe using the broad brush strokes of
generalisations.
In the next chapters I continue to explore the role of the apparently
ceaseless chatter of people's internal dialogues. Bateson (1972) and
Watzlawick et at (1967) argued that words were the digital aspect of
language, whereas most non-verbal communication was analogue in
form. Words are thus of a different logical type than the internal
representations with which they interact.
Many of my co-researchers seemed to demonstrate the use of their
own internal dialogue as an active continuation of the words they
heard from me, and as a means for them to access further internal
representations, further information from within themselves. This was
a pattern, which was to reveal itself time and again in the rest of the
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transcribed interviews. I describe these, and other aspects of people's
responses to words, which emerged from this part of my inquiry in
the next three chapters.
189
Chapter 7. Modal Operators in Action, and Little Words that
Mean a Lot.
"I ... interpret an epistemic modal as indicating the force dynamic
experience of the conceptualizer (primarily the speaker) in working
towards an augmented conception of reality, one that will incorporate
a situation not yet assimilated to conceived reality either because it
has not yet occurred or because the conceptualizer has not yet
definitely learned about it." (Stamenov 1997:68).
"One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use
and learn from that". (Wittgenstein, in Kenny, A (Ed) 1994: 116).
7.1. Introduction
In the last chapter, one of the factors to emerge from my analysis of
the transcripts was the complexity of people's responses. These
occurred at both the levels of internal representations and sub-
modalities. In this chapter I report on some of the ways in which my
interlocutors responded to other kinds of words. These included the
class of modal operators. I described some of the theoretical aspects
of these in Chapter 5. I also report on my explorations of the effects
of other language structures, such as the differences between adverbs
and adjectives. I also include some of my interviewees' responses to
other small words, such as but, feel, and yet.
I describe some of my own insights into people's responses, and the
complexities that continued to appear. Internal representations were
emerging as a part of people's conceptual processes, yet they also
appeared to be complex, and sometimes frustratingly evanescent. I
continue to describe what I believe is more about the complexities of
their dynamics in this chapter, as well as chapters 8 and 9.
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7.2. Responsesto modal operators
My approach to inquiring into the effects of modal operators! was to
ask each participant to think of a relatively ordinary activity that they
would carry out in the near future, and then ask them to obtain an
internal representation of it which they could report on to me. I then
requested them to respond sequentially to six different statements,
such as 'you will do it, you can do it, you might do it,' and so on. I
guided them to focus specifically on what sub-modality changes (if
any) occurred in response to each of the statements, and to report on
them. I was curious to find out the effects of changing the modal
operator, (and by implication, the mode in which the constructed
future activity would be approached) whilst keeping the same goal in
mind. Again, my main focus was on how these affected the sub-
modalities of people's original internal representation.
The first finding was that it was rare for a change in modal operators
not to produce some alterations in the conceivers' sub-modalities of
the internal representations of the constructed goal. Aspects such as
movement, clarity, colour, location and choice seemed to be among
the most critical factors among the responses produced in people by
various modal operators.
More information emerged on the frequency and use of internal
dialogue. My collaborators seemed to use their own internal dialogue
as part of their responses to my words. What they were saying to
themselves 'on the inside' as a response to my statements seemed to
play a role in catalysing sometimes quite dramatic changes in their
own internal representations, thus generating what is known as trans-
derivational searches, (Grinder, Delozier and Bandler 1977). These
lThink of something quite ordinary like cleaning your teeth, or anything of that kind, something
that you do every day, that you're going to do in the near future, and get the I.R. (Internal
representation). And what happens to your response when I say
you will do it
you might do It
you can't do It
you should do It
you can do It
you could do It.
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refer to the process of a kind of internal sorting and searching for
meaning. It is as if the conceiver were seeking an answer to a
question, almost as an uncontrollable process, (Grinder et a/1977).
What follows is a report of some of the ways in which people's
responses changed as the result of hearing similar phrases containing
different modal operators. Often they appeared to produce movement
in the conceiver's perceived images. Changes in modal operators
either altered the rate at which the internal 'film' ran, or altered the
location of the internal representation. These are amongst the many
sub-modality changes described by Bandler and MacDonald (1988).
For one of my collaborators, changing the modal operators actually
changed the speed of movement of the internal representation. This is
shown in the following segment of transcript.
J. What happens to your response if I say 'you will do it'?
Beatrice: I think the K2 is changing. Because ... it's more of a
command, I see it as a command, and the picture is slower, it's like
there's not much enthusiasm... there's no other changes in the colour
or any things like that, it's just the movement is slowed down.
J. OK. And if I said you might do it?
Beatrice. No big change.
J. Not a big change. OK. What if I said you can't do it?
Beatrice. It's a total change. The picture has stopped, the whole thing
has...
J.... sort of frozen?
2 This Is an abbreviation, which the whole class developed for the word
kinaesthetic.
192
Beatrice: Stopped, and disassociation.
1. And if I say 'you can do it'?
Beatrice: It's speeded up.
Other collaborators also reported sub-modality changes in other
sensory modalities. Edward, for instance, experienced the main
differences between the modal operators I used with him as
predominantly occurring in his kinaesthetic domain. His responses
were more also complex. At one level he appeared to be clarifying and
analysing what Iwas saying, and at another level paying attention to
the sub-modality changes that occurred in his own internal world. This
part of the transcript gave me some more interesting glimpses into
the roles of internal dialogue in his processes of generating internal
representations.
1. OK. 'You might do it'.
Edward: Mmmhh, gives me an option. Perhaps [don't want to be
bothered, so ['II leave it. Again it's a kinaesthetic, the picture Is... ah
yeah... the picture Is fuzzy.... Blurry, it's still a no frame, it's still an
open picture, I'm still associated ehh, but it's a blurry picture.
Later he responded to the modal operator 'can't' in the following way.
1. Mh Mh... And if I say, as you think about the thing that you're
going to do, if I say 'you can't do it'.
Edward: It's just a kinaesthetic.
Later on in the transcripts he again reaffirms that his primary
response to my statement was kinaesthetic.
1. {...J. And if I were to say 'you can do it'?
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Edward: Again it's just another ... it's just a laugh, it's a kinaesthetic
with a laugh, of course I can do it!
At one point there were changes in his visual sub-modalities.
Interestingly, my modal operators had the effect of sometimes driving
his attention to externals, for instance to what I was actually saying,
and how I was saying it. Others produced a more internal search. It
appears that we have two modes of attention, one where our
awareness is on information coming from the external world, and the
other when we turn inwards, as it were, to pay attention to our own
thoughts. To the suggestion 'you could do it', his response was:
1. (...) and if I say 'You could do it'?
Edward: That's much gentler. The kinaesthetic is more relaxed, it's
em.... The external auditory effect is one of support, so it's my
choice ... the internal, the picture is soft, still clear, but soft.
1. When you say soft, does that mean the colours are slightly faded.
Edward: The colours, yeah, it's gone more pastel. I mean I wasn't
aware of the colours before, but I would say now there must have
been colours before because it's become a very soft gentle picture
which to me means more pastelly colours .... Softer lighting on the
picture, it was a bright intense picture, but it's very soft now, ehm,
much more relaxing em, more pleasant, and more acceptable, the
external auditory is a more acceptable part ... becomes part of the
picture.
1. So with 'you should do it' you were aware of the external?
Edward: I'm aware of the externals.
1. With 'you could do it ...?'
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Edward: Becomes more internal.
Some modal operators presuppose choice, whilst others, such as 'will',
'can't' and 'must' are modal operators of necessity, and imply a lack
of choice. This was borne out by some of my respondents. For
Edward, the choice that was presupposed by the modal operator
'might' appeared to be the critical factor that altered his visual sub-
modalities in the previous extract from the transcripts. At one point
he said: 'yeah, it's actually a nicer picture because of the choice you
give me'.
Lucy showed a similar response. In her case it appeared as if the
modal operator 'will' acted as a trigger for recalling vivid memories.
Perhaps it was a response to my own tone of voice. Here an image of
an unfortunate teacher was linked to her feelings of a lack of chotce in
the context she accessed. She was also very aware of the presence or
absence of perceived choice.
Lucy: 'You will!' Schoolmarm! You will! It's like you've got no
choices, it's definitely repulsed. School, out there, looking at her, sort
of thing, definitely internal, there's a visual...
1. And are you back at school?
Lucy: 1 saw a schoolmarm! (Laughter) Unless it's a movie that I've
seen. You know, you will do this, and you won't do that! Being told
what to do. Like I'm not a child anymore, 1'1/decide what to do and
when 1 do it.
1. Yeah OK. And what's happened to the picture of the thing that you
were going to do?
Lucy: It definitely didn't seem like it turned me off it.
1. What happened to the picture?
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Lucy: Well the 'will'sort of became very big, and the picture went
quite .... Like I was pushing away. Well I won't now. (laughs) I, a little
bitch! Like ... yeah, I would have pushed it aside.
The reaction to the modal operator 'might' was distinctly different.
1. OK. OK. What happens if I say' you might do it'?
Lucy: Well it's definitely more appealing. It gives me the option now.
And, em, the picture, I can see myself much more clearly now
actually, I can see myself much more clearly doing it. I don't have
the repulsion that I did like when you said 'you will'. And I don't see
any other pictures, just me doing it, yeah, it's much more pleasant.
What emerged from reading these transcripts, and then writing about
them, was that the use of such words also seemed to transmit
information about causality, especially in relation to how the
individuals placed themselves in terms of what Bar-Tal (1984)
described as the locus of control. This may be perceived as either
internal to them, or as coming from an external source. These appear
to be subjective standpoints which may also influence the conceiver's
perception of the performance of a future task.
7.3. Internal dialogue and causal assumptions
By this time in the interviewing process I had become intrigued by the
activities of people's internal dialogue. It was obvious that many of
the responses involved this. What could its role be in the construction
of meaning? So I sometimes questioned my interlocutors further
about what they were saying to themselves 'on the inside'. In the
next extract, it is possible to track the effects of Lucy's internal
dialogue in response to my statement, and how her own internal
words (as it were, carrying on from my own 'externally' originating
words) furthers the development of her internal responses. In effect,
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she continues the process of verbalising through her own internal
dialogue, in which the modal operators that she uses may also have
played a critical role.
1. And if I were to say 'you can't do it'?
Lucy: I would probably say, well I am, so internal dialogue, internal
dialogue ... like I probably doubt myself and then say well I can, so I
will now!
1. OK What did you do before you doubted yourself?
Lucy: I probably (indistinct) I can't? I mean it's a simple thing like you
said, it's like I cant? What do you mean I can't? Course I can! (My
emphasis).
What is also interesting about Lucy's responses is that it is as if her
internal dialogue had the result of shifting her perceptual positions.
She appeared to move from being 'at effect', that is, having a sense
that she has little choice, and experiencing the locus of control as
external, to being 'at cause', a position where she experiences choice,
and therefore some control over what she is intending to do. Here the
locus of control would be described as internal. Bar-Tal (1984) has
explored pupils' perceptions of causality, and its importance to the
success or otherwise of their learning processes. In Lucy's case, she
apparently places herself back in the causal position through her own
internal dialogue. A similar shift occurred with Edward. For him,
having an option seemed to be critical to how he then perceived his
goals. Lucy's responses to the phrase containing the word 'might'
were interesting. 'Might' is a modal operator of possibility, often
implying that causality could be experienced as coming from within,
and presupposes the existence of choice.
Lucy: Well it's definitely more appealing. It gives me the option now.
And em, the picture, I can see myself much more clearly now
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actually, I can see myself much more clearly doing it. I don't have
the repulsion that I did like when you said 'you will'. And I don't see
any other pictures, just me doing it, yeah, it's much more pleasant.
1. Internal dialogue?
Lucy: Yeah, there was internal dialogue as well, it's like OK! Cool, you
know sort of thing. Internal picture as well. Yeah.
She also reported that there were different locations for the internal
pictures associated with 'can' and 'can't'. Although the tape was
indistinct, I made a note of this at the time.
Lucy: The picture's moved, it's on my right now, em, ....(different
locations for picture of 'can' and 'can't' .... Tape indistinct).
Beatrice also reported a strong response to the modal operator 'will'.
This is classified as a modal operator of necessity, (Hall C. 1989) and
by implication removes the conceiver from experiencing being 'at
cause' to perceiving control as operating from the external
environment.
Steve's responses also show how modal operators influenced his
experience of causality. To the phrase including the word 'will' he
responds with information about his internal dialogue, which
reinforces his sense of being in charge.
Steve: (Pause) em, .... Nothing changes internally, nothing changes
because I know I will do it anyway.
1. Were you saying anything to yourself on the inside?
Steve: Yeah, I was asking myself 'why wouldn't you do it anyway, you
are going to do it anyway'?
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J. It's interesting because you were actually looking from side to side
horizontally, which is supposed to be the auditory accessing cues,
which made me ask that question.
His next response illustrates what might be a kind of scanning of
information between his present state and the desired outcome.
Steve: I was going ... I was future pacing, and going back, to the
future again, going auditory, because that which I'm going to do
involves something ... involves the hearing, involves hearing, and I
could hear the sounds that it makes as well as talking to myself. I
need to get this thing! (teuqhter),'
However, the use of the word 'might' had a different effect on him.
Instead of giving him options, it seems to weaken his resolve.
J. 50 what happens if I say you might do it.
Steve: Emm, (pause) Now it seems vague, ...
J. What seems vague, the picture or the sound?
Steve: The picture. The sound doesn't exist. ... it's just. .. I don't have ...
I don't have the same sense of, of doing it, or wanting to do it.
It seemed that for Steve, the modal operators that implied certainty
exerted a more powerful influence on his conceptual world than those
which only suggested a possibility. With Steve, his internal dialogue
appeared to modify the original effects of the modal operators he
heard from me. It is tempting to suggest that what actually changed
was his experience of the locus of the cause. When he re-phrased
what I had said internally, he seemed to be moving himself into a
more causal position, where there was a greater degree of certainty
3 He later told me that his goal was to improve his guitar playingl
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that the outcome would be achieved under his own volition. (I need to
get this thing!)
Kathleen also had a strong response to my phrase 'you will do it'. She
replied '[ don't want to do it now'. There is a sense in which this could
also be interpreted as her regaining her own control over a
constructed situation. Modal operators therefore reveal another
dimension to their complex effects; they seem to have the ability to
locate the individual conceiver somewhere on a spectrum between
having 'internal' choice about a future activity, or being strongly
influenced by forces perceived as external to them.
7.4. The phenomenon of location in internal representations.
One of the sub-modality changes reported by Bandler and MacDonald
(1988) was that people experienced a shift in the location of their
'pictures', almost as if internal visualisation was projected somewhere
into outside space. Sometimes this was linked to a change in the size
of the picture. This phenomenon was reported by Kathleen, who told
me that changing modal operators resulted in a shift in the 'external'
location of the internal picture. I cannot attempt to provide any
explanation for it, except to say that it seems to me to be yet another
internal dimension that is part of how we code and process
information. We seem to use space to 'locate' our images. During my
interviews I observed my interlocutors and made notes. I paid
particular attention to where people looked when they were accessing
their internal representations, and describing them to me. There was
frequently a marked change in the direction in which people gazed, as
if their internal pictures could be scrutinised as if they were external
to themselves. In the following extract, Kathleen described how the
use of different modal operators produced changes in the location,
colour and size of the visual aspects of her internal representations.
These changes also affected her kinaesthetically. In the following
extract, it is possible to track these changes.
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J. And how is that different when I say' you might do it'?
Kathleen: Movement and colour back again now.
J. Nearer, farther?
Kathleen: A little bit closer. And it's bigger ...
J. Closer and bigger. What happens if I say' you can't do it?
(laughter)
Kathleen: (Pause) it actually hasn't changed from the 'might'.
J. Because you're just not processing 'can't'?
Kathleen: No. (laughter).
J. Good good. What happens if I say 'you should do it?
Kathleen: A little bit further away, and a little bit smaller, though
there's still movement there.
J. What kind of kinaesthetic response do you get to 'you should do it'?
Kathleen: (Pause). It's a warm feeling, it's here, there's a warm
feeling here, a warm soft feeling.
J. OK. And now, ' you can do it'.
Kathleen: yeah .... It's a much bigger picture.
7.5. Modal operators and motivation.
For one of my collaborators (Ina), the sequence of modal operators,
(which I had not really thought about, having originally written them
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down just as they came to me) became linked in a meaningful
developing sequence for her. They generated a series of internal
representations in which her conceived actions were developed, and
then nearly completed. I give the extract here in its entirety, as it
shows how each successive modal operator produced a shift in Ina's
responses that were in turn linked to significant changes in her
internal representations. It was as if the modal operators were
directly developing her construction of a future activity. In addition,
the sequence of modal operators also seemed to develop further her
own perceptions of a course of action she had been thinking about.
I have underlined the modal operators in the following extract for
greater clarity. The next extract almost speaks for itself. I have
however, added my own comments in parentheses.
J. So can you think of something quite ordinary, you know, like
cleaning your teeth, something that you're going to do in the near
future, sort of something fairly pedestrian? Now, what happens If I
say 'you will do it'?
Ina: I agree. Can do; will do. (Her first response is that she becomes
aware of her internal dialogue.)
J. Is that an internal dialogue?
Ina: Yeah.
J. And do you have a picture of what you're going to do?
Ina: I'm actually doing it. (Here she apparently associates into the
internal representation.)
J. You're actually doing it. OK. Yeah. So you're doing it, and you're
saying to yourself. ..
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Ina: You can do it. (Here it appears that the internal dialogue
accompanied the images, and perhaps influenced their development.)
1. So back to the picture of what it is you're going to do, or the
internal representation of it. What happens if I say 'you might do it'?
Ina: You've frozen my picture. (her bleep goes off) I'm still. (Here it
seemed that the movement that she experienced in the visual
dimension stopped).
1. Do you want to answer your bleep?
Ina: Yesplease. (Pause, and the microphone is disconnected for a
short time). It stopped the movement, whereas when I said Lwi1.1. I
was actually performing, might do has actually frozen me.
1. So what happens if I say 'you can't do it'?
Ina: Exit picture.
1. You mean the picture's gone?
Ina: No, just me, out. I was there, and now I'm looking at what I'm
supposed to have done. (This implies that she has changed her
perceptual position).
1. OK. And what happens if I say you should do it.
Ina: I've stepped back in the picture, I'm aware of my surroundings.
(Here she refers to her internally constructed surroundings, rather
than those of the interview room.)
1. Is the picture all round you?
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Ina: yeah. I've stepped back into the picture and I'm looking around,
and I'm basically saying to myself 'well have a go, see what happens,
have a go, see what happens'. (Here the internal dialogue comes to
the fore, and seems to catalyse the further build up of her
motivation.)
J. Oh! 'You can do it'?
Ina: I'm there, I'm actually, I'm swinging, I'm doing it, I'm looking
around, looking at what I'm supposed to be doing, and I'm ready.
Yeah. (Now she appears to be engaging internally in the activity, and
aware of the motor movements necessary for the task.)
J. Has the picture changed in any ways?
Ina: Yeah, there's movement, there's sound, I'm looking at
everything around me, and I'm saying to myself 'come on then girl,
keep going'. (She now seems even more aware of her constructed
movement, sounds, internal dialogue as well as vision as she begins
to conceive of the goal.)
J. And is it more so than in 'you should do it'?
Ina: Yeah, in 'should, It was silent, In 'I can' there's sound I ~ hear
what's going on around me. I think 'I should' is more private, I'm like
'I'm going to give it a go!' (Now it appears that she 'switches off' her
awareness of sound coming from the external world, and has a
greater awareness of her own internal dialogue, as her sense of
movement towards the goal continues to develop.)
J. Yeah. So with the 'should' you've got an internal dialogue, and the
outside is silent?
Ina: Is silent.
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1. And what happens if I say 'you could do it?'
Ina: Yeah, it re-enforces my 'I can'. It's just given me, ... go ahead ...
more. I have support by somebody saying I could. 'Go on, you could
do it, you could do it. I'm actually yeah, my coaches.... (Now there
seem to be sounds coming from other people involved in the activity,
encouraging her. She pays attention to these newly appeared internal
images.)
1. So you're touching your left shoulder. Is that as if somebody's kind
of encouraging you?
Ina: Yeah, yeah.
1. So, picture?
Ina: Yeah. Yeah, 'I could' is me actually going out to the dug out,
(indistinct) and I'm getting a 'could' and 'I can' I'm actually at the
batting, right there, on my own, but still aware, but 'I could' is like I
have somebody on my back. (Here she describes how the different
modal operators develop her internal representations of the goal.)
1. Encouraging you! OK. This is content free but I'm quite interested
to know what it was. Is it a sport or something?
Ina: Yes it was, it was my, ... soft ball.
1. Oh OK.
Ina: You sort of like freeze when you get to the batting mount, so it
depends who sends you out. If they say 'you will do it, you could do it
or you can do it. .. '. Brings back memories.
1. So modal operators might actually be quite ...
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Ina: Helps me play better ... (Both of us suddenly seem to realise that
modal operators might be important to motivating.)
J....powerful in terms of your performance?
Ina: That's what I say when I'm getting ready to hit. 'I Will, I will I
will'. With the 'I could' is just an extra support for me. Somebody
actually has faith in me to say, go on you can do it.
J. Just as a matter of interest, as I went through these modal
operators, was there anything like stacking an anchor going on?' (1
am curious to know if the sequence of modal operators have
somehow built on each other.)
Ina: yeah, I~ and I wfl!., and you Q2jJ}Q ... it's just that I'm out
here...
J. Did they all sort of influence each other?
Ina: With the 'I will' then you've told me, and I will do It, so I've
already future done it, 'I will do tt', and 'I can' has put me there, 'I
can do lt', I'm there. And 'couta', somebody's just reinforcing me,
bringing me forward.
J. So with the... it seems to me, and again I'm not sure, I'm really just
suggesting something, trying not to mind read, ... it seems to me that
you've developed like an... attraction.
Ina: yeah, a pull, the further down we've gone the more the pull has
developed [,',] 1feel safe, I feel great, I feel like somebody actually
believes that I can do it. (Here the sequence of modal operators
seems to have amplified her belief in herself. She implies she has a
4 Stacking anchors is an NLP term describing a process where a number of stimulus-response
bonds are linked together and built up to produce a stronger effect than would just one stimulus
alone, (McWhirter 1992),
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motivation strategy where she depends on external support and
encouragement. )
J. OK
This was one of the most surprising interviews; I had not expected
that my simple phrases would be so sequentially influential in the
development of her internal constructs about completing a future
task. It is also apparent that her own internal dialogue played a role
in helping her to make sense of my input.
Modal operators are small words, rarely more than one syllable long.
Yet they seem to exert a considerable power over my interlocutors'
perceptions of their subjective and complex internal events. It is
tempting to conclude that they playa vital role in the representation
of future events, and also exert a modifying influence which may be
unique to each individual. Certainly, no two individuals reported the
same response to different phrases containing modal operators. So at
one level, we can suggest that modal operators playa part in the
creative process of coding future events, yet in another, more specific
domain, each individual has unique, idiosyncratic responses to their
own menu of these interesting little words.
Modal operators are coherent with the cybernetic view, because they
imply the existence of an activity in the future, thus bringing in the
factor of time. They also carry information about the dimensions of
causality, which is implied in the system's approach to a future event.
This is evident from their influence on people's experience of choice
within the framework of a specific modal operator. They certainly
appeared to be the most powerful class of words in the sentence,
perhaps fulfilling the role of what Pinker (1994) calls the 'head' word.
Pinker proposed that in order to be able to make sense of a sentence,
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people needed to have a 'parser's whose role was to decode the
sentence. One of the first things that the parser needed to be able to
do was to identify the head word, which then communicates the
context for the classification of the rest of the words in a phrase or
sentence. Pinker described this as a branching algorithm, with the
'head word' occupying the 'top' position, and other syntactical
structures branching downwards from it. This is distinct from
grammar, which is "a mere code or protocol, a static database
specifying what kinds of sounds correspond to what kinds of meanings
in a particular language," (Pinker 1994: 197).
There is some correspondence between people's responses to the
modal operators, (which seemed to playa leading role in the
construction of the internal representation,) and the idea that there is
some sort of 'head' word which, when a sentence is heard or read,
acts as a focal point around which the rest of the meaning is
constructed. If we use the Batesonian idea of logical levels, then it is
as if the modal operator, because It sets context, may operate at a
higher logical level than the rest of the information in the statement,
and influence how meaning is made at the level of internal
representations.
This was indicated by Beatrice's initial response to question S. This
was intended to explore the effects of the word 'but'. However, her
strongest response was to the word 'need', which is a modal operator
of necessity. In this case it clearly acted as what Pinker would have
described as a 'head' word, creating the context for the decoding of
the rest of the sentence, and overriding the effects of the word 'but'
which with all my other interlocutors was the word which had the
most influence on the meaning that they constructed at the level of
internal representations.
5 "The mental program that analyses sentence construction during language
comprehension", (Pinker 1994: 197).
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1. OK. Next question. What's your response, again in terms of internal
representations and so on, if I were to say to you' you are good at
NLP, but you need to work on your rapport skills'.
Beatrice: Automatically think of rapport skills, that's the part of the
sentence that I would focus on.
1. OK. And if I said you need to work on your rapport skills but you
are good at NLP.
Beatrice: Rapport skills.
1. Still rapport skills?
Beatrice: That little word 'need'. ..?
1. OK. So that word need is kind of...
Beatrice: Yeah, I find I don't react well to that modal operator!
No one, as far as my searches have been able to establish, has ever
taken this approach to the investigation of the phenomenology of the
causal relationships between language and thought. What emerged
was a phenomenon of complex and dynamic relationships between
words and the thoughts that they engender. I am only scratching the
surface of this level of subjective experience. I can only offer the very
generalised conclusion that some words seem to have more power
than others at setting the directions for the ways in which conceivers
may search for, and construct meaning.
7.6. Other small, powerful words
So far this chapter has been mainly about the topic of modal
operators. They are usually small words with surprisingly large
effects. In the analysis of my transcripts, it emerged that there were
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other small words, which also produced noticeable effects on people's
responses. I include my thoughts about these in this section. The
transcripts of these questions also indicate the apparent ubiquity of
internal dialogue in the development of people's responses.
My interest in the effects of small words had influenced the design of
my interview schedule, which I described in chapter 2. To this end I
formulated three different questions, in order to 'test' their effects on
people's responses. These words were but, yet and feel. Questions 76,
87 and 128 were designed to explore these. They are three words
which often trip off the tongue without much thought; this was
another reason for investigating their effects.
7.6.1. Responses to the word 'feel'.
The word feel seems now to have become Interchangeable with terms
such as 'think' and 'believe'. It tends to be used indiscriminately in
every day discourse. In my sample its effect was primarily to amplify
the kinaesthetic dimension of people's internal representation of the
mildly unpleasant event I asked them to recall. I chose to invite
people to think of a 'mildly unpleasant event' as I thought it would be
easier for people to respond to. In retrospect, it seems that asking
people to think of a pleasant experience may have been just as
useful. I was careful that the 'unpleasant event' did not produce
distress in my interlocutors.
I illustrate this by extracts from Beatrice and Lucy's transcribed
interviews.
6 Question 7.
Remember a mildly unpleasant experience. How do you feel about it?
7 Question 8.
A) You are good at NLP but you need to work on your rapport skills.
B) You need to work at your rapport skills but you are good at NLP.
C) Think about your rapport skills so that you can be even better at NLP.
8 Question 12,
A) you can't do that
B) you can't do that yet.
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J. OK. [ ...J 'Remember a mildly unpleasant experience'.
Beatrice: OK.
J. What happens if I say to you 'how do you feel about it'?
Beatrice: The kinaesthetic that I can feel seems to be getting bigger.
J. So it's kind of amplified it?
Beatrice: Yes, it must have amplified it, because it's grown.
1. All right. $0 it's around about your midriff. (She was pointing to her
midriff at the time, which is what generated this question).
Beatrice: I don't have a midriff. Yeah, it's down there.
Perhaps Lucy reported the strongest response.
1. Remember a mildly unpleasant experience and of course we're
working content free so...
Lucy: A mildly unpleasant. ... (laughs).
1. What happens if I ask you' How do you feel about it'?
Lucy: Youjust, what you say, you just want to shrivel up, I'm doing it
now.... How I feel about it? Well it goes straight to your gut.
I then went on to probe more into her kinaesthetic responses, and the
effects, if any, it might have on her internal visual construction.
1.... and you're not attending to the picture?
Lucy: No. I can... it's very still, it's just a head... I don't see myself. ..
the feeling is the strongest thing.
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J. And to the picture?
Lucy: There's a little bit if... it's very still, it's just a head. I don't see
myself. The feeling is the strongest thing.
J. So just asking that, do you think that's just amplified the feelings?
Lucy: Yeah, I suppose...
In each of these cases, using the word 'feel' as a question about their
responses to a particular situation appeared to make them more
aware of their internal kinaesthetic responses. It was as if the word
caused their attention to go to the information about the situation
that was coded in the kinaesthetic domain, rather than In other
modalities. There is the possibility that it even blocked their attention
of the information coded in other sensory domains. This raises
questions about the usefulness of our tendency to use the word 'feel'
as a general question about anything ranging from people's opinions
to their emotional responses. Suffice it to say that perhaps there are
words that block off internal representations, just as there are words
which can produce astounding internal changes.
7.6.2. Responsesto the word 'but'.
Such a blocking effect was not only produced by the word 'feel'. One
of the most interesting effects was produced by the word 'but', whose
use produced surprisingly strong responses in my interlocutors. Its
general effect was to diminish the force of the first half of the
statement coming before the word 'but'. I offer three extracts from
the transcripts of the responses to my first statement to illustrate
this. The third example is more complex, bringing internal dialogue
into play.
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1. What happens if I say 'you are good at NLP but you need to work
on your rapport skills? (I mean obviously this isn't true ... it's just the
process ...)
Kathleen: I've only got the negative now. I need to work on my
rapport skills.
Steve's response was equally clear, and more detailed.
1. How do you respond if I say 'you are good at NLP but you need to
work on your rapport skills'?
Steve: (Laughter). I get a strong kinaesthetic response. It's called
clenching my hands (laughter) a tightness in my stomach, and a
heaviness, a tightness in my chest.
1. Because of which part of the sentence?
Steve: Because of the BUT. (Loudly).
1. OK. Interesting.
Steve: Em, em, yeah, because of the but. I can't even remember
what you said first, I know it was something about NLP.... but you
threw me then. (laughs) It's like being thrown by a judo expert
actually. (laughs).
Lucy, who responded to my first statement as follows, further
demonstrated these effects of internal dialogue modifying internal
responses: (1 have underlined what 1 consider to be the most
significant part).
Lucy: Well actually the first part, you are good at NLP that puts a big
doubt straight away, it like, are you just saying that, and I'm saying,
'am I' and you start looking in yourself, well I am, am 17Are you just
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trying to be nice to the person? Then internal dialogue happens saying
don't be so stupid, they're being .... I'm talking to mvself. The BUT... I
have to tell myself to be practical again, don't be so stupid, that is
how it is. I suppose that would bring a K response, thinking well OK,
thanks!
When I reversed the two halves of the statement, still separated by
the word 'but', people responded differently.
1....'You need to work on your rapport skills, but you're good at NLP'.
Lucy: Ah, beautiful ... compared to the other one... but you're good at
NLP, that just negated, that just got rid of that first one. (laugh) and I
felt good about it. Big K big ...
Steve's response was similar to Lucy's. However he 'hears' more of
the content of the second part of the statement, which could imply
that he has blocked the segment before the but.
1. So If I say you need to work on your rapport skills bJJl you are good
at NLP.
Steve: That is not as unpleasant, the kinaesthetic wasn't as strong as
the last. ..
1. So which bit, ... does any bit stay with you more than another?
Steve: NLP is what I heard.
The word 'but' appears to diminish the power of the information
contained in the first half of a statement, unless it is over-ridden by
another word with a stronger effect. This would seem to agree with
Pinker's (1994) views about the activity of making sense (the parser)
needing to be able to identify the 'head' word, that is, the word which
is then used as the context which structures the rest of the sentence.
214
I tentatively suggest that the approach that I am using enables one to
explore the effects of syntax in this phenomenological way, by
interrogating people's subjective experience of language.
7.6.3. Changingtime frames with 'yet'.
It is tempting to generalise that in some cases the strongest effects
are exerted by the smallest words. Certainly, exploring the effects of
tagging 'yet' on to the end of a directive such as 'you can't do that'
produced some surprising responses. My directives to my
interlocutors followed the general pattern of 'So, you know, imagine
something again that you might do, and I'm really going for the
difference between when I say 'you can't do that' and 'you can't do
that YET.' I give examples of their responses below,
The most critical distinction between these two directives was that the
second one brought up the consciousness of future time in some of
my respondents. For others, the provocative 'can't' seemed to
generate a lot of internal dialogue, which produced additional effects.
However, the introduction of the dimension of time in for some of my
collaborators could imply that time may be a critical aspect of our
internal constructs, though it may be dangerous to generalise from
such a small sample. Consider Beatrice's responses where the second
statement clearly brings the future into what she constructs Internally
in response to my statement:
Beatrice: [ ....] 'you can't do that' is dissolving my picture, and 'you
can't do that yet' is freezing my picture.
J. So one is dissolving and one is freezing?
Beatrice: Yes, yes, it's freezing it. It's giving me an opportunity that I
might get to do it in the future.
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Edward's response was equally unambiguous about the introduction of
a future dimension to his thoughts. It is also interesting to note that,
with the first directive, the use of the modal operator 'can't' seemed
to place the locus of control external to him, and he perceives it as
being an inhibitory force. The second part of my statement produces a
response in which a future possibility is reported as part of the
constructed response. The word 'yet' seems to introduce the
dimension of time into people's constructs, as well as altering sub-
modalities. I give one example of this from the transcripts.
Edward: In as much as... not that I don't have an ability but because
you won't let me do it. (This was his response to the first statement.)
So when you say I can't do that yet, I know have a picture in the
distance, clear, it's a bright picture, it's a white picture which is just
out there waiting for me to go towards. The kinaesthetic is In my legs,
just waiting for me to go there, and, eh, there's no sound.
7. 7. Concluding reflections.
In this chapter I have explored and analysed the results of the
transcripts of the interviews from four separate parts of my
questionnaire. What unites them is that in each case I was interested
in exploring the effects of certain short words included in statements.
In each case the results point to the powerful effects of smaller
words. The examples I used also showed the continuing appearance
of internal dialogue. I began with a consideration of the effects of
modal operators, which are words defining the mode in which a future
activity is to be carried out. They are usually words of one syllable.
What was interesting was that people had no difficulty in forming
internal representations of events that had not yet happened. If we
apply the cybernetic model, then the system has to have Information
about future events, because of the significance of the variable of
time. The modal operators, in the main, seemed to influence how
people conceived of a future task, and to play some part in influencing
their approach to it. Modal operators also have a causal dimension;
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they appear to have the ability for some people to alter their
perception of causality, especially in relation to whether they
perceived the cause as coming from within themselves, or as an
external in origin.
What may be of significance in all this is that having explored such
deceptively simple words, some fundamental epistemological
processes have become more clearly delineated. Among these is the
possibly archetypal process of linking cause and effect. Even more
interesting is the notion that internal representations can code, even
create, images of future events; thus they are not merely memory
devices, or ways of thinking about information in the present. This
ability to generate internal images of the future, apparently using all
the senses, which then become a goal to be achieved, bears out the
cyberneticians' insistence that time should be considered as a critical
variable in our mental constructs, and therefore our epistemology
(Bateson 1972). It may be necessary for us to have clear
representations of future events in order that they can be achieved.
We thus need to 'know' about such outcomes, so that the dimension
of time becomes a part of how we know. So the complex internal
world of internal representations may be critical to our survival, in
that they playa vital part in memory, learning and creating the
future. 9
The importance of time as a critical variable seems also to be
illustrated by people's responses to the question designed to explore
the effects of the word 'yet'. Its main operation seems to have been
to introduce the variable of time into people's constructs. This
appeared to produce some alterations in the configurations of the
conceiver's sub-modalities. In Edward's case it generated a sense of
movement towards a goal. The statement that did not include the
9 I discussthis further in Chapter 11, where I synthesisesomeof the
findings into a hypothetical model of learning.
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word 'yet' had a different effect on people, sometimes even inhibiting
their representations of it. Although I hesitate to generalise from such
a small sample, it could be that what has been uncovered in this
phenomenological enquiry is the possibility that people respond to
information about time in ways consistent with what cyberneticians
have long held, namely that time plays a role in our constructs
mediating knowing and being.
What the section containing the word 'but' illustrates is that some
words apparently have the power to diminish the strength of the
information that preceded it, and perhaps amplifies that which follows
it. This may be of some significance to teachers, who may
unconsciously give feedback syntaxed in such a way that the negative
part of the message comes after the positive part, separated by 'but'.
The sentence 'You did a good essay, but your spelling Is not very
good' might thus have a different internal effect on the listener than
'your spelling is not very good, but you did a good essay',
Whereas the word 'but' appears to diminish the internal attention to
the part of the sentence preceding it, the use of the word 'feel' used
in the context of asking about an opinion or judgement, appeared to
amplify the conceiver's kinaesthetic response. Perhaps it just draws
people's attention to the 'feeling' content of an internal
representation. Lynch (1985) reports observing patients with
hypertension developing even more raised blood pressure when they
were asked to talk about their feelings, as if this created or even
amplified a physiological response. It is tempting to wonder if there
was a similar mechanism at work; certainly certain words have the
effect of catalysing internal searches and amplifying particular
responses in different sensory modalities. I explore the importance of
such internal searches, and their generation, in Chapter 11. They
emerge as perhaps one of the most critical factors for the conceiver
when learning, and making sense of information.
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Chapter 8. Language, Thought and the Dimension of Time.
I just want to remark on the amazing property that conscious beings
have to represent objects and states of affairs in the world, and to act
on the basis of those representations. It is a general feature of most,
though not all, conscious phenomena that they represent objects,
events and states of affairs in the world ... It is a peculiar feature that
the object need not actually exist in order to be represented by our
intentional state. (Searle 1999:64-65).
An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and
institutions. (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994:115).
Brain surgeon David Ingvar has studied the relationships between the
biological functioning of the brain and the nervous system on the one
hand and our behaviour in an organizational setting on the other. He
calls it neurobiological management. One of the findings is that the
individual registers - in physically identifiable sectors of the brain that
can be even photographed - the past, the present and the future.
(Gummeson 2000)1
8.1. Introduction
This chapter explores the idea that the dimension of time is a variable
in the construction of cognitive maps. This was another aspect to
emerge from my study of the transcripts, from both phases of the
data gathering. If one of the main ideas in cybernetics is that systems
'run' on information about both present and future events, then it
would be expected that people would need to be able to construct
representations of something that has not yet happened. Without this,
the TOTEprocess, which I described in chapter 3, would be
impossible. This seems to be borne out so far from what my
1 Gummerson cites Ingvar, 0 (1985) "Memory of the Future An Essay on the
Temporal Organisation of Conscious Awareness", Human Neurobiology 4:127
- 36.
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collaborators have told me. The idea of feedback is only valid if the
system can create a construct of the future. (1 have reviewed the
concepts of feedback and calibration in Chapter 3.) Feedback is
information about the extent to which a system's actions in the
present are fulfilling its requirements for achieving an outcome in the
future. The first kind of feedback is positive feedback, whose essential
message to the system is that no change is necessary in order to stay
on track. Negative feedback, on the other hand, informs the system
that a change is necessary in order for it to be able to achieve what It
set out to do. (Wiener 1961, Bateson 1972, Bateson and Bateson
1988).
This raises the possibility that such a continuous internal scanning and
comparing between what is being experienced in the present, and
what has been constructed about the future, is an important process
in how we construct and utilise our cognitive maps. It may also playa
role in the generation of actions. 1was curious to find out more about
people's abilities to 'move around in time'. This chapter is about my
reflections on my participants' abilities to utilise the dimension of
past, present and future time as frameworks (or categories) for their
thinking. The conceiver's ability to change time frames may be
another component to how we know.
1have already described how modal operators appear to influence
people's internal representations about their future activities in
Chapter 7. This chapter is about the analyses of the parts of the
interview schedule, where 1used questions to explore some possible
ways in which people created an internal representation of a future
event as they were making sense of my words.
S.2. The interview questions addressed in this chapter.
This chapter focuses on the analysis and reflections on the transcripts
of three of the questions from my Interview schedule. I believe they
illustrate aspects of the role of the dimension of time in people's
220
cognitive processes. One of these is the last statement of question 8,2
some of which I have already used in the previous chapter to inquire
into the effects of the word 'but'. The segment from question 8 'so
that you can be' presupposes a future state. It also presupposes a
causal link to an event that has yet to happen. Question 113 includes
a deliberate request to change focus from the present (think of
something you do really well,) to a possible future constructed state
by being asked 'How could you make it even better'. This question
uses the modal operator 'could', as I believed that this might direct
listeners' attention to the future; I then used the comparative 'deleter'
'better' (Bandler and Grinder 1975) to explore its effects.
Question 134 was designed to explore people's constructions of a
future goal. I wanted to know whether words such as how, what and
why, (which are frequently used to introduce questions) would
produce different responses. I was also interested in finding out
whether asking people to think about what it would be like to have
achieved a goal would result in a change in their perceptual position,
and what effects this might then have on the configuration of the
internal representations and their sub-modalities.
2 Question 8:
1. Youare good at NLPbut you need to work on your rapport skills
2. Youneed to work on your rapport skills but you are good at NLP.
3. Think about your rapport skills so that you can be even better at NLP.
3 Questions 11. Think of something you do really well.
How could you make it even better?
What are you not paying attention to?
4 Question 13. Think of a goal you have in life, something that you really
want to do.
What do you need to achieve it?
Why will you achieve it?
How will you achieve it?
What will it be like to have achieved that goal?
Now think of the goal again, has anything changed?
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S.3. The apparent comparing of information between present
and future constructs in internal representations
Although question 8 set out to explore people's responses to the word
'but' in the context of the kind of verbal feedback that one has often
heard teachers use, the final statement was deliberately crafted to
direct attention to the notion of improvement. (Think about your
rapport skills so that you can be even better at NLP.)
Edward was aware of both movement and choice in his response.
J. 'Think about your rapport skill so that you can be even better at
NLP'.
Edward: Nice colour picture! (Here there is a very distinct change in
the internal representation from the one that had occurred in
response to the previous statement).
J. OK.
Edward: Em, sound, feelings that I'm trying to improve those skills, ...
Something to work on so I know I can get better.
J. Movement?
Edward: No, it's very bright, very bright picture, like the light at the
end of the tunnel, although the tunnel .. It's not dark but there's
definitely bright ....down .... there's something to move towards,
something to work towards, so there's a choice.
I have underlined this section as it implies that he Is experiencing
choice, as well as a sense of being able to move towards a goal.
Again, this brings in the Leitmotif of causality, with the added
dimension that It appears that people can experience different
degrees of feelings of being in control and being able to cause things
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to happen. The words that I used to link 'rapport skills' with 'better at
NLP'were so that you. This phrase, used in this context, presupposes
a causal connection between the two. It appears to have set a
direction for the developments of Edward's internal representations.
When I then asked him about his kinaesthetic responses to the
statement, he replied:
Edward: Em, a kinaesthetic, a good kinaesthetic, a very generative
kinaesthetic.
J. In terms of attraction and repulsion, is there anything going on
there?
Edward: It's very attractive.
What I was trying to elicit with this question about attraction and
repulsion was his sense of motivation in relation to his constructed
goal. He replied unambiguously that it was attractive. For another
interlocutor, Ina, her own internal response was experienced as
pleasant. She said:
Ina: That's great, I'm happy, you're not questioning my ability, I'll
just take it into account.
What emerges from these few excerpts is the idea that we seem able
to link present to future in our mental constructs, so we are not, as it
were, bound only by the time frame of the present. We can form
informative links between past, present and future In order to obtain
different perspectives. People seemed to have no difficulty in creating
internal representations of future events, and then using them as
sources of information. This emerged in the responses to question
11. Beatrice's response, for instance, was to develop a clearer picture,
which enabled her to examine her actions In more detail.
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Beatrice: The picture becomes clearer as if you're examining the
action that what you're doing, examining what you're doing, to see
where you could do better. It's like putting it under a microscope and
I'm looking at every little bit of it very carefully to see what I'm doing,
and it's a light feeling ...
Edward's response also included some detail about his own subjective
processes. I cite two extracts to illustrate this. This co-researcher
often reported his kinaesthetic reactions in greater detail than
information coded in other sensory modalities. What is also
interesting is how he describes his internal activity as a search. I
explore the possible significance of this process further in Chapter 11.
Edward: Ehm, that makes me go on an internal search, em, so [ have
a picture of what l do, and I'm looking for another picture where [ can
be doing it better, er, the kinaesthetic is everywhere, it's one of
energy. [ ......} It's a search for a picture where l could be doing it
better, the picture doesn't come up (laughter) but it makes me look
for comparisons, interestingly actually, yeah, the picture ... looking for
a picture of something where I'm doing it better is actually behind the
picture ['m doing it well, [ ...} So all [ have to do is actually see that
new image so that I can then move towards it.
Again there is a reference to a sense of attraction towards an
internally represented future event. Movement presupposes the
existence of the passage of time. Edward also reported that he was
aware of actively comparing his two internal representations. (I have
explored the view that comparison is a fundamental epistemological
process in Chapter 11.)
In Edward's case, there was also evidence of a trans-dertvattona!
search; he uses the metaphor of 'looking' to describe this internal
activity. Later in the interview, after he had time to reflect on his
original responses, he enlarged on the sensation of searching for
information in his constructed future:
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Edward: ... maybe I'm just missing something that I'm not aware of
that will allow me to step up to the next level. So what I'm looking for
is what it is that I need to get me that next step?
Kathleen had no problems generating images of her doing something
'even better'.
Kathleen. OK.... (long pause) I modify the picture actually. I've a
picture here, and ... I find I've made the picture a little bit clearer, the
colours brighter, I've turned up the volume ...
J. And let me just check. That was as the result of 'how could you
make it even better?'
Kathleen: Yeah, yeah. So in this situation I'm doing what 1 do well,
better.
Lucy's response again seemed to be dominated by her internal
dialogue, which appeared to help her to develop her internal searches.
She was often very informative about what she found through her
introspections. One can identify the internal dialogue, the internal
search, and the visual component of her internal responses in the
following extract.
Lucy: (Pause) Searching, she's searching, ahh, there was a bit of
doubt there, internal dialogue, I can't? can 1?And how can I do it? it's
like (indistinct) if I can do that then you can... slight movement to my
right, em.... It's going over now ... where's it gone? Slight movement
to my right on to the future ... right, so if I did that then 1could see
myself being able to do better.
People appear to respond te words and phrases in their own unique
way. What remains constant is that they use their senses internally as
an inevitable response to words, and language in general. These
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activities seem to involve searching, internal dialogue, comparison,
and the ability to use different time frames as contexts to generate
other kinds of internal representations. Similar patterns were found in
transcripts of parts of interviews that I have not cited for the sake of
brevity.
8. 4. Goals and outcomes; back to the future.
Question 13 was used to explore people's internal representations of
future events, and the possible influence of different words and
syntaxed phrases on this process. This was a complex question, as I
was curious to find out more about a number of things, such as the
effects of asking different questions about something that affected
people's internal representations. So I set about asking people about
a goal in a way that would present them with that goal in different
contexts, using what, how and why questions, and then asking them
to change their perceptual position into the future 'as if' they had
achieved the goal. I then asked them to think about the original goal,
and inquired whether anything had changed in their own
representations of the outcome they had been invited to think about.
Partly as the result of these responses, I became more aware that
goals were emerging as important. I have therefore cited extracts
from each of the transcribed interviews.
8.4.1. What' and 'how' questions.
The responses to this particular set of questions and directives were
complex. People had no apparent difficulty in creating internal
representations of a goal they had in life. Everyone of my six
collaborators was able to generate an internal representation about
this future event without difficulty. Then, being asked the what, how
and why questions generated clear alterations in these
representations. This is well illustrated by Beatrice's response.
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1. And as you pay attention to that internal representation, what
happens if I ask you 'what do you need to achieve it'?
Beatrice: (pauses) Well there's something happened, but I don't
know what's happening. ~
1. Take your time, just run over it again and see...
Beatrice: There's a series of pictures below it, of different, I don't
know whether they're resources or skills, different things that I will
need to achieve this final goal.
Edward's responses were also informative, demonstrating the
ubiquitous occurrence of internal dialogue and its effects. My
questions seemed to send him on an internal search, which itself then
altered his own representations. He forms links between his own
internal dialogue and his awareness of his kinaesthetic states, almost
as if his bodily responses were acting as a context for the kind of
inner talk that he produced. To the 'what' question, he responded:
Edward: Right, I have a picture which is just a bright circle, em, no
sounds, the bright circle is what I'm going to achieve when I get
there, the kinaesthetic is one of, it's quite calming, it's a calming
kinaesthetic, it's quite relaxing so that it slows me down getting to
where I want to be, so that it allows me to be aware of how I'm
getting there, so I can get there properly. Em, I also have.... I can
hear music, now I hear the music because it's becoming anchored to
getting to where I'm gOing, so I can hear that quite clearly, though
it's Just very gentle, em, again it's really the kinaesthetic ...It's one of
peace, it's a feeling of em, take it slowly, sensible, there's no rush....
1. Is that a kinaesthetic or an internal dialogue?
Edward: It's, yeah, it's an internal dialogue but it's coming off the
kinaesthetic.
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J. OK.
Edward: Yeah, because the kinaesthetic is there, it's all built up, but
it's holding itself back and that in itself is saying to me 'take your
time, do it properly, you know you can get there so just take the time
to get there'.
Again, internal dialogue emerges as one of the key factors catalysing
the further development of his internal representations. Lucy's
response to my question 'what will you need to achieve it' generated
the response: What do I need to achieve it? Internal dialogue
happening big time. My picture's obviously moved now to where I am
now, it's a long picture. When I was interviewing Lucy, I became
aware that she used a lot of internal dialogue, so I sometimes asked
her about it. I wondered whether it affected some of the sub-
modalities. In this extract, we may be witnessing a link between her
internal words, and changes in the size of her picture.
Lucy: [ ...] I don't know whether I'm trying to make it bright but I'm
just sort of at the moment have to be patient, so I know what's got to
be done to get there ... a lot of internal dialogue.
J. Yeah. Can I just check something with you? Has the picture got
bigger?
Lucy: It did actually for a bit there.
Sometimes my interlocutors had difficulties In describing their internal
processes, so I hesitate to draw any conclusions from some parts of
these transcripts. However, one can recognise changes in people's
perceptual positions, and the re-organisation of information in the
next extract. In response to my 'how' question, she responded:
Lucy: It seems to have moved back to my left and my right and I
have moved myself forward again,... OK. Yep. I'm internal
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dialoguing, visualising, em, the picture's ... actually when you first said
that. .. sort of here, like a what do you call it, just sort of opening out. ..
I interpret her description of something 'sort of opening out' as
indicating that she experienced some sort of movement in response to
the 'how'. Certainly, the 'how' question produced changes in how
Edward's internal representations were organised. They seemed to
bring images of the sub-goals that he needed to achieve on the way
to his consciousness.
Edward: (pause) it's an internal dialogue, with a set of pictures with
the overall goal is again this very bright circle, but leading up to the
circle is this set of pictures which are the individual goals in getting to
the overall goal.
Kathleen's response also showed that the word 'how' produced a re-
organisation of the internal representations she was 'mentally'
scanning. In this case her 'series of pictures' were organised from her
left side to the right, as if they were sequenced and located in the
space in front of her.
Kathleen: (pause) ... I have a series of pictures now coming back
from this one.
1. And are they going from right to left? (1 asked her this because she
was pointing with her hand from her right to her left).
Kathleen: (pause) well that's the future event, (pointing to the right)
and these are events leading up to it, (pointing to the left) so I guess
that it's going from left to right.
Beatrice's response also showed a re-organisation of her thinking. For
her, the key word 'how' produced movement.
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Beatrice: All the little pictures are moving, I can see myself doing this
and this and this and this, ... (Gesticulating).
How and what apparently produced a different kind of information
processing at the level of sub-modalities. In a sense, they also seem
to behave as Pinker's (1994) 'head' words, acting as a kind of
metaphorical hook on which the rest of the meaning hangs. They can
also be thought of as words that create a category, which then acts as
a framework which influences the de-coding of the rest of the
statement. They may act as metaphorical signposts, setting a
direction for the internal search for coherence and meaning.
8.4.2. 'Why' questions.
The responses to the 'why' question, produced different responses
from the 'what?' and 'how?' questions. They indicated that another
basic epistemological process had been brought into playS, namely
that of causality.
The word 'why' seems to elicit causal thinking. Edward's answer to my
question 'why will you achieve it' produced an answer, which implied
that far broader issues were now involved than, had been the case
with the 'how' and 'what' questions. These broader issues covered not
only information about his perception of the causality behind the
desired activity, but also invoked his own sense of self, which is a
more complex construct. For Edward, this sense of self had a strong
kinaesthetic component. Again, internal dialogue seemed to activate
further responses, which appeared to lead to him to experience a
sense of choice.
SI have described this in Chapter 5, and suggest it is an essential aspect of
the model of learning that emerges from this inquiry. I explain this In
Chapter 11.
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Edward: It's a single picture, and it's a single picture built on the
kinaesthetic of who I am. Because I choose to do it, so there's an
internal dialogue which says 'because I choose to do it'.
A similar pattern or response was shown by Kathleen. This short
extract from the transcript indicates something of the emergence of
her sense of self; that this is something where she has a sense of her
own autonomous position, and where the desired outcome is
something that she wants.
1. [ ...] What do you think is the major change produced by the
question 'why'?
Kathleen: (pause) ... I have to decide if I want. .. I suppose really to
re-check myself again, to see if this is what I want, ... my goal, and
I've decided that it is, more achievable.
1. So did it? ... just let me check this out.
Kathleen: OK.
1. Did it send you inside to check something?
Kathleen: Yeah.
1. How did you check it?
Kathleen: Erm, I asked myself, is this definitely a goal I want, is this
definitely a goal I want to achieve?
1. And what said 'yes' to you?
Kathleen: It was an emotion, a kinaesthetic that okeyed it with me.
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Ina's responses were shorter, but still reveal the role of internal
dialogue. They also convey a sense of her being in charge. She
vouchsafed to me that her goal was to obtain a degree. She uses the
modal operator 'want to' followed by information about the necessity
of it for her. This was one of the rare occasions when content came
into the answers.
Ina: Because I want to achieve it. There's a need. I have to.
1. You touched your chest right then. Is that like a K?
Ina: I have to.
Lucy's responses also showed a similar pattern, where a sense of self
seems to be important, and her internal dialogue extends the
response.
Lucy: Why? .... Why.... Why will I achieve it? There's a K and I'm
looking up and I'm trying to.... Why willI achieve it? Because I want
to.
1. Is that internal dialogue?
Lucy: Yes, the internal dialogue going on because I want to.
Later she elaborates on the importance of the goal to her life. As she
was thinking about the answer to my question, she had looked
upwards, as if the location of the picture was high up.
Lucy: Weill actually looked up didn't 1, like it is, it's up high for me
to achieve that that goal, one of my aims for my life, so...
Steve's responses were somewhat sparser; however, they do show
sub-modality changes in response to 'why'. This is also an example of
where using a strictly NLPapproach to questioning about sub-
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modality changes may lead to the researcher missing out on
information, because of focussing too much on content rather than
people's processes.
J. Does anything change about the goal when I ask 'why?
Steve: (Long pause). Actually, it's the picture has become still and
framed, but the... actually kinaesthetic isn't as noticeable.
Perhaps the simplest and most telling answer was offered by Beatrice,
who told me that:
Beatrice: There's no change in any of the pictures but there's internal
dialogue.
J. OK.
Beatrice: I just tell myself I want to. (My emphasis).
8.5. Changing perceptual positions in time
With this part of the question," I wanted to explore what happened
when I asked people to shift their perceptual position, from one where
they were in the present looking towards a future outcome, to
another one of actually imagining themselves in the future looking
back, to having achieved their goal. By perceptual position, I mean
the conceptual standpoint from which something is viewed.
We can use the example of a glass being seen as half empty or half
full to illustrate what is meant by taking two different perceptual
positions. In the first one, one can assume that emptyness forms the
framework (or category) within which the viewer observes the glass.
6 What will It be like to have achieved that goal?
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In the other one, fullness, actual or potential, forms a different
framework. Both are different perceptual positions.
With these questions, I was interested to find out whether time itself
(in the forms of past, present and future) could act as a perceptual
framework or standpoint from which an event was viewed by the
conceiver.
When I asked Beatrice what will it be like to have achieved that goal?
her description of how she conceived the achievement changed. It
became more intense, both visually and kinaesthetically.
Beatrice: The big picture has started moving faster, you know it's a
very strong kinaesthetic and I think it's got brighter, it's just an
overall feeling that it would be right for me.
Edward's response also described changes in both the kinaesthetic
and visual elements of his internal representations. He also reported
on an awareness of his internal dialogue.
Edward: Oh that's a big kinaesthetic in my chest of.... Oh the picture
gets very bright, the circle gets very bright [ ...] and there's an
internal dialogue that goes with it.
Kathleen's response was to engage more with the outcome by
associating with it, which means thinking about it as if it were
happening to her in the present, and being fully emotionally engaged.
Kathleen: (pause) Yeah, I'm in the picture now, I'm associated.
(coughs). (She uses her arms to describe a circle around her).
1. So if you're associated, the picture's all round? OK?
For Lucy the thought of having achieved the outcome was
pleasurable, and she reported a strong kinaesthetic response.
234
Lucy: OK. I'm looking around now, to my right again. I'm having a K,
a big K response, I'm seeing what it would be like ...
1. Picture moved?
Lucy: The picture's moved, definitely moved. I suppose I'm looking
into the future. Like, looking into the future .... Big K, big K, can chill
out now.
1. Good. Right (laughter) Picture's still clear or not?
Lucy: Picture's very clear, picture's very clear yeah!
Steve's response was to generate a number of pictures. When I asked
him how many, he described how he took (at least) three different
perceptual positions
Steve: Yeah, [ have the three of them. (laughter) That's what [ have
done. What I have is a picture of more or less present time, [have
me having achieved the goal, the day after, or very shortly after, and
[ have a picture of me in a couple of years time actually looking back,
physically looking back ... but ['m not doing anything, just standing
looking at the scene, disinterested.
These responses indicate that internal representations can be
influenced by the time frame the information is assigned to. People
seem to be able to construct an internal representation of the present
looking into the future, and then also a future in which they have
achieved something. Then they appear also to be able to look back to
the present. From what my collaborators reported, these different
perceptual positions seemed clearly distinguished by sub-modality
changes, as well as internal dialogue.
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The next part of the question was designed to bring my interlocutors
back into the present, after journeying, as it were, through a number
of different perceptual positions, which were elicited by the words that
I used. I was curious to find out whether the original internal
representation of their outcomes had changed. The answers were
ambiguous; for some of my interlocutors there had been changes, for
others, they were not aware of any alterations. Beatrice's response
described some of these changes.
1. So now think of the original goal again, and notice if anything's
changed?
Beatrice: (pause) I think they've combined the original goal and the
outcome, kind of, it's all the one picture now, it's bigger, it's more a
rectangular ... square. No difference in brightness, there's movement
and it's got a border round it, it's a movie.
She also told me that she felt herself to be 'in' the movie', which is
another change in perceptual position. For both Lucy and Edward the
main changes were differences in their kinaesthetic responses, with
no apparent change in their visual content. For Steve the question
eliminated the visual part of his internal representation. In Kathleen's
case, there were very clear changes. Here the process of questioning
her in such a way that she altered her internal representation of the
goal also altered the perception of her original construct.
1. [...] So I'm interested now to see what happens if I ask you to think
of the original goal again.
Kathleen: It's actually different! (surprised). It's changed. The goal is
actually changed.
1. Has it changed in content, or has it changed how it's represented?
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Kathleen: It's a slight variation in the content. And I think because I
have associated myself in that future goal, it's now more achievable,
and ... I can say there is a variation in the content. I just remember
what the initial picture was up there.
Ina described the process in some detail, as well as offering more
information about the difference between her responses to the 'why',
and the 'how' questions.
1. So when you think of the goal again, has that changed?
Ina: Yeah, it's like I'm on my way to achieve it.
J. Movement? Attraction?
Ina: Yeah, whereas the 'how' stopped me, because I was like .... I've
got this list, how am I going to do it, That's what I said, I hadn't
activated my list yet. But saying that I've achieved it, and how do I
feel, it feels the 'how' has already been done, because I've done it,
and I've succeeded, very happy.
I suggest that such questions, which asked people to think of the
same event in different ways, indicate that words apparently have the
power to direct, influence, and categorise how information is coded at
the sensory level. They seem to be able to effect a change in
perceptual position in the conceiver. This implies that we may have
considerable flexibility at this level of processing. This is shown not
only at the apparently basic level of sub-modality changes, but also in
people's ability to use the dimension of time as a category within
which information is re-orqanlsed.? It is as if we have the ability to
change, to modify, to manipulate and to draw on information coded at
many levels. If this is indeed the case, then it makes the phenomenon
of internal representations an essential aspect of the processes of
7 I have reviewed some recent ideas about the effects of categorisation on
perception in chapter 3.
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thinking, memorising, reflecting, planning and learning. What
emerges is that sometimes, in order to make sense, we compare
information between the time that was, and that is yet to be. Internal
dialogue may possibly be involved in these comparisons. This could be
another part of the phenomenon of making sense.
S.6. Changing time frames
One of my questions (number 68) set out to explore what happened
when people were deliberately asked to shift their perceptual
positions about a constructed future event. So the first question
asked them to think of something 'that you have to do, but you're not
particularly sure you want to do it'. I wanted to see what effect it
would have if I then asked them to imagine that they were in a future
having completed the task. I was interested in what would change as
the result of asking them make such shifts in their perceptual
positions.
Beatrice reported distinct differences in her representation of the
event considered from these two different perspectives.
Beatrice: The picture has changed .... To what's In the picture has
come with me into the future. Does that make sense? No? (laughter)
J. Everything is OK. Every response is absolutely fine.
Beatrice: The picture has changed, I was disassociated, now I'm
associated, and it's in the future. I imagine the outcome of what this
would be.
8 Question 6.
a) Think of something you have to do but you're not sure you particularly
want to do it.
b) Now imagine you were in the future having done it.
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J. So you're actually associated into the outcome. So is that a
different picture from the first one?
Beatrice: Yes, totally different picture.
For Edward, on the other hand, the picture of the task in the future
was fuzzy and grey, and associated with unpleasant sensations.
Having achieved it then produced a clear picture, and a different
kinaesthetic.
J. Yeah OK. Now imagine you were in the future having done it.
Edward: Kinaesthetic, eh, kinaesthetic of relief .....
J. Mh mho
Edward: The object has gone out of the picture, the picture's still
there, it's a 3 dimensional picture... clear.
J. Picture's still in the same place?
Edward: Yeah, and still no sound. (Coughs)
For Kathleen, the picture changed from black and white, to having
some colour in it, and was then accompanied by a different
kinaesthetic.
Kathleen: And here it's like a black and white snap shot. It's not. .. now
that I've done it and looking back on it, because it is small and
framed, but there is colour in it.
Some people's answers were more complex; both Kathleen and Lucy,
for instance, reported that they used a lot of internal dialogue, and
that they experienced their pictures as having two different locations,
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as it were, in the physical space in front of them. On being asked the
second part of the question, Lucy's response was:
Lucy: Yeah, well I feel good, like the K is definitely there, so the K
would be the big thing.
1. What's happened to the picture?
Lucy: Eh, ah well yeah, it's moved over again to my left, it's past,
much bigger, done it, yeah, move on again.
Steve also produced a similar response, and eloquently summed up
the differences between his conceptions of assigning information to
the two time frames. It seems that his internal representation of the
future event (the first response) also altered when he became aware
of the second internal representation. He reported that he also
experienced a marked kinaesthetic change.
Steve: The future? Em, yeah. Pause... I have another strong ... at first
I get a kinaesthetic response, that is the tightness exploded actually
and became fairly loose. The picture is further to the right, and I still
see the other picture. It is framed, but it's 3D, it's like a doll's house
room if you like. The other one is actually duller, even duller now, and
further away.
8.7. Conclusion
In this chapter I explored the idea that internal representations are
not only constructs about past and present events or actions.
Although it is dangerous to generalise from such a small sample, we
also seem to have an extraordinary ability to move about in time. It
also appears that when we change time frames, the information may
be re-configured. Time seems to emerge as an essential agent for the
categorisation of much information in this context. It becomes an
integral part of the phenomenology of internal representations. As
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such, it also appears that these dynamics operate in a truly cybernetic
way. Systems can process information about past, present and future
events, and use this as a basis for both feedback and calibration. We
seem to be able to use our powers to re-create experience internally
using our senses in order to make sense and develop meaning.
Internal representations also appear to act as a basis for generating
actions.
The words that we use seem to be both catalyst for the emerging and
changing internal representations, and metaphoricaJ frameworks that
hold them in place. Our internal worlds are dynamic, changing, and
can move us through time and present us with what was, what is, and
what could be. Words can act as catalyst and stabiliser of our interior
microcosm in an almost alchemical way. Sometimes they evoke
changes, other times they frame information so that the meaning is
transformed. This makes them essential not only for enabling us to
know, but also for how to know. They thus have a truly (and
awesome) epistemological function, drawing on, and bringing into
playa variety of different processes for the constructing of cognitive
maps.
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Chapter 9. Words, and the Generation of Internal Responses.
Now, the interior of language (the language of thought) is essentially
a sub-sentence language; of course it can include complete
sentences, but the code of the genre does not require this for the
success and advantage of the communication. (Roland Barthes
1989:95).
9.1. Introduction
This is the last chapter on the analysis of my own interviews. I include
it because in preceding chapters it emerged that certain words
apparently produced far reaching effects on directing the conceptual
processes that my interlocutors reported on. Here I review my
findings from the transcripts of four questions that have not yet been
covered, (Questions 1, 2, 14 and 15). I have written this chapter in
the interest of transparency, that is, to present as complete an
account of my findings from the transcribed interviews as space
allows. Other aspects of our conscious and unconscious processes
came to light. It was often difficult to select the novel aspects of the
phenomena that emerged under my scrutiny. Thus in this chapter I
add nothing new in the sense that it has already been demonstrated
that words and syntax can produce responses in the listener at many
levels. However, a number of themes also re-emerge, adding more
examples of what I believe to be fundamental epistemological
processes mediated through particular language structures. My
reflections on these form the substance of chapter 11.
9.2. Setting directions for internal searches, and the
consequences.
With questions 11 and 152 I had set out to explore the effects of using
words that could direct people to process information in a particular
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way. Can certain words set directions for people's internal searches? I
wondered what sort of effects using directive words such as 'think',
'remember' and 'be aware' at the beginning of utterances could have
on how people then went on to construct their internal
representations. I had already found that initial words seemed to
'override' the effects of subsequently used ones." What I found was
these words seemed to set a direction for the internal search,
influencing what was attended to. I deliberately separated these two
questions during the actual interview; one came right at the
beginning, and the other one was asked towards the end. In each
case my interlocutors reported different responses. I give some of the
most illustrative examples without going through each of the
respondents' comments.
J [... ] If I say to you 'Think of a time when you were happy~ what's
your response?
Edward: It's a very vague internal search. Because I'm looking for a
memory, and it doesn't really do anything for me.
1. If I say 'remember a time when you were happy?'
Edward: It's more effective.
1. Do you get a picture?
1Question 1.
a) Think of a time when you were happy,
b) Remember a time when you were happy,
2 Question 15
a) Think about how much you have learned,
b) are you aware of how much you have learned?
3 See chapter 6.
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Edward: Yes I am doing. It's very easy with that to find something.
They all come rushing to the forefront. mmm. Yeah. It's a very
relaxing way to ask it.
1. Yeah.
Edward: It's very comfortable. The other one is a very sort of cold
and blunt thing to ask, whereas remember is a very relaxing, very
warm way of being led into what it is you are asking me to remember.
Here it was as if I had happened upon a group of words that
influenced the respondents' modes of awareness. These in turn
affected the internal responses that were evoked and any memories
that were accessed. It is likely that they acted as categorisers
influencing how the rest of the information was then attended to. For
most of my respondents, the word 'remember' produced more
internal representations and sub-modality distinctions. There was one
exception, Lucy, for whom the directive 'think' produced a greater
response than did 'remember'. These extracts also illustrate the role
of internal dialogue. I have underlined Lucy's words where she reports
that talking about something alters her internal representation. In this
case it is not clear whether it is her internal dialogue or 'external'
speech that is influencing the development of these responses.
1. [ ...] So, the first sentence is 'Think of a time when you were
happy.'
Lucy: OK. Well obviously I go inside, and I'm looking at a picture,
search for a picture, and I see the picture and then all the other
feelings, the kinaesthetic feelings take over, the sounds ... Oh it's
getting bright now as I'm talking about it now actually. (Here the
internal dialogue seems to amplify the responses.
1. So you talking about it influences ...
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Lucy: It's the picture for me now is getting bigger and I'm hearing,
feeling those feelings that I might feel, yeah, sounds, that sort of
thing, as they're getting stronger! Whoa!
1. As you're talking about it?
Lucy: As I'm talking about it it's bringing it back more. Yeah Yeah
(Author's emphasis).
1. OK. I wonder how that's different to if I say' remember a time
when you were happy'?
Lucy: Remember a time ... it sounds like the way you maybe said it to
me, a little sadder. I don't know. Remember a time ... it's like it's more
in the past. ... Remember a time ... it seems its more like in the past
and it's not continuing on! ... that was my initial reaction 'remember
a time?' ehm.... If I pick the same thing though it's a little harder.
Remember a time seems very in the past. (Lucy looks to the left.)
1. Mh Mh. because you're looking to the left.
Lucy: Yeah.
1. So has the picture moved?
Lucy: It must have!
Later she told me even more about the different effects of her own
use of 'think' and 'remember' in her internal dialogues.
Lucy: Well as I was talking to you with the 'think' one I was becoming
more associated as I was talking. The 'remember' one I still haven't
really thought of something because that good thing I thought of was
so big.... If I can just think of something ... remember something,
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remember something ... OK, if I keep talking about it I would be
there ..._(Myemphasis).
Steve also reported different responses to the two key words. The
same kinds of responses were also reported for question 15. Some of
them were quite startling. Beatrice, for instance, reported a dramatic
shift in the context of her internal representations. In response to the
directive to 'think' she immediately accessed memories of the course,
whereas when asked to be 'aware', there is a conceptual shift from
certainty about her own learning, to self- doubt.
1. 'Think about how much you've learnt'
Beatrice: It's a moving picture of the last what is it, six or seven
weeks, us all together, I don't know, that's just it. The whole crowd of
us.
1. Moving?
Beatrice: Yeah, all moving, colour, sound, taste, it's got everything in
it.
1. What's the sound?
Beatrice: Chatter! (laughter)
1. And how is that different to if I were to ask you 'are you aware of
how much you've learnt?'
Beatrice: That's different, that's me on my own, ... it's me on my own,
still reading still/earning, but probably not sure if I have really
learnt. ..
1. So there's a bit of doubt in the second one?
Beatrice: Yeah.
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J. OK. Was there any doubt in the first one?
Beatrice: No.
Some of Edward's responses were illuminating. Sometimes it is
difficult to interpret them from the bare text of the transcripts.
However, the following extract gives some indication that the word
'think' elicited responses in the visual domain, whereas 'aware' turned
his attention to his kinaesthetic sensations. His responses were
sometimes almost incomprehensible; I suggest that this is because
we may have been uncovering information for which we do not have
an adequate terminology. So making sense of this extract may not be
possible; nevertheless it shows a dramatic difference between his
responses to 'think' and 'remember'. It would be na'ive to expect total
verbal clarity about people's introspections at such depths. At the end
of his replies to the first question, I asked him:
J. Can I ask you which came first, the pictures or the K?
Edward: The pictures.
J. And if I rephrase that thing slightly and say' are you aware of how
much you've learnt?'
Edward: Yeah the picture shifts up here, but it still has... not a but,
and it still has a connection to the original picture. Interestingly what
it does is that here are slides that come from this picture, so they're
the slides of the things I'm aware of...em..... they're bigger. (pause)
They're not. .. they're just there. They're not actually sitting or
connected to anything... The connection isn't a physical connection;
it's an ethereal connection.
At this polnt, I wanted to know more about what he experienced as
the sensory specific complex equivalences for the word 'ethereal'.
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J. How do you know it's a connection?
Edward: Because it just is.
Still wanting more information, I referred him back to the more
specific details of his internal representations.
J. What sense would that connection be in?
Edward: (long pause) I guess it's a kinaesthetic, it has to be because
it's a feeling. Yeah, it's a feeling, definitely.
I had observed him looking to the right when he was describing the
visual components of his responses to the directive 'think'. One of the
sub-modality distinctions Is the apparent location in space of the
conceiver's internal representation (Bandler and Macdonald 1988). I
was intrigued to know more about his original 'picture'.
J. And what's different about the picture over here to your right?
Edward: Oh it's not anchored, whereas these pictures are anchored.
This actually I can move with me. This one is anchored. Erm, this one
is em, interestingly as if it's sort of carved in stone, it has a sort of
weight to it.
J. That's the left one, yeah?
Edward: Whereas this one doesn't have a weight to it, it's a part of
me, this is a part of me but waiting for me to... erm ... gain what it has
to offer, and once I manage to bring that in as being part of me, it
comes up here... (Indistinct).
J. And this picture is bigger? The one on the right?
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Edward: This one has bands around it, slides. This one doesn't.
J. Is it a movie?
Edward: No, it's just a.... it's not a movie, it's eh, it's not a movie in
the sense of the word movie, it's like a nebulous movement.
J. OK.
Edward: Whereas this one is big pictures in front. ..
J. Are these clear?
Edward: They're actually like words, ... words, things sort of waiting
to... integrate themselves into what I'm learning, whereas these the
words are no longer here because they are mixing and intermingling
with what I've already learnt. And growing, it's actually, actually
growing.
For Ina, this question produced very different, but equally dramatic
shifts in her internal representations. To the first directive, containing
the word 'think' she immediately produced a lot of 'busy' internal
representations of activities such as reading and writing, and seeing
herself writing notes about various topics. This was one of the few
times that my interlocutors 'lapsed' into content.
Ina: I'm forever making notes, so if I hear something, or I hear of a
practice, or a skill, or just things people say, or I've attended these
various symposiums or seminars, I put it down, 'oh maybe that will
come in handy for the hospitsl', or 'maybe that will come in handy
towards so and so'. I'll look that up. In my job I can do that, whereas
the other girls can't.
Her responses to the word 'aware' seemed confused, and the internal
searches become more apparent.
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J. So what happens if I say 'Are you aware of how much you've
learnt?
Ina: (pause) I know what I know .... but I've still got to learn more. I
don't know everything. It's that word 'aware'. I still have yet to learn.
J. It seemed to me that you were searching much more.
Ina: I can't put down how much I know, how much I've learnt, it's
just I can't ... I can't I've learnt this, tick, I've learnt that, tick. I know
what I know. There's still other things I have to learn. So I'm
probably more aware of what I might need to know, than to what I
already know.
Here the word 'aware' appears to have shifted the context of Ina's
internal representations, and turned her internal focus to what she
had yet to learn. This appeared to produce more of a trans-
derivational search. For Lucy on the other hand, the word 'aware'
produced a stronger kinaesthetic response. Interestingly, she changed
the position she was sitting in, straightening her back when I asked
her 'are you aware of how much you have learnt'. For her, the main
difference between the 'think', and the awareness command was 'it
just ... feels nicer'.
With Steve, the main difference was also experienced as kinaesthetic.
In his case, as with Edward, it produced a complex response, which is
not easy to make sense of. The first part of the question evoked clear
memories of a classroom situation, with a teacher whose voice he
could hear, and experienced as unpleasant. I questioned him about
this.
J. What sort of voice is it?
Steve: It's ... a grumpy sort of ... staccato voice, with a deep tonality.
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J. Whose voice is it?
Steve: It's the voice of one of my teachers.
J. OK. Right.
Steve: So annoying!
His response to the directive to be 'aware' was dramatically different.
It seemed to move his focus to his kinaesthetic responses, and
appeared to 'block out' the visual and auditory components that had
been there originally.
Steve: Well, that feels completely different, I feel a sense of, it gives
me a feeling of... nervousness, but not in .,. I suppose awareness
would be one word, aware of my nerve endings, nervous sensation
but not nervousness in the traditional sense of anxiety or anything
like that. A sense that I'm more aware of everything actually, I know
that's a huge jumping off block but I seem .... I don't have a picture,
strangely for this, I just have a kinaesthetic, I don't even have an
auditory. A kinaesthetic of sort of magical feeling, it's difficult to
describe but I sort of feel my nerve endings or something, you know,
it's very difficult to explain, em, it's mainly a feeling, I don't see a
picture.
9.3. Negations
I have already suggested that there are words, such as 'but' that
appear to weaken or delete the internal responses to the
representations which emerged in response to the words preceding
'but'. I have described these in chapter 7. I include a consideration of
negation in this chapter, because it appears to produce strong internal
responses, which appear to influence how internal representations
and sub-modalities are then configured by the conceiver. Some of
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the responses highlight the role of internal dialogue as an aid to
internal searching.
It is believed that the unconscious cannot compute a negative.
(Erickson 1980, Sandler and Grinder 1975A). With question 144 I
deliberately set out to explore the effects of asking people not to think
about something. The first statement 'You must not imagine a blue
camel' was included to lighten the atmosphere. All the respondents
immediately reported that they 'saw' a blue camel, before they could
'delete' it. The second and third statements were somewhat more
searching, and deliberately used the language that could be
associated with the context of a classroom, or other learning
situation. Ina's response to 'don't make that mistake again' was
typical. It also demonstrates that she uses internal dialogue to
process my command.
Ina: It doesn't feel too good.
J. You maybe think of a mistake?
Ina: Yeah
J. I said don't. ..
Ina: ...Just thinks of the things you've done, cringing, good cringe,
just 'don't do it again'.
4 Question 14.
How do you respond to each of the following statements?
A) You must not imagine a blue camel.
B) Don't make that mistake again.
c) Don't think about failure.
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In Lucy's case, her response was to change the modal operators of
her internal dialogue as she seemed to sort through the internal
representations that were evoked. First she said:
Lucy: (laughter) Don't make that mistake again? Don't make that
mistake again. What mistake again ... OK, a bit of movement, don't
make that mistake again. I suppose I am a bit nervy about doing it
again! (Laughter).
Then she elaborated on what she was thinking, and brought herself,
through her own internal dialogue, to a position of choice, (I will if I
want to!).
Lucy: Well I suppose I could make that mistake again then. Don't
make that mistake again. What do you mean, don't make that
mistake again... I will if I want to!
In Kathleen's case, the mention of the word 'failure' produced a
strong emotional and kinaesthetic response.
1. What happens if I say 'don't think about failure?
Kathleen: That's just shut up... there's a falling in the pit of my
stomach, the picture zoomed up here, sounds like a swish,
(indistinct).
Lucy reported that she 'saw' the word failure in response to my
statement.
1. OK. What happens if I say to you don't think about failure?
Lucy: I looked to my left. I suppose failure? Internal dialogue. I look
to my left. I see the word 'failure'.
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1. And you've just been told not to think about it!
Lucy: Yeah I know, yeah, I went straight to it, straight to it, and I see
the word 'failure'.
Here we may have examples of words that have the power to evoke
strong emotional responses, even when people were asked not to
think about them. Not only can the unconscious not compute a
negative, there appear to be some powerful words that will elicit
strong responses whatever their context. In this section I have
considered words that appear to set an internal direction for trans-
derivational searches, and set the context for how the information is
to be accessed. Negations, on the other hand, do not necessarily
block searches. The conceiver seems to first need to produce an
internal representation in order then to negate it.
9.4. Sameness and difference as two ways of attending to
information
One of the factors to have emerged from this study is the possibility
that words can evoke specific epistemological processes. These are
used in the construction of conceptual maps, and include the re-
casting of information coded at the levels of internal representations.
Such processes include categorisation, changing perceptual positions,
generating trans-derivational searches, comparisons, and using
internal dialogue to generate more Information. My interest was
increasingly becoming focused on the processes that we use to
construct our maps. For this reason I include some information about
one of the questions in my interview schedule, where I sought to elicit
comparison, and wondered about the differences between asking
someone to focus on similarity, and then on difference. In chapter 3, I
suggested that there was evidence that comparison may be an
important conceptual process. The question then arose whether it was
possible to elicit these processes in people by the words that one
used.
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This question was designed to elicit people's responses when asked to
consider the similarities and difference between two events. So I
included a question", which asked people to focus on 'sameness' and
'difference'. I only asked it of four of my interlocutors, as I felt, as the
interviews were progressing, that this part of the interview may have
been too reminiscent of an exercise I had set them during their
course. I nevertheless include some of the information that I gleaned
from these, though I hesitate to draw too many conclusions from only
three transcripts. (It is one of the aspects of this research that in
retrospect I would have liked to have explored further, using different
types of questions.)
The ability to perceive similarities and differences are considered by
Bateson (1972) to be among our basic epistemological processes. In
order to categorise events or objects, it is necessary to be able to
perceive similarities between them; a category is essentially a
conceptual device to lump similar 'things' together. Without this
ability to perceive similarities, what may be a fundamental
epistemological activity would be impossible, (Markman and
Wisniewski 1997).
Conversely, the ability to respond to 'difference' enables us to
distinguish between categories, and to place our focus on details. For
Bateson, 'difference' was an essential part of a cybernetic
epistemology. \lA bit of information is definable as a difference which
makes a difference" (Bateson 1972:315). It belongs to the realm of
cybernetics because, in Bateson's view, creatures had to be able to
interact, or exchange information between themselves and the
environment in order to adapt and survive. Such information was for
him, news of difference. One of the passages which best explains
5 Question 2.
A) How are apples and oranges different?
B) How are apples and oranges the same.
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Bateson's thinking about systems, interactions, mind and the
importance of difference is from his musings on where 'mind' begins
and ends in systems.
Consider the blind man with a stick. Where does the blind man's
self begin? At the tip of the stick? At the handle of the stick? Or
at some point half way up the stick? These questions are
nonsense because the stick is a pathway along which differences
are transmitted under transformation. (Bateson 1972:318).
With question 2, I attempted to explore this aspect of people's
information processing. The questions themselves were very simple.
The small number of answers were complex and informative, often
showing that my collaborators oscillated between using the perceptual
filters of sameness and difference, whatever the wording of the
question. Two of my interlocutors used their sense of taste when
asked for the differences between two fruits.
J (...) How are apples and oranges different?
Beatrice: They're fruit. Sorry ...
J. What do you do before you say that?
Beatrice: I recognise one as being an apple and the taste of it, and
you can use it for baking.
Here she immediately accessed the category 'fruit', so I asked her
what processes she had used to make that decision, to which she
replied that she 'tasted' them. Ina gave a similar response, saying she
could tell the difference because she was experiencing the taste of the
apple. I continued to question her about how she thought she made
these distinctions.
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1. When you say you recognise one, is that because you make a
picture of it out in front? Or how do you know it's an apple you're
talking about?
Beatrice: You know it's an apple from previous experience of seeing
an apple. I suppose you make a picture of it as well. A picture of
different possibilities and things you know about it. (Here she seems
to be searching for information she has stored about apples. She may
be thinking of the object 'apple' as a class rather than an individual
'thing'.)
Edward's response was to imagine the two fruits together when I
asked him about their differences. First, he produced one picture.
When I asked him about similarities, he reported conceiving of two
pictures.
Edward: I have a picture with apples and oranges in it.
1. Static?
Edward: Yes, ehm ...
1. What are you paying attention to?
Edward: I'm actually paying attention to the apple and the orange
but there's no colour in the picture.
Later, when I continued to ask him about the similarities, he
volunteered the following information, showing an oscillation between
the two perceptual processes. One was to focus on difference, then on
looking for similarities.
Edward: Ah, that makes me search, now I have two pictures and I
am comparing one to the other, looking for sameness. Interestingly it
makes me see the differences.
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In Lucy's case, 'difference' caused her to search for detail.
J. So if I said 'How are apples and oranges different, what do you do
on the inside?'
Lucy: The first thing I thought of was visual, it was the cotour, the
cotours, the texture, the skins that I'm seeing obviously, first, and
then I suppose that would probably bring me down to the more
specific thing to the seeds, what has seeds, what doesn't, how they
grew, how they do taste obviously, and the smell,
In the last paragraph above, she also shows the oscillation between
thinking in terms of a class, (what has seeds, what doesn't) or of
specifics, (How do they taste and smell.)
Ina's responses to the question about differences was to evoke the
taste of the two fruit, to focus on the sensory specific information
coded in her internal representation.
J. [ ...] How do you respond if I just ask you 'How are apples and
oranges different?'
Ina: (pause), a sweet apple and a bitter orange.
J. How do you know?
Ina: I taste them.
J. So the first thing that comes is the taste?
Ina: Yes. (...) And then, cotour.
Even this fragment demonstrates that using awareness of different
logical levels in a text as an analytical tool can yield insights into
some of the ways in which people process information. People can
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oscillate between using abstractions such as categories, or access the
sensory specific information coded in terms of the senses internally.
There seems to be a distinct 'gap', as it were, between the many
internal processes that I have attempted to explore, and the wording,
or languaging of people's interior worlds. It thus appears that asking
people to think about similarities, or differences, may generate two
different kinds of internal responses. In one, conceivers tends to focus
more on sensory detail, in the other, the focus moves towards
abstracting the information to the 'higher' logical level of class or
category.
9.5. Conclusion
This chapter considered that some words may have the ability to
evoke different kinds of internal responses. These may shed light on
the processes that are used in the construction of conceptual
structures. In this chapter I have looked at how some words seem to
have the ability to direct people's attention internally in different
ways, as well as how they may act as categorisers for the subsequent
information. Often such words come at the beginning of statements.
Other kinds of syntactical structures, such as negations, appear to
achieve the opposite of what is intended; asking someone not to think
of something inevitably brings that 'something' into the conceiver's
internal focus. Some of the material in this chapter adds to the
information about internal representations and sub-modality changes.
Lastly, I considered what was essentially a fragment of my interviews,
where I was attempting to explore what happened when we directed
people to think of similarities and/or differences. Although the
information here was sparse, one can hypothesise that there may be
ways of guiding people towards attending to specific detail, or to the
higher categories obtained through abstraction.
It could be that approaching textual analysis with an awareness of
logical levels enables the researcher to track the movement of
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people's thinking between more detailed, specific information which is
coded by the senses, and the abstractions which appear to be such a
necessary aspect of people's conceptual models with which they map
their worlds. These present yet another aspect of connections, which I
have already suggested are fundamental epistemological processes,
and are embedded in language structures. Here however, the
connections are between specifics, and perhaps untold layers of
abstractions. The ubiquity of trans-derivational searches suggests that
this may also be a process whose functions deserve further
investigation. They appear to be dynamically linked to internal
dialogue. This sheds some light into the roles of inner speech.
The last four chapters were a report on the results of my own
interviews. My interview schedule was designed to elicit information
from other people's deep introspections. In an epistemological sense,
I was asking people to direct their attention as much as seemed
feasible, to some of the finer details of their own internal worlds. As a
phenomenological inquiry, it demonstrates that we seem to use our
senses internally to code and re-create experience. I suggest it also
demonstrates that internal representations are a metaphorical 'layer'
of consciousness whose exploration yields insights into some of the
processes that we use to make meaning. I present a fuller list of
these processes, and a model of their possible interactions, in chapter
11.
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Chapter 10. The Master Practitioners' Interviews; Teaching
and Learning as Transformational Processes.
Choose a friend before you choose a journey, and a neighbour before
a home. (Old Arab Proverb).
For the naturalist, ... the term "design" designates nothing more than
a broad plan relating to certain contingencies that will probably arise,
but the precise nature of those contingencies is unpredictable. It is
anticipated that the design will change as those contingencies are
realised, (that is, made real or constructed by the inquirer interacting
with circumstances that have evolved). (Lincoln and Guba 1985:259.)
The map is not the territory. (Alfred Korzybsky, 1958).
10.1. Introduction
In this chapter I introduce and describe the second phase of
information gathering for this inquiry. It reflects another approach to
the inquiry. In the last four chapters my gaze was directed mainly on
the minute specifics of people's internal representations and their
sub-modality changes, as the result of listening to language
structures. In this chapter, however, I look at the complex
abstractions my collaborators had about learning. These can be
thought of as generalisations that operate at 'higher' logical levels
than those of internal representations, (Bandler and Grinder 1975).
The material on which I base my analysis and reflections in this
chapter was obtained from the second phase of information gathering,
from interviews carried out by two of my assistants. These were
briefly mentioned in chapter 2. Here I consider some of these
students' changes about themselves as learners, after participating in
the NLP course. I also suggest that what is constructed as the result
of a teacher's approach, has consequences for both people's internal
representations and future actions. These may all be considered as
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active parts of people's cognitive maps. I then explore the possibility
that teaching modes can also directly influence the kinaesthetic or
physiological responses of learners, (as well as influencing the
construction of their internal models). I also give consideration to
some of the issues relating to collaborative inquiry. I conclude with
some reflections on the potentially transformative nature of teaching
and learning. These findings are entirely from the tapes and
transcripts of this set of interviews. They were carried out after I had
left the country. The conclusions I offer below are speculations and
hypotheses that resulted from my reflections.
10.2. The background to this part of the inquiry
My research had developed into two separate data gathering phases
during this two-month stay in the Middle East. The first of these was
my own interviews, whose transcripts form the basis of my analysis,
which became the main material for chapters 6 - 9. This chapter,
however, is about a second set of interviews, which were carried out
and tape-recorded by two of my three assistants, 'Edward' and
'Harrv'.' These interviews were carried out after I had left the
country. The tapes were sent to me, and I then transcribed them
when I had returned to the UK. To reflect on this stage of the inquiry I
use a more generalised approach in the analysis of my own
transcripts.
Such an approach has been described as phenomenographical
(Barnard, McCoster and Gerber 1999). It seeks to provide a
descriptive analysis of collective meaning, and aims for a commonality
of understanding. "The emphasis is on how things appear to people in
their world and the way in which people explain to themselves and
others what goes on around them, and how these explanations
change." (Barnard et al 1999:214). This part of the inquiry is still
phenomenological; it seeks to describe some factors that may be
1 The names have been changed to ensure anonymity.
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involved in the construction and re-construction of people's cognitive
maps, and thus also in the processes involved in learning. Anderberg
(2000), investigating the experiences of learners, has raised the
question of how personal understanding is linked to language
meaning, and states that "little is known about the character of the
relationship between word meaning and understanding, how it
develops or what role it plays", (Anderberg 2000:89). This chapter is
also an attempt to consider some of these issues from another
vantage paint.
The two people carrying out these interviews had assisted me as co-
trainers on the NLP course, and were themselves experienced in
teaching and applying NLP. This chapter contains many of my own
thoughts and analyses of their interview transcripts, and then some
tentative conclusions about the potentially transforming nature of
teaching.
Another aim of this chapter was to explore the application of Sandler
and Grinder's (1975) meta-model of language as an instrument for
the textual analysis of these transcripts, and to acquire some notion
of its usefulness as a tool for understanding the subjective
experience. One of the main foci was on how the participants on my
course had constructed (and perhaps re-constructed) the notions of
change and learning. These insights could also shed more light on to
some of the fundamental epistemological processes that surfaced in
my own interviews. What emerged was that when people construct
abstractions about their experiences, they appear to form a complex
web of links, around such nominallsations as 'learning', and 'failure'
(almost as if the nominalisations acted as the metaphorical nodes of a
conceptual web). The interviewees' transcripts showed that changes
had occurred in some of their apparently deeply rooted constructs
which they had built about themselves as learners. Many aspects of
these had changed. There had been alterations particularly in the
connections and generalisations, which formed a part of the 'internal'
architecture of their constructs.
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Sometimes these changes were dramatic, sometimes only slight.
However, all the participants in this part of the data-gathering phase
showed some changes in their approach to learning. This chapter is
also about addressing the question 'what changes when people's
constructs change?' These transcripts hint that what happens when
conceivers change some of their concepts about learning at higher
levels of abstraction, then changes in people's internal
representations about their experience of learning also occur. I
include a short review of this aspect gleaned from this series of
transcripts. This leads to the possibility of using this approach for the
analysis of texts and spoken discourse.
10. 3. Collaborative inquiry.
Both 'Edward' and 'Harry' had been students on previous NLP
Practitioner courses I had run at the hospital. We had started the
2000 course with three assistants, but one of them chose to withdraw
from the venture because she was busy organising her return to the
UK. The remaining two were also keen to increase their skills, so it
was agreed that their assessment for upgrading from Practitioner to
Master Practitioner would be threefold; to assist me with the
Practitioner Training, to attend both the Practitioner and a Master
Practitioner course, and to carry out a modelling project which
involved them in interviewing the participants on the practitioner's
course to find out more about learning. (Such modelling projects are
standard practice for many NLP courses). They gave their permission
to use their tape recordings for this part of my inquiry.
This part of the research was collaborative. Patton (1990) describes
this as the professionals and non-professionals becoming co-
researchers. He suggests that it is suitable for a heuristic inquiry,
where the central question is "what is my experience of this
phenomenon and the essential experience of others who also
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experience this phenomenon intensely"? (Patton 1990: 71). Both the
interviewers and the interviewees had shared the experience of
participating in our NLP course. Such collaborative phenomenological
inquiry can be said to be more heuristic, because, according to
Moustakas, it "refers to a process of internal search through which
one discovers the nature and meaning of experience, and develops
methods and procedures for further investigation and analysis,"
(Moustakas 1994: 17).
The topics for their interviews emerged from one of our evening
workshops; both Edward and Harry reported interesting changes in
their own thinking as the result of developing more understanding of
their own conceptual processes through using NLP as an analytical
tool. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), one of the hallmarks of
naturalistic inquiry is that the design emerges as the research
develops. This was certainly true for this phase of the research. This
chapter emerged from what originated as an assessment exercise for
the Master Practitioners. I have stated before that, at the time, I
believed that this phase was only to be a pilot study, so it will be
incomplete.
I was also curious to have some feedback from participants about the
effectiveness of my own approach as their trainer and facilitator, as
part of my own professional development. Phelps and Hase (2002)
point out that reflexivity is integral to the notion of action research
"which might be defined as a mental process In which one thinks
about things by going back over them." (Phelps and Hase 2002:516).
As Reason and Marshall have polnted out, qualitative research is also
a personal process "for people to make sense of and act effectively in
their world" (Reason and Marshall 1987:112). The case for reflection
on practice, according to Burchell and Dyson (2000) has already been
extensively argued. Leitch and Day (2000) propose that such
reflection should be a part of teachers' development.
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These transcripts were to illuminate my own practice as a trainer, and
lead to deeper reflections on the nature of knowledge construction.
10 4. Issues of power and bias
Power is believed to be an ever present factor between different
groups working within the same organisation. Kincheloe and Maclaren
(1988) warn that the issues of the potential power of one person over
others have political repercussions if not recognised and addressed.
Often, power relations are unrecognised, so that an unspoken status
quo is maintained between dominant and subordinate groups. At this
point the question emerges: what were the power relations between
my collaborators and myself? Mullins (2002) distinguishes between a
number of different power relations in the context of business, based
on the means by which members of the organisation comply. These
include coercive, remunerative and normative power. He links power
to the types of involvement those members of 'subordinate' groups
experience. He develops this typology further by distinguishing
between different kinds of involvement, such as alienative
involvement, (where coercion may feature), calculative involvement,
(where financial rewards are incurred) and moral involvement, which
is when everyone shares the goals and aspirations of their group.
Bateson's (1972) anthropological work had led him to propose that
there were two kinds of relationships between people. These he called
symmetrical and complementary. In symmetrical relationships power
and resources are apparently equally shared. In complementary
relationships, deference is shown by one of the parties to the other.
One interpretation of this idea of Bateson's is that in complementary
relationships, one party is the gatekeeper to resources, (actual or
imagined) which the other may need. Power thus becomes linked to
the availability of resources. My own position was that of someone
who had been asked to spend two months in the country to teach
NLP. In the financial and remunerative sense, the two assistants who
had organised my trip were also my leaders. Without them I would
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not have been able to give the course. They were responsible for it's
financing. They also organised visas, recruited students and arranged
the teaching rooms. They had thus made the whole venture possible,
and wanted to be involved as assistants so as to learn more. In the
context of my research inquiry, there was enthusiasm for the idea,
and a sharing of a common goal. This is close to Mullins' (2002)
notion of normative power with moral involvement; this approach
predominated in our work together. Using Bateson's model, our
relationships were mutually both symmetrical and complementary; we
seemed to be equals in our enthusiasm for exploring NLP, yet
mutually complementary when I was the one with the power of
certification, and they had the power of discontinuing my work in the
hospital.
Thus power was, from my perspective, something that we shared; I
was dependent on them for training fees, accommodation, and the
logistics of obtaining visas etc. They were dependent on me for their
further learning, certification, and willingly engaged with my work. In
retrospect, (from my perspective) our relationships were mostly
reciprocal and balanced; as far as possible we proceeded by
consensus. The only times I imposed my own views was in the choice
of what was taught on the course, and the exercises that would be
used. For me, there was some calculative involvement, as the fees
were welcome. It was not, however, the overriding factor, which was
our common commitment.
Naturally the question of bias has also to be addressed in this context.
Olesen (1998), writing from the perspective of feminist research, has
pointed out that concern with bias has been "a long standing criticism
of qualitative research". (Olesen 1998:314). She also maintains that
the researcher should be reflexive about her views, and be sensitive
to hidden factors that might be experienced as oppressive to her
participants. It Is certainly true that NLP has a particular culture and
an approach to its practice, and is in a sense hierarchical, In that
there are different levels of certification reflecting different levels of
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skill and understanding. The level of certification can influence
people's earning power, should they wish to use it professionally.
Doubtless both my assistants were keen to acquire more advanced
certification. I had made a clear distinction between their modelling
project, which was the 'homework' towards their certification, and my
research, which was my analysis of the language structures in the
transcripts of their interviews for their assessment. Bias is always
present in qualitative research. Both these collaborators told me that
they were very motivated to learn more about NLP. If there was bias,
then it manifested itself in the amount of information they
enthusiastically sought, and the lengths of their own interviews. My
judgement of these two assistants was that they were the sort of
people who were genuinely able to say 'no' if they thought a request
unworthy of their time and expertise.
Addressing the issues of bias, Olesen (1998) also suggests that the
researcher should view her biases as her resources, provided she is
sufficiently reflexive about her project. I am aware that my data
gathering was enormously helped by the enthusiasm of my
collaborators. I believe, as a practising trainer, that the state that I
create in my students has a powerful influence on their motivation.
Some trainers in the NLP world generate a state of great enthusiasm
in order for their clients to pay for further courses. So there is always,
when working as a freelance trainer in this field, a tension between
generating the enthusiasm that, in my experience, motivates people
to engage in learning, and the need not to close down future
opportunities for further earnings. "We cannot rid ourselves of the
cultural self we bring with us into the field", quotes Olesen
(1998:314). Enthusiasm may be a double edged sword; on the one
hand it is a strong motivational state, on the other hand it can
influence the approach of researchers to their task, influencing what is
and is not attended to. From my perspective, the bias of my
assistants and fellow interviewees resulted in far more information
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from them about the interviewees' processes than was strictly
necessary for their assessments.
10. S. The Master practitioner's modelling project
The assistants and I developed a rather 'loose' interview schedule for
this phase after some discussion. I list the topics that were decided on
below. Because this was originally thought of as part of a pilot study,
I had not anticipated the wealth of information that was more than
sufficient for such a phenomenological inquiry. Harry chose to follow
the schedule quite closely, whereas Edward tended to follow his own
lines of inquiry. Both people contributed new and different
perspectives to my own narrower lines of inquiry. Lincoln and Guba
(1985) point out the importance of balancing multiple perspectives;
that in the post modernist world of human research, there is no one
overarching truth or theoretical viewpoint, but rather an embracing of
a multiplicity of perspectives. This is also coherent with a systems or
cybernetic viewpoint; that within a system there must always be
many different perceptual positions. "In soft systems - which includes
most human activity systems considered at a level higher than that of
physical operations, there will always be many possible versions of
the system ... and system boundaries and objectives may well be
impossible to define," (Checkland 1981: 165). This was also Bateson's
viewpoint (Bateson 1972). Reason proposed that the process of
collaboration roots the individual within a community of peers. He
urges the development of such communities of co-operative inquirers,
(Reason 1998). These collaborators' projects provided me with an
extraordinary wealth of information which I would not have achieved
working on my own.
This raises the question of whose research was this? In a collaborative
effort, everyone makes a contribution, some more than others. My
own contribution to this phase was to guide the development of the
Master Practitioners' skills to an appropriate level of understanding of
NLP in order for them to carry out their assessments, one of which
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was the interviews. My own work was to transcribe their six
interviews, each of which was about an hour long. The material was
contributed by the dedication of my collaborators; the transcriptions,
reflections, analyses and extrapolations are, however, my own.
It is important to remind oneself sometimes that the research process
is never tidy. Cook (1998) has written about the importance of'mess'
in action research. Lincoln and Denzin state that "all texts are
personal statements" (Denzin and Lincoln 1998:413) so in a sense
what I have written are my insights, sometimes remaining in the
process of formation, though enriched by the generosity and work of
the others. "There are no objective observations, only observations".
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:24). In the post-modernist world of
qualitative research, "no single method can grasp the subtle
variations in ongoing human experience" (Denzin and Lincoln,
1988:24).
This argues for the validity of using multiple perceptual positions to
investigate human experience. "The age of value-free inquiry is over,"
wrote Denzin and Lincoln (1998:24), so it becomes impossible to
claim impartiality in an inquiry. The collaborative phase of this
research was not originally planned before my visit; it emerged during
the time I gave the course. Having myself devised an interview
schedule that inquired into people's internal representations, it
seemed a natural progression to explore what was happening at some
of the 'higher', (or more complex) levels of abstraction in the
students' cognitive processes. This was an aspect in which I was most
interested in when studying the Master Practitioner's interview
transcripts.
Lincoln and Guba stress that in order for researchers to develop their
inquiries, "there must be frequent, continuing, and meaningful
interactions between the investigator anq the respondents or other
objects of investigation" (1986: 107). They urge that there are
compelling reasons for conducting inquiry in ways that "maximise
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rather than minimize the investigator's interactions", (1986: 107). This
was certainly the case during the time of my visit. In a course of 90
hours, spread over two months, there were many opportunities for
students, assistants and trainer to interact and develop greater
insights and understanding. This happened both within the formal
'classes' and in many informal talks about NLP in general.
I did not really know what was going to emerge from the Master
Practitioners' interviews until I was back in the UK and had
transcribed, then read the transcripts several times. Only then did
patterns of people's thinking emerge, and I began to note aspects I
thought significant. What the short collaborative phase of this inquiry
contributed to the work I was doing was a variety of different
perceptual posltlons, a feedback mechanism for my own teaching
practice, and a rich source of information about other aspects of
people's cognitive maps at levels of abstraction which were different
to the ones my own interviews had concentrated on.
These are some of the questions that initially emerged when we were
discussing the Master Practitioners' interviews. They originally formed
the guidelines for their inquiries.
• Why did the student decide to do the course?
• What did he or she think they would achieve?
• What do they think they will achieve now that they had done
the course?
• What did they think was different about the course?
• What did they think was different about the way they learned?
• What has changed about their ideas about learning?
• How do they think they may have changed as individuals?
• What are the sub-modality differences between their memories
of previous experiences of learning, and that on the NLP
course?
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It was agreed at the time that the three assistants would interview all
ten of the participants separately. However, because one assistant did
not carry out these interviews after I had left the country, the two
remaining ones only carried out six interviews between them. The ex-
patriate community in some Middle Eastern countries is not stable;
people are always coming and going in a politically uncertain world.
The sampling for these interviews was therefore somewhat random,
yet limited to those who had attended the course. It depended on
who was available within the time frame that we had agreed on.
Whereas my own interview schedule was very tightly designed, so
that everyone was asked the same questions, I encouraged these two
collaborators to use the opportunity to engage in their own, rather
'looser' explorations. They used what we had agreed on as their
guidelines, to which they mostly kept. Occasionally they would ask a
more spontaneous question. These interviewers knew their
interviewees well; most of them were colleagues in the hospital, and
had also been coached in NLP by them. The ex-patriate community of
the country also met frequently on social occasions, which had to be
meticulously planned in order to avoid the religious police, who saw
any social contacts between men and women as unlawful, and often
punishable by imprisonment and/or expulsion from the country.
The Master Practitioner's interviews were carried out in the context of
friends interviewing friends, whereas my own interviews were more
that of the teacher interviewing her students. Both shared my
approach to teaching as essentially facilitating the emergence of our
learners' own insights and constructs, and that teaching and learning
should be interesting and amusing, driven by curiosity and
exploration. Whether this worked in practice can only be established
by a post-course evaluation, which was also one of the aims of this
phase.
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10.6. Reflections on using a phenomenological approach
After transcribing the tapes of these interviews, I read through them,
and four main themes emerged. In this part of the process, I tried to
remain true to the phenomenological use of Epoche, where, according
to Moustakas, "we simply let what is there stand as it appears, from
many angles, perspectives and signs" (Moustakas 1994:86). He
further encourages the seeker to use the Epoche in such a way that
"only what enters freshly into consciousness, only what appears as
appearance, has any validity at all in contacting truth and reality"
(Moustakas 1994:87). In reality however, I found that my own
fascination with other people's processes of learning was directing me
to pay attention to certain contents of the transcripts, and not to
others. So what I offer is not the result of an idealised process of
Epoche; rather of what happened to me when "our consciousness is
directing us meaningfully towards something that continues to remain
present however much we may turn inward to our internal
experience" (Moustakas 1994:91). Giorgi proposes that
phenomenology is "the search for essences"; (Giorgi1985:43) What
emerges as the essences of learning from these interview transcripts
are essences which are very much influenced by my own interests.
This is a stage which has been described by various phenomenologists
as reduction; Moran (2000) cites Husserl's belief that "reduction
provides the only genuine access to the infinite subjective domain of
inner experience" (Moran 2000:147). He posited that reduction was
the first acts in laying bare the essences of experience. "Through the
phenomenological reduction we strip away the actual character of the
experience and grasp it as pure phenomenon (Moran 2000: 150), thus
discovering the "correlates of consciousness". Georgiou further
proposed that it was the phenomenological psychologist's role to
uncover the invariants of the phenomenon, because "a description of
the invariants constitutes their essence" (Georgiou 1985:50).
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I have also used a Batesonian and Korzybskian framework in arriving
at these reflections; Husserl's 'essences' seem to me to be essentially
abstractions of a higher logical level than that of description. It
appeared fitting to use Bandler and Grinder's meta-model, which is
essentially about the structures and epistemological processes that
reveal themselves in syntactical structures when information is
assigned to language. NLP may show itself to be a useful adjunct to
phenomenological inquiry, because using it has enabled me to
uncover some information, which is new. I hesitate to claim that I
used the idealistic stance, which holds that one should suspend one's
own patterns of thinking. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) state that
the hallmark pf phenomenological inquiry is the "discovery of
propositions by observation and the careful inspection of patterns,
which emerge from the data," (Maykut and Morehouse 1994: 13).
What follows is from my own careful inspection of some patterns that
emerged from transcribing and listening to the transcripts.
10.7. Some patterns that emerged from the Master
Practitioners' interviews
My two collaborators' interviews had been thorough. They presented
me with a wealth of recorded discussions and reflections around the
themes we had agreed. Several aspects seemed to 'jump out' when I
listened to the tapes, and then read and re-read the transcripts. I
have chosen to elaborate on five such patterns. They also form some
of the bases for my model of teaching and learning which I explain in
the next cha pter.
1. The power of the theme of failure.
2. Changes in people's beliefs about learning.
3. Changes in their views of themselves as learners,
4. Changes in their views about their own abilities and future
activities.
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5. The apparent links between what happens at higher logical
levels, and to the internal representations and sub-modalities of
the conceiver.
10.7.1. The demon" failure; a nominalisation with power
The power of the idea of failure in the context of the individual
learning something new emerged as a significant aspect in many of
the transcripts. The participants seemed to have been aware that the
people teaching the course had avoided mentioning failure when
teaching the course. Cannon (1999) has observed that people's
memories of failure are accessible, vivid and painful. "What was found
to remain well remembered years after a failure experience is the
anger, the sadness, the surprise, the self-criticism - processes more
reactive than thoughtfully reflective," (Cannon 1999:435). Seeqers
and VanPutten (2002) propose that how students access previous
experiences of a subject is crucial to their current approach to
learning. Those whose fear of failure had brought about a sense of
their inadequacy performed less well. The following extract from the
transcript of Lucy being interviewed by Edward in which she reports
her own experiences of the course, eloquently illustrates the
associations that 'being wrong' had once had for her own approach to
learning. Edward had asked her why she thought learning had been
easier on the NLP course.
Lucy: Another word, another word ... well there's no pressure to learn,
your mind was open, you weren't right and you weren't wrong. That's
probably the big thing. You weren't going to fail no matter what. So it
just was like whatever, we had free range to do something or
interpret something that we wanted to, there was no right or wrong
answer, which takes a lot of pressure off learning.
2 I use the term 'demon' in the sense that Chambers' (1959) Dictionary gives, as
something that exerts an influence on people, or possessesthem.
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If this extract is examined for the conceivers' complex equivalences,
then what emerges is a pattern of connections between the ideas of
'pressure', being 'right' or 'wrong', and 'failure' that had been created
through previous learning experiences. In a cybernetic sense, there is
no 'right' or 'wrong', there is only feedback about the extent to which
a system is achieving a goal. What was also noticeable from this set
of transcripts was that there were changes in people's conception of
learning when 'failure' was removed from the metaphorical 'road map'
of their own learning processes. If we then look for cause-effect
patterns in this extract, then what is noticeable is that Lucy implies
that she experienced herself to be 'at cause', an active agent in
charge of her own learning processes. Could this have been the result
of her changing views on the nature of learning, and herself as a
learner? The experience of being 'at cause' is what Bar-Tal (1984)
describes as experiencing the locus of control as being within the
person. In the same interview, when asked for some her beliefs about
learning, she elaborates:
Lucy: Well the main learning curve for me like I said was that failure's
not wrong, you're learning. That was probably the biggest eye opener,
biggest eye opener, and probably the tenses of words, ... belief?
Belief? Probably the biggest belief for me would be that one. The
belief. ..
Then Edward pressed her for more information about her past notions
of failure.
Edward: What is it about failure though, that has, or had such a
strong impact on you personally?
Lucy: Well I suppose you'd feel a bit of a loser, wouldn't you.
Edward: So is this your identity?
Lucy: Yeah, it would be.
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Here there appears to have been a 'loosening' (as it were) of the
connections between the complex equivalences linking four main
elements of the construct: failure, being wrong, experiencing herself
as a loser, and learning. These appeared originally as almost 'welded'
together in her original model of learning. It is as if all these entities
inhabited the same 'mental space', to borrow a term from Fauconnier
(1994), and were somehow blended together. What I think Lucy
implies, in this passage is that there has now been a casting out of
the 'demons' of failure, wrongness and loser from within the complex
of abstractions she assigns to her construct of herself as a learner.
These 'demons' seem also to have been a part of her identity. In
Bandler and Grinder's approach, there has been a disconnection of an
original complex equivalence, and a re-connection to other conceptual
entities such as movement; possibility, and the emergence of new
beliefs about herself as a learner. Such connections may have a
powerful role in the creation and re-creation of meaning.
This is implied in the following extract, where Edward is exploring
some possible shifts among Lucy's complex equivalences. Edward is
using a model from Dilts (1998), which separates Identity from
Beliefs, Values and Capabilities as different logical types. Dilts (1998)
also proposes that how Identity is constructed is crucial for the
. healthy functioning (or otherwise) of the individual. Dilts3 believes
that Identity occurs at a higher logical level, though I am uncertain of
the validity of this claim. It is nevertheless a useful model in the
purely instrumentalist sense; I had used it on the course as a tool for
people's self-exploration. In the next extract she appears to have re-
organised the construct to one including moving on and learning.
Edward: Did you still have that feeling that failure was not good?
3 Dilts (1998) believes that we operate at 6 different levels, which he lists (going from
the most abstract to the least abstract) as Mission or Spirituality, Identity, Beliefs and
Values, Capabilities, Behaviour and Environment.
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Lucy: Yeah, yeah.
Edward: And now that's moved?
Lucy: And now that has moved.
Edward: So that's moved from Identity to where?
Lucy: That's moved, beliefs ... I've probably just learned,... I don't
know, It's a belief about yourself, that it's not failing, you're moving
on, you're learning.
This extract also shows the lost performative 'not good' linked in to
the web of connections she had originally built up about failure. So
within the abstract complex that is the nominalisation failure, there
are infra-structures, as it were, which, when altered, result in the
emergence of new meaning, and even new approaches to future
events, which is also shown in some other extracts below.
In Harry's interview of Kathleen, she reveals an interesting complex
equivalence about her conceptions about learning on the course. She
describes it as 'safe', because there was no 'wrong'. The word 'safe' is
also a lost performative; as with the word 'wrong' it demands that a
judgement has had to have been made against a 'scale' before its
utterance was possible. 4It would have been interesting to inquire
further into the 'safety issues' for this respondent. When asked what
was different about her experience of learning on the course, she
replied:
Kathleen: I suppose that ... we were allowed to learn and explore, we
didn't. .. there was no teacher centred at the top of the class saying ...
with a ruler pointing out, which is what I still have in my image of
teachers at school, and I suppose any course I have done since, like
4 I have written about scalarity as a possible epistemological device in
Chapter 4.
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including nursing and management, all these courses, there's your
lecturer at the top of the class and you sat and you listened and you
took notes, and this course we were very much encouraged to
participate and explore, ask questions, and we were always told from
the beginning that there was no wrong, like there was no wrong,
once, we were safe, (My emphasis). That we could explore, we had a
free run, and I think from day one none of us were frightened to ask
questions, we were never like slapped down and told 'no that's wrong,
you know, that's ridiculous' we might be told that something was
more correct. .. it was an exploration. There was a lot of self-directed
learning in it as well.
It is noticeable that she reported differences between the internal
representations of two separate experiences she had had of learning.
In this passage there is an implied cause-effect pattern as well. This
can be summed up as if not wrong, then safe. This text also implies
that with the type of learning which was associated with exploration,
and not being either right or wrong, Kathleen also showed a shift to a
more internal locus of control. It is interesting to note how many of
these epistemological processes appear to interact with each other; I
explore this further in the model of learning I suggest in Chapter 11.
Edward's interview of Steve indicates some of the power that the
nominalisation 'failure' had for him, implying a strong link between
that and his views of his own abilities, as well as the construct of his
identity or self. Here there is a complex equivalence between 'I' and
'failure'. Dilts suggests that maladaptive constructs about the self can
be potentially insidious in their effects. These kinds of structures,
where the concept of'!' is linked to that of 'failure' seem to act in a
way akin to categories, influencing both their action and perception. (1
have written about the process of categorisation, and its possible
effects on thought and perception, in chapter 3). When Edward
explored some of Steve's views of his past experiences, which were
originally assigned to the complex nominalisation of failure. Steve's
answers are interesting because the text demonstrates that there has
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been a re-framing, a re-categorisation of past experience where there
are no longer the links between the constructs of 'failure' and 'self'. I
have underlined what I believe to be the significant part of the text in
which this is implied.
Steve: I have been successful in most endeavours that I have
undertaken, I haven't ... I suppose I really haven't had a conscious
strategy for achieving outcomes of different kinds in many areas of
my life, I suppose I believed that I was a failure, or that I had fai/ed,
certainly, and I think NLP has given me the ability to see things from
a different, a different perspective, many different perspectives,
really, I suppose.
I suggest that this indicates the strength of the internal architecture
of the nominalisation 'failure'; these people all reported, in their own
ways, that they had abstracted from 'being wrong' in a learning
situation, to the higher level of identity.s This seems to be operating
at a higher logical level, constructing answers to questions such as
'who am I?' Steve reported how some of his beliefs about himself and
his abilities had been set through his earlier experiences of learning
mathematics:
Steve: [. ..}, if a teacher at school told me that I was doing maths,
meaning the ordinary level and not honours, I would consider myself
not capable of doing .... I would have considered myself not capable of
doing honours maths. Now I'm twenty eight I look back on the
honours maths course and I can do it in my head, I can't believe that
1... I just can't believe it, you know, because I had a limiting belief
that was set by somebody else actually, you know.
If we take the cybernetic view, that systems run on information in the
forms of calibration and feedback, then the power of believing oneself
to be a failure, the fear of being 'wrong' must influence how people
5 Thus I = wrong.
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approach tasks, and also how many of these may be thought to be
within the conceiver's abilities. Many of the participants reported
setting new goals for themselves as the result of the course. This
indicates that their perceptions of their own futures had also altered in
some ways. I return to this aspect later in this chapter.
10.7.2. Learning about learning
Another set of complex equivalence that emerges from this passage
were the links between the notions of self directed learning, pro-
activity, choice and exploration. This is a different complex from the
other kind of learning that Kathleen, for instance, reports on, where
there are links between passivity (sitting and listening), being reactive
(taking notes) and essentially having to receive what is given with
very little choice in the matter. When asked to elaborate on what she
believed were the key differences, she makes an interesting link
between being allowed to learn something in her own way, and being
conscious of an increase in her ability to retain information. Here she
describes her reflections after the course had finished.
Kathleen: We were all allowed to learn in our own different ways.
We weren't learning in the lecturer's ... we weren't ... we didn't have to
learn how the lecturer wanted us to learn something ... we were given
the information, and what we did with the information was up to us.
We were allowed to explore with that information.
Harry: Have any of your beliefs about learning changed?
Kathleen: They have, yeah.
Harry: In what way?
Kathleen: I suppose I used to... my method of learning was I suppose
to recite things off and off and off, learn it like a pole (sic) and I
suppose a lot of that information doesn't stay with you long term does
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it, so ... with the NLP, that because I could explore the information for
myself, was encouraged to explore it, that I've retained an awful lot
more of that information without actually having to sit down in front
of the books and rattle it off over and over again, forever and forever.
So I suppose, ... that method of learning I had has gone now. I don't
believe that that method of learning was a good one. This
experiential learning is definitely ...
Ina also discovered that learning could be something that happened
without her being aware of it. When Harry asked her about what she
had experienced as different about the course, she replied:
Ina: (pause) just the general talking, exchange of a lot of information,
and every opinion, everyone's view on something was almost similar
to yours, or that you already had similar feelings to that person, if you
know what I mean, it was like we were connected, we were totally
connected, it's like you would sort of sit there and go 'oh yeah, I felt
that, I saw that' so it was very comfortable, it was learning when we
didn't feel that we were learning, (my emphasis) it was more like we
were sitting in a group discussing things ...
The idea that learning may involve unconscious processing aiso
emerges from Steve's interview. His responses to Edward's questions
about what he had experienced as different in the NLP course is
illuminating, because here again new patterns of complex
equivalences about learning emerge. Now it seems that learning can
take place without the learner being aware of it. He describes the
process as sometimes emotionally draining when asked about his
reactions to the course.
Steve: It was at times very very draining, emotionally and
psychologically draining because of all the Ericksonian type magic she
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was usinq", she was weaving around the place, em, at times I felt
that I wasn't learning anything, but I was surprised that when I went
home, that I'd look over the book, I'd look over the manual and kind
of go oop, there it is, I know that! So I must say that while I wouldn't
have been aware of how much I was learning, I learnt a lot. an awful
lot more than the things I've done in the past vou know that I would
have learnt. (My emphasis) And I mean it seemed effortless,
effortless. (Laughter)
The complex equivalences (and implied cause effect patterns) here
form linkages between learning and unconscious processes. He also
explicitly refers to the influence of the trainer's language structures,
another cause-effect pattern. Edward then inquires more deeply into
what may have changed about his ideas of learning.
Edward: Do you think the way in which you can now learn has
changed?
Steve: Absolutely. Yes. I believe that now I don't have... I suppose
before I had a fear of sitting down, studying and stuff like this
because I felt that maybe it was a waste of time when I could have
used that time to do something practical, and I would have been
afraid that the outcome wouldn't have been as desirable as I want it,
that fear has gone, and now I believe that within certain limits that I
can learn just about everything, anything really, well maybe I couldn't
learn anything, everything, but I'd be willing to give it a go, and I
think that I would use as much of a model of NLP or how 1. managed
to teach us, I would apply that to any new methods of learning or
6 What I believe he is referring to is the practice in NLPtraining of what is called
opening and nesting loops. This is a practice much loved and used by Bandler, who
developed it from his time modelling Milton Erickson. It is designed to overcome
Miller's (Miller et a/1960) belief that the conscious mind can only process 7+/-2 bits
of information, whereas the unconscious may be much more receptive to new
information. By opening and nesting loops, that is, starting a theme or a story, then
another, then another, then closing the third, then the second, then the first, sets up
an unconscious mini-Zeigarnik (Mazur 1996) effect which, as it were, makes the mind
more focused and therefore receptive to the information needed for closure or
'understanding'. It is alleged that it is thus better attended to and remembered
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parts of it. It might not all be useful, but certain parts of it I would
use.
Steve's complex linkages within his construct of the nominalisation
learning indicate that originally he had constructed the nominalisation
learning as connections between elements such as studying = sitting
down = learning theoretical material = waste of time. The cause
effect pattern is shown in his statement that his original mode of
studying would not lead to success. It is also associated with fear, a
physiological response. The changes in his beliefs are dramatic; not
only has the fear gone, but he now believes himself to be capable of
learning many more things. In terms of causal thinking, the first kind
of learning produced the feeling of not having any choices of his own.
The locus of control is experienced as external, and, he uses mind
reading as a source of his judgements about himself as a learner.
It is as if the kind of learning Steve experienced on the course may
have created new beliefs about himself as a learner. The locus of
control has moved to within himself, and his identity as a learner can
now be summed up as someone who can learn anything he wants to,
and is self-directed. He reported that he now perceives more future
possibilities for himself; in cybernetic terms he has experienced
having a greater future potential, having generated more outcomes
for himself to which he can calibrate. There appears to be a link
between his changing construct of himself, and his perception of his
own future. This includes the factor of time as an additional dimension
in people's constructs.
If we then consider what modal operators are implied within his two
distinct constructs about learning, then it seems that he has moved
from a position of 'having to', to one of 'wanting to'. There is thus a
shift in his experience of the locus of causality. For the conceiver, not
only past and present are part of the mental architecture of complex
abstractions, the dimension of the future has a real and dynamic
presence.
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In the extract on page 281, Ina also reported that learning had
occurred without her being aware of it, and that the group had
influenced this process. This corresponds to Mercer's views, that
learning takes place between people through the exchange of ideas
and experiences, (Mercer 2002).
10.7.3. Changes in people's perceptions of their futures
If the cybernetic view has any validity, then it is to be expected that
calibration must be an essential aspect of information processing in
systems. Central to the act of calibration is the notion that in order for
any behaviour to take place, there has to be, within the system,
information in the form of a construct about future events. (Wiener
1965, Bateson 1972). I suggest that my own interviews show that an
essential aspect of such constructs is people's internal representations
of future events. They may also act as Significant categorisers of
information.
One of the aspects of the Master Practitioner's interviews were
changes in people's perceptions of their own abilities, and therefore
what they now perceived as possible for them to achieve in the
future. Some of the interviewees reported that they had already
changed some of their approaches to their professional activities.
These included teaching, and acquiring more professional
qualifications. It is perhaps simplistic to suggest that changing
people's constructions about themselves as learners alters their
beliefs in their own abilities, and therefore what they now can
calibrate to in their own futures. The following extracts bring into
sharper focus the notion that our information processing may involve
an internal exchange of information between the different time frames
pf past, present and future.
Ben had been a participant who had initially seemed reluctant to
engage in the course. He reported that he had only come on it
because his friends were doing it. It took a long time for him to settle
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in, and relax with our different approach. In one part of his interview
he polqnantlv describes his associations with the process of learning
at his college of nursing.
Ben: Well sometimes I'd take down notes just to ... but I wouldn't
like ... it would be like if your listening to your NLP you're writing,
you're listening and you're writing it down, whereas if I was bored in
the classroom I'd be writing it down but I wouldn't actually have any
idea of what I was writing down. I'd be copying or just listening, but
as soon as you said what was the last sentence I wouldn't have any
idea because it would be... I'd be disinterested, it would be above my
head maybe, so I'd just be going you know cranial nerves blah blah
blah, but I could read it the next day and have no recollection of what
I wrote down.
I was interested in Harry's interview of Ben, and in his feedback. Ben
had made all of us aware of his resistances to the different approach
we took to teaching and learning in the first few sessions of the
course. This extract indicates how his views then changed.
Harry: So we've established that you are learning differently, I think
that you're learning differently now. Have your outcomes changed?
Have your expectations of what you are going to learn changed?
Ben: In ... have my ...?
Harry: In all learning experiences ...?
Ben: I've actually become a lot more interested in... there's a few
courses I want to do, I was sort of well yes, maybe. But since I've
done it I'm actually a lot more interested in making sure I do these
courses because I've become a lot more interested in learning. (My
emphasis).
Harry: Right
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Ben: Because I am ... I've become a lot more interested in learning,
because before studying was because you have to do it to get from A
to B sort of thing. I'm quite interested in learning more.
Harry's interview with Kathleen produced an example of her growing
awareness of the power of calibration in something as simple as
planning how to talk to a Doctor differently when she was working on
the wards. It could be said that she was more aware of how she could
use the TOTE process. Here she indicates that she now rehearses an
event internally, thus creating an internal representation to calibrate
to. This appears to enable her to feel more prepared. When Harry
asked her about the changes she has made, she replied thoughtfully:
Kathleen: (long pause) I don't know, it's hard to describe, I'm just
more confident approaching a situation, ... I'm more conscious of the
language I use, because I understand now the effects that your
language can have on other people, and how like one word can make
so much difference, so I probably run a situation through my head
first before 1... run a conversation. how I would expect a conversation
to go through my head before I actually encountered the situation.
(My emphasis).
Harry: Interesting. Are you just running the conversation, YOlJr
conversation through your head?
Kathleen: No I'm probably guessing their response and have another
response for them, especially if it's a situation where I'm trying to
convince somebody, like a Doctor who does not belong to a team and
I want him to write up antibiotics or something, I will now approach
the situation (indistinct) ... I know I've done it, run it through my head,
I expect them to ...
Harry: So you almost hallucinate what you're actually going to say ...
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Kathleen: Yeah, I always expect them to turn down my request and I
always have a gentle and persuasive argument for them to do it, and
I always run that through my head now first. So I suppose I do
actually listen to both sides of the conversation and then I'll go into ...
it doesn't always come out like I have previewed, but at least I'm
prepared for.
The following extract also indicates that she now perceives her own
future differently, both in the personal and professional domains. (She
was pregnant at the time of the interview).
Kathleen: I set a goal for myself during the course, on a goal setting
exercise, and I still have that goal. It's actually ... a course that I
intend to do, and that still is... that hasn't been put aside. That is
going to be done when I go home.
Harry: How are you going to do it?
Kathleen: How am I going to do it? Well it's just a course, I going to
applying for it, obviously because of the baby I'm not going to do it
straight away. But I know that, and I'm actually going to apply for the
course after a period of time that I've set for myself, so that I'm not
going to be under pressure with a young child in the house, new job.
I've set a time period in which I'm going to achieve this goal.
Harry: When you've achieved that goal, where do you see yourself
going from there?
Kathleen: There's an area of work that I want to go into that this
course would actually bring me on to this area of work. So I look to
the course for achieving that goal.
There were many examples of the students in this sample thinking
differently about their future as the result of their participation In the
course. Three of the six people interviewed in this phase of the
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research made life changing decisions about their own futures. Ina,
for instance, determined that she would study for a nursing degree on
her return to the UK. Both Lucy and Ina were applying what they had
learned about communication to their own teaching. When Harry
asked Ina what was now different about her own approach to
teaching, she replied:
Ina: And I enjoy my classes, and I know the students that attend
enjoy my classes, so I've achieved that, they know that when they
come to my class it will all be fun, it will not be like something out of
a book, or on the board. It will be something that I'm going to get
them to be involved, and an atmosphere that is really calming and
friendly.
Harry: And before?
Ina: Before it was like go up to the board, 'this is what you need to
learn, this is hospital pottcy', this is to protect you, go out there and
make sure you practice well and you deliver certain (indistinct), not
giving them any leeway.
Harry: Right. Is that material still present?
Ina: Same material, I'm still using the same material, just delivering
it differently.
It is possible that having experienced a different approach to
teaching, one where the emphasis was on directing conceptual
processes through communication, people were then able to change
the way they themselves taught, even though the course had not
been about teaching, but about the complexities of communication.
Ina's extract indicates her realisation that it was Important for
learners to feel comfortable, and that 'fun' should be a part of her
learners' experience. The main difference in her subsequent approach
289
to teaching is hinted at in the following extract, where she describes
how what she now attends to is different.
Ina: Yousee, I'm not concentrating on the way I teach, I'm
concentrating on the way I'm getting feedback, whether I'm making
sense, whether I'm getting through to them, whether they understood
me, so ['m more aware of that, whereas in any teaching course you're
a/ways more aware of your style, your technique, (...)
Perhaps the.changes that people experienced in their beliefs about
themselves as learners may have affected how they subsequently
acted, especially those who had a teaching role in the hospital. A
simple complex equivalence appears to emerge from this, (which can
also be expressed as a cause effect pattern). Changing people's
beliefs about their own abilities may also change their approach to
related tasks. This, in turn, can affect factors such as their
performance and results. Another participant, Nigel, also reported
that he had changed his approach to teaching, by becoming more
aware of his students' responses. Having been asked, by Edward,
what had changed about his approach, he replied:
Nige/: [ ...], recognising their physiological responses and ensuring
you're giving them the correct ... well not that ... by being aware of
their physiological responses and actually listening to what they're
saying and respond appropriately so they feel they have your support
and don't put them off from new ideas.
It is as if there are a number of inter-related elements (or internal
dynamics) in people's maps which, when one is altered, others are
also affected. This is only a tentative conclusion; I believe that further
investigation may be needed for more insights to emerge.
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10.8. Sub-modalities revisited; the physiology of internal
representations.
In this chapter I considered some of this group of interviewees'
changes in their ideas of learning, and themselves as learners. I also
explored how using Bandler and Grinder's (1975) meta-model could
shed light on some aspects of people's constructs. These interviews
thus revealed a different order of phenomenon to my own inquiries
into internal representations and sub-modalities. However, my two
Master Practitioner collaborators were as fascinated by people's
complex inner worlds as I was. It was not surprising then that one of
them (Harry), rather enthusiastically pursued people's sub-modality
distinctions in their memories and constructs of learning 'before' and
'after' the course. Edward was not so interested in this aspect;
nevertheless he too uncovered some distinctions.
What emerges from the text of these transcripts are some aspects of
the complex inter-connections between people's Internal
representations of the nominalisation 'learning', and the abstractions
that are linked to it. Although internal representations, and the many
forms that they take, are of a different logical type to those of
abstractions and language, they seem linked dynamically to each
other. Every respondent was asked to compare the internal
representations that they had of learning something before the
course, and after it. I have chosen, for the sake of brevity, to focus
more on what people reported about their kinaesthetically
experienced sub-modalities, although there were also changes
reported in the visual and auditory domains.
Just as there were dramatic changes in people's models about
learning, so there are equally dramatic differences in people's internal
representations. Whereas in my part of this inquiry I concentrated
almost exclusively on the effects of language and syntax on this level
of subjective experience, what my two collaborators did was to stride
out into unknown territory to map some of the correlations between
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people's abstractions and their internal representations. I believe that
these parts of the transcripts deserve some scrutiny because of the
novelty of these findings. What was interesting was the idea that
when people's complex abstractions change, so do their internal
representations, and therefore their bodily responses, even when
these were only experienced very subtly. This raises an interesting
question; does the way that we are taught actually influence our
physiological responses? Does this happen when we remember a past
event, or plan the future? One of Lucy's responses indicates a
difference in her physiological state, (her kinaesthetic response)
between the two internal representations she has of planning
teaching. Here Edward Is asking her to compare her 'before' and
'after' representations of planning her teaching sessions.
Edward: Lets go back to when you were preparing for this lecture. OK
you have a picture. Now what I'd like you to do is to make next to
that another picture of how you would have prepared for this lecture
before you did the NLPcourse.
Lucy: Yeah.
Edward: So the two pictures are next to each other.
Lucy: Yeah.
Edward. Now what I'd like to do is to compare the two pictures. Just
tell me what the differences are.
Lucy: The one before the NLPis just flat, just flat at the moment.
Edward: What do you mean by flat?
Lucy: It's just flat, flat.
Edward: Two dimensional?
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Lucy: No it's flat, it's like a mirror.
Edward: OK. Two dimensional?
Lucy: It's flat. No real (indistinct) on it. While actually the other
one's all bright colours all happening, ... much bigger, it just seems
more clearer.
Edward: What are you doing different?
Lucy: I can see a big smile on my face actually. It's really weird. It
just seems happy, I feel more in control of the ... of the organisation,.1
feel more comfortable, it's like I'm given this ... I don't know ...
something I can use, like ... I'm probably actually excited like I'm
trying to use it now. I think it's what thjs picture's doing. (My
emphases).
In the last extract, Lucy shows linkages between what she 'sees'
internally, her sense of control, her state of comfort and what appears
to be a cause effect connection between her internal pictures, and
what she experiences kinaesthetically. Lucy's abstract constructs
about teaching and learning had undergone considerable
transformations; here they seem to be echoed at the level of internal
representations.
In the transcript of Ben's interview. Harry interrogates him minutely
about his internal representations, which are described in some detail.
I give only the extracts about the reported differences in his
kinaesthetic modality, although there were also differences in the
other senses, such as size, Intensity of colour and location of the
picture. The 'picture' of learning before the course was reported as
flat, dull coloured, and small.
Harry: And is there any feelings associated with it?
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Ben: Yeah.
Harry: Where are those feelings located?
Ben: Here.
Harry: In the upper abdomen?
Ben: Yeah.
Harry: And do they feel heavy or light?
Ben: They feel like a cloud or something. They just kind of feel like a
ball or wind or something. They're not kind of doing anything, they're
just there.
Harry: Is it warm or cold?
Ben: Just ... I don't think there's a temperature, just normal.
The internal picture of the 'after' was larger, with brighter colours and
much clearer. The feelings it generated were also different; one was
experienced as kinaesthetically 'warmer' than the other.
Harry: Are there any feelings associated with this?
Ben: Yeah.
Harry: What kind of feelings are they?
Ben: Kind of warm.
Harry: Are they located anywhere?
Ben: Yeah, in me stomach.
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When Harry interviewed Ina about her representations of learning, he
posed similar questions. Again, I give the extracts that relate to her
bodily responses, though she had also reported changes in her
internal visual and auditory domains. This extract, describing her
construct of learning before the course also shows the interplay
between internal dialogue and the development of ideas. The feeling
that seems to predominate is that of frustration.
Harry: And what are your feelings ...
Ina: We're just sitting there saying, well no, I'm having an internal
dialogue actually. I'm saying Oh God I have to finish this course, I
have to finish this course.
Harry: And does that give you a feeling somewhere?
Ina: Yeah, a bit of ...1 wanted to do it but it's taking so long, I'm just
like ...'come on, let's go'.
Harry: Is that located anywhere?
Ina: Yeah,
Harry: In the central chest?
Ina: Yeah, my arms and chest, and I say 'come on let's go!'.
Harry: Your tone is actually dropped very dramatically as well
although you're still smiling away, you've dropped your facial tone as
you were ...
Ina: A bit frustrated I think.
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It is interesting to compare her kinaesthetic responses with those
evoked by the memory of the learning experience she had classified
as 'good'.
Harry: I want to now go back and do what we've got, so lets take you
to a bit half way through the course, just before the course and all
that learning, just before you were away.7 And just remember
yourself back in the classroom then, and see what you're seeing, hear
what you're hearing, watch any feelings, tastes, any smells, anything
that you can actually give a title to, and just as you remember that
can you tell me where that picture is?
After describing the visual and auditory aspects of her internal
representations which his words evoked, (which were very different
from those of the previous experience), she also describes a very
different kinaesthetic state. Here links began to emerge between how
something is learned, and the learner's physiological state.
Ina: Yeah, everyone's talking. I can see people (mentions one of the
assistants), everyone's talking, we're all talking. We're all listening.
Harry: Any feelings?
Ina: Yeah.Absolutely happy.
Harry: How does happy feel to you?
Ina: How? Great!
Harry: What does happy feel like?
Ina: It feels light.
7 There had been a 'half-term' break halfway through the two month course.
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Harry: Light. Is that lightness located anywhere?
Ina: Everywhere.
Harry: Everywhere? Good sensation?
Ina: Oh God, yes.
The same pattern is shown in Steve's descriptions of his different
internal representations about learning before, during and after the
course. They appear to show dramatic emotional, (and therefore
physiological) differences. In the first representation he experiences
himself as anxious, in the second as more content. He also reports
seeing himself in his internal representations, as if he was taking the
perceptual position of witness rather than actor.
Steve: Yeah.... well the first one is smaller and framed, and the
second is bigger and has a fade out frame just as it goes out of my
line of vision, actually I see things clearer with my glasses on, even
internally, bizarre, (laughs) oh my God, It's bizarre to discover that
now, but em .. yeah, the picture of before the course is framed,
there's a very sort of anxious looking me in the picture, whereas in
the other its a brighter picture ... more, I don't know, more content or
something. Yeah, much ... I suppose in the second picture I look much
more content. ... I don't look any different, maybe a few weeks older,
that's about It, but I think the picture after the course is brighter, and
it is a bit more vibrant in colour as well, or is it? ... (indistinct.) I think
those are the main changes. Both are still pictures. In one I'm on my
own and in the other I'm with a bunch of people.
Edward did not always cover the minutiae of his interviewees' sub-
modality distinctions, but he uncovered some interesting aspects
relating to the changes that interviewees had made in their personal
views of future tasks. With Lucy, he chose to approach the differences
in how she now approached teaching, exploring the differences
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between the 'before' and the 'after' of the course. What he was doing,
essentially, was to explore how she now calibrated differently to a
future event. This is what she told him; it is noticeable that she
implies that her kinaesthetic response was linked to her internal
picture of planning a future event. In this short extract one can also
get a sense of the interplay between information about the present,
and about the future.
Lucy: I can see a big smile on my face actually. It's really weird. It
just seems happy, I feel more in control of the ... of the organisation, I
feel more comfortable, it's like I'm given this ... I don't know ....
something I can use, like ... I'm probably actually excited like I'm
trying to use it now. I think it's what this picture's doing.
Here I have chosen to focus on people's kinaesthetic responses to
their constructs of two types of learning they had experienced. The
differences were noticeable; most people reported that their physical
responses to their memories of their experiences of the more
orthodox, information transmitting, approach to teaching resulted in
bodily sensations that they often reported as unpleasant. When
thinking about the type of teaching and learning they had been
exposed to in the NLPcourse, there had been changes in many
factors such as their constructs, their beliefs and values, and their
vision of their own futures.
Their internal representations, which I suggest are an essential part of
people's information processing, were also different. It is as If they
were coded differently at the level of the senses, In response to how
information was structured at the more abstract levels. Our beliefs
and values seem to produce a kind of 'top down' effect, which reaches
even into the body, possibly through the internal representations they
generate. Perhaps one of the insights to emerge from these
interviews is that we teachers have the power to create (and
transform) learners' constructs at the level that Bateson (1972)
describes as 'learning about learning'.
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Teaching therefore seems to carry messages about more than one
level of abstraction. Not only does it involve the transmission of
information, it may also create beliefs about the nature of the activity
which people are engaged in. According to Bateson (1972) learning,
and learning about learning are of two different logical types. I
suggest that these two processes may be distinguished in some of the
students' responses. Transformation happens at the higher level of
learning about learning; it results in more profound changes in
people's beliefs about learning, and about themselves as learners.
These are changes in the processes guiding learning, rather than the
content of the topic. They involve changes in factors such as the
abstractions that people have built of their beliefs about learning,
their vision of their own future, their constructions about themselves
as learners, all linking to the images, sounds, bodily sensations,
tastes and smells that seem to be such an essential part of human
information processing.
10.9. Conclusion
In this chapter I reviewed the phase of this inquiry, which was carried
out by two of my assistants on the NLPcourse in 2000 after my
return to the UK. I used the meta-model to analyse the transcripts. I
focused on the ways in which people had constructed the abstractions
about teaching and learning from participating in the NLPcourse. I
found that there were certain key nominalisations, such as 'failure'
and 'learning' which were complex structures with far reaching
implications for the beliefs that people had made about themselves as
learners. This then influenced how they perceived their own personal
and professional futures. The apparently all-pervasive concept of
failure in this group, seemed to act as an inhibitor; a metaphorical
'virus' preventing the system from fulfilling its potential. I suggest
that this could be because it acts on the TOTEprocess (Miller et al
1960) altering or blocking off the individual's potential to create, then
calibrate to, future possibilities. It is as if It weakens the power of the
dimension of time in people's Internal worlds.
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I also explored the nominalisation 'learning', which proved to be a
complex of different deletions, generalisations and connections. I
believe that what these transcripts show is that when beliefs about
learning change, other profound transformations also happen. This
has implications for teaching, because it seems to be an impossibility
not to communicate about learning at the level of learning about
learning, with far reaching consequences for how the activity is then
approached by the learner. Teaching, then, is also about creating and
transforming beliefs about the individual as a learner, as well as about
the transmission of 'knowledge'. The study of these transcripts
indicates that such transformations may have far reaching effects on
the lives of individuals.
The approach to the textual analysis that I used in this chapter was
based on Bandler and Grinder's (1975) meta-model as an approach.
In a sense, it is also an evaluation of its usefulness as an instrument.
It enabled me to uncover the complexities behind people's
abstractions coded in the nominalisations 'failure' and 'learning', and
enabled insights to emerge, both on the nature of people's constructs,
and the apparent effects they had on their beliefs and actions. These
included their constructions of themselves as learners. People's
internal worlds are of an extraordinary complexity and individuality,
yet there may be universal processes that are essential to how we
process information. These are at the same time mediated through
language. This raises the question "Could language and thought be
two aspects of the same phenomenon?" The analysis of the
transcripts indicates that their mutual interactions may be subtle,
intimate and powerful. I extrapolate some possible epistemological
factors from these analyses of the transcripts in the next chapter.
Last but not least, there are many links between people's abstractions
and their inner, conceptual worlds of internal representations. These,
including bodily responses, are also influenced by the many
abstractions, categories, connections and time frames that seem to
operate at other levels. When we ask 'what is it that has the power to
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create and re-create such powerful beliefs?' then the answer points to
language. There is an awesome power to words and syntax, which, in
this approach, become information that is potentially deeply
transformative at many levels for individuals. The next chapter is
about exploring and tentatively describing what I propose are some of
the fundamental processes that enable us to know, and to know that
we know. These could be described as our mapping processes.
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Chapter 11. Mapping the Territory; Synthesising the Research
Findings.
A scientific epistemology, defined as an analysis of cognitive
processes in all their diversity, would be comparable to a kind of
comparative anatomy of the structure of know/edge, collating the
most widely separated intellectual constructions in different areas of
science so as to extract the invariants and transformations. (Piaget
1972:3)
We work hard to make sense, according to our epistemology, of the
world which we think we see. (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:222)
The new geometry mirrors a Universe that is rough, not rounded,
scabrous, not smooth. It is a geometry of the pitted, pocked, and
broken up, the twisted, tangled and intertwined .... The pits and
tangles are more than blemishes distorting the classic shapes of
Euclidean geometry. They are often the keys to the essence of things.
(Gleick 1998:94.)
11.1. Introduction
In this chapter I explore a hypothetical model of the epistemological
processes that may be involved in the construction of our cognitive
maps. This hypothesis emerged as the result of summarising and
synthesising the findings that emerged from the transcripts of the two
sets of interviews. I also use some material from a lesson I observed,
recorded and transcribed in 19991• Moustakas (1994) urges that the
phenomenological approach involves a continual reflection of the
material under scrutiny. "Things become clearer as they are
considered again and again" (Moustakas 1994:93). He suggests that
the stream of reflection should continue "to the point of unifying the
parts into a whole", (Moustakas 1994:93). It is in this spirit that I
1Thiswasas part of the first year coursework (1999).
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offer this new model of the relationships between language and the
construction of cognitive maps. Language is considered as more than
a transmitter of content. I propose that it also plays a significant
epistemological role. Statements contain instructions for the elicitation
of certain processes critical to cognitive mapping. We may thus
separate the effects of language into two dimensions. In the first,
language is understood as transmitting information about the content
of a topic. The second dimension is that it also conveys messages
about how the information is to be configured. This is considered as
its epistemological aspect.
I suggest that there are a number of basic epistemological functions
that are used to make meaning out of the chaotic mass of information
that continuously bombard our senses. I further propose that these
functions may act in systemic, interdependent ways. In an attempt to
provide a model, which may explain their actions, I have drawn on
complexity and chaos theories for some of my explanatory
metaphors. I further propose that the language used in classrooms
could be critical to the construction of learners' cognitive maps. My
philosophical standpoint is that of an instrumentalist, where a model
is used more as a heuristic device than a description of the laws of the
'real world'. I review what I believe to be some of the epistemological
directives embedded in language forms, which emerged from my
analysis and reflections on the two sets of interview transcripts, and
suggest these are essential to teaching and learning. I end with a
model (which I stress has the status of a hypothesis) of the basic
processes I believe are involved in processing information. I further
propose that fractal theory may offer useful model to explain some of
their dynamic interactions.
11.2. Language, teaching and learning
The current predominant approach to education has recently been
much Influenced by constructivism; the learner is now perceived as
someone who is actively engaging in the creation of their own
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knowledge, as well as that of others, (Mercer 1995, 2000). I have
reviewed the subject of cognitive maps and constructs in Chapter 3.
The constructivist approach to teaching is summed up by Wells
(2002): "Knowledge cannot be transmitted. It has to be constructed
afresh by each individual," (Wells 2002:236). Wells also points out
that what, in his view, is wrong about the 'transmission model' of
teaching is that it focuses almost exclusively on the input, rather than
on the processes that people use to arrive at understanding.
Rasmussen (2001) suggests that "language should be regarded as a
medium which the psychic and social processes, respectively, can use
to structure their own operations". (Rasmussen 2001: 575). Mercer
(2000) proposes that language enables us to engage actively in the
mutual construction of knowledge. I also suggest that language and
teaching style playa fundamental role in how people create their
internal models, because it could be said that language may catalyse
or inhibit many of the processes that are vital to learning. For
instance, Lee and Law (2001) suggest that the language that teachers
use may reinforce scientifically inappropriate conceptualisations.
The idea that language may shape cognition is not new. Fauconnnier,
for example, has explored the idea that language has an important
constructive function. "It is only within a complete discourse and in
context that meaning will actually be produced. The unfolding of
discourse brings into play complex cognitive constructions",
(Fauconnier 1997:37 - 38). However, Fauconnier's work seems to be
mainly theoretical; there is little evidence of any empirical
underpinning of his nevertheless generative ideas. These final
reflections on my inquiry are distinct from Fauconnier's work in that
they derive from an empirical inquiry. That is, they are as empirical as
the study of the phenomenology of such evanescent phenomena,
introspectively arrived at ,allows. It then outlines a number of
dynamic constructive processes that may be mediated by language.
I have introduced the distinction between the content of language and
the processes it generates. Thus any transmission of information that
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is mediated through language, including teaching, transmits
messages about both the process whereby the model is to be
constructed, as well as its content or subject matter. This model of
learning is therefore one in which stresses the importance of language
in the construction of learners' models. This follows in the Vygotskian
tradition (Frawley 1997). It places considerable emphasis on the idea
that teaching becomes as much about activating the processes of
learning, as about the transmission of content. There have been some
recent attempts to explore these areas within an educational context.
Davies (2002) makes the point that one of the central questions that
should be addressed when planning a topic to teach, is "what
language will work best to achieve this particular goal?" (Davies
2002:241). Galton et al (2002) stress the need to impart specific
cognitive strategies to learners in order to improve learning.
Mercer (2000) proposes that one of the functions of language is "for
collectively making sense of experience and solving problems".
(Mercer 2000:1). What the model I propose adds to present thinking
about such issues is that it offers a more detailed description of some
of the epistemological processes embedded in language structures. I
suggest that these are fundamental to any sense making. Process and
content are thus two aspects of communication, and can be studied
separately. They may need to be perceived as two separate aspects of
teaching.
This has implications for theories such as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,
and Vygotsky's approach to learning, neither of which make such a
clear distinction between process and content. In cybernetic terms,
process and content are not separate entities, but two aspects of the
same dynamic of sense making. Changing the ways in which
something is languaged, also changes the ways in which its meaning
is constructed or sought. This is close to Lakoff and Johnson's views
that two different sentences can never say the same thing, but will
often subtly alter meaning, (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
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11. 3. Cybernetics, and other approaches to understanding
complexity.
The model that is proposed is also cybernetic and systemic, in that it
suggests that both language and learning communicate (and can
influence) many different levels of organisation within human
systems. Kenny and Boxer (1992) proposed that a cybernetic
approach enables people to make distinctions between what are
essentially different phenomenological entities. There is a sense in
which this inquiry is also multi-level in a systemic and cybernetic way.
This resembles Bateson's (1972) way of teasing out what may be
happening at different levels of understanding. Phelps and Hase
(2002) have explained that applying complexity theory also means
thinking about phenomena in terms of hierarchies of levels of
complexity. There are, for instance, at least four qualitatively distinct
levels that can be identified in this inquiry, with a fifth that is
emergent. On the next page is a way of explaining this model
diagrammatically.
One of the difficulties that we encounter in an exploration such as this
is that we lack a terminology for how to describe what happens at the
different levels. Each involves different ways of thinking about the
phenomenon. In a sense, the reader of this chapter may be learning
about learning about learning about learning about learning, so
generating yet another layer of abstractions. This chapter is an
attempt to synthesise and map what this inquiry has uncovered about
the phenomena of language and learning, as the result, as it were, of
learning about learning about learning about learning!
The other challenge that arises when using a cybernetic approach to
describe a model is that written descriptions tend to present
information in a linear way. The model I propose is non-linear and
systemic. If I were merely to list all the elements of the model, then
that would not represent my thinking on it; all the processes that I
describe are a part of all the other processes, so that if, for example, I
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take the concept of causality, then that contains within it many of the
other dynamics such as abstraction, connections, deletions, goal
directed thinking, beliefs, and others. If I take the example of
intentionality, then it will also encompass such processes as cause-
effect patterning, internal representations, abstractions, induction and
deduction and the TOTE.There seems to be an almost fractal nature
to the relationships between these epistemological dynamics that I
describe.
Diagram 1. Different levels of abstraction involved in this inquiry, using
Bateson's model of logical levels. Modelling as a multi-level activity.
Learning about learning about learning about learning about learning:
Reading this.
t,l,
Learning about learning about learning about learning:
Synthesising research findings and reflecting on them.
Learning about learning about learning:
Analysing the transcripts of learners' interviews.
t,l,
Learning about learning:
Interviewing learners.
t,l,
Learning:
Participating in the NLPcourse.
Diagram 1. There was learning on the NLPcourse, and then there was learning
about learning when the interviews were carried out and reflected upon. Then,
in writing the analysis of the transcripts, 1 was learning about learning about
learning. This chapter could be described as learning about learning about
learning about learning. Each of these levels, according to Bateson, will show
different emergent qualities.
This hypothesis proposes that the relationships between language and
thinking are essentially non-linear. It also borrows from chaos and
complexity theory as explanatory devices, (Gleick 1998), Clegg
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(2000) and Lee and Law (2002) have proposed that the most
powerful way of altering concepts, and therefore how we understand,
was through changing their perceived ontological bases. There is a
sense in which the model that emerges from this inquiry has
uncovered a different ontological dimension to learning and teaching.
Both chaos theory and complexity theory suggest that, as well as
randomness and disorder, there are, within chaotic systems, the
seeds for an emergent patterning and ordering. This has been used to
explain the apparent mixture of random and patterned activities in a
classroom by Doll (1989).
Doolittle (2003, 2003A) urges that the time is ripe for a change in the
explanatory metaphors used to describe the teaching and learning
processes. He suggests that complexity theory could yield useful ways
of thinking about learning. It is coherent with constructivism, "As with
constructivism, a complexity perspective recognises the difficulty in
predicting global behaviour from an understanding of its parts. This
complexity-based alternative perspective understanding the whole, by
understanding its parts Is to understand the whole by understanding
the interaction of its parts. (Doolittle 2003:2).
Ontologically, chaos theory generates the paradox that systems are
essentially self-organising; that chaos contains underlying ordering
principles. Phelps and Hase (2002), in their theoretical paper, urge
that complexity theory may be relevant to action research, because it
offers a formal attempt to question how coherent and purposive
wholes emerge from the interactions of simple and sometimes non-
purposive components. They also support the exploration of the
connections between complexity theory and constructivism.
The ontological bedrock of systems theory is information. (Bateson
1972). This proposed model suggests that the chaotic dance of
disorganised data is self-organised via some basic epistemological
processes into more or less ordered conceptual models. These
processes may be seen as part of the dynamics of self-organisation,
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(Gleick 1998). Phelps and Hase describe the process of emerging
complexity as producing what they term a bifurcation or phase
transition, where "the branching of phenomena seen during chaotic
episodes [ ...] bifurcation usually results in new, but more complex,
stabilities." (Phelps and Hase 2002:516).
Such conceptual processes may also, I suggest, be catalysed by
certain language structures. Patton (1990) proposed that systems
theory and chaos theory could offer a new set of metaphors for
thinking about what we observe. "Chaos theory challenges us to deal
with unpredictability and indeterminism in human behaviour", (Patton
1990:84). Within this explanatory framework, the epistemological
dimensions of language could be seen as one of the ways In which an
ordering is brought about from the chaos of information overload.
Diagram 2 (page 310) lists some of the basic epistemological
processes involved in the construction of cognitive maps. Although
they are presented in linear form, they are all interactive in a
systemic way. This is summed up in diagram 3 (page 344). Diagram 4
(page 345) synthesises what I believe are the interactions between
the senses, our epistemological processes, language, and cognitive
mapping. Separating out these many factors diagrammatically can
only hint at their complex Interaction.
11.4.1 Induction, deduction, and abduction In particular
Indurkhya (1992), taking a Whorfian perspective, proposed, "our
perceptual and cognitive apparatus is not a passive receptor of
sensory stimuli but asserts a formative spirit in shaping the sense
data through its concepts" (Indurkhya 1991:99-100). There is a sense
in which the whole of this inquiry has been to track this formative
spirit, especially the extent to which language is a part of this
dynamic. Some of the most striking phenomena to emerge from this
inquiry are the seemingly myriad levels of abstraction that human
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consciousness engages in to create its cognitive models, (Murphy and
Lassaline 1997).
This idea that we operate at many levels of abstraction is not new; it
is the central thesis of Korzybski's (1958) seminal work, and the
conundrums that this idea generated were a life long interest of
Gregory Bateson's. This approach is drawn from Russell's theory of
logical types, which posits that there are many levels of abstraction to
our sense making. Korzybski summed up the resultant
epistemological challenges for anyone interested in language and
consciousness with the apothegm 'the map is not the territory'. Many
others have recognised the multi-levelled nature of our cognitive
systems. Indurkhya 1992, for instance, stated that "a cognitive
system might well have several layers with each successive layer
representing a higher level of abstraction" (Indurkhya 1992:181).
The processes of abstraction raise important issues for our
understanding of how we think. Language is itself an abstraction,
furthermore with the ability to abstract. If we think of mental models
as consisting of various 'layers' of abstractions, then it becomes
possible to propose that we have the ability to scan levels from higher
to lower, and lower to higher, and across different domains. If the
idea that language can guide some of these processes has any
validity, then moving people from abstract to concrete, or concrete to
abstract, or across domains, through language, may be possible.
One of these basic processes, induction, involves the generation of
abstraction of generalisations from prior experience, (Chalmers
1978). A child investigates how a red-hot stove top feels, and satisfies
her curiosity by reaching out to touch it. The subsequent burn may
cause her to generate the abstraction that glowing red things are hot
and hurt if touched. Thus are generalisations inductively formed.
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Diagram 2. Some basic epistemological processes that can be translated into
language and used to construct cognitive maps.
Abstraction, categorisation, classification, ordering into logical levels.
Induction
Deduction
Abduction
Deletion
Making Connections
Causality: (Cause-effect).
Complex Equivalence (includes metaphor).
Lost performatives
Mind reading
Modal operators
Internal representations
Vision
Hearing
Kinaesthetic; bodily sensations
Smelling
Tasting
Movement and balance
Trans-derivational searches:
Involves internal dialogue
Comparison and judgement (scalarity).
TOTE: calibration and feedback
Converting Information to analogical or digital
Quantification: ordinal and cardinal;
Changing positions In space and time
Physiological state; emotions and levels of arousal.
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The complementary process to induction is deduction, where the
abstractions are presented first, and then linked to details, (Chalmers
1978). The deductive process is one where higher levels of
abstractions are used as conceptual frameworks to which information
can be assigned. Categorisation influences what is, and what is not,
attended to, (Whittlesea 1997). This process is summed up by Thich
Nhat Hanh (1988) when he wrote "Our mind creates categories ... and
puts all physical and psychological phenomena into categories ...
before examining them and trying to find their true nature" (Hanh
1988:46).
11.4. 2. Abduction.
Induction and deduction are recognised as basic to how learners make
sense, (Muijis and Reynolds 2002). However, there is a third, equally
powerful process, which Bateson found of interest, namely the
process he referred to as abduction, which he believed was as
epistemologically significant as the other two processes. Abduction
involves the creation of connections between different conceptual
entities. Abduction may also be seen as an aspect of the formation of
connections between conceptual entities. (I have reviewed this aspect
of language and cognition in chapter 5.)
One of the best examples of abduction is the process of metaphor
creation. This involves using a familiar construct in order to explain
one that is unfamiliar. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have described the
process as one where the structure from one domain is used to
structure the information from an unfamiliar domain, through the
super-imposition of perceived structural similarity. 2 Gineste and
Indurkhya (2000) suggest that metaphors not only create new
associations between concepts, they also generate new
understandings. Thus the bringing together of two separate entities
2 Whereas induction and deduction can be thought of (metaphorically) as upwards or
downwards movements, linking different logical levels, abduction can be thought of
as a horizontal movement forming links between different logical types.
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causes the emergence of new concepts. Hitherto unconnected entities
become linked so that radically new insights emerge, such as Winston
Churchill's linking iron and curtain to create a label and thus a new
perception of the cold war, (Schon 1967).
This indicates that our ability to code for, and perceive, similarity is a
basic epistemological process. This idea is gaining support. (Hahn and
Chater 1997, Goldstone 1998A, Gattis 2001). Its complementary
opposite is the perception of difference, without which another basic
process, comparison, would not be possible. The creation of a
metaphor is therefore only possible if similarity is perceivable between
the source and target domains. Mercer (2000) proposes that
metaphors "are categories of likeness which people use to organise
the data of experience. We say that something 'is' something else,
and so make the second thing a category which includes the first."
(Mercer 2000:78). Cameron (2002) urges that a greater
understanding of the role of metaphor is needed in the creation of
scientific concepts. Metaphors are also fundamental to language
production and comprehenslon.?
Bateson wrote in 1977 "It is abduction which enables me to draw my
instances of a given regularity from a vast range of different universes
of experience", (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991: 150). All metaphoric and
analogical thinking originates through connecting conceptual entities
through abduction. Lakoff and Johnson emphasize the importance of
connections: "Basic ontological metaphors are grounded by virtue of
systematic correlates within our experience" (Lakoff and Johnson
1980:58).
Metaphor and analogy are now thought to be of central importance to
how we make sense. Clement and Gentner (1991) have explored the
processes involved in analogical reasoning, suggesting that analogy is
3 I have reviewed some of their aspects in Chapter S.
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a process whereby one matches similarities between unrelated
domains, thus grouping them and assigning them to 'higher'
categories. Bateson believed that processes involving abstracting
were among the most important of ways that we have of making
sense, describing them as 'tricks', of which the best known were
"induction, generalisation and abduction" (Bateson and Bateson
1988:174). By generalisation, I believe he means the process of
applying information coded at higher levels of abstraction, which
includes deduction.
Gick and Holyoak (1997) demonstrated the power of abduction as a
method of facilitating medical students' thinking when asked to solve
a theoretical clinical problem. When a group of students was told a
story whose content was nothing to do with a clinical problem they
were asked to discuss, yet which contained, within its language, both
the structure of the problem and the processes whereby a solution
could be arrived at, this group showed more insight into the
apparently unrelated clinical situation than did the group which was
not exposed to the story, but simply given the problem to discuss.
Here the structure of a story unconsciously influenced the way In
which succeeding information emerged, despite the fact that the
content was different. This may also be an example of processes
operating unconsciously, and shaping the understanding of content,
which is then perhaps consciously attended to.
There has been some interest in how students generate explanatory
analogies for themselves, (Clegg 2000). Burchell and Dyson, (2000)
explored the use of writing stories as aids to reflective practice, and
found that they provided insights into the writer's wider situation. This
is typical of the working of a largely abductive process. Cameron
(2002) suggested that the mediation of metaphor by a skilled teacher
reveals strategies for avoiding interpretive problems, and maximises
the impact on the learning of science. It is also suggested that
abduction may be a largely unconscious process. This could be
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another example of the fundamental epistemological role of
connecting.
The act of creating metaphor has been extensively explored by Lakoff
and Johnson (1980), whose now classic work has generated a
different approach to language and thought, often referred to as
cognitive linguistics. Sandra (1998) suggests that cognitive linguistics
should be concerned with the mental structures, which make
language possible. The group of cognitive linguists which focuses on
the notion of meaning making through what they call conceptual
blending, such as Fauconnier (1997), Fauconier and Turner (2000)
are essentially exploring the rich diversity of abductive processes and
their role in how people make sense. They even extend this to the
notion of causality, (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, website download).
11.4. 3. Induction, deduction and abduction in the classroom
Deduction, induction and abduction do not necessarily operate
independently, but perhaps we are always, simultaneously, inducing,
deducing and abducing whenever we are engaged in thinking. The
question then arises; how can we guide these processes through how
we communicate in the classroom? I believe the following extract
from the maths lesson I observed demonstrates how a teacher uses
strategies and language to facilitate the processes of induction and
deduction, thus influencing the processes whereby the children learn
and make sense.
When I observed Mr Phil teaching a lesson about a Turning Value
Problem, he seemed to have the ability to move the children's thought
processes effortlessly between inductive and deductive thinking. He
did this through how he spoke to them and presented the material.
He asked the children to cut out rectangular pieces of various sizes
from the corners of sheets of paper so as to make a box. He then
invited them to explore how changing the size of the indents would
alter the volume of the resultant box. Many parts of the lesson were
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largely inductive in that he engaged the children in activities enabling
them to arrive at a general rule about the mathematics of volume for
themselves. He often used incomplete statements, interspersed with
directives that set the children's thinking in a particular way. Here is
an example of his guidance of the children'S inductive processes. After
they had cut out the first box, and worked out the volume, he directs
them to cut away more of the paper, and then to find that a smaller
piece of paper, which, when cut in a certain shape, actually produced
a box with a bigger volume.
Mr Phil: Now isn't this weird? We've cut out more paper; we've got
less paper now (he waves his own demonstration 'box' in front of the
children) but a bigger box! ... So maybe if we cut out even more
paper, we'll get an even bigger box, (rapidly and enthusiastically) all
right then, let's try it, another one, all right, yeah!
The children's recorded responses to this illustrate how they are
searching to make sense of the puzzle he has set, by looking for the
abstraction, (or rule) at a higher logical level from which they would
be able to create meaning, and then apply it further. The mini-disk
recorder that I was using picked up different children's comments;
their talk indicated that they were engaged in searching for a
generalisation or rule, which would 'fit' the raw data.
First child: Sir, its going to keep getting smaller sir.
Second child: no it's going to keep getting bigger ...
Third child: no it's going to keep getting smaller.
Mr Phil: Hm, maybe it will, maybe it won't.
By the end of the lesson the children seemed well on the way to
understanding the theory that there would be a certain limit to the
growth in volume as the surface area of the box got smaller. The
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homework that he then set them included asking them to see if they
could work out a general mathematical principle relating changes in
the surface area of a box to its volume. This is directing a largely
inductive process. What also interested me at the time were the ways
in which he gave messages about the nature of learning, which is at a
higher level of abstraction than working out a formula. He did this
through his enthusiasm and the ways in which he talked to the pupils:
He was communicating the complex equivalent learning = discovery.
Whenever an abstraction is communicated, whether at the level of
awareness or below, it seems to create a framework for deduction. It
acts as a category, which then influences how its contents are
attended to.
We could further hypothesise that if learners are given information
about the nature of themselves as learners, the beliefs they form may
be carried over into other situations. This is another example of a
process of abduction. The language structures, which catalyse the
processes of induction, abduction and deduction, are different. It is as
if they create different kinds of movements in the thought processes
of learners; either from the more specific to the abstract, the abstract
to the more speclflc, or creating links between different domains.
These are different processes embedded (as it were) within the
nominalisation 'learning'. What Mr Phil did was to facilitate the
inductive processes in his learners by the ways in which he
communicated to the class. It would have been very different (and
using deduction) had he put the relevant formula on the board, then
given the children exercises teaching them how to apply the given
theory.
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11.5. The role of the senses in teaching and learning: the
world of internal representations.
The exploration of the inner world of internal representations, and
their undoubted roles in sense making, has been one of the key
innovative areas of this inquiry. However, there remain some
unanswered questions. What are the roles of the internal
representations in the construction of knowledge? How does language
influence this aspect of our inner worlds? There has been almost no
systematic research into this area before my own interviews, so I can
only reflect on this part of the inquiry, and wonder about the
implications that this may have for teaching and learning. It may be
for neuro-biology to offer further insights. There have been attempts
at this; Hennigen (2000), for instance, has explored ways of linking
introspectively obtained information with possible neuro-biological
mechanisms.
One of the aspects which emerged from this inquiry was that there is
a "layer" to consciousness In which the senses playa vital role In the
construction of cognitive maps, through the creation of internal
representations. People seem to be unique in the way in which they
constellate their individual internal world of the senses. If we use the
idea that cognitive maps may include a hierarchy of abstractions, then
internal representations could be seen as belonging to one of the
'lower' layers, 'above' which words, abstractions, generalisations and
the other complex building blocks of our conceptual architecture
operate. Words, and language itself, are of a different logical type
than internal representations, yet these two phenomena apparently
interact in a dynamic way.
At this point we could ask: what would happen if we thought of
teaching as partly the creation of certain kinds of internal
representations critical to the construction of knowledge? It is as If
thought, memory, reflection, fantasy and thinking about future
activities (which are essential to the TOTE process) are dependent on
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internal representations. Thus the internal re-creation of events
through the use of our senses is vital to our continuous functioning.
What people learn also appears to be coded internally through the
senses. So our senses not only receive information from the external
world, they have a vital role in 're-presenting' information internally.
This aspect of the inquiry is the perhaps the most radical and new.
There is little in the academic literature that addresses the roles of the
senses in the construction of knowledge. Schnotz et al (1996) have
proposed that visualisation is an essential part of the act of
constructing. However, research into the roles of all the senses in the
formation of cognitive maps is noticeable by its absence. This aspect
of thinking, which my collaborators described so generously, does not
appear to have been the focus of mainstream cognitive psychology.
Yet it was not unknown in history. Frances Yates (1992), investigating
the ways in which ancient and mediaeval scholars demonstrated
apparently extraordinary abilities to memorise, did so by first building
up complex internal representations. The information to be
memorised was then assigned to specific loci within these constructs.
These seem to have been mainly using internal vision. Cicero stated
that the way to develop the memory was as follows:
"we ought, then, to set up images of a kind that can adhere longest
in the memory. And we shall do so if we establish similitudes as
striking as possible; if we set up images that are not many or vague,
but active (imagines agents); if we assign to them exceptional beauty
or singular ugliness; if we ornament some of these, as with crowns or
purple cloaks so that the similitude may be more distinct to us..."
(Quoted in Yates, 1992:27).
This passage shows the evocation of sub-modalities, such as
sharpness, movement (which I take from the use of the word active),
and colour. One of the most important aspects of the hermetic
tradition of memorising was to build up complex internal
representations of structures where space and locus were important,
319
so there could be 'places' where the contents to be memorised were
assigned. Yates claimed that the adepts at this art would 'build'
internal representations of palaces and other structures of
extraordinary complexity as memory aides.
Yates claims that such complex internal pictures were also spatial and
three dimensional. Thus some aspects of what I have uncovered were
not unfamiliar to the hermetic tradition, whose understanding of the
power of visual imagery was a closely guarded secret. There may be
untapped potential for the modern world in the activation of people's
internal representations, both for learning and memorising. However,
this part of our cognitive maps can be created, altered, skewed,
distorted, inhibited or generated through language, whether this
comes from an external source, or from people's own internal
dialogues.
Language seems to have considerable power to influence this level.
Subtle changes in wording can alter internal representations; it seems
to be able to change how information is coded at the sub-modality
level. It can make a person's internal responses to a topic coloured, or
black and white, large or small, vivid or pale. They can be
experienced as a film or a series of stills; three dimensional or two
dimensional, with an apparent location in space. The words that are
used can evoke more of one sense than another. They can enable
people to see, hear and feel, as well as taste, smell, balance and
move, when information Is coded by the senses. In my interviews it
seemed that language structures could apparently even influence the
location of people's 'pictures' in their conceived space. Not only does
this happen immediately, as the words are de-coded, it also
influences how experiences are then re-accessed at a future time.
How teachers use language also seems to create certain kinds of
memories, partly coded as internal representations, which can stay
operative in people for many years. They form a part of people's
beliefs. Such constructs may be insidious in their influence on the
person, operating below levels of conscious awareness, perhaps for
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good or ill. It seems that not only the words that teachers use, but
their style and approach, can influence the internal representations
that remain long after the end of lessons.
Internal representations are by no means unconnected to other
cognitive processes. How the content of a topic is categorised,
apparently has a direct influence on the sub-modalities of the internal
representations that are evoked. This aspect is, I believe, indicated by
some of the examples of people's experiences of learning from the
transcripts of the Master Practitioner's interviews. After there had
been a change in students' beliefs about themselves as learners, (a
re-categorisation, as it were) there were also changes in how the
experience of learning was then coded at the level of their internal
representations. This may have been as the result of a deductive
process, where changing categories and connections at more abstract
logical levels had a direct result on how the experience was then
accessed internally and constellated by the senses.
I have shown that through introspection, people were able to report
on changes in their subjectively experienced sub-modalities in
response to changes in the syntactic structure of my statements and
directives. I believe that much more research needs to be done on
this; this inquiry is only skimming the surface of a phenomenon,
which needs further exploration. Bandler and Grinder suggest that
one can evoke rich internal imagery in all the sensory modalities
through careful use of sensory predicates; that is, words that elicit a
response from a particular sensory modality, (McWhirter 1992).
This may be too simplistic a view of how we may influence these
activities in others; yet I have not really been able to answer a
question such as 'how do we influence internal representations
through our language?' This inquiry only seems to show that it is
likely that we do. There appears to be a dynamic interaction between
words and the constructs that are produced at the level of internal
representations. This might be clarified at the level of neurological
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studies. I believe that this inquiry has at least demonstrated that
these evanescent, fragile, constantly changing, yet powerful aspects
of our internal constructs are indeed vital to creating understanding,
and therefore of considerable epistemological significance.
11.6. Connections that produce influential beliefs
Making connections between different conceptual entities seems to be
fundamental to sense rnaklnq", In the analysis of the Master
Practitioners' interview transcripts, examples emerged where people
seem to be disconnecting and then re-connecting conceptual entities,
especially about their understanding of 'failure'. In this section, I want
to explore the possible roles of connections in the structuring of
people's beliefs, and how these may be influenced by communication.
I also suggest that when people create beliefs about their own
learning, and what kind of learner they are, this involves the
formation of many different kinds of conceptual connections. Such
frameworks can act as powerful abstractions for the conceiver, which
then influence the conceiver's approaches to their future actions.
This is echoed in the recent work of Brownlee and her collaborators
(2003) who showed a link between teachers' conceptions of learning,
and their views of their own outcomes. The authors distinguish
between 'surface' and 'deep' learning, where 'deep' learning involves
the active construction of knowledge. Beliefs will also influence the
generation of goals. Bandura (1997) proposed that when people have
clear attainable goals, these produced a 'higher' performance level
than if they only had general intentions to do their best. Illeris (2003)
showed that adults learn well if they can relate what is taught to their
immediate goals. Papanastasiou and Zemblyas (2002) have reviewed
the notion that people's 'self' beliefs playa role in effective learning,
and that this can be influenced by their own perceptions of their past
achievements. Vrugt et al (2002) claimed that the theories that
4 I have reviewed this aspect of epistemology and language in c,hapter 5.
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people harbour about the determinants of their achievements could
also influence their motivation and the results they obtained. The
term 'belief' has a complex dictionary definition (Tosey and Gregory
2002)5.
I propose to use the idea of beliefs to explore the notion that many of
the epistemological processes I have described operate
simultaneously, as if they were different aspects of a whole. When
using the term 'belief' we are essentially using a nominalisation, with
all its attendant epistemological traps, which I discussed in Chapter 4.
How beliefs are defined depends on the perceptual stance taken by
the definer. Chamber's Dictionary, (1959) for instance includes among
its definitions of beliefs 'to regard as true', 'to judge', 'the opinion or
doctrine believed', and then includes 'intuition' as part of the meaning
of the term. Wilson, (1990), on the other hand, prefers a more
neurological approach, suggesting that beliefs are 'an imprinted
and/or conditioned, and/or learned network of biochemical reflexes in
the cortex of the brain', (Wilson 1990). Dilts, an early colleague of
Bandler's and Grinder's, refers to beliefs as factors which are required
to accomplish the behavioural goals, that is, why people do things in a
particular way. "On a macro level, basic beliefs relate to the type of
meaning, cause-effect relationships and boundaries people place on
events or perceive in the surrounding world", (Dilts 1998:35).
5 Beliefs are very generalised concepts which influence how people think and
act. Usually people will select information that supports or strengthens their
beliefs. They are wide ranging explanatory principles which may be held by
individuals or groups. They act as conceptual filters through which
individuals' experiences are perceived, coded and made meaningful. Shared
beliefs produce social cohesion. They cover a variety of experiences, such as
the meaning of life and death, suffering, right and wrong, the construction of
an individual's identity, task in life, relationships, roles and other life
experiences. It is thought to be impossible to live without beliefs. They often
create expectations about how things 'should' be. Many beliefs operate
unconsciously, and are influenced by language. It is now increasingly
surmised that a person's beliefs can influence such factors as health,
recovery from Illness and the ability to tolerate crises. (Tosey and Gregory
2002).
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My approach to the notion of beliefs is that they are complex
constructs that operate at many higher levels of abstraction. They can
be thought of as a metaphorical framework of interconnecting
cognitive 'entities'. Beliefs can be thought of as wide ranging
explanatory principles that may be held by individuals or groups. They
act as conceptual filters through which individuals' experiences are
perceived, coded and made meaningful. They are more complex than
simple nominalisations, yet people may sometimes use a
nominalisation to describe a belief, such as 'human rights', 'liberty'
and 'education'. When de-constructed, they can be shown to contain,
as it were, many of Bandler and Grinder's (1975) meta-model
patterns, such as the deletions, connections and generalisations that I
reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. Beliefs act as conceptual frameworks,
categoriSing, constructing, connecting and linking to internal
representations.
These reflections are informed by the shared introspections of my
collaborators during my time with them. In this sample, some people
showed significant changes in their belief systems about themselves
as learners, as the result of experiencing a course where the trainers
were using a particular approach. 6
I suggest that the changes in people's beliefs about learning that I
describe are indicative of the complex and multi-level effects of
communication. This is not, on the other hand, a complete account of
how teachers can influence the construction of beliefs. I offer the
suggestion that both the verbal and non-verbal messages that were
exchanged in the hustle and bustle of the course in Riyadh may have
played an important constructive role for learners. These may have
involved the creation of new conceptual connections. The category
into which a learning activity is placed, explicitly or impliCitly, creates
6 I have described some of these belief changes, and their effects, in Chapter
9.
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a deductive frame, which may then affect learners' perceptions; new
experiences that they may then have when learning differently might
catalyse an inductive process, which then creates new generalisations
through induction.
When observing Mr Phil, I noticed that his verbally (and non-verbally)
transmitted messages included information that what the children
were doing was not only engaging in solving an interesting
conundrum. He was also able to transmit the message that they all
had the ability to solve the puzzle he was setting and developing. The
children were often in a state of relaxed awareness, and obviously
enjoyed his lesson. I wondered what generalisations they would form
about Maths as a subject, and their own abilities to learn it. If I
analyse this in terms of the non-verbally expressed modal operators,
by implication he was informing them that this was something that
they can do.
What emerged from the Master Practitioner's interviews was that
when there were significant changes in people's beliefs about
learning, other changes also occurred. One of these was a change in
what people then believed was possible for them to attain in the
future. This may be a consequence of their changed beliefs about
themselves as learners. The teaching and learning styles that were
adopted in the NLP course in Riyadh seem to have resulted in people
altering many of their original abstractions, complex equivalences and
cause effect patterns. These may have developed as the result of
previous experiences of schooling. How they then judged themselves
as learners had also changed by the end of the course. This was
expressed through the kinds of lost performatives (Sandler and
Grinder 1975) that were used by the interviewees. These include
reference to 'good' learning, or 'not so good' learning. Thus we can
begin to dissect the anatomy, as it were, of beliefs; they have
connections and cause effect patterns within them, as well as criteria
for making judgements, and internal representations of the mode in
which future activities might be carried out. For each of these
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processes used in the construction of knowledge, there is a language
pattern that can either come from the teacher, or from the learner's
own internal dialogue.
If, when we teach, we facilitate the emergence of constructs in our
learners, then using language structures based on the meta-model
could provide us with other means for creating the generalisations,
nominalisations, and the myriads of linkages through cause-effect and
complex equivalences that are among the processes that are inherent
in the construction of knowledge. Learners' beliefs may then affect
how they generate the internal representations of their own future
activities that are essential to calibration in the TOTE process.
It seems that the beliefs that are installed through teachers'
communication patterns may remain operative at unconscious levels
for decades. Much of the information that we transmit between each
other appears to be processed unconsciously. Gipps and MacGilchrist
(2002) have reviewed the extent to which learners' achievements are
influenced by the expectations (that is, the consciously and
unconsciously transmitted beliefs) of teachers, especially in the range
of children's success with literacy and numeracy. How is this done if
not through words, but through the pre-suppositions and implications
involved in verbal communication. It may also involve the multiplicity
of non-verbal signals that always accompany human speech.
The implications of this for learning and teaching may be profound,
especially if educators consider the idea that what and how they
communicate can influence learners at levels below awareness, and
even their physiology. Our epistemological processes operate outside
our immediate consciousness, and yet can be profoundly influenced
by many different aspects of human language. Erickson summed up
this approach in the following extract:
In any work you are going to use words to influence the psychological
life of an individual today, you are going to use words to influence his
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organic life today; you are going to also influence his psychological and
organic life twenty years from now.
So you had better know what you are saying. You had better be willing
to reflect upon the words you use, to wonder what their meanings are,
and to seek out and understand their many associations. (Milton
Erickson, cited in McWhirter 1992)
11.7. The inner dimension of causality as a factor in learning
Bandura has explored the many ways in which a person's belief in
their own self-efficacy influences their personal goals and actions. This
brings in the topic of people's views on causality. Causal thinking has
been described as an epistemological primitive. (Weick 2001) Within
the conceptual structures that we call beliefs, there appear to be
many dynamic processes, which interact. One of these is causality,
which, although expressed as a nominalisation, represents one of the
fundamental epistemological processes. It is as if there were specific
programs that can be activated through language. Causality can be as
much about what one believes about, say, what happens in the
external physical world, as about oneself in relation to certain events.
The transcripts of the Master Practitioner's interviews often indicated
that people had made a kind of internal movement along the axis of
causality. Their experiences of being at the receiving end of
knowledge transmitted deductively had made them feel less in charge
of their own learning processes, thus placing them, as it were, 'at
effect'. The kind of learning that they had experienced on the NLP
course altered the complex set of beliefs that they had about learning,
and themselves as learners. At the same time, they moved, as it
were, to experiencing more control over their own learning. It was as
if, having changed the abstractions that they had created, they
altered where they placed themselves on the continuum between
experiencing themselves at cause or at effect. Bandura (1997) has
pointed out that people's beliefs in their own self-efficacy create
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attentional biases and may then influence what memories are
retrieved. These can be benign, or emotionally perturbing.
Viewed through the framework of systems theory and cybernetics,
experiencing oneself as having control or agency in a situation, or not,
generate two different perceptual positions which, because they act in
the same way as categories, must then alter the conceivers'
perception of experience. This will influence how they then react.
Moyles (2002) summed up this aspect when she wrote \\ Once
children see education as something that other people do to them,
they lose the ability to take any initiative or responsibility for their
own learning", (Moyles 2002:260).
Wells (2002) has pointed out that the transmission model of teaching
tends to override learners' attempts to construct their own
knowledge, forcing them into a more passive role. Carrer and
Scheider (2002) have reviewed the topic of how people construct their
sense of autonomy and self-determination. They suggest that there
may be key needs for people, among which competence, autonomy
and relatedness may be vital emergent properties of human systems.
Autonomy could be described as the sense that a person has of being
at the locus of control, or 'at cause'. Sideridis and Kaissidis-Rodafinos
(2001) proposed that learners made causal links between goal
importance, behaviour and beliefs, motivation and perceived locus of
control, as if these factors were all interactive dynamics of a system.
Causal thinking appears to be a powerful process, because it links
motivation to the perception of what is possible for the conceiver.
When I observed Mr Phil's lesson, I was struck by how he was able to
give the children a sense that they were in charge of their own
learning. He did this through behaving as if he was uncertain, using
many questions, and never telling a child that he or she had the
wrong answer. He appeared to make their learning something that
they did autonomously. The next extract gives a sense of how he
achieved this through the strategies he used. He engages the
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children, as if they were really all responsible for solving an intriguing
problem, and for which he did not have the answer.
Mr Phil: (Conspiratorially) we are trying to get the (emphasis) biggest
... the maximum, the biggest possible volume we can, out of that
square that we started off with, that seventeen square. What's been
the best one so far, giving us the biggest, what's the best cut at it?
Child 1. eleven ...
Mr Phil. Yes, how much did we cut out, I'm interested.
Child 2. three.
Mr Phil: Three, right, three's been the absolute best. Four? (pauses)
Child 3: is going down!
Mr Phil: (lowers his voice) is going down. Somebody said, well, shall
we do five? What will I do if I do five?
Child then heard singing "down down down ..."
It was also noticeable that Mr Phil listened to what every child had to
say to him, as if it was Important to the whole of the outcome of the
lesson. Such active participation by the children, and the way he
interacted with them, appeared to place them in joint charge of
solving the problem. Later, when I asked him whether he did this
deliberately, he told me that he liked to give the children the illusion
of being in charge of their own learning. In this way he was guiding
the processes involved in learning through his communication
strategies, as well as transmitting the content of the syllabus.
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11.8. Framing and connecting
It is now an accepted view that the process of categorisation plays a
crucial role in the formation of mental constructs 7. Language can be
thought of as operating at many conceptual layers, as sentences may
contain within them information about a number of different levels of
abstraction. How people perceive events or activities depends on the
categories to which these are assigned. There are many linguistic and
non-verbal ways for communicating the overall framework for
learning.
The words that people use, especially at the beginning of statements,
seem to influence the subsequent development of their listeners'
internal representations and abstractions. Is learning classed as
'exploration' or 'chore'? Are learners 'participants' or 'subjects'? Is the
task something that is 'possible' or 'impossible'? All these are
examples of categories which influence both students' and teachers'
responses. Teachers may communicate categories informing students
of the nature of learning, or of themselves as learners, verbally, or
non-verbally. It seems that we cannot, not categorise, whenever we
communicate.
Bateson (1972) pointed out that such frames are essentially
messages that organise the perception of the message by the
recipient. Such frames inform people to "attend to what is within, and
do not attend to what is without" (Bateson 1972: 187). Non-verbal
communication is especially powerful at transmitting information
about the category to which the information is to be assigned.
Watzlawick et a/ (1967) explored these foundations for the study of
meta-communication (that is, communication about communication),
suggesting that the non-verbal, analogue part of a spoken message
acted at a higher logical level than words. This implies that aspects of
communication such as body language and voice tonality are powerful
7 I have reviewed this further in Chapter 3.
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transmitters of information about categorisation. This influences
perception as it creates a deductive framework, which affects how the
information is then processed at different levels of abstraction, as well
as at the level of internal representations.
Thus both framing and categorising appear to involve the universal
epistemological process of creating connections between different
conceptual entities. Such connections can occur between internal
representations and the abstractions that have been generated from
them. They are also involved in deductive and abductive processes.
How learning is categorised, verbally or non-verbally, also affects
people's perceptions of outcomes, which are connections to future
events. Here again the almost fractal nature of the model appears,
because when considering connections, future outcomes are also part
of the dynamic of processes such as causal thinking and the TOTE
process.
Beliefs contain a multiplicity of different types of connections. When
using language, a teacher is continuously creating connections of
many kinds, including complex equivalences and lost performatives.
These processes are inevitable, because they are both embedded in
language, and evoked through the words that we use. They may also
be fundamental thinking processes. In my own teaching on the Riyadh
course, I deliberately set out to create complex equivalences between
learning and discovery, exploration, and the students' own abilities to
deal successfully with a novel topic. This meant deliberately giving
them new lost performatives that then acted as new yardsticks for the
measurement and judgement of their own performances. Moustakas,
in his descriptions of the phenomenological approach, wrote" when
one looks with confidence, what one sees will be radically different
than when one looks with doubt" (Moustakas 1994:71). Such
different, yet apparently critically important perceptual frameworks
may be created through verbal or non-verbal means.
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The connections that language can make or break may be as
numerous as words themselves. It is probably impossible to put a
number on them. When we teach, we weave a web of abstractions
and connections that influences how learners process information.
Connections are perhaps one of the most universal and influential
strands of the web. The complex equivalences, cause effect patterns,
lost performatives, categories, and mind reads that are part of the
architecture of beliefs are communicated through the teacher's words.
They may also influence how learners then construct their knowledge.
11.9. Language and future outcomes
Nunez and Freeman (1999) urge that the time has come for
educationalists to return to the idea that intentions and emotions are
of prime importance to our understanding of cognition. One of the
most surprising aspects to emerge from this inquiry was the extent to
which changes in people's belief systems altered their thinking about
what was possible for them in the their own futures. This suggests
that the complex conceptual structuring that I have been exploring is
not time bound; that time itself may be a significant dimension in the
construction of understanding. By this I don't only mean that such
structures have a temporal duration; rather, that they include
information about the future. This may set a direction, consciously or
unconsciously, for future activities. Expectations and intentions may
thus be considered as a part of such conceptual structures.
It is possible that such changes may directly influence how the TOTE
process is used. In a cybernetic model, systems cannot function
without the need to calibrate to an internal representation of future
events. I have suggested that the phenomena of internal
representations and their sub-modality variables also playa
significant role in the construction of knowledge, and may be
influenced by communication. This may in turn influence action. For
instance, Bickerstaff (1993) has demonstrated that verbal
encouragement by Physiotherapists to patients performing physical
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tasks significantly improved their (the patients') performance. She
also cites work where it was claimed that the louder the
encouragement from the physiotherapist, the greater were patients'
responses to strength tasks.
It is no longer novel to propose that intentionality is an essential part
of the behaviour of systems. Zelazo and Frye (1997) have suggested
that cognitive scientists have failed to clarify the functional role of
consciousness in the production of goal directed activity, and suggest
a model for the carrying out of intentions that is not dissimilar to the
TOTE, yet fails to cite Miller's model, (Miller et al 1960). Freeman
(1999) has suggested that "intent comprises the endogenous
initiation, construction and direction of behaviour into the world,"
(Freeman 1999: 147). He explores the possible neurological bases for
the existence and fulfilment of a system's goals. Intention and
causality are interlinked; Freeman further suggests that Hume's belief
was that causality emerges in the minds of observers. This raises the
question: what are the links between people's belief systems, and
how they then generate the information about future events to
calibrate to? Could there be causal links between the conceptual
structures that are created, and the conceptual processes that are
activated for the perception of a task.
People's constructs of their own future outcomes may also act on their
perception in a way similar to the effects of categories. They may thus
exert powerful roles in people's perception of their different life
events. Certainly, in my small sample, people who had changed their
beliefs about themselves also changed their approach to their own
future goals. Sideridis and Kaissidis-Rodafinos (2001) propose that a
learner's goals are the strongest causal agents of success, especially
for students who can do a lot of studying. Freeman suggests that
"wholeness is revealed in the striving for the fulfilment of the potential
of the self through its lifetime of change." (Freeman 1999:47).
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It is as if we may be continuously creating and recreating our future.
These futures will be perceived through the filters of our constructs.
Their formation of these constructs appears to be affected and altered
through certain language forms, such as modal operators. I want to
offer the following generalisation about what has emerged from this
inquiry; namely that it is an awesome thought that how we
communicate with our learners not only has a physiological effect on
them, it also weaves a complex web of beliefs which then influences
their perception of what is possible for them throughout life.
In this model, intentionality emerges as a vital aspect of people's
constructs. It follows from this that the factor of time becomes
another crucial aspect to how we know. In our constructs there are
connections between numerous pasts, presents and futures. Not only
is an awareness of time critical to the successful operation of the
TOTE process, it also acts as a context for changing perceptual
positions, which I suggest is shown by my findings described in
Chapters 6, 7 and 9. Both time and intentionality become integral
processes in cognitive mapping. Some of my collaborators'
introspections indicated that when there was a re-organisation of their
own cognitive maps, then some of their perceptions changed. One in
particular was their approaches to their own futures. Teaching and
learning may therefore be as much about facilitating the creation of
people's futures, as about learning content for exams and
qualifications.
11.10. Searching for, and ordering information through inner
dialogue
The notion of trans-derivational searching has been a concept long
used in hypnosis, (Grinder, DeLozier and Bandler 1977). It proposes
that when people hear words, they are directed into an internal
search in order to make sense of the information they may contain. In
my own interviews, I was able to observe how often my interlocutors'
awareness changed. First they might attend to information from an
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external source, then change to focusing on their own internal
processes. Often this seemed to involve a search for their responses.
Grinder, Delozier and Bandler (1977), suggested that people were, in
this way, connecting surface structure to deep structure. It is as if, in
searching, a TOTE was set up, where the outcome was to access the
relevant information. The TOTE process is only exited (or ceased)
when the conceiver is made aware of the information. In doing so, it
may well undergo re-organisation. As part of the model that I am
proposing, I suggest that such searches are another essential process
in making sense and constructing information. When I was
interviewing my collaborators, I noticed that they often paused after I
had spoken, and then repeated my words to themselves. Only then
did they appear to search internally, and access the internal
representations that were evoked by my words. Their own inner
dialogue, whether spoken or not, seemed to playa part in this
process. Carruthers (1996) has explored the significance of inner
speech, and concludes that it plays an important role in thinking.
Questions seem to emerge as one of the most powerful language
structures for generating trans-derivational searches. It was
noticeable how often Mr Phil used questions in his maths lesson. The
whole of the lesson could be interpreted (at the process level) as a
series of guided trans-derivational searches. It would be interesting to
know what effects such searches have on people's learning. This is
one of the main differences between the 'transmission of knowledge'
style of teaching, and one in which learners are treated as co-
discoverers. Such searches must, I suggest, have the effect of
allowing each learner to structure what is to be known in their own
ways. Again, causality re-appears as part of this dynamic; when
learners are actively engaged in their own 'knowing' then it is likely
that they also experience themselves as being the agents of their own
learning.
Another aspect of trans-derivational searches is the Zeigarnik effect.
(Mazur 1996). Zeigarnik proposed that when human consciousness is
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presented with incomplete, paradoxical or contradictory information,
then it seems to be pre-programmed to search for order and meaning
so that the person can achieve closure. Originally this concept was
used to describe a psychological process, which was generated after
the individual had experienced traumatic events. It is as if there is a
drive to make sense, to order and categorise, which can also be
explained as a process aimed at exiting the TOTE. This is thought to
occur when the afflicted person has reached the outcome of having
made sense of events by assigning them to a meaningful category.
Lebiere and Lee (2001) believe that intentions are even critical to how
people retrieve information. They describe what they term the
'intention superiority effect'. This was that the time that their subjects
took to retrieve memory items related to uncompleted or partially
completed intentions, was faster than for those people with no
intentions associated with the task. We seem to be able to set
directions for the trans-derivational searches of our learners through
our questions and how we present topics. As teachers, we also seem
to be activating the internal dialogues of learners, which, in my small
sample, appeared to catalyse their trans-derivational searches. We
can also set goals and outcomes which affect how tasks are
approached.
Internal dialogue may have many functions. In my interviews, my
collaborators used it to make sense of my requests. It seemed to aid
the processes that were used to search for and generate their
responses. In the Master Practitioners' interviews, there were some
people who reported on the internal dialogues about themselves that
they had in the remembered learning situation. USing internal
dialogue to search for internal representations is different to using it
as a commentary and judgement about oneself as a learner. Perhaps
one of the processes that could be an essential part of learning is to
encourage useful kinds of internal dialogue for the learner.
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Inner speech was a topic which fascinated Vygotsky, who believed
that it was not simply talking, rather that it had an additional
function. In Robbins' (2001) account of Vygotsky's theories, she
quotes Akhutina, who proposed that "For Vygotsky, inner speech is a
particular independent aspect of verbal thought in which all the
dynamic relations between thought and word are concentrated."
(quoted in Robbins 2001:51). However, there is little in Vygotsky's
writings to suggest that he recognised the role of inner dialogue in
trans-derivational searches; his views on inner speech were more that
it represented the internalisation of understanding that had originated
from an external origin. He did, however, hint at the idea that It had a
role in sense making (Vygotsky 1939). It was also considered to be a
'controlling mechanism' (Robbins 2001:53). Robbins (2001) also
suggests that Vygotsky thought of inner speech as part of the process
of internalisation, which Robbins describes as a 'system of ontological
transformations' (Robbins 2000:101). This seems to recognise that
inner speech has important functions, and may even link to
motivation, and perhaps a dawning recognition of its apparently
powerful role in inner searches for meaning, ordering, and arriving at
conclusions. There is some support for this view; Emerson and Miyake
(2003) suggest that inner speech serves as an internal self-cueing
device by retrieving and activating a phonological representation of
the upcoming task.
Bandler and Grinder (1975A) were fascinated by Milton Erickson's
abilities to enable his clients to change the way they perceived
themselves and their problems. They identified that he used language
to generate trans-derivational searches in his patients, suggesting
that this was one of his most powerful therapeutic techniques. They
suggested that Erickson deliberately sought to engage the
unconscious part of clients' minds. This raises questions about what Is
conscious and what is unconscious? 8 It does seem that when we use
language to stimulate the epistemological processes of others, we are
8 I have addressed this question in Chapter 3.
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aiming to influence a process that may be mainly below conscious
awareness. One of the aims of modelling with NLP is to discover more
about these processes. It is coming to be accepted that much of our
information processing occurs below conscious awareness. (1 have
reviewed this topic briefly in chapter 3). Perrig (1993) believes that
there is evidence that many such processes operated below conscious
awareness. These included making distinctions between different
sense impressions (Sinneseindruecke), classification, comparison and
ordering.
In taking a phenomenological stance, I can only describe the
phenomena that have emerged, despite the temptations to theorise
further. The role of internal dialogue in learning and making sense
becomes an important part of this model of learning. Perhaps it is also
a way for people to bring unconscious material into awareness.
11.11. The role of the construct of the self as learner;
judgements and mind-reads
One of the most difficult concepts to define is that of the 'self'. From
an NLP point of view, the word 'self' is a complex nominalisation, a
concretisation of something that may be both abstract and a process.
Perhaps it is as complex a concept as that of beliefs. The ways in
which the notion of self has been constructed has been explored
elsewhere by many, for instance by Vrugt et al (2002), Lacan (1968),
Bandura (1997), and Harre (1998). I observed that people
occasionally revealed the complex equivalences that they had made
between themselves and what sort of learners they were. For the
purposes of explaining this model, I borrow from a Batesonian
definition. Bateson struggled with the concept of self, recognising that
it was a word that seemed to avoid definition. "Perhaps what each of
us means by the "self" is in fact an aggregate of habits of perception
and adaptive action plus from moment to moment, our immanent
states of action" (Bateson 1972:242). Lakoff and Johnson (1999)
state that the study of the self, 'concerns the structure of our inner
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lives' (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:267), proposing that this structure is
based on metaphor. Furthermore, they view causation as being one of
the fundamental dynamics in people's self constructs. Furthermore,
Grush (2000), has proposed a neurobiological model which explains
how people make distinctions between themselves as separate
objects in the world.
I found that in my sample, people's experiences of schooling had left
them with interesting complex equivalences between their ideas of
'self' and what kind of learners they were. This was well illustrated by
some of the Master Practitioners' interviews, which I explored in the
previous chapter. Dilts (1998) suggests that identity operates at a
higher logical level than beliefs and values. He proposes that a key
element in establishing a particular role or identity "involves defining
the sense of mission a person has within the larger system in which
he or she is operating". (Dilts 1998:35). In this view, self or identity is
linked to a person's constructs of their own future, and what is
possible for them. In another sense this translates into 'what can I
cause, what can I make happen?' It was noticeable how many of the
participants actually re-organised their ideas about what they believed
was now possible for them in the future, after the course. Here again,
the dimension of time becomes one of the factors in people's
construction of themselves. Our educational systems continually
encourage comparison, whether it is the individual marks for a piece
of homework, or school league tables. This presupposes the existence
of a scale, against which one can be measured and perhaps defined.
Thus lost conceiving of performatives and comparative deletions are
the inevitable consequences of asking the question 'what sort of a
learner am I?' The answer to this seems to act as an overall
framework influencing people's perception of a learning task.
In this model, every dynamic process is also an aspect of all the other
processes that I have so far outlined. Thus, the idea of 'self' can be
considered as a complex abstraction within which will be found all the
other epistemological factors that are mediated through language. It
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also operates as a filter through which people perceive what is
possible (or not) for them. I have found that people's ideas about
themselves as learners have a remarkable longevity, yet (leaving
aside various theories of personality) these ideas are only subjective
constructs which have arisen through what people have been told,
perhaps at sensitive stage in their lives, through the verbal or non-
verbal messages from teachers and significant others.
Feedback, and how it is languaged at the levels of words and
accompanying non-verbal messages, may be another influential way
of creating or re-enforcing people's beliefs about themselves as
learners. I suggest this is an important aspect of my findings. This
was illustrated by many of the extracts from the transcripts of the
Master Practitioners' interviews, where they reflected on the kinds of
messages they had assimilated about themselves as learners from
their past schooling. If communication is multi-level, then perhaps it
is not irrelevant to ask what kinds of messages, spoken and
unspoken, do learners receive and construct about themselves? What
do they project on to others in the form of mind reads? I offer no
simple solutions; only that this may be an area for further inquiry. I
can only suggest that my inquiry shows that people construct
information for themselves in ways that may be far reaching, yet
below their awareness.
11.12. Comparison
Bateson proposed that another fundamental epistemological
processes was comparison, (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991). In this he
echoes Wiener (1948) who had proposed earlier that comparison was
fundamental to our sense making. He also proposed that the ability to
distinguish similarities, and differences, were vitally necessary to how
we knew. Bateson believed that "any ongoing ensemble of events and
objects which has the appropriate complexity of causal circuits and
the appropriate energy relations will surely show mental
characteristics. It will compare, that is, be responsive to difference"
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(Bateson 1972:315). The process of comparison is considered to be a
fundamental cognitive process by Markman and Gentner (2000).
Associated with the act of comparing is the notion of scalarity, that is,
that we make use of 'internal scales' as part of our sense making
processes.
Could there be hidden directives in language that evoke the use of a
scale whereby judgements are to be made? Johnson (1987) suggests
that scalarity pervades human thought. "Consequently, this ... value
laden structure of our grasp of both concrete and abstract entities is
one of the most pervasive image-schematic structures of our
understanding", (Johnson 1987:123). He proposes that we are able to
comprehend "virtually every aspect of our existence in terms of
scalarity" (Johnson 1987:124). Clausner and Croft (1999) perceive
scalarity as essential to understanding, and argue that such image
schemas have a psychological reality. In language, quantifiers, words
that originate from judgements, values, and even words such as
sharp will, they suggest, be located at some point on a conceiver's
scale. These ideas are similar to Bandler and Grinder's linguistic
category of lost performatives, which I have described in Chapter S.
Clausner and Croft (1999) also suggest that scalarity operates as an
epistemological device that transforms complex non-linear constructs
into linear form. Again, one could use the explanatory metaphor from
chaos theory (Gleick 1998); that there are underlying ordering
principles which make patterns out of the chaotic and myriad bits of
information that the nervous system processes every millisecond.
Among these may be scalarity and comparison.
The use of a scale, however subjective, is impossible without the
ability to make comparisons, to evaluate and discriminate between
the perceptions of sameness and difference. Bateson (1972)
considered comparison as one of the fundamental epistemological
processes operating within a successful cybernetic system. It is also
an essential part of TOTEing. Cybernetic systems could not use the
TOTE process, that is, to know when a task has been accomplished
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without the ability to compare the present state of the system with
the desired outcome to which it is calibrating. It could therefore be
proposed that the act of comparing could be a universal process in
human activities and information processing, (Markman and Gentner
2000). Mr Phil's Maths lesson encouraged the learners to keep
comparing; he was constantly encouraging the children to compare
the volumes of the different sized boxes they were making in order
for them to reach the generalisations about the turning value
problem. He even encouraged them to be 'wrong' with their answers,
so that the learners kept up the impetus of learning, and finding new
ways of acquiring their insights.
Comparison, which is the ability to attend to both similarity and
difference, may be one of our basic ways of making sense. It may
also be odious. It may cause students to develop beliefs about
themselves as learners by comparing themselves unfavourably with
others. The language of comparison seems ubiquitous; any words that
evoke the use of an internal scale effectively activate this process. All
language structures havlnq the qualities of lost performatives and
comparative deletions as well as many adjectives and adverbs appear
to elicit these processes. Comparison is also needed in order to
categorise information; to be able to connect 'similar things' and
distinguish them from others that are not the same at a higher level
of abstraction. This seems to be unavoidable to the act of
classification. This may be another area for further inquiry.
11.13. Factors that appear to generate or inhibit learning
In both the transcripts of my own interviews, and those of the Master
Practitioners, there was evidence that people could access learning
experiences which were associated with a particular (and often
memorable) kinaesthetic sensation, which were then linked to an
emotional state. There is currently a growing interest in the
importance of studying the effects of emotional states on cognition;
Tart (2000), whose main interest is in altered states of consciousness,
342
suggests that emotions such as rage, depression or ecstasy could be
viewed as altered states. He goes so far as to compare states of
consciousness to Kuhn's (1970) paradigms, claiming that they act
"like a set of blinkers" (Tart 2000:217) which produce their own
complex interlocking sets of procedural rules and theories, which then
lead to interpretations specific to that emotional state. It may be that
learning is state dependent; that people learn more easily in some
emotional states that in others.
One of the first people to note this was Tolman (1948), thought to be
the originator of the term cognitive maps. He urged that "we must in
short, subject our children and ourselves ... to the optimal condition of
moderate motivation and of an absence of necessary frustrations
whenever we put them before that great God given maze which is our
human world", (Tolman 1948:208). The links between people's
physiological and emotional states, and their abilities to process
information is currently a fertile field for exploration, (Harber and
Pennebaker 1992, Bower 1992, Tobias, Kihlstrom and Shacter, 1992,
Yair 2000). More recently, Bibby (2002) has investigated the role that
"shame" plays in the learning of mathematics. There is also evidence
to indicate that degrees of physiological arousal, emotion and attitude
have a part to play in how a learning task is approached. (Revelle and
Loftus 1992, Teglasi and Rothman 2001, Papanastasiou and Zemblyas
2002, Hackbath, Grover and Mun 2003).
One of the most interesting aspects of Mr Phil's lessons was how he
controlled the emotional states of his pupils as part of his classroom
management. Discipline seemed to come secondary to his control of
the emotional states in his classroom, so that learning was interesting
and fun, driven by a relaxed curiosity. He also controlled the levels of
arousal of the class; just enough to generate enthusiasm, not enough
to create disorder.
Another aspect that emerged from studying the transcripts of my
interviews and those of the Master Practitioners, was the many times
343
where people reported on sub-modality distinctions in more than one
of the sensory modalities of their internal representations; often there
were apparently distinctly experienced bodily states associated with
different experiences of learning. It was as if people's construct of
learning had a phvsloloqlcal correlate; certain kinaesthetic sensations.
being inextricably linked to visual and auditory memories. Such links
are known as synaesthesias, where two different modalities are
experienced at the same time. For instance, recalling a pleasant
holiday experience may evoke both feelings and pictures, which are
linked as two aspects of the same phenomenon. Damasio (2000)
believed that even the feelings which "make up the backdrop of each
mental instant are images, ... somatosensory images, that is, which
mostly signal aspects of the body state," (Damasio 2000:319). He
considered that the underlying mechanisms producing these
phenomena were neural patterning mechanisms. It may thus be
impossible to separate the construction of knowledge by individuals
from their physiology, whether it be that of the brain or the rest of the
body. The two can thus be considered as two aspects of the same
anatomical and physiological information processing system.
One aspect of teaching and learning that emerges from this is that
learners' states could be directly affected by the communication of
others. I suggest that this is where non-verbal messages, transmitted
through body language and voice tonality, may playa role. Perhaps
this is an aspect, which is influenced by how something is said.
Mehrablan (1971) proposed that "we can say that people's implicit
behaviour has more bearing than their words on communicating
feelings or attitudes to others", (Mehrabian 1971:77)9. Watzlawick et
al (1967) explored the notion that meta-communication, that is, the
non-verbal message about the message, operated at a higher logical
level than words, and therefore categorised the contents of the verbal
part. Perhaps the emotional state that is created in a classroom is yet
9 Mehrabian (1971) also tried to quantify the amount of information that was
transmitted through voice and body language. He has been much criticised for this. I
do not believe that it is possible to reduce such complex interactions to numerical
ratios.
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another way of categorising the activities of learning. This in turn may
influence perception, the generation of future outcomes, beliefs about
learning, self-efficacy, and much else.
11.14. Epistemological processes as part of a systemic
network; a working hypothesis.
On page 310 I presented a linear listing of the epistemological
processes that I suggest playa role in the construction of knowledge,
and which are used by, and activated through language. Such a list
does not give a sense of the complexity of their interactions. I suggest
the hypothesis that each of the major categories of epistemological
processes that I list do not operate singly, but always in conjunction
with others, either actually or potentially, as a non-linear, systemic
network. Each process operates as parts of a greater whole, in order
for us to make sense of the chaos of incoming information, and thus
form our mental constructs.
Let me explore this suggestion further, using the TOTEas an
example. I attach a number to each process for clarification in my
exploration of the possibly systemic structure of epistemology, and
diagrams on pages 348 and 349 that give an overview of the model.
In diagram 3 (page 348) I give an overview of the hypothetical
processes used to make sense. In diagram 4, (page 349) I suggest
that in order to calibrate to a future outcome using the TOTE (1),
there must be an internal representation (2) of the desired outcome.
We appear to calibrate (3) to an internal representation (2) of a
future outcome, continuously comparing (6) the present state with
the desired outcome. The outcome itself may act as a category, (4)
which operates at a higher logical level, influencing the configuration
of the internal representations and their sub-modalities. In order to
process feedback, (which is information about the extent to which an
organism has or has not achieved an outcome), the perception of
sameness and difference (5) playa crucial role.
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Negative feedback is 'news of difference' (Bateson 1972) in order for
the organism to 'know' that the goal has not yet been achieved. This
brings in the fundamental role of comparison. This may also involve
the use of an internal scale by which information is judged, (6). When
people's achievement and their perceived outcomes are the same,
then the TOTEcan be exited, because then the system 'knows'that
the task has been completed. The wayan outcome is achieved is
dependent on the organism's neurology and state of physiological
arousal, (7). We could add that functions such as the trans-
derivational search (TDS) (8) is run by the TOTEprocess, (or how
would we know that we had found the information we were looking
for?) The TDS is itself often mediated through inner dialogue. This
uses words, which could be thought of as digitalised information, (9).
They are of a different logical type than analogue processes. (Bateson
1972).
How an activity is performed is influenced by past experience and
beliefs, in the construction of which many kinds of connections and
abstractions playa role, (10). Time (11) is also an essential
component of the TOTE, as it involves awareness of both present and
future.
Engaging in a TOTEprocess may also involve evaluation of the
effectiveness of the task, which not only involves beliefs (10), but also
changing perceptual positions in time, (12). Each of these steps may
also depend on the system's ability to create internal representations.
Every one of these patterning principles appears to be different
aspects of the act of knowing.
It is as if these strange aspects of consciousness operate more like a
complex system. The mind is not a static structure, neither can it be
understood by superimposing on It a linear reductionist methodology,
(Gleick 1998). Perhaps these epistemological processes are some of
the patterning principles, which are proposed as underlying organising
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factors in chaos theory. Gleick describes these as "Patterns born
among formlessness: that is biology's basic beauty and its basic
mystery", (Gleick 1998:299).
11.15. Conclusion
This has been a complex terrain to explore and map. The resulting
map is offered purely as a hypothesis. Themap is not the territory.
I have proposed when we know, we may do so at a number of
different levels, which I have outlined in Diagram 1 (page 306). I
have also described some of the main epistemological processes,
which I suggest are active in the construction of knowledge, and are
communicated through the language and style of a teacher or trainer.
I have listed these in Diagram 2, (page 310). However, these are not
separable Into discrete functions. What has emerged from these
explorations is the apparent impossibility of separating one
epistemological function from others in the human act of knowing and
constructing internal maps. They are all a part of the larger function
of making meaning. The epistemological processes themselves
connect with other dynamic aspects of the system such as language,
sensory input and cognitive mapping, which are summed up in
diagram 3, page 348.
These processes seem to be inter-dependent and to occur again and
again at various levels of complexity, whether in the formation of
simpler constructs such as Insights Into a mathematics problem, or at
the more complex level of the build up of a conceivers' beliefs and
identity about themselves as a learner. I propose that these processes
are mediated through language, through its syntactic and semantic
structures as well as through non-verbal means. If these views have
any validity, then good intentions on the part of a teacher are not
enough. This hypothesis involves a profound ontological shift to
realise that a teaching method may even influence a learner's
physiology; that when we communicate we may cause a myriad of
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conceptual and physiological changes in others. In cybernetic theory,
whenever there is communication between people, then they become
a system, where every part can potentially influence other parts. A
system also has emergent qualities, which are not predictable from a
study of its parts alone, (Checkland 1981, Gleick 1998). Language
may be one of the most potent tools for the development of
knowledge in human systems. Teaching could be said to be about
'Ianguageing' the thinking of others. This could have implications for
the training of teachers, which I explore in the next chapter.
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Chapter 12. Some Thoughts on the Implications of this Inquiry
for Teaching and Learning.
The reality that we impute to the 'worlds' we inhabit is a constructed
one .... Reality construction is the product of meaning making shaped
by tradition and a culture's toolkit of ways of thought. In this sense,
education must be conceived as aiding young humans in learning to
use the tools of meaning making and reality construction, better to
adapt to the world in which they find themselves and to help in the
process of changing it as required. In this sense it can even be
conceived as akin to helping people become better architects and
better builders. (Jerome Bruner 2002: 10)
12.1. Introduction.
The model that I have proposed in this thesis arose from my
reflections on, and analysis of data that suggests that there may be
close links between the way in which teachers communicate, and the
epistemological processes that are activated in their learners as they
construct knowledge. This implies that there may be two distinct but
related aspects to guiding learning; one is the transmission of the
content of the subject matter, and the other involves activating the
processes whereby specific kinds of learning may be engaged, and
conceptual maps developed. I argue that this is a vital distinction to
make.
This dichotomy, (of which I am aware in my own practice as a teacher
and trainer) aroused my curiosity about what teachers are taught
about language and communication. I also wondered about how
teachers' communication skills were evaluated in the classroom. I was
intrigued to know what teachers are currently taught about
communication. This chapter is the result of this inquisitiveness. It
aims to indicate, through soundings and informal inquiry, the extent
to which the issues raised are elreadvreflected in teacher training and
development. The chapter does not purport to be a systematic study
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of these questions. The intention is to help assess some possible
implications for practice.
Much of the material in this chapter is drawn from a small number of
soundings. I spoke to a Headteacher and an Ofsted inspector to find
out how communication was evaluated in the classroom, and whether
there was any recognition that language activated epistemological
processes. I also include the experiences of three newly qualified
teachers, who had recently undergone PGCEtraining in three different
institutions.
I review some of the information that I was able to gather on the
questions from a variety of official guidelines for the training and
evaluation of teachers. Finally, I include some of my reflections on the
literature for the training of teachers at the Open University, drawing
out some generalisations about their approach to language in
teaching and learning. I then review the implications of the model
that emerged from this inquiry for teacher training programmes at all
levels, advocating more of a focus on the subject of communication
and its possible roles in the creation of cognitive maps.
12.2. Ofsted sources
The Ofsted Handbook on the Guidance on the Inspection of Secondary
Schools (HMSO 1995) contains pointers on what inspectors are
looking for when judging teachers and evaluating classroom practice,
yet does not address communication as such, except by implication.
Criteria that it lists include:
• The teachers should show knowledge of the subject area
• Set high expectations, challenge, deepen knowledge and
understanding,
• Employ methods and organisational strategies which match
curricular objectives
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• Manage pupils to achieve high standards of discipline. (HMSO,
1995).
The following description of good teaching is couched in abstract
generalisations, (let alone the extensive use of nominalisations, which
I italicise). "Good teaching makes clear the importance of application,
accuracy and good presentation, and the need to use critical thinking,
creativity and imagination. It provides the stimulus, the knowledge
and the methods for pupils to do their best in all these respects.
Teaching should provide opportunities for students to take increasing
responsibility for their own work." (HMSO 1995:72).
These nominalisations are essentially descriptions of processes written
as abstract nouns. They do not inform the reader about how precisely
these activities are evaluated. My view is that all of these factors are
achieved through the way that information is languaged in the
classroom. They are also influenced through both verbal and non-
verbal means, and may be processed consciously and unconsciously.
The Ofsted Handbook goes on to state what inspectors should
consider when observing teachers' teaching methods." Again, these
focus on processes, which according to the model I propose, are all
mediated through language structures and ways of communicating.
However, this is never explicitly addressed. The closest that these
guidelines come to evaluating communication is that inspectors
should consider how well a teacher manages explanation, questioning
and discussion.
In order to find out more about the Ofsted approach, I approached
the school where I had originally observed Mr Phil's maths lesson,
1Exposition or explanation by the teacher is informative, lively and well
structured, the teachers use of questions probes pupils knowledge and
understanding, and challenges their thinking, practical activity is purposeful
in that pupils are encouraged to think about what they are doing, what they
have learned from it and how to Improve their work, investigations and
problem solving activities are efficient in helping pupils to appiy and extend
their learning in new contexts. (HMSO 1995:73).
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which were to have an Ofsted inspection in February 2003. The
Headteacher invited me to go and see her during the inspection, and
to talk to one of the inspectors. I talked to both for about 35 minutes
about the Ofsted guidelines, and the practice of Ofsted inspections in
schools.
I was also intrigued by what, if any, theoretical bases were used as
the underpinnings of what teachers are taught about language and
the effects of wording. Taking soundings from an Ofsted inspector was
one of my first ports of call.
12.3. The Inspector's views
During my visit to the school, one of the inspectors agreed to talk to
me during the lunch hour. He appeared very kind, friendly,
enthusiastic, helpful, and committed to his mission of improving
teaching, so that children enjoyed school. He wished to remain
anonymous, refused permission for our conversation to be recorded,
though gave me his assent to use his views, of which I made
handwritten notes at the time. This account of our meeting is based
on these notes. My questions to him were simple; what did he look for
when evaluating a teacher's communication skills in the classroom?
What makes good teaching? What should teachers be taught about
communication skills?
His answers were interesting, because they bore little resemblance to
the somewhat mechanistic guidelines published by Ofsted. He brought
a very human dimension to the rather abstract written
recommendations of the Ofsted handbooks.
He said he looked for how long teachers talked, how they built on
what was intended for the lesson, how clearly they stated and shared
the goals of the lesson, how well the lesson was formatted, the extent
of the teacher's command of the subject, the teacher's use of
understandable language, the extent to which the teacher's language
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was geared to the level of understanding of the pupils, and how a
teacher was able to improve pupils' communication skills and
knowledge of technical terms.
One of his main aims was to evaluate the response of the pupils
themselves. How long were they engaged in learning activities? To
what extent were they 'in charge' of their learning? What state of
mind, emotional engagement and joy in discovery did they
demonstrate? In his view, teachers were catalysts, who should not
only have a good knowledge of their subjects, but also the desire to
share it with others.
When I asked him what he thought teachers should be taught about
communication, he replied that he believed that an integral part of
teacher training should be drama, rhetoric and voice projection.
Teachers were "thespians within their little theatre". He then went on
to offer the view that, in his experience as an Ofsted inspector, the
quality of the teaching of the expressive arts was better than that of
any other taught subject. He also added that teachers should be able
to learn, think, evaluate and reflect on their practice, so as to raise
the awareness of what they were doing.
He thus recognised the importance of the factors I would describe as
state, feedback, TOTE,goal setting, inductive and deductive
processes (though he pleaded ignorance about abduction) for
learning, though he did not use these terms. He also recognised the
significance of pupils experiencing themselves as being at cause in
their learning. These are some of the factors I propose as
fundamental epistemological variables involved in the construction of
knowledge. He appeared somewhat baffled yet interested when I
mentioned that I believed there were links between language and how
learners constructed knowledge; it was clear that he recognised many
of the aspects that I believe are involved in 'good' teaching, yet there
was no stated theoretical framework to his views, nor any knowledge
of the area of research of this inquiry.
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I mentioned to him that I had found that internal dialogue seemed to
playa role in learning; he responded that he believed that one of the
most telling ways of evaluating the success of a lesson was to stand
outside the classroom door as the pupils came out, and listen to what
they had to say about the lesson.
This was a useful insight into how teachers' communication skills were
evaluated by one committed and enthusiastic Ofsted inspector, but
told me little about what was being taught about communication skills
to aspiring teachers, and those doing in-service training.
12 4. The Teacher Training Agency (TTA)
One of my next ports of call was the Teacher Training Agency. I
telephoned their information desk, and asked what guidelines there
were for the teaching of communication skills to those wishing to
teach. This question was greeted with a certain amount of bafflement.
I was passed on to several people, none of whom were able to answer
my question. After several abortive attempts, I reached someone
who, in answer to my question, told me that their guidelines
emphasised management, attitude and the ability to handle multi-
cultural situations. I was unable to obtain answers to more specific
questions about the content of what is taught about communication,
being told that it was 'up to the training providers to interpret the TTA
guidelines in their own way'. They kindly forwarded a copy of their
handbook of guidance, Qualifying to Teach which the ITA produces for
initial teacher training providers, (TTA 2002). This outlines the
'standards' that qualifying teachers are expected to achieve in a
number of fields.
Little in these standards is immediately identifiable as specifically
referring to communication skills. Some of them assumed the
importance of effective communication skills in the context of
promoting good behaviour. Standard 52.7 declaims that "Those
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awarded Qualified Teacher Status must demonstrate that they know a
range of strategies to promote good behaviour and establish a
purposeful learning environment" (TTA 2002:34). Among the
evidence for the achievement of this standard was "Trainees could
[ ...] demonstrate their knowledge of effective behaviour management
by the approaches they use in the classroom, for example: teaching
assertively, maintaining a brisk pace to their lessons, setting and
maintaining high expectations, using their voice effectively, using
praise and encouragement, asking carefully formulated questions, and
intervening in a timely way to maintain or re-focus pupils on task"
(TTA 2002:34).
For teaching at the level of Key Stage 3, the ITA manual urges that
those "awarded Qualified Teacher Status must demonstrate that they
have high expectations of pupils and build successful relationships
centred on teaching and learning. They establish a purposeful learning
environment where diversity is valued and where pupils feel secure
and confident." (ITA 2002:51). The evidence that assessors are
required to look for includes: can the trainee encourage pupils to
expand on toplc, express their views on different Issues, reflect,
evaluate and learn from mistakes?" (TTA 2002:51). In the standards
for delivering effective lessons, (53.3.3) the TTA urges that those
judging teachers should consider the extent to which they support
pupils' understanding of the nature and purpose of the lesson. "Can
the trainee provide collaborative learning? Can the trainee employ
interactive teaching methods to promote questioning, reflection,
observation, critical thinking [ ...] discussion and dialogue?" (TTA
2002:58).
From these few extracts, it is apparent that these activities need
teachers with a sophisticated knowledge and understanding of the art
of communication, as well as its complexity and theoretical bases.
Yet nowhere is the teaching of communication skills directly
addressed. The TTA does not directly set standards for communication
skills per se, yet everything that they urge should happen in a well
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run teaching situation is implicitly based on a teacher's skill in the
effective use of language and non-verbal messages. Teachers are
furthermore expected to have good background knowledge of their
own subject, including its theoretical basis, yet the means whereby
these are transmitted to others through language is never directly
addressed. The implication is that teachers learning to communicate
within the context of schools and colleges are not offered
communication as a subject with its own theoretical underpinnings
and practical experience. Despite the recognition that communication
is critical to teaching, it is not one of the official Standards for the
training and evaluation of teachers set out by the TTA.
The TTA publication GTP Needs Assessment and Training Plan, a
review of good practice (TTA 2002A), makes clear that the courses
are driven by the need for students to achieve certain stated
standards. "The Standards are not used as a framework for planning
but are organised in the training plan as outcomes" (TTA 2002A:4).
This document urges the use of a wide variety of training activities,
such as taught courses, workshops and seminars. In the section
outlining the ways in which tutors should plan their feedback sessions
with students in teaching practice, there is again no mention of
language skills per se.2 Similarly, in the list of examples of training
activities within and beyond the classroom, there is no mention of
communication training, public speaking, presentation skills, or
understanding the possible relationships between language and
thought, let alone the ways in which language could influence the
learning process of individuals. It is surprising that these do not
appear as core subjects.
2 "The focus of the school based tutoring meetings can be planned for each
term and most frequently may Include:
• Review and verification of evidence in the trainee's portfolio
• Subject-specific training
• Discussions on lesson planning, teaching and assessment
• Discussions and feedback of classroom observations
• Review of the implementation of the training plan; and
• Target setting for the trainee. (TIA 2002A: 5-6).
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In another document published by the TTA (1997)
Deputy/Headteachers' views on accessing and using research and
evidence-results of a pilot survey, which reports on an inquiry into
Deputy Heads' and Heads' uses of research, there are some statistics
indicating the kinds of research papers they had consulted, and what
types of research they would like to see carried out. The greatest
number of references that had been used referred to aspects of
learning. Classroom processes and teaching styles (under which
communication could be considered to be subsumed) were seventh in
order of frequency of consultation. The perceived research needs of
teachers, however, placed comparing the effectiveness of different
teaching strategies as the highest priority, closely followed by models
of effective classroom teacher behaviour. These last two could, by
implication, hint at an interest in, and perceived need for more on
communication skills.
What of the Further and Higher Education sectors? A similar picture
emerged. I first approached the Further Educational National Training
Programme (FENTO)by email, who recommended that I download
their publication FENTO Standards for Teaching and Learning from
their website, (FENTO2002). Again, communication as such is not
explicitly addressed, but implicit in many of their published standards
of attainment. In Section 0 (FENTO2002), called 'Managing the
Learning Process' the enthusiastic researcher experiences a sense of
deja vu. It urges that teachers should aim to achieve an interactive,
safe and productive learning environment, maintain learners'
interests, redress poor motivation, set tasks that foster curiosity and
creativity, encourage learners to take responsibility for their own
learning, use group work effectively, set tasks, give constructive and
relevant feedback, and "use a range of communication skills and
methods appropriate to the subject being studied". Here again,
communication is implicitly central to effective teaching, yet it is not
identified as a subject that deserves to stand on its own, as perhaps
the most important catalyst for achieving the stated good learning
practices!
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A trawl through the publications on United Kingdom Central Council
for Nursing (UKCC) Standards for the preparation of teachers and
lecturers of nursing, midwifery and health visiting proved equally
revealing about the dearth of information on the specifics of teaching
communication to people qualifying to be educators. Again, the
recommendations are couched in the form of Standards, which have
to be met by the student in order to achieve qualified status. They
state that they are 'broad statements of principle' which can be
applied and developed in different ways in order for educational
institutions to offer meaningful, adaptable and appropriate courses of
education', (UKCC 2000:5). The first programme outcome is titled
'Communication and working relationships'. The subheadings, which
state what this means in practice, do not address communication as
such, but the word 'relationship' is mentioned several tlmes," (UKCC
200: 6).
There are also recommendations for how to facilitate learning. These
encourage teachers to attend to the development of an enquiring,
reflective, critical and innovative approach to education and practice.
It urges the implementation of a wide range of teaching and learning
strategies, which are effective across a range of education and
practice settings. For the programme outcomes, which give an
indication of the content of the courses, communication and learning
are addressed, but again in very abstract terminology.
Communication is, however, perceived as linked to developing
working relationships, understanding and support. Another
programme outcome for the trainee is the facilitation of learning.
Here, trainees are exhorted to demonstrate the facilitation of effective
learning, as well as strategies for its achievement.
3 1. Communication and working relationships, Including
a) the development of effective relationships based on mutual trust and
respect.
b) The development and maintenance of appropriate supportive
relationships with students/registered practitioners.
c) The fostering of student Inter-relationships
d) an understanding of how students/registered practitioners integrate
into a new practice setting and assisting with this process.
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The same patterns emerge in the advisory standards for mentors and
mentorship. Here again the links between communication and
relationships are stressed, as if they were conceptually linked. A
criticism of this document could be that it presents communication as
so closely linked to relationships that the two approaches could be
considered as synonymous.
There are, however, some common themes that can be plucked out of
these documents. Among them are the recognition of the importance
of developing the autonomy of the learner, of providing an
appropriate learning environment, (which could imply that the
recognition of the state of the learner is important), the need for
flexible approaches to teaching, and the importance of goals, and
relationships. These are all supported by my inquiry, though I
approach the area in greater detail. The recommendations are, I
suspect, also more complex than those currently posited by received
educational wisdom.
12.5. Newly Qualified Teachers (NQTs) report on their
experiences of learning about communication.
I was curious to know what the experiences of newly qualified
teachers had been of their training, and whether it had included any
'input' on the effects of language. These soundings only involved
three NQTs, so as to obtain a brief glimpse into their experiences of
their PGCEcourses. Because the sample is so small, it is invalid to
generalise from it. However, it was random sampling, in that each of
them was teaching at the school where I had interviewed the
inspectors, but came from different backgrounds. One of them taught
English, the other Science, and the third Drama. Silverman (2000)
warns that it may be dangerous to claim representativeness for such
small samples. He also points out that much qualitative research is
dependent on access to people. Thus I chose these three people, all of
whom were women, as much for their accessibility as for the
'snapshot' that I hoped to obtain about their experiences on their
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PGCEcourses. Each one of them had attended a different training
provider. After obtaining their signed consent/ and my assurance that
they would remain anonymous, I emailed each of them, asking for
their responses to the following questions:
• Were you taught communication skills specifically during your
PGCE course? If so, what sort of things did the course cover,
and what theory was it based on?
• Now that you have had some teaching experience, what sort of
things would you like to have been taught about
communication?
• Were you ever told that there may be a connection between
language and the development of mental models In learners?
The English teacher replied that she had had one seminar on
communication, which stressed the importance of recognising the
main senses that pupils used to learn. This encouraged her to present
material so that it stimulated pupils visually, auditorily and
kinaesthetically. She was also encouraged to use body language and
gesture. The rest of this seminar was on developing multi-cultural
awareness. It appears that no theory was addressed, neither was
there any mention of the possible roles of language In the
construction of mental models.
The Science teacher replied that she had not been taught
communication formally. "We had a few lectures on class
management, managing difficult pupils which included a little on how
to communicate effectively with pupils, but that's about it." She also
reported that she had had no specific lectures or programmes on the
study of language. There was also no apparent theoretical basis to
what she was taught. My second and third questions elicited the
following response. "1 was in the Science PGCEcourse. The answer
4 The consent forms are included in Appendix 2.
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again will have to be no. Not specific programmes or study on
language".
The third NQT,who taught Drama, responded to the first questions
with this information. "I was taught about basic language to use in
the classroom. For example making sure that the language we use
was only positive that we never used negative phrases towards
pupils". She also vouchsafed that "there was no theory based on this
but there might have been!" Amusingly, to the third question she
replied "I remember a brief and very boring seminar based loosely on
this subject. But I don't think anyone paid any attention since the
lecturer was boring us to sleep!"
Although these are only soundings, it is clear that none of these
respondents had had any formal input into the critical importance of
language structures and communication generally in the activating of
learning processes, let alone what may be emerging about the ways
in which languaging information could influence how mental models
are constructed.
12.6. Classroom talk
Despite some reservations about how professional educators
perceived the importance of understanding communication, classroom
communication has generated conslderable interest. It is increasingly
coming to be recognised that classroom talk may playa significant
role for learners. A glimpse at recent publications mentioned below
shows growing interest In the role of different kinds of classroom talk,
and there have been several attempts to evaluate its usefulness. The
emphasis of this approach is to encourage the students themselves to
learn useful ways of discourse, which facilitates learning.
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Corden (2001, 2001A) investigated teachers who wanted to break out
of the mode of 'traditional' classroom talk," and to examine the
quality of teacher-student discourse during group work, recognising
that social constructivists emphasise the interrelationship between
spoken language and learning. He identifies how teachers can
influence the production of the kinds of talk that facilitate learning,
among learners. He urges that the oral discourse patterns prevalent in
many classrooms need modification. He observes that successful peer
group work depends on students having a shared understanding of
the purpose of talk, which was not always the case. He distinguishes
between exploratory language and reasoned evaluation, (which lead
to successful peer learning) contrasting these with desultory and
disputational talk, which seem to inhibit learning. Significantly, he
also observes that when students perceived teachers in a non-
examiner role, this influenced their approach to learning. He also
suggested that there were distinct discourse markers" that teachers
could use to facilitate students to explore and question for
themselves.
Tao (2003) set about teaching a group of students about the nature
of science through stories about famous scientists, and peer
collaboration. This author believes that stories had a considerable
impact on students' understanding of the nature of science, yet also,
paradoxically, confirmed the entrenched and inadequate views of
some. His students apparently even showed selective attention to the
parts of the story that appeared to confirm their 'inadequate' views.
This was an attempt to understand different ways of instructing
through how the teacher communicated, yet when I turned to the
5 This he identifies as the IRE pattern, where the teacher initiates, the
student responds, then the teacher evaluates the response.
6 These Discourse Markers included phrases such as
Iwas wondering ...
I suppose .
It eouId be .
What if...?
Don't you think ...?
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bibliography, there were no references about the literature on
communication, metaphor, unconscious learning, let alone linguistics.
The work of Osowski et al (2003) is interesting because they explored
effective ways of teaching medical students about the immune
system." They found that presenting material with 'gaps' in it, so that
the students had to fill in the missing information for themselves,
improved their overall test scores in the subject. This is essentially an
application of the Zeigarnik effect. There are however no references
to this, nor is there any attempt to explore any underlying
explanatory theory, existing or otherwise, (despite the fact that this
paper had six authors!).
Haggarty and Postlethwaite (2002) make a case for the improvement
of communication between students and teachers; again they focus
on the learners' patterns of discourse. However, they also propose
that there are some useful ways in which teachers can improve their
classroom skills; these include using checking questions, 'why'
questions, and giving opportunities for peer-peer self-reflection. Non-
verbal communication is also included as a topic of interest; examples
include giving students full attention, when talking to pupils altering
their posture so that teacher and pupil are at the same eye level,
giving negative feedback non-verbally, and positive feedback verbally,
and ensuring that the seating arrangements in classrooms produce a
sense of inclusiveness among learners. Again, there is little reference
to any theory on which such recommendations are based.
Gray et al (2000) recognise the importance of teachers learning about
communication. They observe that "a significant proportion of
teaching and learning takes place in the classroom, and this cannot
occur unless communication between teachers and learners
7 I was very keen to read this paper, as the title said An Alternative Teaching
Method for the Regulation of the Immune System. I read this to mean that
there could be a causal link between the behaviour of the learners' immune
system, and how a subject was taught. Alas, I misread this ambiguously
phrased title.
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themselves takes place", (Gray et al 2000: 111). They recognise that
language lies at the very heart of the teacher-learner communication
process. They stress the importance for teachers to keep their talk in
proportion, to use words that connect to the abilities and ages of their
learners, and to be aware of the differences between the spoken and
the written word. Despite the importance given to understanding the
classroom communication, there is little reference to any theory about
language and communication.
The Open Unlverslty" uses an approach to the training of educators
that stresses the importance of teaching pupils useful ways of talking,
in order to facilitate each other's learning. The implications here are
that teachers need to develop an understanding of the usefulness (or
otherwise) of different patterns of discourse, in order to facilitate their
emergence among learners. They place considerable emphasis on the
teaching of oracy and the facilitation of peer group learning. This is
reflected in the DES Publication Language at work in lessons, Literacy
across the curriculum at key stage 3. (Qualifications and Curriculum
Authority 2001) The approach that is encouraged in this publication is
the result of much of the work done by the Department of Education
in the Open unlversitv." It is addressed to teachers, and contains
suggestions and examples for the improvement of pupils' abilities to
engage in useful ways of talking to facilitate learning. Mercer (2002)
emphasises that teachers need to be able to encourage the
development of constructive ways of talking among their pupils, even
in "situations which are not continuously dominated by the presence
of the teacher", (Mercer 1001: 178).
The theoretical framework for this approach comes from the tradition
of Discourse Analysis. This, as Potter (1991) has pointed out, is a
8 This is well represented by their recommended reading, such as Moon, B.,
Mayes, S., Hutchinson, S. eds. (2002) Teaching, Learning and the
Secondary Curriculum in Schools: A Reader London and New York: The Open
University, Routledge/Falmer.
9 I am grateful to Professor Neil Mercer of the Open University for drawing
my attention to this publication.
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somewhat broad church, comprising more than one approach, whose
aims were not the investigation of cognitive processes. In another
Open University Readerlo for their students in Education, Hicks
(2003), in her reviews of research in this field, and her analysis of
classroom discourse genres, is clear that she believes that discourse
could be understood as a mediator of children's learning. Her
approach is underpinned by the notion that knowledge is socially
constructed.
Neither in how most teachers are trained, nor in the publications that
are used as recommended reading, are the relationships between
language and cognition directly addressed. They are however often
implied. Although constructivism appears to dominate the approaches
taken by teacher educators (Doolittle 2003), there appears to be no
formal attempt to link what words are used by teachers, to how these
may influence the emergence of cognition in their learners with the
degrees of precision that my inquiry seems to support. The link is
nevertheless recognised. Anderberg (2000) for instance, argues that
the intentional-expressive aspects of language and thought have not
hitherto been taken into close consideration in the investigation of
learning.
12.7. What would it mean for teachers to know more about
language and epistemology? A new Trivium?
There is currently some interest in new ways of training teachers In
communication skills. Burchell and Dyson (2000) have explored the
use of stories as an aid to reflective learning. Lee and Law (2001)
urge that the language that teachers use may reinforce scientifically
inappropriate conceptualisations in their students. Teglasi and
Rothman (2001) have shown that the use of stories with young
children showing aggressive behaviours can inform pupils about more
10 Goodman,S., Lillis,T., Maybin,J., Mercer,N., (2003) Language, Literacy and
Education: A Reader Stoke on Trent UK and Sterling USA: Open University,
Trentham Books.
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appropriate forms of behaviour. Valenzo et al (2002) describe how
teachers' gestures enhanced comprehension of instructional
discourse. Barth et al (1997) claim that in medical education, where
surgical residents have had training in communication skills, these
develop more effective ways of teaching. However the authors do not
refer to any theoretical basis for the communication skills that were
taught. In medical education there is an increasing emphasis on the
importance of acquiring communication skills; Wagner et al (2002)
describe the design of structured training activities to emphasis key
polnts about patient-physician interactions. Kennedy (2001) has
written about the importance of teaching veterinary surgeons and
medical students the art of empathy. Maguire and Pitceathly (2002)
describe some key communication skills for medics, and how useful
they were found to be. Vegni, Martinoli and Moja (2002) claim that
training physicians in patient centred approaches to communication
increased their perceived competence.
The approaches used by these researchers are not based on any
clearly identifiable set of theories. There Is a noticeable dearth of
citations from the field of linguistics, let alone the new paradigms of
cybernetics, systems theory, or other ways of thinking about the
science of complexity as applied to human consciousness. Our
understanding of teaching and learning may be enriched by the use of
such approaches; it could allow for different ways of exploring and
experimenting. However, the time could now be ripe to introduce
some new theoretical underpinnings to what teachers study about
language, and the complexity of human interactions. This could
provide a focus for further investigations, discussions, and most
importantly, research. There is a need to test such theories about
human interactions.
In the mediaeval schools, the curriculum was based on the trivium
and the quadrivium. The subjects of the trivium were grammar, logic
and rhetoric, largely informed by the works of classical antiquity. A
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new trivium for the 21st Century might be based on what is now
known about how we construct our cognitive maps.
It would include a grammar that is based on the idea that different
combinations of words have a distinct effect, and that much of their
power operates at levels of consciousness that are barely within
people's awareness. It could be the grammar of moving listeners from
having a sense of being a passive recipient of knowledge, to being an
agent of their own learning. Grammatical or syntactical structures can
set categories to which information is to be assigned, can influence
the direction of internal searches, can be echoed In people's internal
dialogue, and can affect a variety of different logical levels of the
'system'. They can also influence peoples' sense of self, as well as the
value, or otherwise, of what they are learning. They can generate
moods, which mayor may not be appropriate to learning. There are
powerful words, which elicit strong physiological responses, such as
the term 'failure'.
One of the most fundamental linguistic (and conceptual dynamics) in
teaching is feedback; words can set directions for people's thinking,
set goals and outcomes, and inform people about the extent to which
these are being met. Most importantly, linguistic forms can also
influence what happens to learners' internal representations, sub-
modalities and physiology. They can also connect, or disconnect
different conceptual entities, thus both creating meaning, and
changing how it is made. Last but not least, it could include the
profoundly metaphoric nature of discourse, and the implications of
this for our knowledge building.
Rhetoric would address how the words are delivered, and would
include the effects of non-verbal communication, including body
language and voice tonality. Although this has not been a focus for
my inquiry, there is nevertheless some literature on how non-verbal
communication itself acts as a creator of categories, (Watzlawick et al
1967, Watzlawick 1997). I have said very little about the voice and
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tonality; I noticed when observing Mr Phil's teaching, that he used his
voice to great effect; creating moods of intrigue and excitement,
calm, arousal, humour, whilst always retaining control. He told me
that he had had training in Drama. It was no wonder that his lesson
was both theatrical and highly informative.
Last but not least, we come to logic, not the dead hand of mediaeval
syllogisms, but the new logic of cybernetic epistemology. This would
recognise that we can code information at different levels of
complexity, and that we can confuse different logical types and create
double binds (Bateson 1972). It could also be a logic that recognises
the epistemological necessity of the TOTE, and the power of people's
goals to their thinking and acting. It would cover some of the main
epistemological processes that I explored in Chapter 11 as necessary
to the building of cognitive maps. These may be significant pre-
requisites to learning. It could also include the logic of multiple
perceptual positions, trans-derivational searches, and the effects of
sameness - difference filters. It might also describe the ways in which
human beings make sense of the myriad of bits of incoming
information through the use of inductive, deductive and abductive
processes, which always involves the deletion, generalisation or
distortion of information thus constructed.
All epistemologies imply a presupposed ontology. In Bateson's
cybernetics, he proposes that we may not really 'know' what is 'out
there'; we build a reality through our senses and our physical bodies
by means of an inescapable epistemology that both enables us to map
the territory of our experience, yet constrains us by the paradox that
we may never really totally 'know'. We are caught in the most
fundamental of epistemological paradoxes, which is that the map is
not (and may never be) the territory.
370
12.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to review some of the ways in which
it seems teachers are currently taught about language and
communication. I have done this by taking a small number of
soundings, so as to obtain a somewhat generalised view. I
demonstrate that there is an increasing interest for some in the
educational community in the generation of the kind of talk which is
useful to learners. This however, focuses mainly on learners' rather
than on teachers' talk.
This chapter has considered how to redress the balance, by sketching
out some contents for a hypothetical syllabus designed for a course
for those training to be teachers. It is based on the notion of a new
trivium, which emerged from my reflections on my findings. This
encompasses developing an understanding of the different
grammatical and syntactical forms that influence the creation of
mental maps, the rhetoric that ensures an effective delivery through
verbal and non-verbal means, and the logic of the epistemology that
has emerged from this inquiry. Without these processes, the act of
knowing as we do would not be possible.
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Chapter 13. Reflections at the Endof the Journey.
William James, in his Principles of Psvchologv (1890) wrote: "As we
take ... a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness,
what strikes us first is the different pace of its parts. Like a bird's life,
it seems to be made of alternate flights and perchings. " In their quest
to understand consciousness, modern scholars apparently cannot
agree on which direction the bird is flying, where it might perch, nor
even what nature of bird it is. A mystery indeed. (Lewin 2001:69)
You see, whenever you think that you understand totally, that is the
time to go inside and say, "the joke is on me". Because it is in those
moments of certainty that you can be sure that the futile learnings
have set in, and the fertile ground has not been explored. (Bandler
1985:156).
13.1. Introduction.
In this chapter I review some of my main research findings in a more
critical light, stress what I believe may be some original contributions
to our understanding of teaching and learning, and look back at my
own research process, and at what I have personally learned from
engaging in it.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) distinguish between theory generation and
theory testing as different yet valid approaches to qualitative
research. This inquiry is clearly in the former category. It has
generated hypotheses and models about language and information
processing. The main approach was the use of a phenomenological
approach and some modelling under the umbrella of Action Research.
According to Maykut and Morehouse (1994), the hallmark of the
phenomenological approach is the discovery of propositions. Action
Research (McNiff et a/1996), is about illuminating practice. "Such
research aims at helping people make better sense of their lives, no
mean ambition", (Coulter 2002:203).
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My main focus was to explore the inter-relationships between
language and people's construction of their cognitive maps. The
inquiry suggests that the use of our senses internally is an important
aspect of our cognitive mapping processes.
The generation of the theories that I have written about, particularly
in chapters 10 and 11, has been the culmination of a complex
research process, involving an eclectic approach, which has brought
together ideas and information from a number of different, sometimes
apparently unrelated, disciplines. This approach belongs within the
post-modernist tradition. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998) "all
research is interpretive, guided by a set of beliefs that guides action",
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998:26). One of the threads running through
the fabric of this work has been both the theory and application of
NLP, against a background of cybernetic and systems theory.
NLPwas used in both stages of the data collection. In the first stage,
it was applied to interviewing a small sample of students about their
deeply subjective experiences of their own internal representations
and sub-modalities. In the second stage, it was used as a means of
textual analysis, to elicit a generalised model of some basic
epistemological processes, which may be mediated by language, and
vital to learning. There is a sense in which this research project was
also an evaluation of NLPas a potential adjunct to phenomenology,
because of what is presupposed about the nature of consciousness,
cognitive mapping processes and language. It does not seek to raise
NLPabove other approaches to textual analysis; the case is made for
it to be considered as complementary to approaches such as
Discourse Analysis.
One of my rationales for using NLPwas that it claims to provide a way
of modelling people's subjective experiences. This was the main thrust
of my data gathering activities. Chapters 6 - 12 are my own
reflections on the information that I was given by my collaborators.
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My interest focused on modelling people's subjective processes when
engaging in learning. In order to make sense of much of this
information, I drew on a number of different approaches, ranging
across linguistics, cognitive psychology, systems and complexity
theory, cybernetics, philosophy and research methodology to provide
the background theoretical matrix to my approach.
McNiff et al point out that "our thinking is already conditioned by what
we believe in" (McNiff et a/1996:38), so my choice of literature was
influenced by the need to explore topics such as cognitive mapping,
and the wide-ranging topics that have developed from different
approaches to the study of language. This included information about
the type and use of mental maps or cognitive models. Here I drew
largely from the field of cognitive psychology, the 'cybernetic
epistemology' of Gregory Bateson, and many ideas of the founders of
NLP, Richard Bandler and John Grinder and some of their
collaborators.
Another area that I drew from was linguistics; I reviewed some of the
more recent ideas in this area, and again used Bandler and Grinder's
distinctive approach to language. Their use of their meta-model,
which I explored in some detail in chapters 4 and 5, was critical to
this inquiry. The main reason for this is because it presents a typology
of language structures, which are thought to relate directly to
processes that are used in the making of meaning. Thus this has been
as much an exploration of the epistemology of language, as a
phenomenological inquiry into the nature of learning and making
sense.
13.2. On the phenomenology of the relationships between
internal representations and language
Integral to action research is the notion of reflexivity, which might be
defined as a mental process in which one thinks about things by going
back over them. (Phelps and Hase 2002:516).
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My original research questions had been:
• How does language influence the formation of people's
conceptual structures?
• What perspective does NLP offer on inquiring into the processes
of teaching and learning?
For the first phase of the data gathering for this inquiry, I sought
information about an aspect of our cognitive maps, which has been
largely ignored in the educational and psychological literature, namely
the phenomenon of internal representations. I suggest that an
essential part of our cognitive mapping processes are internal
representations. In using these, we re-create, as it were, on the
'inside', rich images of information coded through all the senses.
Among these findings, and the detail in which I have presented them,
I propose that information may be coded through all the senses. This
is new to our understanding of the construction of cognitive models.
Thus we use our senses internally to 'make sense'. This involves not
only the conceptual abilities of the mind, but also some complex
bodily and physiological processes. This implies that a more holistic
view of learning may be useful, one where the whole of the person is
perceived as involved, rather than learning being considered as only
involving 'mind' or 'reason'. The paradigms that give the best 'fit' to
this emerging model are those of cybernetics and systems theory.
In these approaches, phenomena are not reduced to their component
parts, or distorted by false dichotomies such as the mind/body divide.
Various different variables within a system are considered as
operating interactively. They cannot be 'reduced' to one factor driving
all the others. The science of complexity proposes that more complex
systems give rise to emergent properties, which are not predictable
through the mere study of their component parts. Maturana and
Varela (1987) echo this; "we hold that the biological roots of knowing
cannot be understood only through examining the nervous system;
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we believe it is necessary to understand how these processes are
rooted in the being as a whole", (Maturana and Varela 1987:34).
Wiener (1948) proposed that the stored information of the mind lay
on many levels of accessibility, that it was rich and varied, and always
influenced by an individual's affective and hormonal conditions.
Bateson (Donaldson 1991) believed that the separation of what we
experience into apparently clear categories was a creation of our mind
and our own psychology. I discovered that the conceiver's fleeting
appearances of internal representations, and their changes, could be
influenced by words and syntax. These could either come from
another person, or through the individual's own internal dialogue. I
believe this to be a new contribution to our understanding of cognitive
mapping, and making sense of experience. It may also be of interest
to educators who take a constructivist approach to learning.
Throughout this research I was attempting to develop a model of our
learning processes, which was intrinsically holistic, and not reducible
to parts, or presented as a list implying any order of importance.
Having teased out what I believe to be some of the vital
epistemological processes without which learning cannot take place,
and which are mirrored in syntactical structures, I drew on complexity
and chaos theory to suggest that these processes operated holistically
and interactively. Phelps and Hase (2002) have stated that in their
view, complexity theory can be treated as a formal attempt to
question how a coherent and purposive whole emerges from the
interaction of simple and sometimes non-purposive components. I
am not aware of any work that has attempted to show such
interrelationships between language and thinking in such detail, and
uncovered not just more about our 'mental maps', but also the means
whereby such maps are created from the chaotic dance of information
that assaults our senses. As Silverman pointed out, "human subjects
actively participate in the construction of social and psychological
realities." (Silverman 1993:110). I hope that this study has addressed
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some of the ways in which this happens, particularly through the
model of the interactive nature of some of our basic epistemological
processes.
I have presented a new model of learning, which can be viewed as
belonging within a constructivist approach. This was the culmination
of a long and complex modelling process, whose beginnings I
described in Chapters 1 and 2. It is now coming to be recognised that
chaos theory, and the science of complex systems, may have a role to
play in educational research. Doolittle (2003A) suggests that the time
is ripe for the introduction of a new metaphor system to our theories
about teaching and learning, urging that chaos theory may be a way
of gaining new insights. Phelps and Hase (2002) have furthermore
made the point that few authors have drawn an explicit connection
between action research and complexity; an approach which is still in
its infancy. My whole inquiry was illumined, from the start, by
cybernetic theory, which belongs, as it were, to the same family of
models as systems theory, the science of complexity, and chaos
theory. I thus offer both a new model of learning, and a different
metaphor system whereby we may gain insights into the complex
ways of how we make meaning.
In chapter 1, I suggested that the approach that I took was largely
constructivist, and influenced by the ideas of Vygotsky. I then used
NLP to investigate the phenomenon of learning in more depth.
Frawley (1997) cites Vygotsky's comment that "thought is not
expressed in the word, but is completed by the word. One might
therefore speak of the becoming (the unity of being and non-being) of
the thought in the word" (Frawley 1997:97). He further proposed that
the Vygotskian, interactive approach to language and thought
presupposes that every piece of information can potentially impinge
on every other. For Vygotsky, knowledge was mediated through
language, first from an external 'other', then internalised to become
part of the developing individual's thinking. Thus this inquiry may also
add to the Vygotskian approach.
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13.3. Reflections on questions of validity and reliability
This brings us to the question of the status of the models I have put
forward. Because the means of obtaining them was essentially
phenomenological, this meant that the models that emerged were
largely inductive in origin. They have not been tested or replicated,
and thus, strictly speaking, only have the status of a hypothesis or
sketch map waiting to be refined by further exploration. This would
involve testing them, and even submitting them to falsification in the
Popperian sense, (Popper 1969). This is what hypotheses are for!
There is a sense in which this inquiry has been an adventure in
mapping a little known terrain, and has relied on the use of a limited
number of instruments. The material was obtained through a small
number of collaborators, who shared their deep and personal
responses with my two assistants and myself. James (1999),
exploring the influence of a researcher's autobiography on her
research, has pointed out that the development of insight into
situations was a "somewhat haphazard process" (James 1999:85).
This was certainly the case with this inquiry. The apparent significance
of people's inner dialogues, for instance, only emerged during the
course of the interviews, and was confirmed by the reading and re-
reading of the transcripts.
There are of course limitations to both the data and my
extrapolations. This is because I used a very small sample from a
target population of people who had trained in NLP. Anderson urges
that a target population should be clearly defined and its boundaries
understood. (Anderson 1990). Thus one can only legitimately
generalize about this particular target population. "One cannot
generalise from a sample to anything other than the population from
which the sample was drawn," (Anderson 1990:197). However, my
sample could also be included in the category of learners, so my
extrapolations may be relevant to other learners. Nevertheless they
remain as hypotheses, awaiting further testing.
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The reasons for restricting myself to a handful of collaborators were
twofold. Firstly, my small groups yielded a vast amount of
lnrorrnatlon.' which provided me with much analysis and reflection.
Secondly, I knew that the people involved could safely explore and
share their inner worlds. As a practitioner of NLP I am cognisant of
the possibility, however remote, that drawing people's attention to
deeply subjective experiences may evoke repressed traumatic
memories, which can cause them great distress. I have witnessed this
in other trainings. Safety was thus an issue.
I was confident that each individual in my small sample could safely
navigate through these inner worlds, and share their introspections
with me. For this reason it may have been ethically questionable to
use a larger and randomised sample of people that I did not know. I
remain aware that the extrapolations from the transcripts must
remain hypothetical, and material for further exploration. The
generation of hypotheses is after all the main aim of the
phenomenological approach, (Giorgi 1985). Giorgi also urges
"psychological explorations must discover their own methods,
procedures, rules of interpretation and so on ..." (Giorgi 1985 :45).
A reasonable challenge to this work is the possibility that in training
my collaborators to be aware of their internal processes, (which is one
of the main approaches used in all NLP training); I could be accused
of installing their internal representations rather than eliciting them.
The NLP approach in training is to make people more aware of how
they construct their own internal realities. It is difficult to know how
many people have undergone NLP training; a conservative estimate
would put it at many thousands. The only occasions where I have
failed to enable people to elicit their internal representations were
with severely traumatised individuals. Working with people's internal
representations has a formed the basis of many therapeutic
interventions in NLP, (Bandler and Grinder 1979). There are claims
1 The transcripts of my interviews amounted to over 35000 words. Those of
the Master Practitioners came to over 27000 words.
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that they have been used successfully for the treatment of phobias,
anxiety and trauma, (Koziey and McLeod 1987, Einspruch et at 1988,
Konefal and Duncan 1992).
There is also the question of the power and influence of the teacher
turned researcher. I have explored some of these issues in chapter
10. An ever-present danger to validity could be that a student turned
into a research subject may be too inclined to 'please the teacher'. In
this case I was careful to separate out the two activities of assessing
and interviewing. All the practitioners had been told that they had
passed the course nearly two weeks before my interviews. There was
a lapse of time between their assessment and the formal presentation
of their certificates, and my interviews. The course itself had thus
achieved some closure. This does not mean that my influence had
ceased; if anything I believe it manifested itself in the amount of
detail that my collaborators presented me with. Everyone who
participated in my interviews was given to understand that these had
nothing to do with their assessment. Punch (1998) has described the
politics and ethics of qualitative research as 'a swamp' (Punch
1998:179). I was as honest as possible with my collaborators.
However, in qualitative research, it is recognised that the researcher
is never without influence, (McNiff et at 1996).
McNiff et at (1996) have also suggested some criteria for establishing
the validity of a piece of research, though they warn that the
discussions about validity in the literature are "littered with
controversy" (McNiff et at 1996:67). They suggest that when a study
has been carried out where the researcher has developed her own
measuring instrument, the situation becomes more complex. (The
patterns of language, which NLP describes, can be used as
instruments for information gathering and textual analysis). For
McNiff et at (1996) an important criterion is reliability. For them,
measuring human characteristics with an instrument that is valid but
not reliable will produce potentially different results on different
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occasions. Furthermore, an instrument that is not valid can never be
reliable.
Seale (1999) has suggested that it is useful to distinguish between
internal and external reliability. Internal reliability is evaluated by the
degree to which the models that are presented are coherent, and the
extent to which the work is replicable. It also depends on the
evidence procedures; the extent to which filed notes, transcripts and
recordings are made available. The transcripts, which came to over
62,000 words, are indications of internal reliability. I doubt that this
work is entirely replicable, though I believe that others, working in
similar contexts, may happen upon the same processes that I have
described.
External reliability, on the other hand, is more complex. It involves
the researcher in being clear and transparent about her own
theoretical perspective. She should also provide as much as possible
of the original data to the reader to ensure reliability, (Seale 1999). I
have attempted to do this; two complete transcripts are included as
examples in the Appendices.
The illustrative texts are highly selective, having been chosen because
they show aspects that I thought important. Seale (1999) polnts out
that the interpretations of texts may produce ideological distortions.
Thus interpretations can never be 'neutral' (whatever the word
means) but will always be informed by the perceiver's own bias. The
research questions themselves continually influenced how I looked at
the transcripts; the notion of a separate, 'neutral' observer having the
ability to make 'objective' judgements and reach 'true' conclusions is
no longer viewed as valid in the post-positivistic tradition.
This approach is echoed by Gleick (1998), who explored the notion
that it was never possible to obtain totally accurate measurements.
Measurement is influenced by how something is measured. My texts
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were used as a source of information, which allowed me to pursue my
own curiosity about people's internal conceptual processes.
Another significant aspect of the inquiry was the order in which the
questions were asked. I do not have any basis for believing that
altering the order of questions would significantly and materially have
altered the data. My concern in designing the interview schedule was
to vary the questions as much as possible, so that similar language
patterns were repeated in the next question. It is possible that during
the interviews, which demanded deep introspection from participants,
they may have become more practised in reporting on their
introspections as the interviews progressed. In one case, ('Ina', in
chapter 7) the sequencing of modal operators seemed to amplify her
motivation. Perhaps this is also an area for further investigation.
So how valid is such an inquiry? Gummesson (2000) proposes that
validity means that a theory, model or concept describes reality with a
good 'fit', "just as a good map properly describes Earth or an
architect's blueprint is useful for erecting a functional building",
(Gummesson 2000:93). He suggests that validity is "seen as a
continuous process that is integrated with theory and that requires
the researcher to continuously assess his (sic) assumptions, revise his
results, re-test his theories and models and reappraise the given
limitations that have been set for the study," (Gummesson 2000:91).
Seale (1999), paints out that all interpretations may ultimately
involve a modified form of realism; this "involves opposition to the
pure constructivist view that states that there is no possibility of
knowing a real world which exists separately from language," (Seale
1999:27). Bateson (1972) would add to this that the territory of
'reality' exists, that our maps are our ways of knowing it, and that we
may be continuously updating our maps through feedback from
interacting with the 'real' world. The hypotheses that I offer may In
this sense be understood as initial attempts at mapping a terrain of
experience, which is experienced by the conceiver as real.
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Even with something as novel as the relationships between language,
epistemology and the construction of knowledge, I have referred to a
wealth of disparate literature to back up my views. I do, however,
take full responsibility for the models that I propose, however fragile
they may seem as initial hypotheses.
This fragility is in part due to the small sample that I used. Silverman
(1993) suggests that one way of validating the generalisations that
have been derived from data is by respondent validation. That means
asking the respondents for feedback on one's theorising, to establish
some validity. This was not possible; some of my sample had moved
to new jobs in other countries, and others who stayed in the Middle
East were difficult to access electronically; emails to certain countries
in the Middle East have a habit of not arriving at their destination.
Silverman (2000) also warns that there can be problems with
representativeness when a small sample has been used. The solution
he offers, is to validate the theories generated from a small number of
cases through further inquiries using a larger population. He also
suggests that in such cases, the theoretical nature of any propositions
generated from small samples should be emphasised. Without further
testing, my theories risk being accused of 'anecdotalism'. Silverman
describes this as a situation where researchers have used a few well-
chosen examples, rather than basing their findings on critical
investigation. To counter this, I referred to as much of the related
literature as was feasible.
The wealth of data that I obtained, even from my limited sample, was
almost overwhelming; a larger sample would perhaps have generated
too much information. Silverman (2000) also suggests that one of the
ways of overcoming the problem of representativeness and validity is
triangulation. This was not part of the formal research protocol, as the
design 'emerged'. I had not, whilst carrying out the fieldwork in 2000,
expected my initial inquiries to form the main body of the data on
which to base this work. However, the Master Practitioners' interviews
383
could be seen as a kind of triangulation. Certainly, they too were able
to interrogate people's subjective experience, and to evoke responses
in their interviewees about internal representations and sub-
modalities, as well as other aspects. They also showed that the
conceiver's internal representation changed according to the context
of the memory of the experience they were being asked to access
introspectively.
The second phase of information gathering could be criticised because
some of the people my collaborators interviewed were the same as I
had used. I had no control over this stage. I had already left the
country when these interviews were carried out. I had initially asked
all three assistants to interview every participant on the course,
assigning them to speclflc students before I left. One of the assistants
was unable to carry out the agreed interviews, leaving the other two
to do the best they could in my absence. Truly, research is never a
tidy, or predictable process.
Silverman (2000) also suggests that "in qualitative research, working
with smaller datasets open to repeated inspection, one should not be
satisfied until your generalization is able to apply to every single
gobbet of relevant data" (Silverman 2000: 180). Repeated inspection
through interviewing was not possible with the small transient
population I had at my disposal during my two month stay in the
Middle East in 2000. However, the transcripts were repeatedly
inspected and searched for meaningful patterns, and I believe that
they were there in all of them. This was one of the reasons for going
into such detail about my findings. I could have presented even more
examples.
Whatever the problems of validity and reliability, I believe that as an
exercise in theory generation, this inquiry has shed new light on a
number of issues. Not least of these are the possible relationships
between language and epistemology, which raises questions about
the training of teachers about the influence of language forms on their
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learners' subjective processes. I explored some aspects of this in
Chapter 12. It also adds to our understanding of cognitive processes,
by drawing attention to the phenomena of internal representations
and sub-modalities. There are also the roles of internal dialogue and
trans-derivational searches, which again appear to be catalysed in
some way by speech. Although the most hypothetical part of this
work is explained in Chapter 11, I do not claim that what I have
written is 'the truth'. In Frawley's view, "Higher thought is
instrumental and involves the deferral and recasting of the external
world, never its direct apprehension In its own terms" (Frawley
1997:96).
The model I have presented of the possible basic epistemological
processes which are linked to language are a working hypothesis,
rather than 'true'. Silverman (2000) has polnted out that hypotheses
have their uses in the generation of knowledge; they are essential to
further research in order that better theories may emerge. This is the
spirit in which I offer my findings. As hypotheses however, they are
still novel and original. The main issue is whether they are testable.
Reliability can also be provided by the researcher exposing her
emergent Ideas to the scrutiny of others, (Seale 1999). Although
research often feels very isolating, I engaged in many discussions
with others who also used NLPas an approach to their teaching.
These gave me encouraging feedback. I also gave a brief presentation
of my findings to a group of professionals working as coaches and
mentors, and found a receptive audience. Perhaps the acid test was in
submitting chapters 11 and 12 to the scrutiny of the Headteacher who
had let me observe teaching In her school. She has no knowledge of
NLPor related fields. She considered that my ideas were novel, valid,
and could stimulate new Insights Into our understanding of teaching.
This also raises the issue of the possible use of my hypothetical model
to teachers. I have explored some of the existing approaches to the
training of teachers In communication skills in Chapter 12. The
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question of how this could translate into directions for teaching
practice is a relevant one. Iam aware that more research needs to be
done. How do I know that my findings are of any use to teachers? I
have been surprised to find that carrying out this research has
changed my own teaching; Iam much more conscious that I am
Intervening in some complex, multi-level personal processes that are
Influenced and directed by how I teach and the language I use. Such
reflection on practice, and the consequent development of new
insights, is claimed to be one of the aims of Action Research, (Gill and
Johnson 1997, McNiff et a/1996).
It is difficult, without more research, to say more precisely how some
of these ideas could Influence the training of teachers. All Iwould
suggest is that a few weekend workshops are not enough; that to
understand the power of language in the classroom, teachers would
need a grounding in many aspects of linguistics, some of which are
yet still to be fully discovered.
13.4. Using NLP
One of the aims of this inquiry was to test the use of NLPIn three
main ways; first as a way of structuring interview schedules, using
questions directly derived from Bandler and Grinder's meta-model,
secondly as a distinct method of approaching textual analysis, and
thirdly as another tool to use in phenomenological inquiries.
The first approach was used In my own data collection through
Interviews. One of Bandler and Grinder's assumptions Is that
information Is always deleted when it is languaged. This is coupled
with their view that we use Internal representations as part of our
cognitive mapping processes. My approach was based on these
notions. Iwas Interested In people's subjectively experienced aspects
of consciousness, so my approach was to uncover as much detail of
people's Internal representations as was possible within the time
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that it yields, then Isuggest that this approach has yielded some new
understandings of the processes of cognition, and therefore to
learning. Exploring the roles of internal representations and the role
of affective body states to learning are, I propose, some new
directions for future educational research. Furthermore, little is known
about the nature of internal dialogue, and Its effects on learning.
The second aspect was the use of NLPas a tool for textual analysis.
This was one of my main aims with my approach to the Master
Practitioner's transcribed interviews. This forms the main body of
chapter 10. Idemonstrated that there were a number of different
thought patterns, which could be revealed by such an analysis of the
text. These included the ubiquity of connections, of cause effect
thinking, of nominalisations with powerful Influence, and not least, of
the effects of learners' beliefs about themselves as learners. It also
included the question of whether these collaborators experienced
themselves as active agents or as passive reciplents of their own
experience of education. The factor of time emerged as a possibly
significant factor in people's conceptual maps.
The Master Practitioners' interviews were also an evaluation of my
course. Here Ibegan to concentrate on bringing what Ibelieved to be
some basic epistemological processes to light. I began to perceive
these processes as factors, which could be thought of as bringing
order to chaos. They informed my subsequent approach to teaching
and training. These processes could not be reduced to discrete
functions, but were essentially interactive in their nature in an almost
fractal way. (My explorations of these aspects formed the main body
of chapter 11). This is yet another metaphor for our metaphorical
toolbox. However, again Istress that my findings are in essence the
results of hypothesising, and not of establishing facts.
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13 5. Bias and verisimilitude; the spectres of qualitative
inquiry
Many of my theoretical speculations have been directed through the
'lenses' of the paradigm of cybernetics, especially as developed by
Gregory Bateson. As Kuhn pointed out in his seminal work (Kuhn
1970) a paradigm Is never neutral, but tends to 'skew' perception so
that one attends to what 'fits', which means, to what is explicable
through the perceptual filters of the paradigm. Anomalies that are not
explicable tend to be Ignored, or dismissed through ad hoc
hypotheses. Sometimes the seductiveness of a paradigm may blind
one to the appearance of anomalies, which may not even be attended
to. However, It may be impossible for us to 'know' anything that is
not, In some way, theory bound. Ibelieve that using cybernetics
sheds a different light on our understanding of our cognitive
functions. Lincoln and Oenzin (1998) warn that "there are as many
veriSimilitudes as there are genres (comedy, detective fiction, tragedy
and so on), (and that this) is a reminder to the too enthusiastic
researcher claiming verisimilitude", (Lincoln and Oenzin 1998:416).
Although Lincoln and Oenzin warn that "verisimilitude can be
described as the mask a text assumes as it convinces the reader It
has conformed to the laws of Its genre; In doing so it has reproduced
reality In accordance with those rules," (Lincoln and Oenzln
1998:416). The Master Practitioners' transcripts revealed that
people's Ideas about their own futures were not only Influenced by the
language in which a proposition was couched, but also affected by the
personal generalisations they had derived from their own past
histories. Thus, when using NLPas a method for approaching an
analysis of texts, many dimensions are brought to into view, not least
among them being the power of people's perceptions of their own
futures.
NLPalso offers the researcher a way of identifying the many ways In
which people use the factor of time In their constructs. This was
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explored in chapter 10. Again, here I only scratched the surface of a
complex issue. If there is substance to the idea that language
structures reveal not only the content of people's experiences, but
also the means whereby these were constructed, then this way of
analysing language may potentially also enable researchers to identify
what epistemological processes lie buried below the surface of a text
or speech. This notion is presented as another aspect of the
hypothesis, which needs to be tested by further inquiry. Paradoxically,
Lincoln and Oenzin's caveat is not inconsistent with some of Bateson's
deepest held beliefs; that we can only map the territory of
experience, and were thus forever caught in the ontological double
bind of knowing that we know that we cannot know.
13.6. Using NLP to investigate the phenomenology of learners'
experiences
The complexity of the NLPmodel could make the investigation into
the phenomenology of subjective experience more complex. It could
also offer a more detailed map for exploring this terrain. I started by
inquiring Into the possible interactions between language, and the
cognitive maps which were Important to teaching and learning. What
emerged was a model, not of maps, but of the processes we use to
construct our maps. I believe an understanding of these to be basic to
gaining new insights into the complex processes which are mediated
through language, and which drive teaching and learning. On the way
I became aware of both Internal dialogue and the ubiquity of the
directives in language about how the building blocks of knowledge
were to be put together.
Seale (1999) warns that the issue of causal analysis in qualitative
research should not be igno!ed, as, in his view, It so often is. My
hypothesis relies on the notion that the epistemological processes that
I have described in Chapter 11 have a causal function, In that they
are agentlve in the creation of cognitive maps. "Writers generally
depend on carrying readers along with their sense of having been
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close to the field, so that causal asides ... are accepted as the
successful application of verstehen", (Seale 1999:40). He urges that a
useful corrective to this tendency would be the application of
Popperian falsificationism to one's favourite theories. If on the other
hand the model that is proposed is clearly defined as having the
status of a hypothesis, then falsification seems to be appropriate to
another type or phase of research in this area. Popperians would of
course approach the model with falsification in view. Mapping our
mapping processes is inevitably complex and fraught with the dangers
of over-simplification.
At heart this was a phenomenological inquiry, which approached the
experience of subjective, sense-making processes using the tools of
NLP. Within this framework, however, I can claim some validity to my
constructs, as they have been carefully obtained from interviews
designed to uncover phenomena rather than to measure or test them.
My aim was to obtain what Wertz (1985) describes as data that is "as
faithful and complete a description of what was lived through by the
interviewee as possible". (Wertz 1985:167).
Wertz also stresses that it is necessary to identify what he calls the
'meaning units'. These are the result of the researcher's organisation
of the parts they can work with. It is then up to the researchers to
judge which constituents are relevant to the research. "In the case of
every meaning unit, the researcher's comprehension is challenged to
find relevance any way it can, and his (sic) choices are based on his
specific ability to do so. The burden of proof rests on him." (Wertz
1985:167). This, in Wertz's view, is where the limits of a researcher
may be revealed. However, for him, a valid way of approaching
phenomenological research is to reflect on the descriptive data, pull
her reflections together, and "concisely express the psychological
structure of the individual case". (Wertz 1985:178).
Giorgi (1985) makes the point that both phenomenology and
psychology are not mature sciences, but are still in the process of
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coming into being. This reflects my own approach to my reflections on
my collaborators' introspections. Giorgi (1985), further stresses that
to be phenomenological means to return to the phenomena, and to
obtain an eidetic intuition of their structures. He also urges that the
investigator should be rigorous and systematic, "each defined
according to how the very appearance of the phenomenon invites the
researcher to be methodical, systematic and rigorous." (Giorgi
1986:26). The method, rigour and system need to be defined
according to the "very appearance of the phenomenon" (Giorgi
1986:26). The extent and depth of the small number of Interviews,
and the use of the system of language structures proposed by Bandler
and Grinder requires both rigour and a systematic approach.
Thus, this inquiry may have a phenomenological validity, yet be
unacceptable to those of a positivistic Inclination. Oenzln and Lincoln
(1998) stress that what we take to be objective knowledge and truth
is the result of perspective, holding that there Is no 'real' world
Independent of human mental activity and human language. When
considering the notion of truth as applied to research findings, they
state that they prefer the notion of 'rightness' to truth, dismissing the
idea of certainty as "a pretentious muddle of the psychological and
the pseudological", (Denzin and Lincoln 1998:238). In their view, the
idea of 'rightness', that is, the ability of new constructs to fit into
context, is a more appropriate one. Drawing on different methods
can be like using a street map of London to inquire into Its geological
structure. Both maps are equally valid, but are produced for radically
different purposes. It is as If the range of qualitative methodologies
that are available to the putative researcher can be metaphorically
thought of as different protocols for the mapping of the same terrain.
Another of the aims of this research was to evaluate the use of the
theoretical approach of NLPas an adjunct to phenomenological
inquiry. Here I will allow the collection of my data to speak for Itself.
Not only has It uncovered an aspect to language, which has hitherto
not received much attention, It has also indicated the existence of
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internal representations and sub-modalities, and given us glimpses
into their complex dynamics. This is an addition to our understanding
of cognitive processes. NLPhas also been useful in textual analysis. I
believe that it revealed more about people's cognitive processes that
lay, as it were behind the language structures of the transcripts, than
had I relied on Discourse Analysis as my main methodological 'lens'.
Nevertheless, NLPitself is still in its infancy, and needs the further
refinements that constructive criticism can produce.
13.7. Action research, and reflections on Lincoln and Denzln's
'Fifth Movement'.
Researchers that have reached this juncture are urged to be self-
critical and to reflect on their research process. "Action researchers
have the social intent of improving the quality of life for themselves
and others, and this Is deeply value laden", (McNiff et a/1996:38). I
am not sure whether the results of my inquiry would improve the
quality of life of an already overworked teaching profession; however
Ibelieve that if it generates energetic discussion and even heated
disagreement, then it will have fulfilled some of Its purpose, even if
only to make people aware that there may be a vast field of research
that has been opened up for further investigation and verification.
This marries well with the psychological-phenomenological approach,
which McCall (1983) urges should "stand for a program to be
developed, a set of recommendations to be followed", (McCall
1983:97). He goes on to suggest that these can provide a prelude to
what could assume the rationale for a new and improved psychology.
That is my perhaps over-ambitious hope for this work.
Lincoln and Denzin (1998) go on to challenge us with the Implications
of post-structuralism. Texts, In their view, have a political dimension;
an author who claims some authority In the field writes them. This
they refute: "The desire to produce an authoritative (valid) text is
renounced, for any text can be undone in terms of its Internal
structural logic", (Lincoln and Denzln 1998:415). They stress that
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such research should not neglect issues of power, proposing that truth
is political whereas verisimilitude is textual. There were certainly
power issues in the carrying out of this research, which I reviewed in
chapter 10, and re-visited in section 13.3 above. There are also the
further issues of the penetration of texts by power and ideological
standpoints, which Lincoln and Oenzin stress that the fifth movement
in qualitative research must take into active consideration.
Paradoxically, I believe that what I have uncovered about language,
thought and epistemology, may provide a set of more refined tools for
uncovering such threads running through texts. Thus, a model of
language, which assumes that there are identifiable embedded
epistemological directives In texts, is surely one which could be used
to reveal such facets to scrutiny? Can having a grasp of epistemology
mean, In some way, that we can be more aware of how information
influences people, even, perhaps unconsciously, the politically
dispossessed? It could be that this research project is in some ways
coherent with Lincoln and Oenzln's fifth movement as part of the
development of other approaches to qualitative research. It could
possibly even provide it with new tools to use for textual analysis and
Interview design.
13.8. What has been learnt on the way.
This has been a journey, an obsession, and an exploration. It has
been full of surprises, especially when information suddenly seemed
to constellate itself into new patterns of insights. My unconscious was
as much a part of this process as were my conscious rational
reflections. Perhaps one of the biggest surprises was the discovery
that the 'pilot' studies yielded so much information, and that using
NLP, there was almost no end to the many levels of analysis that I
could have carried out. This meant leaving out some Important
aspects, such as the whole field of non-verbal communication and its
many Influences. I have also largely ignored the NLPmodel of meta-
programs (McWhirter 1992), which is almost a theory of personality,
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and describes some overall patterns that people use when responding
to Information. I have perhaps been somewhat selective In the
examples from the transcripts that I have used. McNiff et al (1996)
stress the need to identify collaborators who are representative of
what one is trying to show. The dividing line between seeking
representativeness, and being biased seems to be a very fine one.
Were I to repeat this project, I would think about gathering less data
on Internal representations and sub-modalities, and more about the
'higher' logical levels of people's changing beliefs and values. At the
time I was unaware of the wealth of information that I would also
glean from the analysis of the Master Practitioners' texts. I only
became conscious of this on my return to the UK, when my
collaborators were no longer available for further face-to-face
inquiries and follow-ups.
I have been committed to using NLPas my main approach. I
recognise however that it is not necessarily a perfect tool. The model
that I used is based on work done in the early 1970s. Neither Bandler
nor Grinder, who were the main originators, have developed their
model of language further, or deliberately invited scrutiny from the
academic community. The meta-model also has Its critics. Robbie
(2000), who was one of Bandler's students and co-workers, has
suggested that Bandler and Grinder have not kept up to date with
other developments In linguistics, and that their model Is therefore
Incomplete. McWhirter (2002, 2003), who runs his own training
company specialising In NLP, has posted an extensive critique of NLP
on the internet. He accuses Bandler and Grinder of neglecting other
important aspects of language such as metaphor. In his view, their
models of language and personal change are not precise enough. He
proposes that the meta-model should only be treated as an
incomplete introduction to the complexities of language. He even
suggests that language has a fractal aspect. He believes that unless
people are trained to a higher level of precision In NLP, practitioners
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may use it without a full enough understanding of the underlying
dynamics at work within language and thought.
NLPalso has a culture of competitiveness and is often explicitly anti-
academic. It can be too slick, used too easily to identify and exploit
people's patterns of thinking, and may in some training schools
encourage trainers to become manipulative in order to keep
generating a cash flow. It can be used unethically, as in many
trainings on selling. Cialdini (2000) has described many techniques
that can be used to influence people's actions unconsciously. Despite
these reservations, NLPis used extensively in training sales people, as
well as in general management training, (Bandler 1996). NLPhas,
however, never been applied and tested in the way that I have In this
study within an academic context.
I could be accused of having Ignored the spiritual dimension, which is
considered important by NLPtrainers such as Robert Dilts (1976,
1994, 1998). There are researchers who believe that qualitative
research should engage more with this aspect of being human,
(Lincoln and Denzin 1998, Heron 1998). Lincoln and Oenzin (1998)
have suggested that the time is right for the emergence of what they
term a 'fifth' movement In qualitative research. They propose that
the centre of the fifth movement lies "in the humanistic commitment
of the qualitative researcher to study the world always from the
perspective of the interacting individual" (Lincoln and Oenzin
1998:407). This is perhaps an idealistic view; is it ever possible to
study something purely from another perspective, without 'polluting'
such information through one's own beliefs and approaches? Perhaps
NLPcould be a useful adjunct to such explorations, particularly for
tracking changes in how people make sense of life-changing events.
I believe the limitations of NLPare at the moment more in how It is
used, rather than about its theoretical assumptions. Both have yet to
be developed and tested more extensively. For me It was as if I had a
different and more powerful high-resolution lens through which I
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caught fleeting glimpses of some mysterious creatures, which had not
yet been described.
Throughout this inquiry, I may have given the impression that I was
inquiring into what I believed were the only ways of knowing. It was
never my intention to provide a complete description of
consciousness, only to explore the interface between language and
thought. This was as the result of my personal interest rather than my
metaphysics. The topic of my Inquiry is distinct from the insights of
the dreamer, or the ecstasy of the mystic where there has been a
letting go of the ties of consciousness that bind (Epstein 1996). I
have simply explored language, which is one of the most Important
ways we have of being human, from a phenomenological perspective
within the context of teaching and learning. Let Wittgenstein have the
last word! "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can only In the end describe it." (Wlttgensteln, In Kenny
1994:269).
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A Bedouin Story
There was once upon a time an old Bedouin who had three sons. He was
ambitious for them to become leaders of the tribe. In the village lived a wise
old man, many people went to him for advice with problems such as whether
they should mate their camels, plant more date palms or take another wife.
One day he sent his firstborn son to the old man, to ask him how he could
become a wise leader of men. The old man received him graciously in his
dusty old tent. After they had exchanged the age old Arab greetings, the old
man asked:
"What brings you here to me my son?"
"Ya Mahmoud, I wish to become wise and be a leader of men. "
The old man looked at him, running his hands through his grey beard. There
was a silence, then he said:
"My son, you must go into the desert for thirty days, and report back to the
tribe what you found. "
The young man was a little surprised, but he did as the old man suggested.
Early one morning he took his favourite camel, laden with food and goat
skins full of water, and walked away from his father's tent into the wide, arid
hot desert, not knowing what he would find.
They travelled a long time, through rough country and bright red sand
dunes. The camel's plodding hoof beats were about the only sounds that the
young man heard in the throat parching heat of the evenings, when they did
most of their travelling (because it was cooler than during the day). When
they stopped for the night, it was pleasant for the young man to drink the
water the camel had carried for him, even though it tasted of goatskins. They
slept under the stars, so close to each other that the young man could reach
out and stroke the sleeping camel's rough fur, whereon she would grunt with
pleasure.
One day they arrived at a beautiful wadi, a dried riverbed, just as the sun
was setting, making the sky blaze with golden light.
"Oh" said the young man, "this is beautiful. I could stay here and enjoy these
feelings for ever. H Then he remembered his task. "['m sure my fellow
tribesmen would love to hear about the wonderful feelings that the desert
produces. That would surely be very wise",
So he spent many days writing about all the feelings that the desert
produced in him, of joy, terror, interest, pleasure, excitement, and fear of
the unknown.
One day he arrived back at his village, and everyone came to greet him.
"What have you discovered?" they asked him, with great anticipation.
"Oh my friends, [ want to share with you all the feelings I had in the desert"
replied the young man. And he told them. He listed every feeling, and then
far into the night noticed that the tribesmen had crept back into their tents,
as they weren't very interested. And the young man went back to his father,
and tended camels for the rest of his life.
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One day, many months afterwards, the second son went to the wise man's
dusty old tent, exchanged the age old Arab greetings, and when the old man
asked him what he wanted, this young man told him that he wanted to learn
to be wise enough to be a leader of his tribe.
"In that case" said the old man, pulling at his grey beard, "you must go out
into the desert for thirty days, and come back and tell the tribesmen what
you found." So this young man set off with his favourite camel, carrying a
supply of food and water on its back. They wandered for some days, until
they came to a sandy plain. As he looked at it, the young man suddenly had
an idea. "What if I counted the grains of sand on this plain, and told my
fellow tribesmen 7Surely that would make me wise7"
So he set about counting the grains of sand. In the evenings, only the sound
of his counting, and the snorting of his camel could be heard on the desert
air. Before they slept, he would talk to his camel, drink her sweet milk, and
tell her how many millions or trillions he had counted that day.
One day he arrived back at his village, and everyone came to greet him.
"What have you discovered?" they asked him, with great anticipation.
"Oh my brothers and friends" he replied. "I have counted the grains of sand
on the great red plain, and found ten thousand trillion million, one hundred
and forty two thousand, six hundred and eighty three grains of sand. Is that
not truly wonderful?'
But his fellow tribesmen did not share his enthusiasm. They looked
disappointed, muttered amongst themselves, and then went off to one of the
tents to smoke a hookah. The young man was disappointed, went home, and
grew date palms for the rest of his life.
Some time later, the father of the three young men told his youngest born to
go to the wise old man, and ask him how he could become a leader of the
tribe. This young man would rather have stayed at home drawing pictures in
the sand outside his tent, but he went, because it is written that one must
obey one's father. They exchanged the age old melodious Arable greetings,
and then the old man asked him what he wanted. The young man told him
that he wanted to learn to be wise enough to be a leader of his tribe.
"In that case" said the wise old man, pulling at his grey beard, "you must go
out Into the desert for thirty days, and come back and tell the tribesmen
what you found. "
So this young man took his favourite camel, laden with food and drink, and
one evening their footsteps could be heard getting fainter as they went off
into the vast unknown desert. They wandered about for some time, exploring
wadis, and visiting the red plain, and the young man wandered and
wondered at how he could learn to be wise In this unknown and hostile place.
One evening he came to the crest of a hili, and saw many mountains and
valleys in the distance.
"I wonder If anyone has ever seen these betore?" said the young man to
himself, as he looked at the landscape. But then he realised that perhaps no
one could ever find their way through these strange mountains, so might
never be able to describe them to his fellow tribesmen.
425
Appendix 1. A Bedouin Story. 426
The distant hills looked tempting, so he decided to go there. He said to his
faithful camel "my friend, we are going to strange new places" and the camel
grunted. Then the young man had an idea. "1wonder if 1 can make a sort of
image of how to get into and out of the mountains as I go along?" he asked
himself, and no sooner had he thought this, that a picture came to his mind
of representing the complex mountains, dried river beds and oases by
scratching lines on a goatskin, which had been used to carry the precious
water, and was by now very smelly.
So he wandered up and down strange wadis, over rocky hills and sometimes
rested in small oases where there were sweet dates on the trees. And
always he scratched the outlines of the mountains, and many other features
he discovered on the goatskin, so that he could at least tell his fellow
tribesmen where he had been, and how to get there again.
When the end of the thirty days came, he looked at the goatskin, and it was
frankly rather a mess. "Oh dear" he said to himself. "They will think me a
fool for wasting my time, bringing back such an inelegant thing as the
outlines of mountains, paths, rivers and oases scratched on to this old smelly
goatskin." So it was with fear and disappointment that he returned to the
village on the appointed day. Everyone came to greet him. "What have you
discovered?" they asked him, with great anticipation.
''Alas'' he replied. "I have not brought you any great wisdom. All 1have is
this old goatskin with scratches on it, to tell you where I've been and what
I've discovered. It is incomplete, my brothers, but hear my tale".
So they sat around the fire, which was filling the desert air with the scent of
special woods burning" and he told them of his journeys, showing them
where he had been by pointing at certain lines on the skin. The fellow
tribesmen were fascinated, and therefore did not mind the smell of old
goatskin. Soon they were all crowding round, asking "what is there? What is
here?" as they pointed at the various signs he had scratched. Soon it was
night, and the sky was full of stars as bright as only they can get in the
desert sky. Still they asked questions, and then, when it was nearly the hour
of the dawn prayer, the wise old man, who had crept into the throng without
being noticed said:
"My son, you are truly wise, for you have brought back a map, so that
everyone can now find their way around the desert. " And they all cheered,
and embraced him, before facing Mecca and praising Allah.
The young man became the leader of the tribe, and spent many more hours
in the desert, making more maps, content that although they were
incomplete, his people could now find their way to places of which they had
never even dreamed of before.
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Transcript of the Interview with 'Ina'. April 2000.
Interviewer: Jane Mathison.
1.OK Ina, so what I'm going to do is just read some sentences to you, and
you respond in whatever way, and if you can respond with what do you do
internally ... as the result of my words, that would be lovely. OK. So if I
were to say to you think of a time when you were happy? what happens?
Ina: I immediately start smiling. (laughs gently)
1.Smiling, yeah. What happens before the smile?
Ina: I picture a picture of when I was happy, I picture a story in my life
which brings joy and which I think of fondly comes straight into my head
and I'm there.
1.You're associated. Yeah yeah.
Ina: Yeah. Associated. Warm feelings
1. ...and you're pointing to the left. Is the picture to the left?
Ina: Yeah, It's actually right in front of me there. (Points in front of her)
1.About two feet in front of you. Yes?
Ina: Yeah.
1. 3D? Colour?
Ina: 3D. Colour. Movement, I can even hear what I'm saying and what
people are saying to me, I can even remember a touch, I've got, you know
I've got the whole thing.
1. Lovely. Well you were really there, so I'm wondering what happens if I
change the sentence slightly. To remember a time when you were happy?
Ina: (pause) ...... I have many pictures now, in slides, it's silent, ... and I'm
actually looking at the slides, so I'm dissociated, putting the slides down, of
happy moments, but I'm outside, they're in my hand, and I'm putting them
down like cards.
1.Any sounds?
Ina: No, silence.
1.Feelings? Kinaesthetic?
Ina: Warm.
1.Any difference between the kinaesthetics between those two experiences?
Ina: Yeah, this one was joy and ... I'm up, but ready to go back into that
picture, this one (point to the others) is yeah, I remember that, I remember
that...
1.Great. So that's question one. So now we go on to question two. How do
you respond if I just ask you How are apples and oranges different?
Ina: (pause) '" a sweet apple and a bitter orange.
1.How do you know?
Ina: I taste them.
J. SOthe first thing that comes is the taste?
Ina: Yes.
1.eh he
Ina: And then, colour.
1.Yeah. So when you see colour, what are you doing. Are you making a
picture?
Ina: Yeah, apples, oranges.
1.Two pictures?
Ina: I've got two pictures, two scenes.
1.Where's the apple as a matter of interest?
Ina: Here.
1.To the left?
Ina: One is sweet, bitter orange.
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!,_ OK. nice. So what happens if I now say to you how are apples and
oranges the same.
Ina: The shape. They're both round. (laughter)
!,_ Yes! What's happened to the picture?
Ina: I've actually put the apple on top of the orange. (laughter)
!,_ Yes I can see. You were gesticulating with your hands. Yeah.
Ina: They're the same shape.
!,_ Are the apple and orange superimposed over one another?
Ina: Yeah.
!,_ OK. Wow. All right. SO question three is a bit different. Can you be
aware of how you relate to someone you value?
Ina: (pause) yeah,
!,_ Yes.
Ina: Yeah.
J. What happened before you said the yes?
Ina: I actually thought of the person that I value. I had to picture it, and
then I (laughter) I was like ... if she was sitting there I would, you know ...
how do I ... how do I respect and value her.
b So you actually see her?
Ina: Yeah.
J. Sitting over there in that chair?
Ina: Yeah.
b Fine. How is that different to can you think of a relationship with a person
you value?
Ina: (pause) yeah, (laughter) he's floating! Yeah.
!,_ Who? Someone's floating?
Ina: Yeah. I visualise there, that space, looking down at me.
b That person's looking down at you. Life size?
Ina: Life size.
J. OK. Movement?
Ina: Yeah. The mannerisms of that person I value, I know what he does
when he greets ...
J. Yeah
Ina: ...or when I was nervous ... you know, times when I've needed his
friendship and he's trying to make me relax, he does things ...
!,_ So just to compare the two, when you were looking at the person you
value over there, the first one, was there the same amount of movements,
less movement, more movement in one or the other.
Ina: Em, she was still. I had movement in him.
J. You had movement in the second one?
Ina: Yeah.
J. So the person there was kind of moving, interacting with you?
Ina: Yeah.
b All right. Here comes some biology. So just let me know your responses
to this. In the heart the ventricles contract to pump blood around the body.
The atria receive blood from the body. Closure of the valves at the bases of
the main arteries prevent the back flow of blood on ventricular relaxation.
Ina: (pauses) ... I have blue and red, I have the heart actually pumping, I
can see the actual movement in and the movement out, but that's probably
due to my education.
!,_ Yes, because you're a nurse, but you're kind of pointing to your own
heart.
Ina: Yes, and here's It's coming in, and going out. (points to places on her
chest).
!,_ OK. And blue and red?
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Ina: Yeah, and the heart moving. Pumping.
J.. So, what happens if I were to say your heart is a pump and receives
blood from your body and pumps blood around your body. Imagine your
ventricles contracting and squeezing blood into the main arteries so they
need valves at their bases that close, so that blood isn't sucked back when
the ventricle relaxes. (My voice was slow and a bit monotonous).
Ina: Picture of a diagram.
1.You get a picture of a diagram? (laughter)
Ina: Yeah. (laughs) I get the picture of a diagram like from when we were
studying with actual ...
1. It's on the table is it?
Ina: Yeah, it's on the table with actual arrows pointing in and pointing out,
the valves ... yeah, I've got a diagram.
L Mh mh
Ina: I can't see the heart pumping, it's just a diagram, a still, and the
arrows are actually pointing in, painting out, and the valves, like that, you
know, this is open, this is closed.
J. Yeah.
Ina: Actually I couldn't think of it pumping!
L The second one there's no pumping, the first one you were pumping.
Ina: The first one was pumping, I Immediately saw it.
J. It seemed to me you also felt it in your chest.
Ina: Yeah, but this one was just a diagram.
L Outside? dissociated?
Ina: Yeah, when you were giving me the instructions I actually had the
diagram, yeah.
LOK.
Ina: Whoo, sorry. What did you think of that?
J. I think what is so fascinating Is that you just get a response, and there's
no right or wrong responses, it's just a response. OK. You obviously know
your heart.
Ina: (laughter) I think to make sense I had... first instructions you had
were nice, the second Instructions you gave me were more textbook. The
language was unfamiliar yet it needed textbook picture, whereas the first
language was un textbook like, it was understandable to a nurse or a
layman, it was easy, the second one I needed a diagram for myself, it
reminded me of school.
L Oops! OK. So we're on to number five, and this is essentially running
something through a series of different modal operators, it's something
we've already done. So can you think of something quite ordinary, you
know, like cleaning your teeth, something that you're going to do in the
near future, sort of something fairly pedestrian. NOW, what happens if I say
you will do it.
Ina: I agree. Can do, will do.
J. Is that an Internal dialogue?
Ina: Yeah.
1.And do you have a picture of what you're gOing to do?
Ina: I'm actually doing it.
1.You're actually doing it. OK. Yeah. So you're doing it, and you're saying to
yourself...
Ina: You can do it.
1. So back to the picture of what it is you're going to do, or the internal
representation of it. What happens if I say you might do it.
Ina: You've frozen my picture. (her bleep goes off) I'm still.. ..
J. Do you want to answer your bleep?
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Ina: Yes please. (pauses, microphone accidentally disconnected .for a short
time). It stopped the movement, whereas when I said 'I will' I was actually
performing, 'might do' has actually frozen me.
I:. So what happens if I say you can't do it?
Ina: Exit picture.
1.You mean the picture's gone?
Ina: No, just me, out. I was there, and now I'm looking at what I'm
supposed to have done.
1. OK. And what happens if I say you should do it?
Ina: I've stepped back in the picture, I'm aware of my surroundings.
I. Is the picture all round you?
Ina: yeah. I've stepped back into the picture and I'm looking around, and
I'm basically saying to myself well have ago, see what happens, have a go,
see what happens.
1.Oh! You can do it?
Ina: I'm there, I'm actually, I'm swinging, I'm doing it, I'm looking around,
looking at what I'm supposed to be doing, and I'm ready. Yeah.
J.. Has the picture changed in any ways?
Ina: Yeah, there's movement, there's sound, I'm looking at everything
around me, and I'm saying to myself 'some on then girl, keep going'.
I:. And is it more so than in you should do it?
Ina: Yeah, in should, it was silent, in 'I can' there's sound I can hear what's
going on around me. I think I should is more private, I'm like 'I'm going to
give it a go! '.
1.Yeah. So with the 'should' you've got an internal dialogue, and the
outside is silent?
Ina: Is silent.
I:. And what happens if I say 'you could do it?'
Ina: Yeah, it re-enforces my 'I can'. It's just given me, ... go ahead ... more.
I have support by somebody saying I could. 'Go on, you could do it, you
could do It'. I'm actually, yeah, my coaches ...
I. SOyou're touching your left shoulder. Is that as if somebody's kind of
encouraging you?
Ina: Yeah yeah.
1. So, picture?
Ina: Yeah. Yeah, 'I could' is me actually going out to the dug out
(indistinct), and I'm getting a 'could' and 'I can' I'm actually at the batting,
right there, on my own, but still aware, but 'I could' Is like I have somebody
on my back.
I:. Encouraging you! OK. this is content free but I'm quite interested to know
what it was. Is it a sport or something?
Ina: Yes it was, it was my, ... soft ball
I:. Oh, OK.
Ina: You sort of like freeze when you get to the batting mount, so it
depends who sends you out. If they say 'you will do it, you could do it or
you can do It ...'. Brings back memories.
1. So modal operators might actually be quite ...
Ina: Helps me play better ...
J.... powerful in terms of your performance.
Ina: That's what I say when I'm getting ready to hit. 'I will, I will I Will'.
With the 'I could' is just an extra support for me. Somebody actually has
faith in me to say, go on, you can do it!
1. Just as a matter of interest, as I went through these modal operators,
was there anything like stacking an anchor going on?
Ina: yeah, I can, and I will, and you could ... it's just that I'm out here ...
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L. Did they all sort of influence each other?
Ina: With the 'I will' then you've told me, and I will do it, so I've already
future done it, I will do It, and I can has put me there, 'I can do it', I'm
there. And 'could' somebody's just reinforcing me, bringing me forward.
L. So with the ... it seems to me, and again I'm not sure, I'm really just
suggesting something, trying not to mind read, ... it seems to me that
you've developed like an ... attraction?
Ina: ... yeah, a pull, the further down we've gone the more the pull has
developed. I feel safe, I feel great, I fell like somebody actually believes
that I can do it.
1. OK
Ina: Somebody values me as a player!!!
L.Yes, that's always important.
Ina: Oh God here she comes, it's like, 'oh great, we've got a chance there
to get some home runs.'
L.Yeah. OK. Well we could talk about that for a long time but we're on to
question six. Think about something you have to do but you're not sure
you particularly want to do?
Ina: Yeah. I have to (indistinct) ... what a repulsion! I have to .... Bound
by duty.
L. So what was the first response? Was It a K?
Ina: Yeah.
L. Because It seemed to me, and again I might be mind reading, so just let
me check this out with you. It seemed to me that you were running
something through ... saying something to yourself. Maybe you were just
running my words through again.
Ina: No, I actually visualised It, what I'm supposed to be doing, and what I
have to do.
L. OK OK.
Ina: It's like. I had it back there, it's like Oh God, I've still got to do that!
L. Picture in front?
Ina: Picture in front, yeah. You've just made me bring It forward. I did have
It back there. (POints to where she 'sees' the image).
J..:. You had it behind you first?
Ina: I had it behind, and I was, you know, repeating the question, I had to
bring it forward, yeah, I have to do it.
L. So now imagine that you were in the future having done it?
Ina: Well I would hope that I've done it would be a good outcome. I won't
know until I did It because I can get two reactions to It, I do it, depending
on the outcome it might be a good one or a bad one, depending on the
person involved.
L.OK
Ina: My intentions would have been ABC... somebody else's may have been
CDE.
L. So what's happened now that I've asked you to step into the future and
imagine you've done it, what are you doing on the inside in response to that
question?
Ina: Well if I do it this way, will she be pleased, but if I do it that was... to
please me, will she be pleased. I know what I have to do but what I want to
do, I'm going to get two different ...
L. Do you have two pictures?
Ina: Yeah
L.Where are they?
Ina: Out in front.
L.Which one's on the left?
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Ina: The one I have to do. The one I want to do is.... (points in another
direction).
1. Let's assume that it's successful and you're in the future looking back on
it...
Ina: Yeah,
1.Where's the picture now?
Ina: In front of me. I know Lcould lead to this way but I just don't want to
think about that though ...
1. So there's another one down by the left that you're not looking at?
Ina: 'Cos I haven't done it but I would like the one...
1. I'm sure you'll find the necessary resources to have a good outcome. OK.
So, on with the interrogation ...
Ina: ...just down on the floor.
1.Can you remember a mildly unpleasant experience, ... mildly ....
Ina: OK.
1. Response? You're looking down.
Ina: Disappointment really.
1. Right, so it's a strong K?
Ina: Yeah, I've seen it.
J. You've seen it, but is it down on your ... It's down on the floor? OK. What
happens if I say how do you feel about it?
Ina: I got angry.
1. So...
Ina: Disappointed the way It turned out, but I'm also angry because it went
the way it did. It shouldn't have done that.
1.OK. So has... and again don't let me put words into your mouth, ... asking
how you feel about it (bleep goes off) Has the asking 'how you feel about' it
in any way amplified your kinaesthetic response?
Ina: Yeah,
1. 'Cos you didn't mention anger the first time
Ina: I was just seeing the picture and I'm listening to what was going on
and I'm seeing both person's involved, and I knew those persons, that's
why disappointment came first, then the anger.
1.Was there anger after I said 'how do you feel about it?'
Ina: yeah.
1.OK. Do you want to answer your bleep?
Ina: Yes please. (pause)
1.On to question number eight. What if I were to say to you: you are
good at NLP but you need to work on your rapport skills.
Ina: I'm thinking, ooh, what have I demonstrated ... you've given me .... I'm
questioning your ability ...
1.You're questioning your abilities. OK.
Ina: The next question would be 'how can I improve it'?
1. So it's like you're paying more attention to the second part of the
sentence than the first.
Ina: Yeah. I like the first bit. The second bit I need to work on.
1.OK, so if I were to say you need to work on your rapport skills but you
are good at NLP?
Ina: OK.
1. Does that change anything?
Ina: Actually, I don't have the (indistinct) that I had with the first one.
1.OK. So the first one was more powerful?
Ina: Yeah. You made it sound like my rapport skills were acceptable, but I
could get better, but you didn't ... there was like no force or anything, there
was no focus on it,
1.OK
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Ina: ...because you but the 'but' in, and you said I was good at NLP, OK,
I'm going to take the second value.
b.You ended it good? OK. So ending it good has a different effect on you
than ending it bad?
Ina: With 'bad' I automatically start thinking 'how can I make it better'.
b. OK so if I were to say to you think about your rapport skills so that you
can be even better at NLP?
Ina: That's great, I'm happy, you're not questioning my ability, I'll just take
it into account.
b. So is it an internal dialogue, or are you seeing pictures, or is it just a
kinaesthetic response or anyone or all three?
Ina: Pictures and kinaesthetic. Pictures of what I was like in class, and the
feeling I was getting from the group. Yeah. Nice.
b.Yeah. OK. the next one, we're on number nine now, is think of something
you might have done better. Again, pick something that isn't a biggie.
Ina: OK.
b.And just see what happens if I give you feedback in two different ways. If
I say you did that wrong or you did that wrongly, is there a difference?
Ina: You did that wrongly makes me ... fiddle about? .., (indistinct) you did
it wrongly gives me room to make It better. Wrongly notices some things
that I've done wrongly so I can make that better, but with wrong I'm going
to have to start all over again, I must have done a big boo boo.
b. So with the 'wrong' is there a picture? I mean, you're going like this with
your hands.
Ina: Yeah
L. Yeah, and wrongly?
Ina: Wrongly, I have a picture, and I have ... I'm actually ... I'm aware of
what I'm doing and I'm just thinking, everyone's looking and I'm actually
going to think about this. So I'm actually having an internal dialogue, and
it's like they're frozen, but I'm actually having a dialogue saying to myself
'OK, Ina, how are you going to do this? remember your paints, look at your
lesson plan', so they're frozen, yeah, and I'm .... I'm making improvement
and I'm actually checking ....
L. It wouldn't be a series of slides ... ?
Ina: No no, my lesson pian ...
L. OK. You've got your lesson plan actually In front of you. Like a stack?
Ina: Sort of at waist level.
L. Yeah. OK. Thank you! (laughter) OK we're on to question ten so we're
half way through. What happens If I say remember your childhood?
Ina: (Long pause). It was hard.
L. It was hard. Picture?
Ina: Just the word childhood, and I'm getting flash backs of things I had to
do and things I had to put up with.
J.. Right, flashbacks in terms of ....
Ina: Way back there!
L.Way back there, but they seemed to be in front of you at one point.
Ina: Oh yeah yeah. Oh no I can handle it.
J.. Sure sure sure.
I~a: Questions come up, why this, why that? What if? (she shows signs of
distress).
J.,OK. Internal dialogue. So let's go through the next one very quickly. Just
glvdeme a... just dip in and out, remember being a child? (pause) Just dip in
an Out.
I~ath: Yeah. No, I remember, I can see me as a child, but I'm remembering
WI this head.
b Yeah
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Ina: If you know what I mean ...
1. I know what you mean.
Ina: I can see myself as a child, with a child's body. I can see ... the girl, as
the girl, who was nine and had the head of a seventeen or eighteen year
old, kind of...
1.OK, so you're looking at her at nine, there in front of you?
Ina: She wasn't thinking as nine, she was thinking of ... you know, ten
years her agJ. OK. so let's move quickly on to the next one. this is just
exploration. Is it any different if I say remember your self as a child?
Ina: (pause) I was lonely.
1.So is that a K?
H. I had brothers and sisters and stuff but I felt lonely.
1.OK. That's fine. And pictures, sounds ...?
Ina: Oh yeah, I can hear the family going on...
1.Can't we all. Yeah!
Ina: They never seem to ,go silent.
1.Oh dear!
lana: But yeah, they're going on having (indistinct) but being a child, I was
carrying I was ten years, and I was .... (indistinct) ....
1.OK, so it's obviously a biggie, and you know, it takes a lot of shit to
produce the best roses. (laughter from both people.)
Ina: But when you think your parents are there to develop the roses and It
turns out that you have to do the developing of the roses, that's when It's
hard. It's like, hold on a minute, I'm still nine, still ten.
1.OK. Those questions evoked quite a lot of stuff. I mean, I appreciate you
sharing that, and you can zoom it out, so question eleven, think of
something you do really well. And there's lots of things you do really well.
Ina: Yeah.
1.OK? What's your response?
Ina: (laughs) it's like I'm having an internal dialogue saying yeah, you
really do that really well, and you know you do it well so go forth, so it's like
I'm giving myself the old pat on the shoulder, and going you know ...
1. Picture?
Ina: Yeah.
1. Picture before internal dialogue or after?
Ina: No, I've actually said it to myself, as I'm saying it as well, the picture's
coming up. It's everywhere
1. Sort of all round? What happens if I say to you now as you're looking at it
how could you make it even better?
Ina: (long pause) this is going to sound really weird, but it's like I need to
have my mum in the picture and say 'look what I can do!'
1.OK.
Ina: Look look look look, take it in. That sound weird, doesn't it.
LNo!
Ina: Anything I do, anything good, I'm proud of this, it's like you said look
what I can do!
1. ...and you're pointing to a series of pictures in front of you from left to
right?
Ina: yeah, look.
1.And again, if I said to you what are you not paying attention to, what
happens?
Ina: In my picture?
1.Wherever.
Ina: I can still see the good stuff, looking at it, enjoying it.
1.Yeah. Could you be looking at It differently at all?
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Ina: Oh no.
L. Great. The next one is a fairly simple one. So, imagine something you
might do.
Ina: OK.
L. And what happens, what's the difference between me saying you can't do
that and you can 't do that yet?
Ina: What do you mean you can't? I put up my defences. I can do it.
L. Internal dialogue? OK. And 'you can't do that yet?' What sort of
response? Do you just go 'OK'?
Ina: OK for now, but why? (Laughter) OK, I'll take that in but why? Just
explain. The 'I can't' is ... I get defensive. And 'I can't yet', OK I'll accept it
for now, but I'm going to do it, for now, unless you tell me otherwise.
L. OK. Next one's a little bit longer. Think of a goal you have in your life.
Ina: OK.
J. And you've got the VAK1, the lot? OK. What happens if I ask you what do
you need to achieve it?
Ina: What do I need? I'm making a list. I've made a list of all the things I
need.
L. And what happens if I ask you how will you achieve it?
Ina: I don't know until I start activating my list (laughter) I need a trip to
go home to England first, the process starts then.
L. And If I ask you why will you achieve it? What happens to your internal
response?
Ina: Because I want to achieve it. There's a need. I have to.
L. You touched your chest right then. Is that like a K?
Ina: I have to.
L. So it's something important to you. And if I now say what will it be like to
have achieved that now?
Ina: It would be excellent. I would be working on my degree.
L. I don't think you'll have any problems there.
Ina: Thank you. I'll be very proud. I'll be happy.
L. So now if I ask you to think of the goal again, has anything changed from
the first representation, between the first representation and the last one?
Ina: You know the question of how will you do it? I've actually visualised
how I'm going to do it before activating my list.
L. OK.
Ina: I've actually ... doing my degree, and ... I've done something because
I'm doing It, because I know the 'how' so I'm actually seeing myself doing
it.
L. OK.
Ina: I've done It!
J.. So when you think of the goal again, has that changed?
,Ina: Yeah, it's like I'm on my way to achieve it.
J. Movement? Attraction?
Ina: Yeah, whereas the 'how' stopped me, because I was like .... I've got
this list, how am I going to do it, That's what I said, I hadn't activated my
list yet. But saying that I've achieved it, and how do I feel, it feels the how
has already been done, because I've done it, and I've succeeded, very
happy.
L. Congratulations. OK. Next question. What happens if I say you must not
imagine a blue camel?
Ina: (long pause) I'm sitting here thinking of a blue camel.
L. And if I say don't make that mistake again!
!Mi. The blue camel? Or just the words?
1 This is an abbreviation for visual, auditory, kinaesthetic.
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b Anything.
Ina: It doesn't feel too good.
b You maybe think of a mistake?
Ina: Yeah.
I:. I said don't ...
Ina: ...just thinks of the things you've done, cringing, good cringe, just
'don't do it again'.
J. Picture, sounds?
Ina: Internal dialogue again. 'Oh Ina, I don't believe you did that'!
I:. So if I said Enjoy your holiday and your time off?
Ina: That's good, that's cool.
I:.A good K?
Ina: A good K, yes
J. Pictures?
Ina: Airport? Family, holiday.
I:. So you see...?
Ina: The rain, the wind, looking forward to it.
b Yes. Slides or film, movie, colour, black and white?
Ina: I'd say slides, it has to be still, because the family will be there. We'll
do this, we'll do that, so I'm probably thinking of our last holiday, we'll be
doing this, going to Grand Ma's, going to In laws.
J. It looks to me as if they're all on the table as you're pointing.
Ina: Yeah.
b The next one might sound a bit silly, just interested to know if there's any
different kind of response if I were to say to you Enjoy your trip and have a
good break?
Ina: You've shortened my holiday!
b Oh, sorry!
Ina: It's not a trip, it's a holiday. I like the word holiday.
I:.You don't like the word trip?
Ina: Trip I consider is a weekend away which I do to Jeddah.
I:.Yeah.
Ina: But a holiday ... you don't get a trip to England, you get a holiday to
England.
b OK. It's a nice complex equivalence. (laughter)
Ina: Yeah, trip equals Jeddah.
b Right. We're on to number sixteen. Think about how much you've learnt?
Ina: What, everything?
I:.Anything you want.
Ina: Wow.
1.:. What produced the wow?
Ina: The 'God you really did that, well done:
(interruption)
1.:. OK. so 'think about how much you've learnt?
Ina: I've learnt a lot. I've still got a lot to learn. You've got this, this, this,
and you've still got this '" still haven't learnt this, so I've learnt this, but I
still have...
1.:. So, you seem to have an internal representation of something you've
learnt, and that's close to your chest, and you seem to have a circle beyond
that of things you're stili ...
Ina: ...which I have to learn.
1.:. You have to learn. Right.
Ina: I can see myself up there.
J. Are you paying more attention to what you haven't yet learnt by any
chance?
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Ina: I'm forever making notes, so if I hear something, or I hear of a
practice, or a skill, or just things people say, or I've attended these various
symposiums or seminars, I put it down, 'oh may be that will come in handy
for the hospital, or maybe that will come in handy towards so and so. I'll
look that up. In my job I can do that, whereas the other girls can't.
L.OK. So internal representation of what you've learnt close to your chest,
the rest out there, and then you go in to seeing yourself writing things
down.
Ina: Yes.
L. So what happens if I say Are you aware of how much you've learnt?
Ina: (pause) I know what I know .... but I've still got to learn more. I don't
know everything. It's that word 'aware'. I still have yet to learn.
L. It seemed to me that you were searching much more.
Ina: I can't put down how much I know, how much I've learnt, it's just I
can't... I can't I've learnt this, tick, I've learnt that, tick. I know what I
know. There's still other things I have to learn. So I'm probably more
aware of what I might need to know, than to what I already know.
J.. You see the interesting thing is your gestures are completely different,
because what you know is now further in front of you, and then what you
don't know is up, up there.
(end of first side of tape. Turn over.)
J.. Lovely. OK. SO, if I say it's a nice day, the sun is shining, we could all go
to the desert?
(Laughter)
Ina: I don't think we should be going to the desert in this heat. It's all
sweaty. It's not a good idea.
L. Did you make pictures?
Ina: I made a picture, yeah
b. And then you ... what happened
Ina: I associated.
b. Yes. And you felt the heat?
Ina: I felt the heat, and the uncomfortable sweat and the ...
L.OK. And is that any different to, it's a nice day and the sun is shining so
we could all go to the desert?
Ina: We could all go? ... Still nothing, no change. Not even a picture. Just
don't go to the desert in May!
L. It's only April!
Ina: April, beg your pardon. (laughter)
L....Changeof subject a little bit. It's important to understand
communication.
Ina: (pause) I'm agreeing with you.
L. How are you representing it though?
Ina: I'm seeing things at work.
L. In front of you?
Ina: Yes. (pause) I am listening to what everyone is saying, and I'm saying
to myself that it's important, that's why we have to be aware of it.
L.OK. And is that in any way different to it's important to understand
communicating?
Ina: (Pause) understand communicating. I'm communicating. I'm
visualising ... I'm doing the communicating.
b So in the other one, there was general communication going on?
Ina: Communication. And I'm going 'that's why it's important' and to
understand communicating, what I'm actually doing the communicating,
and I see the responses of the people.
L. Is there more movement?
Ina: Yeah, more movement.
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J. More sounds?
Ina: Only for me though. Only for me, yeah, just me, doing the ...
:h Brilliant. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you so much.
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Transcript of 'Edward' interviewing 'Steve', 8th May 2000
Edward: Is there anything you wanted from the NLP course before you
actually started it?
Steve: Just information really about accelerated learning techniques and
how NLP was different or similar to hypnosis.
Edward: Right. You looked into NLP before?
Steve: Yea yeah.
Edward: And so did you have any expectations of the NLP course ...
Steve: Emm, the course itself, really, no.
Edward: What were the goals you had coming to the NLP course?
Steve: Oh, ... main goal was to satisfy my curiosity, and anything after that
was a plus really to be honest.
Edward: How did you think you could use these goals if you achieve them?
Steve: ... Interesting question. I suppose ... I suppose I didn't have any
preconceptions about using them after, I hadn't, I didn't perceive myself
using the skills after the course, it was mainly out of curiosity that I
undertook the course, but the reality was different.
Edward: OK. With the skills that you now learned, and the different things
you've become aware of, do you think there's anything that you can now
achieve that you didn't think you could achieve before?
Steve: Thousands of things!
Edward: Really.
Steve: Yeah, thousands of things, from very very small things to
considerably bigger things.
Edward: How is it that you think the NLP will help you achieve all these
different things?
Steve: I have been successful in most endeavours that I have undertaken, I
haven't ... I suppose I really haven't had a conscious strategy for achieving
outcomes of different kinds In many areas of my life, I suppose I believed
that I was a failure, or that I had failed, certainly, and I think NLP has given
me the ability to see things from a different, a different perspective, many
different perspectives, really. I suppose.
Edward: OK Saying that you perceived in the past that you failed to achieve
the things you wanted to do, using the NLP you've learnt, do you think the
things you tried to do were failures?
Steve: No, no, I look at them a lot differently now, and I see them in a lot ...
In a lot better light, if you like, it's hard to describe them, but better
actually, sub-modality wise you could say In a much brighter light. And I
think that ... yeah well I suppose that's It really., they're .. they definitely
don't seem to have the same impact in my present life as they did have
before the course.
Edward: OK. Are you able to look back at these events and break them
down into the useful part, the part that really have no value, and the part
that may have some value but you're not aware of yet.
Steve: I think mainly the parts that were not of any use to me, and in those
situations I wouldn't use those again, really. You know, I wouldn't go so far
as to make the same mistake twice If you like.
Edward: OK So maybe NLP helped you to learn from what you thought was
a failure, and actually wasn't necessarily a failure, was just a way of doing
something?
Steve: Yeah, absolutely. That's a fair analysis.
Edward: I guess leading on from that, is there anything you would now do
differently as the result of having learnt NLP.
Steve: Yeah. There are a few things. One that comes to mind I suppose,
I've changed my outlook on what I'm able to do and what I'm not able to
do. I'm far more confident In my abilities In the future, I suppose if I were
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to say that ... I'm not using NLP on other people if you like, or at least not
consciously. Mainly I'm using it on my own processes.
Edward: OK. DO you not think that may be this affects the way you are with
other people then?
Steve: With some people, yeah, with some people. In certain situations,
yeah,
Edward: OK, so maybe what you're telling me is that at certain times you're
aware of using the processes of NLP in order to sort through the things
you're doing and thinking about?
Steve: Mainly what I'm thinking about, mainly what I'm thinking about, in
other words I suppose I've used, or I use NLP all the time at work, but
mainly internally, and I suppose I do believe that externally I have changed
a little bit anyway, you know, for the better.
Edward: How is it that you're using NLP internally?
Steve: I suppose by using the different techniques to ... there again, view
situations from different perspectives and trying to find out how somebody
else would do the same thing, so sort of modelling really, on a smaller
scale .... I suppose I've become more aware of other people's anchors as
well, for triggering off responses to me, and I've learnt either to avoid the
anchors or to use them for my own benefit really.
Edward: OK. You mentioned modelling. Do you find that you are breaking
down processes?
Steve: Yeah yeah. Yeah yeah ...
Edward: So you're becoming more aware maybe of the Individual bits that
lead to an outcome?
Steve: Absolutely, absolutely, and not only in my own in my own, in what
I'm doing myself, but in what I see other people doing as well. ... I would
be more conscious of my ability to solve problems now as well, whereas that
was taken for granted in the past, in so far as I never thought about solving
problems, It just. .., the problem had a solution, but now I think problems
have many solutions you know, and I don't see them as problems as such.
Edward: OK, well that's good. What I would have to say then here is,
because we're all very happy to say NLP is very good, It's very helpful for
people, do you actually find that it is helpful?
Steve: Absolutely, absolutely.
Edward: In what way?
Steve: It's helped me to become more consciously aware of my thoughts, of
what I think, even though generally I'm quite an internal person anyway, in
so far as I tend to have a lot of internal dialogue, and I think that from the
NLP point of view it's helped me to place thoughts and Ideas in different.. .. I
suppose to sequence them, to put them in the best order I find possible, to
help me to achieve just from small things to, from small things In the
present like work, like everything really, doing much bigger things in the
future, that I'm planning on doing.
Edward: OK. Do you do this by running and re-running the Internal
dialogue, or do you just do it once and say 'that's how it's going to be'?
Steve: Running and rerunning but not too often, you know, I wouldn't run
the loop over and over again, just a few times, and each time I would try to
see or hear ... I would try to become aware of what might be different each
time that I do run the internal dialogue.
Edward: So in rerunning the dialogue a few times, do you have pictures
with it?
Steve: Yeah, yeah ...
Edward: And are they clear pictures or do they change?
Steve: They change, they change as the dialogue changes. They change, or
they might change ... they would have the same theme but In detail It would
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be different, maybe each time or every so often when I'm ... thinking or
talking to myself on the inside.
Edward: And do you find yourself looking in on these pictures or being part
of the picture?
Steve: If it's future I tend to be looking in at the picture, something that's
future events, but seeing myself in the picture, for present things, I
generally, if it' something that's quite close by, I tend, generally, tend to be
doing it internally if you like.
Edward: Just a little extra, do you ever step into your future pictures?
Steve: Often yeah.
Edward: So you like to try them out? And you find that useful?
Steve: I find that very pleasant, mostly, it is useful, well, it would be wrong
of me to say it's useful until I've actually attempted to do what I'm doing in
real life, in real life, you know at the present time if you like or at the future
present time. I won't know fully if it's useful until I've tried it out, but it
certainly is useful in so far as it makes me feel like, like going forward, it's a
motivator, it's a motivator.
Edward: OK. Could we say it gives you confidence?
Steve: It, yeah, it gives me confidence even though I generally have quite a
lot of confidence but this gives me a different type of confidence, you know,
I would view confidence as being able to communicate with people, as being
... having knowledge and being able to use that knowledge, but It's the
confidence that I get from stepping into pictures of future events a sense of
excitement and apprehension and things like that, It's more or a rush than a
sense of confidence I suppose really, almost like a surge of adrenaline if you
will.
Edward: Right, so you get feelings with this then. Before you did the NLP
were you aware of all these different feelings you had when you thought
about future events.
Steve: Yeah, I would have been, it would depend, at certain times I would
have been, I do a lot of meditation so when I'm meditating I would be very
mindful of my thoughts and where they are, and the thing about meditation
is as I've explained is that I spend most of my time trying to forget about
them. (laugh) or trying to calm them down or trying to ignore them, if you
like you know, but I would have been aware of before, but I wouldn't have
known why I was aware, If you know what I mean, I wouldn't have
understood the process, the process of it.
Edward: It's interesting because NLPallows you to actually look at these
thoughts and be aware of them and see the process that goes on. Do you
find now that you can meditate perhaps better than before?
Steve: I certainly have become more, I suppose I've meditated for about
ten years on and off, I can't say every day, but I do try every day, but I
suppose I would feel more comfortable in the practice now than I did
before. I tend to forget about the aches and pains and sort of... the
thoughts don't bother me as much. My mind seems calmer anyway. When
I'm meditating which is a very calm time for me ...
Edward: One of the interesting things about NLP, I'm not sure if you've
come across this, is it teaches us that we can sort of make deals with our
body. So if you've got aches and pains, If you've got things rushing through
your head at that time that you don't want to deal this, it allows you to
make a deal with your body endsay OK let's put this aside, but I will come
back and deal with it. Are you aware of that side?
Steve: Yeah I am, I think I didn't hear about through NLP, but I have been
discovering it since I did the course, I mean I hadn't. .. I suppose in the past
I would have been, there would have been situations where I was able to
fool my body or to instruct my body not to feel pain or not to feel such and
such a way at a particular time, but I would have found it a lot more
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difficult then ... or that I'm beginning to, I'm finding it a lot easier to change
my states really, either like emotionally or physiologically, I'm just finding it
a lot easier to switch between the two.
Edward: So do you maybe find that NLPjoins together with all these other
things that you've done in the past, you meditate ... ?
Steve: I think so yes.
Edward: Rather than it standing on its own.
Steve: No, no it's very much integrated really, and as I was telling Jane in
her last interview, she was asking me about ... actually she wasn't asking
me, I was telling her how I was organising my NLP and it seems that
everything internally that I'm organising has been based on how I organise
the NLP because I found that so useful and good for easy accessing ... and I
think that I've integrated an awful lot internally, you know, and these things
are all becoming, everything's becoming linked, but it's not around NLP, it's
just around ... I mean ... it's just another number on the clock face really.
Edward: That's a nice metaphor, yes. It's amazing how many we use. OK.
Let's just move back to the course itself. You've obviously done many
different types of courses to get where you are today. Did you find this
course in any way different to courses you've done before?
Steve: Yeah, I found it a lot more enjoyable because I think it was a lot
more stimulating ... in many different ways. I must say I found the day I did
with Graham Betts-Symonds, it was fantastic because it was such a holistic
approach to learning, to understanding, and I think that the NLPcourse had
great similarities, I love doing group work, I love doing practising new skills,
and I love being able to practice them there and then rather than having to
wait like if I was doing ... you know, if I was studying nursing, you learn
about injections before you get to give them and it's just so different, it's
just so different, I wouldn't have had the same enthusiasm for other
courses that I have had for the NLP because of, because of it's nature really.
Edward: Graham Betts Symonds's course ... you went on the afternoon
session, was very much, in the way we did it, to do with chaos and different
types of learning and whether you learn in it, so this obviously, you brought
this with you Into the NLP course. The way the NLPcourse is set up Is quite
different in as much as it does have a structure that is probably you were of
that there was a structure there rather than what we did with GBS, but
looking at the way the NLP course, was there anything specifically that you
see in it that was different from what you're used to in the past that you
found was more useful compared with ways you've learned in the past.
Steve: (Pauses) .... In comparison with certain things I mean, yeah. I tend
to learn very very well if it's a practical theoretical mixture conducted as I
say, at that time, I suppose in comparison to say when I was a school when
it was all theoretical, and I went to a school which was very academic so we
didn't have science pracs or any of that, we had books and that was it, and
we had Latin and we had history and crap like that but the I think the way
that Jane taught the course was very stimulating, was very It was at
times very very draining, emotionally and psychologically draining because
of all the Ericksonian type magic she was using, she was weaving around
the place, em, at times I felt that I wasn't learning anything, but I was
surprised that when I went home, that I'd look over the book, I'd look over
the manual and kind of go oop, there it is, I know that! So I must say that
while I wouldn't have been aware of how much I was learning, I learnt a lot,
an awful lot more than the things I've done in the past you know that I
would have learnt. And I mean it seemed effortless, effortless. (laughter)
Edward: That's one of those phonological ambiguities. So If you look at the
way you learnt from before the kind of way you used to learning, we all
remember sitting in the classrooms studying, you've got to pass exams, and
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taking that and how you applied yourself in order to learn in that situation.
Do you think the way in which you can now learn has changed?
Steve: Absolutely. Yes. I believe that now I don't have ... I suppose before I
had a fear of sitting down, studying and stuff like this because I felt that
maybe it was a waste of time when I could have used that time to do
something practical, and I would have been afraid that the outcome
wouldn't have been as desirable as I want it, that fear has gone, and now I
believe that within certain limits that I can learn just about everything ...
anything really, well maybe I couldn't learn anything, everything, but I'd be
willing to give it a go, and I think that I would use as much of a model of
NLPor how Jane managed to teach us, I would apply that to any new
methods of learning or parts of it. It might not all be useful, but certain
parts of it I would use.
Edward: OK. And do you see a use for these new skills when you are
teaching people?
Steve: Yes I do.
Edward: in what way?
Steve: Well I must, I agree with the statement that not everybody learns on
one representational system, and that's a thing I would not have been
aware of before. So now I would integrate that if I was teaching people
something, as well as using things like metaphors and past experience of
my own and of other peoples, I think they are very very benefiCial for
different people. If I was confident enough to assess how best another
person might learn.
Edward: You said earlier that you would have limits to perhaps either how
you learn or what you would be able to learn. What do you mean by limits?
Steve: I think (laughs) may be I don't! I suppose, I mean I do believe that
there are certain things that I will not be able to learn, I don't believe I'll be
able to learn, emm how to build a nuclear reactor. Nuclear physics was
never my thing. I mean I'm aware of nuclear physics but I don't believe I'll
ever become competent in learning them, I don't know why that is, I've
never tried to learn nuclear phvstcs but I mean it's just a belief that I have,
you know (laughs) a belief that I need to address! Sorry Jane!
Edward: Well that's an interesting thing, because nuclear physics is an
interesting point to bring up as something that you perceive as being out of
your reach anyway, or for where you see yourself going.
Steve: As well as that I suppose it's not just out of my reach, it's something
I don't really desire to do, or desire to learn.
Edward: So what I would say here is it that you're putting a belief on to
something because its not within your environment as somethlnq that you
desire, or is it really setting to you that you believe 'well I couldn't do that
so I wouldn't do that'.
Steve: No I suppose it's about the environment, it really is... I suppose if I
put my mind to it I could, I could, yeah I could ... I hope there are jobs in
Thorpe when I go back, I hope Thorpe's stili there. Yeah, there are limits
when I haven't discovered, when I haven't discovered .... No, what I'm
trying to say is I believe I've got limits until I've tried something I don't
know if I've got limits, If I'm limited or not.
Edward: OK
Steve: It's something that I'm future pacing or, but on beliefs I suppose,
I'm not a strong believer in the fact that I have limits like, but it is a
limiting belief.
Edward: how do you set those limits?
Steve: Lack of knowledge I think Is one thing, lack of practice ... I suppose
other people's beliefs about my capabilities would have been an influencing
factor, like if a teacher at school ... a very common example, If a teacher at
school told me that I was doing' maths, meaning the ordinary level and not
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honours, I would consider myself not capable of doing ... I would have
considered myself not capable of doing honours maths. Now I'm twenty
eight I look back on the honours maths course and I can do it in my head, I
can't believe that I ... I just can't believe it, you know, because I had a
limiting belief that was set by somebody else actually, you know.
Edward: OK so you're able now with your NLP to see that it's not your
limiting belief, it was somebody else's imposed on you.
Steve: Very much so yea, in many, in many many areas.
Edward: It's interesting that society gives us boundaries that so many
people maintain, they never step outside the boundaries that have been set
by other people, and NLP gives us a way to see round these boundaries and
then break them. OK. If we just move on a little bit more. It's interesting
because we've just touched on beliefs and what I'd like to know now is have
any of your beliefs changed.
Steve: Yes, some have, some have. We've discussed one there. I suppose ...
many many have ... what am I trying to say here... yeah many have but
not to a great extent you know, They may have. Maybe one or two beliefs
have changed. One or two have sort of wavered. I wouldn't say there have
been too many changes but there have been some.
Edward: I mean you're aware that the course was not designed to change
your beliefs or change your ideas, this is some would say a benefit, some
would say a flaw of NLP. What it does is it allows you to look at your beliefs
when you feel comfortable with them and see if you can change those
beliefs. Now what I would ask Are those beliefs that have changed that you
are aware of, how have they changed?
Steve: I suppose ... it's in sub-modalities that they've changed. I see
pictures and have feelings about things that have changed from how I did
before, how I viewed them and felt about them before. But the changes in
beliefs have been generative really. They haven't ... like they have been
positive as well. They've generated new beliefs, I suppose that's probably
more than changing, they have generated new beliefs, or NLP has
generated new beliefs for me and it's been linked with old beliefs, to be
honest I'm not a hundred percent sure which way it is. Excuse me ... the ...
I think that's the main one that's change. I think it's the main one.
Edward: So what kind of directions it's moved you in?
Steve: Its sort of ... sort of fanned me out in a forward direction If you like,
it's more a sixty degree angle in a forward way, and I'm tending to bounce
back and forth, sort of along path, if you like, path, picking up something
new from each path as I go along.
Edward: So how does this compare to before you did the course?
Steve: I think before I was sort of slowly sauntering along one path.
Edward: Really!
Steve: Yeah.
Edward: So perhaps this made you more aware of the different choices you
have?
Steve: Yes, absolutely but I think before when I was sauntering along the
path the things I could have done were like Billboards along the side of the
road that I looked at as I passed them and they fade away for some of them
would have been filed away for later, but now I have an array of pictures in
front of me and bright colours, and when I close my eyes and think of the
future, this is what I see, lots and lots and lots of different pictures. I don't
ever believe that I can achieve all of them because I just don't have enough
time, some of them are unachievable, I know that, but ... you're going to
ask me how I know this now, I just know. (laughs)
Edward: No, I was going to say, OK at the moment you might say that
some of them are unachievable. But perhaps It's not that they're
unachievable, perhaps it that at the moment you don't see that as being
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Steve: Oh yeah I do, I do, and I find it a lot more comfortable and safe to
do now than I would have before, not that I would be ... not that I would be
a very anxious person or anything, but I'd be aware of where I need to ... I
suppose I would be aware of where I need to, what am I trying to say, the
word ... linguistics? No. language? No. The word? I suppose I'm more careful
at how I go about it, I would chose the times that I want to deal with things
more carefully so that I'm at my optimum for dealing with it, you know, not
that I mean there ... because of NLPand because of the re-framing, and
being aware of changing sub-modalities and that, it has become a lot less
sinister if you want to .... A lot more enjoyable because, because one thing I
like doing is playing with my computer, and what I love about it is the fact
that whatever you do, you can go back and look at it, and you can change
it, and this was something I wasn't aware of you could do with the human
mind, and since I've learnt that I play more with my mind than I do with
the computer, you know, which isn't very good for (indistinct) purposes ...
expect from computer ... it's really fast, but that's my brain, it's the same,
but I, yes, there's definitely, I suppose that's a change that I wouldn't have
been aware of, but I'll probably be aware of it in my own way but not
always in consciousness, I would say.
Edward: Is it fair to say that may be you, though it's not maybe not an
attractive time of your life to look back at, you can now see things in that
time of your life that are attractive to you and that you can maybe take
those out of the rest of it and use those resources that were there and be
aware that it wasn't all that bad.
Steve: Yes. I would find myself saying that a lot actually. It wasn't all that
bad and it could have been a lot worse, but it wasn't, that's the thing, and
in many ways I suppose I think it's great to be able to have the opportunity
to do that, you know, whereas I wouldn't have been aware that there was
that opportunity before.
Edward: Well at the moment taking this is that we all tend to look at what's
happening to us now, and as you say, you look towards the future, do you
find this has maybe changed the way you can now look at what's happening
to you now and in the future, because often things that happen In the past
do affect how we are now, and you can come across situations that will
remind you of past events, and those situations will then automatically
cause a repulsion to you, 'God no I don't want to deal with that sort of
thing.'! Do you find that now that's changed at all?
Steve: I'm not sure I've experienced it, since now on the course I haven't
really experienced anything, anything so I couldn't speak further for the
present, but for the future I believe that I could handle things a lot better,
not merely a lot better but with a lot more confidence, a lot more ease. I'm
sure I'll mess things up as well like, but you know, the thing Is, with the
resources from the past experiences that would be considered negative or
yucky, ... yeah I think if similar developments happen in the future at least I
have the options of looking at them better, you know. I don't think that
anything would startle me or shock me in those kind of things you know,
not that they don't anyway, ... I don't get upset very easily anyway you
know. Because if I feel... It's part of my Identity. I'm a person whose, who I
believe is very very strong, very hard, not easy to faze, and I don't get
upset easy, easily, ... and that's great, that's what gives me my external
confidence, the fact that internally I believe that nothing can harm me,
except perhaps a nine millimetre bullet. (laughs)
Edward: Well, there are things that you really don't have a lot of control
over. But putting that aside, the nine millimetre bullet, there's probably one
waiting for all of us somewhere in one form or another, it's another
metaphor, something waiting to jump up. So however it doesn't have to be
connected to past events. If something suddenly jumps out at you In the
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near future, do you find that NLP, along with all the other things that you
have, the meditation and all the other things you've found useful for you,
gives you possibility to sort your way through these things better.
Steve: With NLP, yeah, I believe that I will get through things easier, I don't
know how much better, but easier.
Edward: So there is the possibility that you can sort things or deal with
things much easier than ...
(tape turn)
Steve: I found myself 'toting' towards desired state more than I used to
before. To ... as many people do, I've tended to do things for shying away
from things that repulsed me, to avoid pain more than anything, that I
suppose was one of my chief motivators, was doing something in order to
avoid pain or disappointment or hurt, or, you know, all the other wonderful
things that go with it ... and I found myself checking out the future more
than going back into the past, I suppose, yeah, I suppose previously the
NLPcourse, I used to tote to a lot of past experiences, and not to the
resources of those past experiences, but no I've found myself going really,
using the desired state, or even parts along the path for getting to the
desired state for my toting really.
Edward: OK. What I'd like to do, this is coming to the end now, what I'd like
to do is just have a picture, just before you started the NLPcourse, all that
time back so you can see yourself in that picture maybe.
Steve: I can't at the moment. I'm aware of it, but ... (indistinct) yeah, OK,
yeah I can see myself.
Edward: What I'd like you to do is to now is next to that picture I'd like you
to see another picture of where you are now that you've been through
before and you're taking all those learning experiences with you
Steve: Mh mh ...
Edward: Can you see any differences in those pictures?
Steve: Yeah.... well, the first one is smaller and framed, and the second is
bigger and has a fade out frame just as it goes out of my line of vision,
actually I see things clearer with my glasses on, even Internally, bizarre,
(laughs) oh my God, It's bizarre to discover that now, but em ... yeah, the
picture of before the course is framed, there's a very sort of anxious looking
me in the picture, whereas in the other its a brighter picture ... more, I don't
know, more content or something. Yeah, much ... I suppose in the second
picture I look much more content .... I don't look any different, maybe a few
weeks older, that's about it, but I think the picture after the course is
brighter, and it is a bit more vibrant in colour as well, or is it? ... (indistinct.)
I think those are the main changes. Both are still pictures. In one I'm on my
own and in the other I'm with a bunch of people.
Edward: Your'e on your own in the ... ?
Steve: In the first one, the pre course one. Obviously I know all the people
there, and I'm sure you do too.
Edward: OK, If you can just look at yourself in the two pictures, are you
seeing any significant changes?
Steve: In one my facial feature's aren't so pleasant, in the other they're
much much more happier, smiling. My eyes look brighter for some reason.
Edward: And this is in which picture?
Steve: In the second picture.
Edward: OK.
Steve: They look brighter but they look wider in the first picture. Yeah... ,
Edward: See any differences in the person?
Steve: Physical changes or the way the person is responding or how the
person feels? There's definitely, I mean I'm feeling that now, there's a...my
stomach ... there's a definite change in the feeling, emm, I think I've used
the words before, confident .... I definitely feel more confident in the second
448
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picture, I'm much more knowledgeable as well, I'm much more capable. But
I suppose in the second picture I'm not particularly aware of what I'm
knowledgeable or capable of. That's the strange thing, you know, it doesn't
make ... it doesn't make a whole lot of sense in some ways, but it does
because I know what it means.
Edward: That's good. Anything else you'd like to comment on?
Steve: No, I think I ." the main changes. I'll probably go home and now
and in ten minutes 'oh I meant to say that!'
Edward: That's OK. Are you aware of these changes and the benefits you've
gained from it, and the different resources you've gained and also the
things that you're stili not aware of that are in there bouncing around in
your head, just know that you can use these whenever you want, and they
will be there whenever you need them, when you want them, they'll
suddenly go 'ah yeah, all these different things. OK. That's the end of the
interview. The last thing I'd like to ask you Is do you have any comments
about the course itself?
Steve: I must say I thoroughly enjoyed the course I found it very very
stimulating, very Interesting and a great start for what I hope to be a very
informative area of study for me, you know. You know, I suppose a lot of
people, from what I've heard them say, you know, they've come out, and
they want to be therapists, they want to be this that and the other, and for
me that's what I thought as well during the course, but now I prefer NLPas
a private tool for myself, and I don't want to go out and be Paul McKenna or
Michael Breen or any of these people. I don't even want to be Richard
Bandler. I did the course, like, you know, it was quite you know, ... it was a
bit short for my liking in so far as I was away on holiday for two of the
weeks, pain in the ass, am I allowed to say that (laughs) yeah, it was very
very interesting and very enjoyable, I must say, and for some reason, I
don't know exactly why, I feel It to be of incredible value to me, and I know
It will be continue to grow whether I want it to or not. Yeah, It was good.
Yeah I really enjoyed it.
Edward: Is there anything you think we could change on the course to
maybe Improve It or make things clearer for people?
Steve: I think that maybe ... I think that maybe the likes of the TOTE and
the SCOREmodel and that, that they could be brought in a little bit closer,
or a little bit forward maybe and ... maybe the conclusion of the course be a
bit more refreshing than it was, I would like to have had the opportunity,
no, I would like there to have been a direction where the class was ... not ...
yeah, I suppose, would have reviews in a bit more depth maybe, what we've
covered in the course, just over maybe one or two days, not in depth, just a
little bit ... (bleep) I think those, that's the main thing, otherwise I found
the course quite professional, quite good.
Edward: Any last comments?
Steve: No, thanks for the interview.
Edward: Thanks for your time and we're glad you enjoyed It. Switch this off.
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Appendix 5. 1 Bandler and Grinder's Metamodel of Language.
Bandler and Grinder identified three universal processes that occurred when experience
was translated from the deep structure of internal sensory representation into the surface
structure of language. These are deletion, or where detail is missing, generalisations, or
statements giving information about the scope of the information, and distortions, which
involve making connections between different levels of abstractions.
• Deletions, or statements where detail is missing
Simple Deletion (Information about Detail)
A deletion is a statement with insufficient detail, or missing information.
Example "I am uncomfortable" or "I don't understand".
Recovering the missing information is by questions such as
''About what? About whom? Uncomfortable about what?"
The predicted result of this type of response is that the missing information can be
recovered and a fuller description gathered. There are a number of different kinds of
deletions.
Comparative deletion
A comparative deletion is where the standard of comparison is missing. The key words to
such statements are better, worse, more/less, greater, lesser, happier, sadder.
Example. "She's a better person, He's a worse player"The responses which would recover
the missing standard of comparison are questions such as:
"Better than whom? Who says? Worse than what? How do you know?
These kinds of deletions are so called because they involve making a comparison. It is as if
the person using these words has to have some sort of internal scale or standard against
which to compare their experience so as to arrive at their judgement. The questions that
recover deleted information must also recover some of the processes by which the
judgement has been made.
Lack of referential index.
This is typified by the presence of an unidentified pronoun.
Example: They don't listen to me, or that doesn't matter
The response to identify the non-specific pronoun could be
Who, specifically, doesn't listen? What, specifically, doesn't matter?
1 This is an extract from one of my training manuals. The information was derived from
Bandler and Grinder (1975).
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Unspecified verbs
These are verbs in sentences that delete the specifics of how something happened,
where it happened, and when it happened.
Example. She rejected me, or he left me,
The response to this pattern is to recover the specific information about the
experience, for instance:
How did she reject you? Where did he leave you? How do you know? What do you
mean by leave?
Nominalisations
How often have you heard people say "I want a relationship", or "Justice must be
done." The words 'relationship', and 'justice', belong to a group of words called
nominalisations. They are words that are abstract, yet we talk about them as if
they were 'real', almost as if they were three-dimensional.
However they do not relate to anything that has a concrete existence. Rather they
are verbs made into nouns (like things or events), thus deleting the process or
action of the original verb form. They are a very interesting group of deletions,
because they act as if they change what was originally a process into what is then
thought about as a product. We can say that they digitalize what was originally an
analogue process.
Examples.
My relationship is going well
I want recognition,
We must improve our communication.
Here the words relationship, recognition, communication are nouns which
presuppose that they have an independent existence external to the subject. They
also imply that they can be possessed, rather as one does a house or a car.
The questioning here needs to re-establish the noun as a verb, that is, to rediscover
the process or the activity that the nominalisation disguises, thus:
What would people be recognising? How would you be communicating? How would
you be relating?
• Generalisations
Human speech contains messages about the application of their contents. The more
generalised or abstract information becomes, the more it implies that what is being
said is universally applicable. Quantifiers are a group of words that indicate the
conceptual scope of the application of the content of the statement. They are
generalisations, so they also indicate the degree to which abstraction has taken
place. They are key words that indicate the beliefs of the speaker. They can in their
turn also influence the beliefs of others.
For instance, the remark women are a/ways like that presupposes that what the
speaker believes women to be is universally true, and that there can never be any
exceptions. Similar messages are pre-supposed by words such as never. These
words indicate that the belief is universally applicable. Such universality is also
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implied by statements such as men are better at engineering than women. Here the
universal applications of the statement are conveyed through deletions.
Universal Quantifiers
These are words that imply that the scope of the information is universal, that is,
perceived as always valid.
Examples. She never listens to me!
No one tells me the truth.
Teenagers are always like that.
If you are wanting to challenge the speaker, and uncover the specifics which have
led to the generalisations, then your questions will needs to recover the exceptions,
contradictions, counter-examples and alternative choices, for instance:
Has there ever been a time when she has listened to you?
Are you saying that all your life every single person has lied to you?
Have you ever known a teenager not behave like that?
Limiting Quantifiers
These limit the scope of the information being given. Words such as only, just,
sometimes, occasionally, imply that the applications of the information are limited.
Replacing a universal quantifier with a limiting one can alter meaning.
I never get my sums right.
I sometimes don't get my sums right.
You are always bad tempered.
You are sometimes bad tempered.
Modal Operators. These are important words that inform you about the mode or
approach someone is taking towards an activity.
Hall2 (1989) distinguishes six categories of modal operators.
• Impossibility: impossible, unable to, can't, couldn't, incapable
• Possibility: possible, able to, can, could, might, may
• Capability: can, could, able to, capable of
• Desire: want, wish, hope, would like, choose
• Necessity: necessary, need to, have to, must, should, ought to
• Certainty: am going to, will, am, is, won't.
The most important thing that modal operators tell you is whether the individual
using them is seeing that activity as a possibility or a necessity. People using many
words such as should, got to, have to, can't, must, are driven more by necessity.
Others using words such as want to, may, could, might, are telling you that they
have a choice in the matter, and may therefore experience a greater range of
possibilities.
2 Hall, Christina. (1989) The Language of Change London UK: ITS, 7 Rudall
Crescent, London NW3 iRS. UK.
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Modal operators can also give information about an individual's cause-effect
patterns of thinking. This may be uncovered by questions such as because? or what
will happen if you don't?
It can sometimes be useful to recover the hidden causes behind modal operators.
We do this by recovering the outcomes or consequences of the perceived action. In
this we can recover the hidden causes for the generalisation by using questions
such as:
What would happen if you didn't? Who says you should? What stops you? What
will happen if you do/don't?
• Distortions, the connections in people's maps.
Cause-effect
This is where a sentence indicates that the speaker believes that a specific stimulus
causes or caused a specific response.
Examples
I am depressed because I had an unhappy childhood.
Teenagers are lacking in concentration because of too much television.
His voice irritates me
You're saying that to make me angry.
The response needs to recover the imagined process of the causal connection, thus:
How do you know that is the case? Really? How do you know that? What evidence
is there?
It is also important to identify how an individual perceives him or herself in relation
to an event. Are they at cause or at effect in a particular situation that they talk
about? This can give useful information about whether they perceive themselves to
be in control or not.
Mind reading
Such patterns imply that the speaker somehow 'knows' what a person thinks, feels
and so on.
Examples. You don't like me or He should know that I love him, or I know you are
feeling uncomfortable or She looks very anxious.
The response needs to recover the source of information and establish how the
person arrived at that conclusion. Questions such as How do you know that? What is
your evidence? are useful In this context.
Lost Performatives
These are patterns implying value judgements or opinions in which the source of the
opinion or belief is missing. To use a lost performative, there must have been some
comparison to an unspoken referent. Every time someone uses words such as good,
bad, awful, super, interesting, bOring (some would call these value judgements) he
or she must have used some kind of Internal measure against which to compare the
experience.
Example: It's bad to be inconsistent or Volvo's are best.
Appendix 5. 454
The response is to recover the source of the opinion or the belief strategy operated
by the speaker, by using questions such as:
How do you know it's bad?
According to whom?
Who says?
Complex Equivalence patterns
The structure of complex equivalence is a=b: in other words, a statement such as
making mistakes means I'm a failure, I can't do maths because I'm a woman, or
you can only be a good politician if you care about other people. Words that link
such as means, because, if often denote complex equivalences. This process lies at
the heart of the structure of beliefs, how individuals connect different aspects of
experience, and generalise them to apply to more and more examples.
Being a good wife means always doing the washing up is another example of this
type of connection, where concept a is linked to concept b. Here being a good wife
is related to 'always doing the washing up'.
